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Contemporary discussions regarding ethics in the technological society are obscured by faulty 
presuppositions regarding the answer to one question: is technology neutral or non-neutral? 
The question itself presents a binary that betrays a dimension of human nature that allows for the 
possibility of responsibility within the technological society to exist.  We may presume human 
transcendence over, or contingence to, technology.  In so doing, we either assuage one’s 
conscience of any moral deliberation whatsoever, or inhibit one’s freedom to the point of a 
mindless determinism.  In either occasion, one is left with an easy conscience—an inability to 
attribute evil in the technological society to human conduct. 
 
There are at least two thinkers, Lewis Mumford and Herbert Marcuse, who frame their 
understanding of the question of technological neutrality in a way that diminishes the pitfalls of 
either position.  While Mumford holds that technology is neutral, he is still attentively critical of 
the philosophical presumptions that led to the rise of the technological society.  While Marcuse 
holds that technology is non-neutral, his critique of the technological society does not default to a 
despairing determinism.   
 
However, despite their contributions, both still presume anthropologies that lead them toward the 
same binary that both originally resisted, articulating the human as so transcendent over 
(Mumford) or contingent to (Marcuse) technology that one lacks the tensions necessary to 
establish an uneasy conscience—the recognition that humans are responsible for evil in the 
world.   
 
In response, this thesis will utilize Reinhold Niebuhr’s method of Christian Realism as a way of 
establishing an anthropology upon which responsibility can be maintained, but also as a way of 
housing both Mumford and Marcuse’s critiques of the technological society within an alternative 
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Chapter 1: Prolegomena 
I: Why is the Technological Society a Worthy Topic of Study in the Field of Ethics? 
To ask whether it is the case that the technological society is a worthy topic of study 
within the field of ethics is to ask whether it is the case that technology is “neutral,” and if so, in 
what way?  If the term, “neutral,” is taken to mean “having no effect” (as the field of chemistry 
uses the term), technology is clearly non-neutral, as it is overwhelmingly changing the modern 
landscape and human activity increasingly by the day.  If, however, one is to imply moral or 
ethical neutrality, technological neutrality becomes a highly polarizing question.  Does 
technology have any influence upon how humans behave towards one another?  To judge 
whether it is the case that the technological society is a topic worthy of study in the field of 
ethics, one must first observe the relationship between technology and society: is technology 
ethically neutral (henceforth, simply neutral), and if not, in what way does technology influence 
ethics, political thought, and society?   
 In his book, Critical Theory of Technology, the philosopher of technology, Andrew 
Feenberg, argues convincingly that there are generally three schools of thought that uniquely 
respond to the question of technological neutrality: Instrumental Theory, Substantive Theory, 
and Critical Theory.1  This section will begin by (A) explaining these three types to observe the 
                                               
1 It should be noted that this opening section is heavily dependent upon Andrew Feenberg’s Critical Theory of 
Technology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991) for distinguishing the typologies of Instrumental, 
Substantive, and Critical Theory.  It should be noted that while Feenberg’s work is not the definitive work on each 
respective approach to technology, his original contribution to the study are, according to Douglas Kellner 
(“Feenberg’s Questioning Technology” in Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 18 No. 1, 2001, P. 158) his “analytic 
distinctions” between the differing approaches to the philosophy of technology, which “are useful in clarifying some 
key aspects and dimensions” of the three while analyzed alongside one another.  In her article, “The Relevance of 
Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology to Critical Visual Literacy” (Writing and Communication Vol. 37, No. 3, 
2007. P. 253), Katheryn M. Northcut argues that Feenberg’s work is “underutilized…for its potential clarification of 
large social issues,” and progresses to use his categories as a clarifying basis upon which her work in technological 
communication would develop.  Thus, it should be noted that while Feenberg should be considered the prominent 
voice for differentiating these three philosophies, as the thesis progresses beyond its demonstration of the marked 
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varying approaches to the nature of technology’s bearing upon ethics. Second, this section will 
(B) outline particular challenges unique to the technological society that are of primary concern 
to this thesis.  Finally, this section will (C) close by exploring current Christian scholarship 
regarding the ethics of technology, particularly in relation to the challenges that are of primary 
concern to this thesis. 
A. The Question of Technological Neutrality: Three Types 
1. Instrumental Theory and Technological Neutrality 
 
 The instrumental view is the most widely accepted theory concerning technological 
neutrality.2  In this view, technology is completely neutral and is pure instrument.  This school 
suggests that technology is “familiar and self-evident,” politically indifferent, and has an essence 
of universality in that it can be deployed in any society with the same basic consequences as any 
another. 3  At most, in a social context, technology “…signifies all the intelligent techniques by 
which the energies of nature and [human beings] are directed and used in satisfaction of human 
needs.”4  Similarly, Eric Mullis states, “…iPods, cell phones, microwaves, computers, and 
television sets are just the fruits of intelligent inquiry.” 5  Effectively, technology contains within 
itself no valuative or ethical meaning, but rather, it is the agent who determines its worth—be it 
benevolent or malevolent—regarding how it is used and towards what ends.    
Therefore, for the instrumentalist, the human is the master of one’s technology, and any 
critique of technology begins and ends with how that gadget is used.  It is in this way that the 
                                               
differences between the perspectives, other sources will become more central to laying a more complete foundation 
for each respective school under observation. 
2 Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), P. 5. 
3 Ibid, P. 5, 6 
4 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey, Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), (Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1969-1991), P. 270. 
5 Eric Mullis, “The Device Paradigm: A Consideration for a Deweyan Philosophy of Technology,” Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy Vol. 23 No. 2 (2009), P. 115.  Emphasis added. 
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instrumentalist most often either takes a “use-based” approach to technology or a “design -
based” approach. Regarding the former, instrumentalism asks only whether a given technology 
provides the best “framework” for achieving a certain end.6  Use-based approach asks the 
following types of questions: is it best to use email as the primary means of communicating with 
co-workers? Are humans allowing cellphones to become too much of a distraction?  Should 
people take bicycles or public transit to work?  The onus is entirely placed upon the person using 
the technology, and the technology itself is completely controlled by its user. 
Regarding design-based approach—merely a more teleological form of use-based 
analysis—the instrumentalist sees technology as originating “…with a view to the resolution of 
perceived problems.” 7 This kind of teleological approach to technological critique is 
characterized by one’s potential objection to the ends for which a particular gadget is conceived.  
Feenberg gives the example of reproductive technologies, such as contraception, abortion, or 
“test tube babies,” and, in addition to these, one could also include landmines, chemical 
weapons, or devices created for the sole purpose of physician-assisted suicide.8  The end for 
which these instruments were built may or may not be ethically objectionable, therefore the 
technology itself might be objectionable.  However, it should be noted that this still does not 
attribute value to the neutral instrument, but rather it calls into question the purpose for its 
existence and the person responsible for creating or using it. 
                                               
6 In an essay concerning military technology (“The Technological Culture of War” in Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society Vol. 28 No. 4, August 2008. P. 300), Joelien Pretorius describes the instrumentalist view in 
the following way: “The point is thus to apply the ‘right’ technology to obtain chosen ends…. Instrumentalism only 
asks whether given military technologies offer the best technological framework to enhance security in a specific 
context of objectively given threates.” 
7 Larry A. Hickman, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture: Putting Pragmatism to Work (Bloomington, 
IN, Indiana University Press, 2001), P. 12. Italics his; bold, mine. 
8 Feenberg, P. 6. 
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Regardless of either approach, the instrumentalist may engage in certain “trade-offs” 
where the progress and efficiency of technology is suppressed or abandoned for ethical, 
religious, or environmental purposes.  Feenberg states, “There is a price for the achievement of 
environmental, ethical, or religious goals, and that price must be paid in reduced efficiency.”9  
He continues: “On this account, the technical sphere can be limited by nontechnical values, but 
not transformed by them.”10  In other words, Instrumental Theory suggest that a society cannot 
reach maximum efficiency while also serving society’s moral concerns.  
Finally, Instrumental Theory has an overall tendency to consider technology as a source 
of progress within human development.  The instrumentalist, John Dewey, views the equation as 
relatively simple: “…when the machine age has thus perfected its machinery it will be a means 
of life and not its despotic master,”11 and all that society has to do is rid itself of the antiquated 
“habits” of its culture.12  In other words, the problems of society are not due to technology, but 
rather it is that humanity is “lagging” behind technology in matters of “belief, desire, and 
purpose.” 13  Effectively, ethics simply needs to “catch up” to its technological progress.  
While Instrumental Theory seems quite simple, there is a significant division between 
types of instrumentalists.  Henceforth, these different types of Instrumental theory shall be 
divided using the following terms: (a) “Hard Instrumentalism” and (b) “Soft Instrumentalism.”14  
                                               
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 John Dewey, The Collected Works of John Dewey, P. 350.   
12 For a helpful essay on how Dewey sees the connection between society’s ethical development and technology’s 
progress, see: Geroges Dicker, “John Dewey: Instrumentalism in Social Action,” in Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society Vol. 7 Is. 4 (October 1971), P. 221-232. 
13 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York, NY: Capricorn Books, 1963), P. 58. 
14 The categories of “Hard” and “Soft” instrumentalism are partially modified categories introduced by Niebuhr, in 
his essay, “Two Forms of Utopianism” (in Christianity and Society Vol. 12 No. 4, Autumn 1947. P. 6) to fit the 
school of Instrumental Theory.  Niebuhr differentiates “hard” and “soft” in terms of utopianism in the following 
way: “Hard utopianism might be defined as the creed of those who claim to ebody the perfect community and who 
therefore feel themselves morally justified in using every instrument of guile or force against those who oppose their 
assumed perfection.  Soft utopianism is the creed of those who do not claim to embody perfection, but expect 
perfection to emerge out of the ongoing process of history.”  In a similar way, Hard Instrumental Theory is defined 
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The difference between the two will be expounded upon in this section, but one can suffice to 
say that the two disagree only on the degree by which humans are uniquely influenced by a 
society which is technological.  Both view the gadgets themselves as neutral, but for the “soft 
instrumentalists,” the modern technological society carries with it a kind of thinking that is, on 
the one hand, necessary for the existence of such a technological society, and yet on the other 
hand, potentially detrimental to the human condition and culture.  In other words, Soft 
Instrumentalism sees technology as neutral, but they do not see the technological society as 
neutral, while hard instrumentalists see both as harmless. 
(a) Hard Instrumental Theory 
A good example of Hard Instrumental Theory can be found in the work of Walter 
Marshall Horton.15  Horton claims that the potential problem of technology within socio-ethical 
dimensions is “nonsense” and that “…no very heroic measures are needed in order to put 
[technology] back in [its] place,” that humans must only develop a “sense of humor and 
proportion” to “laugh [technology] back into its rightful place.”16  Horton reasons that 
                                               
as those who are already in right standing with technology, and use of technology as instruments has no negative 
bearing on society.  Soft Instrumental Theory shall therefore be defined as those who are not in right standing with 
technology, but through processes of history or a proper rational orientation towards technology, such right standing 
will be achieved.   
15 While Horton is unique in that his interpretation emerged contemporaneously with the other thinkers examined in 
this thesis, there are numerous examples of Hard Instrumental Theory.  See: Simon Ramo, Century of Mismatch 
(Philadelphia, PA, D. McKay Publishers, 1970. P. vi); Melvin Kranzberg, Technology in Western Civilization (vol. 
II, New York, NY, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. P. 705); Peter Drucker, “Technological Trends in the Twentieth 
Century” (in Technology in Western Civilization, vol. II, M. Kranzberg and C. Pursell. eds., New York, NY, Oxford 
University Press, 1967. P. 32); Samuel Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering (2nd Edition, New York, 
NY, St. Martin’s Publishing, 1994. P. 61).  Perhaps John Dewey is a better representative than Horton, but there are 
some who would question this categorization.  For a good explanation of these doubts, see: Phillip Dean, 
“Dialectical vs. Experimental Method: Marcuse’s Review of Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” (in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 46 No. 2, 2011. P. 242). 
16 Walter Marshall Horton, Can Christianity Save Civilization? (New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1940), P. 
185-187. 
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technology is simply a “highly developed tool” and that this “essentially simple problem has 
become artificially complicated.”17   
 Despite his confidence in humanity’s handle on such a “simple problem,” Horton 
curiously seems grateful that humans have figured out how to control technology.  He states, 
“Fortunately, the development of machinery itself is now favoring its due subordination to 
human uses.”18 Horton points to the technological progress from the early Industrial Revolution 
to his current place in history19 as proof that technology has a kind of self-correcting feature.20  
Ultimately, for Horton, the problem is not nearly as bleak as the “tearful moralists” make it out 
to be; in fact, it’s barely worth discussing.21 
(b) Soft Instrumental Theory 
While there are those Instrumentalists like Horton who seem to “laugh” at the possibility 
of techno-ethical problems, there are other Instrumentalists who take a more sobering view of 
technology, all the while still reducing it to a mere tool that humans are capable of correcting.  
An example of this “soft” form of Instrumentalism is found in the work of Lewis Mumford.  
Mumford understands the perilous possibilities that technology wields, 22 especially through his 
argument that technological systems are imposed upon individuals within society—that society 
itself is reduced to a “machine” through an appropriation of the human being—by either the 
systemic abuses of those who he calls “Prime Movers,”23 or by the willful acceptance of a 
particular social order.24  Mumford maintains that the same kind of thinking—he calls 
                                               
17 Ibid, P. 183-184. 
18 Ibid, P. 186. 
19 Horton’s Can Christianity Save Civilization? was published in 1940. 
20 Ibid, P. 186. 
21 Ibid, P. 187. 
22 TAC, P. 4. 
23 MOM, P. 163.  “Prime Movers” are those in power who control the mechanized society. 
24 In POP (P. 330), Mumford calls such a willful acceptance of the social structure a “bribe.”   
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“mechanistic thinking,” a product of a kind of religious “myth of the machine”—that creates a 
hyper technological society simultaneously creates a social structure which is detrimental to 
humankind. 25   
 However, Mumford ultimately sees technology as a neutral entity that can be rescued by 
a “reorientation” towards a more “organic” mode of social organization, construction, and 
utilization;26  essentially, he seeks to refuse the predominant ordering structure of the 
technological society and seeks to establish natural, or more “organic” goals in its place.  This is 
where Feenberg’s earlier description of a “trade-off” takes place for Mumford, though its 
implications run deeper than simply riding a bike instead of driving a car.27  In Mumford’s view, 
technology has serious implications as a conduit through which power controls and the human is 
appropriated, and therefore argues that the redemption of technology can only take place through 
various cultural, philosophical, and economic shifts that will result in the more organic, 
technologically “scaled-back” version of society he seeks to deploy. 28 
(c) Instrumental Theory Conclusion 
 In the case of both Horton and Mumford, technology—no matter how docile or dominant 
it appears within its current context of history—can eventually be conquered.  Mumford states, 
“The old machines will in part die out, as the great saurian died out, to be replaced by smaller, 
faster, brainer, and more adaptable organisms, adapted not to the mine, the battlefield and the 
factory, but to the positive environment of life.”29  Despite its potential perils, Mumford, Horton, 
                                               
25 A fuller explanation of the technological society structure will come in Chapter 5. 
26 For more information on “reorientation” and “organic” ideology, see TAC, P. 364-367.  More on this will be 
covered in concert with the forthcoming chapters on Lewis Mumford. 
27 Feenberg, P. 6. 
28 TAC, P. 125 
29 Ibid, P. 428. 
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and the Instrumentalists view technology simply as a tool that, at worst, must be refashioned and 
reoriented in society for correct use. 
 If it is the case that technology is simply a gadget that exists independently of human 
beings, as Horton affirms—that it has no bearing upon social, political, or ethical concerns—then 
the technological society is hardly worth studying within the field of ethics, outside of how best 
to use an instrument and within which context.  However, if the technological society is—as 
Mumford argues—a willful acceptance of a given social structure which imitates that of a 
machine, certain questions should indeed be examined within an ethical framework.  Even if the 
instruments themselves carry no ethical value, there is an apparent social dimension Mumford 
observes that exists concomitantly with the technological society that is negatively affecting 
individuals and culture.  Therefore, such a view presses the observer to analyze the extent to 
which the technological society’s conceptual structure is impacting the way humans live and act. 
2. Substantive Theory and Technological Neutrality 
 
 Unlike Instrumental Theory, Substantive theory denies the neutrality of technology.  
While this view is certainly a minority among theorists,30 its most prominent adherents—Martin 
Heidegger and Jacques Ellul—are nonetheless prolific voices within philosophical, theological, 
and political circles. This section will investigate these two thinkers to determine if either is 





                                               
30 Feenberg, P. 7. 
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(a) Martin Heidegger – The First Substantive Theorist 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Horton, Heidegger not only argues against 
technological neutrality, but claims that ignoring technology’s implications—treating it as 
neutral—would be a grave mistake.31  Heidegger states: 
 Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it.  But 
 we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this 
 conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of 
 technology.32 
Heidegger argues that the sheer essence of modern technology houses within it a function of 
dominance that ends even with the domination of its creator: humankind.   
 At its core, Heidegger claims that technology is a “challenging forth” (Herausfordern)33 
and “setting-upon” (Stellen)34 of nature; essentially one wields nature to one’s own purposes 
through construction, organization, and exploitation.  Heidegger sees that the greatest threat that 
this “challenging forth” and “setting-upon” poses to humankind is the transformation of nature—
including human beings—into what he calls “standing-reserve” (Bestand);35 essentially a state 
where the “truth” of the object—be it a plant, animal, or even a human—is “concealed,” and the 
thing exists entirely for the purposes of exploitation.36 
The human, Heidegger argues, becomes swallowed up into its own “standing-reserve.” 
He states, “Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies 
of nature can this ordering revealing happen.  If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does 
                                               
31 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (translated by William Lovitt, New 
York, NY: Harper & Row, 1977), P. 4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Herausfordern – to challenge, to call forth or summon to action, to demand positively, to provoke.  Heidegger,  P. 
14 fn. 
34 Stellen – “to put in place, to order, to arrange, to furnish or supply, and, in a military context, to challenge or 
engage.”  Heidegger, P. 15 fn. 
35 Bestand – “Standing by, waiting for use.”  Heidegger, P. 17 fn. 
36 Ibid, P. 17. 
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not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?”37  
Essentially, by its very process, the action of ordering and demystifying nature is necessarily wed 
to ordering and demystifying the human who orders; the very pursuit of ordering nature is a 
result of an already-ordered individual.  This cognitive ordering, of which Heidegger calls 
“enframing,” is essentially an epistemology that “challenges-forth” or enslaves nature38 simply 
through the process of creating a new mechanical framework of understanding the world.39  
Ultimately, enframing is the cognitive process of seeing both the world and the self as standing-
reserve.40 
 The real power of Heidegger’s work is found in his recognition of technology, not merely 
as a thing or noun that exists independently from humans like Horton argues, but rather as a 
verb; technology is something humans are actively doing.  In fact, Heidegger argues that 
understanding technology as mere instrument is precisely the problem.  He states, “So long as we 
represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it.  We press on 
past the essence of technology.”41  Essentially, technology is not an instrument; it is an ethic—
something humans do.  Placing technology within this category gives it immediate ethical, 
social, and political significance.   
                                               
37 Ibid. P. 18. 
38 In his book, The Gods and Technology (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2006. P. 71), Heideggerian scholar, 
Richard Rojcewicz, argues that Heidegger’s understanding of “challenging” could hold within it a double meaning 
that alludes to ancient forms of slavery—that technology is effectively the enslavement of nature.  He states, “For 
Heidegger, not only is modern technology a challenging, it is a dishonourable one; nature is given no chance to 
defend itself and is instead forced to give satisfaction.” 
39 Ge-stell – “a framework of calling-forth, a challenging claim…that ‘gathers’ so as to reveal.” Heidegger, P. 19 fn. 
40 In “Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, technology, and the poietic attunement of literature” 
(Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2012: P. 506), J.M. Magrini states, “Enframing…is always 
already at work coloring the way the world reveals itself, and this includes…the ways in which we envision our 
selfhood through our interpersonal dealings with others…. Viewing existence through the lens of Enframing, we are 
driven to quantify our entire existence…” 
41 Heidegger, P. 18. 
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 In the earlier stages of his writing, namely, The Question Concerning Technology, 
Heidegger has a more hopeful approach to this problem.  He states, “Thus the coming to 
presence of technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving 
power.”42  However, shortly before his death, Heidegger forebodingly declares, “Only a god can 
save us now,”43 implying the deterministic essence of technology and, ultimately, its hidden 
malevolent fate. 
(b) Jacques Ellul – Technological Autonomy 
 Jacques Ellul, the second prominent Substantive theorist, is especially fatalistic in his 
articulation of technology from the outset.  He states: 
 …technology ultimately depends only on itself, it maps its own route, it is a prime and not a secondary 
 factor, it must be regarded as an ‘organism’ tending toward closure and self-determination: it is an end in 
 itself.  Autonomy is the very condition of technological development.44 
 
It is important to note that Ellul does not say that technology as an instrument is autonomous—
how a clock or a windmill runs on its own—but rather that technological development is 
autonomous.45  Ellul’s analysis of technology is that there is another dimension, which he calls 
“technique,” that comprises the whole of culture and technological development within it.46  To 
                                               
42 Ibid, P. 32. 
43 From an interview with Der Spiegel, “Only a God can Save Us Now” (translated by D. Schendler, Graduate 
Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, Winter 1977). 
44 Jacques Ellul, The Technological System (translated by Joachim Neugroschel, New York, NY, Continuum 
Publishing, 1980), P. 125. 
45 Lawrence Agbemabiese and John Byrne describe a rather horrifying example of Ellul’s technological autonomy, 
as the imposition of technique, he argues, ravaged the newly liberated Ghana.  They argue that technologizing a 
postcolonial, developing country like Ghana creates new problems that only technology can solve, thus further 
entrenching the country within the technological system.  In their article, “Commodification of Ghana’s Volta River: 
An Example of Ellul’s Autonomy of Technique” (Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
February 2005. P. 17), They state, “Ghanaians are today living—and suffering—from the fact that the magnitude 
and complexity of problems created by the VRP [Volta River Project] and similar modernist projects tend to exceed 
the capacity of its specialists to solve…. In this respect, Ghana’s energy fiasco, unfortunately, illustrates an alarming 
detail the Ellulian problem of autonomous technique.” 
46 Ellul: “Technique is the complex and complete milieu in which human beings must live, and in relation to which 
they must define themselves.  It is a universal mediator, producing a generalised mediation, totalizing and aspiring 
to totality.” (“The Search for Ethics in a Technicist Society,” in Research in Philosophy and Technology, 1989. P. 
23) 
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Ellul, technique is all-encompassing and “omnivorous,”47 consuming society piece by piece.  He 
states, “What we are witnessing at the moment is a rearrangement of the world in an intermediate 
stage; the change is not in the use of natural force but in the application of technique to all 
spheres of life.”48  Similar to Heidegger’s enframing, for Ellul, technique is the epistemological 
process of turning society itself into a machine – “systematization, unification, and 
clarification…applied to everything.”49 
 In Ellul’s form of Substantive Theory, humans, science, politics, economics, and culture 
have all become absorbed into technique.  Not only is technology far from neutral, it is actively 
pursuing everything to specialize and systematize—turning everything into a gear in the 
machine.  Ellul states, “We can be confident that the final result will be that technique will 
assimilate everything to the machine.”  This is seemingly the end result of Heidegger’s thought: 
humans have become “standing-reserve.”  Ellul concludes this sentiment by stating: 
But when technique enters into every area of life, including the human, it ceases to be external to man and 
becomes his very substance…. [it] is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs him…. This 
transformation, so obvious in modern society, is the result of the fact that technique has become 
autonomous.50 
 
According to the Substantive Theorists, the outlook on human progress is “apocalyptic”51 and 
may seem absurd to many because it is attributing seemingly “magical powers to technology.”52  
                                               
47 Ellul, Technological Society, P. 10 
48 Ibid, P. 42. 
49 Ibid, P. 43. 
50 Ibid, P. 6. 
51 In his article, “Critique: New Demons” (Sojourners 5, November, 1976. P. 37), Dale Brown calls this apocalyptic-
style writing, “[Ellul’s] Amos-like ministry to the technological society.” 
52 Feenberg, P. 7. 
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However, the apparent correlations between the technological society and a loss of meaningful 
relationships,53 dialogue,54 and civic duty55 do seem, nevertheless, significant. 
(c) Substantive Theory Conclusion 
Perhaps Substantive theory’s greatest contribution to the study of technology’s role 
within society is that it articulates a new dimension of its influence.  There seems to be a much 
more powerful force that lies underneath technology than what appears on its surface as a simple 
gadget or tool.  If, according to Heidegger, technology is a statement about the person who 
creates it, then modern technology says something about the culture that creates it, and this web 
of interests and patterns do seem to pose alarming implications for ethical, political, and social 
discourse.  Viewing technology as something humans do—and as something that creates humans 
as much as humans create it (standing reserve)—appears to open up a new need for self-
awareness and critique.   
However, upon closer examination, what the Substantive theorist makes up for regarding 
technology’s ethical dimensions, it lacks all the more regarding the ethical dimensions of the 
human it perceives.  Particularly, when it comes to the question of what the human must do now, 
                                               
53 Feenberg gives the example of “fast food” and how its availability is seemingly weakening the family ritual of 
eating together at the dinner table. (P. 7) 
54 A study called, “Social Media and the ‘Spiral of Silence’,” www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/26/social-media-and-
the-spiral-of-silence/ (Pew Research Internet Project, 26 August, 2014), found that “86% of Americans were willing 
to have an in-person conversation about the [United States’] surveillance program, but just 42% of Facebook and 
Twitter users were willing to post about it on those platforms.”  Given that this is a particularly controversial topic 
(47% in favor, 44% against), it was articulated that Facebook and Twitter actually discouraged dialogue out of the 
fear of disagreement among “friends” and “followers” respectively, where in-person dialogue remained relatively 
the same despite the fear of disagreement. 
55 In a Slate.com article titled “Where Have All the Flower Children Gone?” 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2006/12/where_have_all_the_flower_children_gone.html 
(Slate.com, 13 December, 2006) Jacob Weisberg cites technological “breakthroughs in field medicine” as a possible 
reason that public protests against the Iraq War never reached the level of those during the Vietnam War.  His 
reasoning is that despite the fact that Americans came out against the Iraq War more quickly than the Vietnam War, 
technology’s ability to preserve life made the costs of war seem less detrimental and less deserving of outrage and 
immediate action.  
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the Substantive theorist is utterly paralyzed; the human the Substantive theorist articulates is 
completely powerless, if not fully integrated into the technological society itself.   
 For the Substantive theorist, the ability to undo what has been done in the technological 
society is ultimately futile.  While Heidegger exhibits a small amount of hope, albeit earlier in 
his career, Ellul is utterly terrifying in his description from the start: “No human activity is 
possible except as it is mediated and censored by the technical medium…. Thought or will can 
only be realized by borrowing from technique its modes of expression.  Not even the simplest 
initiative can have an original, independent existence.”56  To Ellul, all human activity and 
decision-making reflects the technological society, and the human is never free or separate from 
the machine.57 
 For Ellul, like Heidegger, “only a God can save us now,” however, Ellul takes this quite 
literally.  Ellul states, “For the world ought to be preserved by God’s methods, not by man’s 
technical work (which can, however, be used by God and form part of his activity, on condition 
that men bring the whole sphere of technics under his judgment and his control).”58  Effectively, 
Ellul imagines an eschatological event that will bring all things into appropriate order by way of 
God acting through the Christian revolutionary.  For Ellul, a kind of divine invasion is needed to 
rescue humankind and the world. 
 In conclusion, the substantive theorist imagines a paralyzed human subjected to the 
technological society; paralyzed in will, the scope of its capacity for self and environmental 
consideration, and the trajectory of history.  In diametric opposition to Horton’s hard neutrality, 
the substantive theorist views humans as being completely enveloped within the technological 
                                               
56 Ellul, Technological Society, P. 418. 
57 Ibid, P. 410-420. 
58 Jacques Ellul, The Presence of the Kingdom (Colorado Springs, CO, Helmers & Howard, 1967), P. 16. 
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system—consciousness included.  In the words of Rupert Hall commenting on the work of Ellul, 
“If he is right, his book is useless.”59  Essentially, a theology where God alone fulfills the tasks 
of good in an evil world is not ethics; it is a spiritually justified nihilism.   
3. Critical Theory and Technological Neutrality 
 
 Critical theory largely sees itself as charting a path between the two extremes posed by 
Instrumental Theory and Substantive Theory.  To do this, Critical Theory unites both extremes 
by analyzing one common flaw.  Feenberg states, “Despite their differences, instrumental and 
substantive theories share a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude towards technology.”60  Technology is 
either void of meaning outside of pure utilization (Instrumental), or so full of meaning that it 
consumes all understanding of history, politics, and values (Substantive).  Technology either has 
no meaning or totalizing meaning, and neither seek revolution within the current technological 
system.  Critical Theory seeks to change that. 
To chart its path between opposites, Critical Theory does not reject either type entirety.  
On the one hand, while Critical Theory rejects the fatalism of Substantive Theory, it embraces 
Instrumental Theory’s seemingly more transcendent view of humanity over technology, or at 
least free enough from it that humans can change it; something can be done to steer technology 
as it currently exists into the right direction.  On the other hand, Critical Theory rejects Hard 
Instrumental Theory’s conception of complete technological neutrality and argues instead that 
ethics and politics are guided by “technological rationality,” which is similar to Heidegger’s 
“enframing.”61 
                                               
59 Ruper Hall quoted in Clifford G. Christians, “Ellul on Solution: An Alternative but No Prophesy,” in Jacques 
Ellul: Interpretive Essays (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1981), eds. Clifford G. Christians and Jay M. 
Van Hook, P. 147. 
60 Feenberg, P. 8. 
61 This concept will be described at-length in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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 Ultimately, the place where Critical Theory argues that a transformation of technology 
can take place is in the political realm.  Critical theory posits that every technological instrument 
is constructed through the interaction between socially-bound individuals with their society’s 
economic and political ends, and it is therefore impossible to create a fundamentally different 
form of technology without also radically “redesigning” the political structure.62  Therefore, 
Critical Theory engages in what can be described as “political redesign.” 
However, within the redesigning process, critical theorists are often stifled by the two 
extremes they seek to evade. While many critical theorists take up the task to “redesign” modern 
technology through political change, most stop short of actually creating a new operational 
structure.63  Many of the problems relating to Critical Theory’s ability to restructure a political 
medium that can restructure the technological society revolve around the tendency to slip into 
Substantive or Instrumental approaches.  For instance, concerning the former, Herbert Marcuse, 
though perhaps the most constructive of all critical theorists, becomes so successful in his 
critique of the all-pervasive dominance of the capitalist-driven technological society that his very 
arguments can appear self-defeating; the words he uses are merely a part of the “technical 
rationality” he seeks to articulate and resolve.64  Concerning the latter, known critical theorist 
Jürgen Habermas, for instance, seeks to separate the actions of labor and interaction, granting 
his argument an individual that transcends both categories by embodying both and then is 
capable of expression through either avenue,65 but the laborer in and of itself has a tendency of 
slipping into a mere “instrumental” view that lacks ethical and political significance, leaving him 
                                               
62 Ibid., P. 13. 
63 Ibid. 
64 This critique will be fully explored in Chapter 7. 
65 See: Habermas, Jürgen, “Labor and Interaction: Comment on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind,” in Theory and 
Practice, John Viertel, tr., (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973), P. 142-169. 
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vulnerable to the same critiques leveled against Instrumentalist Theory.66 For many, the path 
between these two extremes seemingly stifles nearly any theory of reconstruction all together; 
Michel Foucault, for instance, introduces a new critique of “power” by allegorically expanding a 
form of imprisonment known as the “panopticon”67 to observe a new way technology is used to 
control (surveillance, isolation, and controlled research), but his articulation of resistance68 and 
how to go about restructuring remains “vague.”69   
4. Conclusion  
 Thus, the way technology is neutral or non-neutral is the deciding factor concerning 
whether the technological society is a topic worthy of study in the field of ethics.  Of the four 
different perspectives covered—including the hard/soft bifurcation of Instrumental Theory—two 
approaches appear unhelpful for the ethical study of the technological society and two appear 
helpful and potentially constructive.  Those who appear unhelpful are the Hard Instrumental 
theorists and the Substantive theorists, and those who appear helpful and constructive are the 
Soft Instrumental theorists and the Critical Theorists. 
If it is the case that technology is completely neutral (Hard Instrumental Theory)—if 
technology is mere instrument without any related social effects or ethical implications to 
culture—the only bearing technology has upon ethics is how best to use a given gadget within a 
given culture.  On the other hand, if technology is non-neutral but has such a complete and 
                                               
66 Egbert Schuurman, Technology and the Future: A Philosophical Challenge, Herbert Donald Morton (tr.), 
(Toronto, ON: Wedge Publishing, 1980), P. 256-257 
67 For a more detailed description, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (translated 
by Alan Sheridan, New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1977), P. 195-228.  For the original idea of the panopticon as 
applied to prison systems, see: Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 1995). 
68 Foucault’s answer to the panopticon is what he describes as the festival, which boasts “suspended laws, lifted 
prohibitions, the frenzy of passing time, bodies mingling together without respect, individuals unmasked, 
abandoning their statutory identity and the figure under which they had been recognized, allowing a quite different 
truth to appear.”  However, Foucault makes no attempt to argue exactly how one is to restructure panopticism so as 
to create the festival. 
69 Feenberg, P. 67. 
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totalizing affect upon culture (Heidegger/Ellul’s Substantive Theory) that it consumes all 
mindfulness and critical power, perhaps prayer is more valuable than an ethical analysis of the 
unavoidable and impending apocalypse.   
 It is for this reason that this thesis will deal primarily with those thinkers who both (1) 
recognize and discern the perils of the technological society, yet (2) do not fall victim to fatalism.  
The primary research of this thesis will not engage with writers who, like Horton, “laugh” about 
the apparent technological problems within society, nor will it engage with those prophets of 
doom (Heidegger/Ellul) who effectively “cry” about the problems of the technological society.  
Rather, this thesis will primarily engage with those who take the problems of the technological 
society seriously, do not submit to fatalism, and thus are capable of creating constructive ways 
forward with which one is able to dialogue: namely, the Soft Instrumental Theory of Lewis 
Mumford, and the Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse—who is considered the Frankfurt 
School’s most ardent critic of technology.70 
B. Ethical Challenges of the Technological Society 
There is no shortage of use-based analyses regarding ethics within the technological 
society.  The impact of social media, drone warfare, big data and privacy, genetic engineering, 
and artificial intelligence are just a handful of topics which currently populate current 
scholarship regarding ethics.71  These are no doubt monumental challenges that contemporary 
                                               
70 In his essay, “Groundwork for the Concept of Technique in Education,” (in Policy Futures in Education Vol. 4 
No. 1, 2006. P. 63), Clayton Pierce rightly distinguishes Marcuse as being the most concentrated Critical Theorist on 
the subject of technology.  He states, “Of the…Frankfurt School theorists it was Herbert Marcuse who relentlessly 
studied the role of technology and its impact on civilization.” 
71 For excellent primers on the use-based ethical analyses of social media, drone warfare, big data and privacy, 
genetic engineering, and artificial intelligence, see the following publications, respectively: Zhanna Bagdasarov, 
April Martin, Rahul Chauhan, and Shane Connelly, “Aristotle, Kant, and…Facebook? A Look at the Implications of 
Social Media on Ethics,” in Ethics & Behavior Vol. 27 No. 7 (2017), P. 547-561; Kenneth Himes, Drones and the 
Ethics of Targeted Killing (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015); Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math 
Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (New York, NY: Crown Publishing, 
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society faces and will face increasingly over the next decade, if not century.  However, what 
ultimately dictates the way humans posture themselves towards these questions are fundamental 
presuppositions regarding the relationship between humans and their instruments.  The greatest 
challenge to ethics within the technological society, therefore, is how one should consider three 
mutually reinforcing variables: (1) the implications of the technological neutrality v. non-
neutrality binary, (2) the implications of how one posits human nature within the technological 
society, and above all else, (3) how one is to maintain ethical responsibility in the technological 
society.  This section will pose the interrelationship between these three in order to show how 
this thesis will uniquely respond to the challenges of the technological society. 
1. The Effects of the Neutrality/Non-Neutrality Binary 
 
As the previous section demonstrated, the question of technological neutrality can be 
answered in a limited number of ways, but to be clear, the unique challenge this thesis seeks to 
address is not simply to do with one’s inability to clearly establish whether technology is neutral 
or non-neutral.  Rather, the challenge is that by establishing any concrete stance in either 
direction, one further complicates one’s perspective on ethics.  The challenge is found in the 
implications of taking a clear side on the binary itself. 
On the one hand, if one insists that humanity is the master of technology as a neutral 
instrument, one must at minimum admit the limitations of humanity which first impelled such 
technology.  Humans lack greater sight, so they invent the telescope; humans are drawn to 
supplement a limited and spatially dictated community with a seemingly unlimited and 
deliberately crafted social media; humans are moved to partially transcend their natural limits to 
                                               
2016); Tami Ball, “The Ethics of Genetics” in American Medical Writers Association Journal Vol. 32 Is. 4 (Winter 
2017), P. 182-184; Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, “Incorporating Ethics into Artificial Intelligence,” in Journal of 
Ethics Vol. 21 Is. 4 (December 2017), P. 403-418. 
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understand the world with search engines that retrieve seemingly limitless collections of data in a 
nanosecond.  Technology reveals the power of humankind, but it also continues to reveal new 
ways the human is limited without it.  The very existence of technology at once reveals the 
human’s capacity to create and, to some extent, the human’s dependence upon their creation in 
order to maintain or advance their current abilities, especially when those abilities are in some 
way attached to one’s livelihood or economic stability.  In a technological society where its 
instruments are ubiquitous, the human’s dependence grows proportionally to its uses and 
ubiquity.   
While this apparent vexation does not disprove technological neutrality, it should at 
minimum dispel the instrumentalist of the illusion that one is entirely the master of one’s 
technology and is, to varying degrees, dependent upon technology to supplement their natural 
limitations.  Furthermore, when one assumes technological neutrality and denies the potential 
impact that technology is having on one’s life, one is tempted to ignore the ways in which that 
dependence is influencing one’s behavior and philosophical presumptions.  What is wrong with 
the view of technological neutrality is not necessarily the claim in itself, but what that claim 
falsely permits by what it implies: that humans are in fact masters over their technology when 
one is simultaneously quite dependent upon it. 
On the other hand, if one insists that humanity is influenced by technology as a non-
neutral entity, one must at minimum admit that the creativity and reach of technology reflects 
humanity’s capacity for enlarging one’s sphere of influence, freedom, and possibility.  Even the 
most hardened Substantive theorists entrust the printing press to disseminate their ideas to all 
corners of the world, and one cannot deny that the boundaries of nature, geography, and 
communication are expanding at the very moment humans appear most enslaved.  
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Likewise, while this apparent vexation does not prove technological neutrality, it should 
at minimum dispel the substantivist of the illusion that he or she is entirely a slave to technology 
and is indeed, to varying degrees, capable of transcending one’s natural and social constraints 
through its creation and usage.  Furthermore, however, when one fully embraces the idea that 
technology is non-neutral, and that it does indeed have an impact on society and ethics, one is 
invariably tempted to misinterpret the rapid progression and ubiquity of technology as inevitably 
totalizing in its effects.  When one conflates the ubiquity of technology with technology’s social 
and ethical effects, one invariably removes freedom and agency.  Ultimately, the position of non-
neutrality tempts one either towards determinism or towards an all-or-nothing plan of salvation. 
Therefore, the first challenge of understanding ethics in the technological society is to 
establish a way of talking about technology that does not minimize its effects to the point of 
naïve apathy, nor maximize its effects to the point of hopeless resignation.  In either extreme, 
technological ethics is a vain pursuit.  Rather, this thesis seeks to develop a new type—a new 
way of talking about the question of technological neutrality—in order to overcome this two-
sided challenge.  For this reason, this thesis will examine two thinkers who construct ways of 
dealing with this challenge without entirely committing either error: Lewis Mumford, an 
instrumentalist who affirms technological neutrality while also remaining especially critical of 
the technological society, and Herbert Marcuse, a critical theorist who denies technological 
neutrality without submitting to a hopeless determinism.   
2. Human Nature within the Technological Society 
 
The second challenge of the technological society this thesis will examine relates to how 
humans should consider themselves within the technological society; specifically, should the 
human consider him or herself as subject or object?  Is the human in the technological society a 
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rational, tool-making being who is shaping and acting upon technology, or is technology itself 
shaping and acting upon the human being?  This challenge is similar to the first in that the 
question tends to present itself as a binary, but has significant implications once one position is 
clearly established in either direction.   
If it is the case that the human is pure subject, that he or she transcends nature and freely 
acts upon technology, one is tempted to interpret technology as something that is manageable 
and neutral.  On the other hand, if one were to insist that the human is pure object, that he or she 
is historically, sociologically, or economically determined, one is tempted to place human beings 
entirely under the influence of technological progress itself.  How one perceives oneself 
ultimately shapes the way in which one perceives the technological society.  Thus, to speak of 
technology is to speak of anthropology. 72 
Therefore, it is central to note, that no matter which view one has regarding the neutrality 
or non-neutrality of technology, whichever way one positions the self and human nature 
ultimately dictates the presumed effects or non-effects of technology, whether explicitly or 
implicitly.  Particularly, as will be argued in this thesis, while Mumford and Marcuse seem 
astutely aware of the pitfalls of their presumed stance on the first challenge regarding 
technological neutrality, and both can remain critical without succumbing to resignation, this 
thesis will show that their flat constructions of the self and human nature betray their 
conclusions, and compound the problem in a way that leads each towards an implicit 
determinism, even if they reject such determinism superficially.   
                                               
72 The term “anthropology” throughout is defined simply as “the study of human beings” and is to be understood in 
the broadest sense.  It is to include the biological, social, and psychological studies of human beings, as well as those 
examinations which permeate the humanities. For a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of the term, see 
Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes’ (eds.) Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982). 
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 Ultimately, what is needed as a base for Mumford and Marcuse is a view of self and 
human nature which does not betray their uneasy relationship with the question of technological 
neutrality; one that can maintain their critical relationship with technology without succumbing 
to paralysis or resignation.  It is for this reason, therefore, that this thesis will utilize the Christian 
anthropology of Reinhold Niebuhr to grant a dimension to each thinker’s view of human nature 
that better situates the self in relation to technology. 
3. Ethical Responsibility within the Technological Society 
 
The final and central challenge of the technological society this thesis will address deals 
with the topic of ethical responsibility.73  Ethical responsibility can be crudely defined as “the 
sense of being accountable for and accountable to”74 an object or an action under one’s control.75  
Thus, the challenge of ethical responsibility within the technological society is establishing what 
is under one’s control, to what degree, and whether or not one should be held accountable for 
and to it.   
To properly address this challenge, the nexus of the previous two challenges must be 
properly understood in relation to one another.  What are the ways in which technology has an 
effect upon human beings, if at all, what are the limits of human control over those effects, and 
                                               
73 In “Technology and the Ethics of Responsibility” (Metanexus, September 2011), Egbert Schuurman defines 
ethical responsibility as “…the sense of being accountable for and accountable to…” and describes such a “sense” 
within the technological society in the following way: “[E]veryone involved in scientific-technological development 
must act as proxy or steward with reference to one another.”  While this definition is preliminarily helpful, this 
thesis will include all who are integrated in the technological society—all who create and use technology—not 
simply those who develop technology.  This thesis will refer to ethical responsibility within the technological society 
as a sense that all humans “must act as a proxy or steward with reference to one another.” 
74 Ibid. 
75 This thesis presumes two Kantian maxims which relate to the grounding of ethical responsibility: first, that the 
sense of ought is a disposition that serves as the “ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of maxims,” that it is a 
“property of the will,” and that it is grounded in nature or freedom (Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, tr., New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. P. 20-21) .  Secondly, this 
thesis presumes that “…the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action” (Critique of Pure Reason, J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn, tr., Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003, P. 308); in other words, ethical responsibility implies a 
disposition which has adopted a maxim that one is capable of doing: i.e. “ought implies can.” 
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to what degree is the human accountable to and for those effects?  If one were to take too 
extreme a view regarding either binary (neutrality and human-as-subject/non-neutrality and 
human-as-object) one would eliminate ethical responsibility altogether by either removing 
technology too far from the realm of ethics (the former), or imagining its effects as being so 
totalizing that humans have little or no control (the latter). 
It is therefore imperative to investigate the ways in which both overconfidence and 
distrust regarding the human’s control over technology plays a role in assigning ethical 
responsibility in the technological society.  While Mumford and Marcuse maintain a helpful 
uneasiness about the question of technological neutrality, this thesis will demonstrate that their 
presumptions regarding human nature eliminate ethical responsibility from the outset.  It is for 
this reason, once again, that Niebuhr’s construction of the self and human nature will be utilized 
to grant Mumford and Marcuse a base from which ethical responsibility, or what he calls, the 
“uneasy conscience,” can emerge.76 
II: Recent Christian and Niebuhrian Scholarship in Relation to the Ethical Challenges of 
the Technological Society 
In addition to utilizing Reinhold Niebuhr as a resource for both his anthropology and his 
construction of ethical responsibility, this thesis will also borrow from Niebuhr’s Christian 
Realist methodology, which goes hand-in-hand with each, and will be expounded upon more in 
Chapter 2.  Using Niebuhr’s methodology to develop the thought of Mumford and Marcuse 
renders this thesis a work specifically of Christian ethics, and brings a theological critique to the 
philosophy of technology. 
                                               
76 In his essay, “Reinhold Niebuhr” (in The WileyBlackwell Companion to Political Theology, William T. 
Cavanaugh, Peter Manley Scott eds., Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2019. P. 188), William Werpehowski 
states, “How can anyone deny that Niebuhr’s is the quintessential example of a political ethic of free 
responsibility?” 
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With a view towards the various challenges this thesis will principally address, this 
section will accomplish two things.  First, (A) this section will examine current Christian 
scholarship regarding the question of technological neutrality and show what has been 
accomplished regarding the challenges this thesis seeks to address, and what has not.  Second, 
(B) this section will show how this thesis will utilize Reinhold Niebuhr and how this thesis fits 
within current scholarship regarding Reinhold Niebuhr. 
A. Recent Christian Scholarship Regarding the Challenges Presented 
The Christian community’s response to the technological society has overwhelmingly 
taken the form of Instrumental restraint (Mumford-influenced), Substantive despair (Ellul or 
Heidegger-influenced), or some kind of mixture of the two (Substantive/Instrumental hybrid).  
Consequently, no current scholarship addresses the challenges regarding their presumed stance 
on the binary of neutrality/non-neutrality and human nature, and none address the implications of 
such views on ethical responsibility.  However, like Mumford and Marcuse, two subgroups, 
namely the Soft Instrumental theorists and Substantive/Instrumental hybrids, do seem 
moderately aware of the pitfalls of the neutrality/non-neutrality binary and make some attempt to 
steer clear of them. 
 This section will serve as a review of the most recent scholarship in order to show where 
the research of this thesis fits, first turning to (1) Christian Instrumental theorists (Hard and Soft), 
then (2) Christian Substantive theorists (proper and hybrid).  This section will close, however, 
with one recent essay which appears to open a different approach, though still falls short in a 




1. Christian Instrumental Theorists 
 
 Regarding Instrumental Theory, and following in line with the contrast between Horton 
and Mumford, Instrumental Theory can be divided within contemporary Christian scholarship 
along the lines of “Hard” and “Soft” instrumentalism.  The former maintains ethical 
considerations of technology that are purely use-based, only having an effect to the extent the 
user deems appropriate.  The latter understands that technological thinking within a society can 
have negative consequences, but it is primarily a social issue, not a problem of technology.  
Both, however, result in some kind of advocacy for a trade-off between efficiency and morality 
or spirituality. 
 There have been seven recent articles which reflect a Hard Instrumental view of 
technology.77  The first five articulate a simple trade-off between efficiency and spirituality, 
while the latter two go a bit further as to say that technology can be an addictive activity.  Nancy 
J. Duff, Peter Fleming, Colleen Maura McGrane, Jeff Vogel, and Rodney Clapp all argue along 
similar lines from each other, that technology can have a detrimental impact upon oneself only 
insofar as one allows it.  Duff likens social media relations to the invention of the telephone, that 
it would silly to reject it just because “…only face-to-face encounters [matter].”78  But she argues 
there is a wealth of benefits that could be had if only the church learned to better use it.  Fleming 
understands technology to be at most an occasion for idolatry, but makes clear that it should not 
be associated too closely with technology itself.  He states, “The idols have shifted into our 
hands, our pockets.  Who needs a lararium when you have a laptop?”79  His resolution is to 
simply know when it is becoming an idol, and instead turn to God.  Similar to Fleming, McGrane 
                                               
77 “Recent” is considered to go back at least to the year 2010. 
78 Nancy J. Duff, “Praising God Online,” in Theology Today Vol. 70 No. 1 (2013), P. 28. 
79 Peter Fleming, “The Spiritual Case Against the Mobile Office,” in America Vol. 220 Is. 4 (February 2019), P. 50. 
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wishes to grow one’s consciousness more in how Christians allow technology to encroach upon 
their time for spiritual disciplines.  She states, “We can foster mindfulness of God by being 
aware of our proclivity for online drifting, praying when clicking online…and choosing specific 
times to set our phones aside and be wholly present to God.”80  Similarly to McGrane, Vogel 
warns of technology becoming a distraction that humans deploy at will, but one which is easily 
overcome if one is self-aware and disciplined.  He concludes, “…we might be wise to view this 
impulse as the latest invention of the noonday demon.”81  Slightly different in perspective, Clapp 
sees prayer as the very solution to the human’s various technological misgivings rather than the 
potential cost.  He argues, “It makes sense that we pray for the right use…of computer 
technology.  Sometimes these may be prayers of anxiety and desperation, just as farmers pray for 
rain [in, sic] the midst of a drought.”82  All of these scholars, much like Horton, are aware of 
various use-based problems brought about by technology, but they interpret them as correctable, 
so long as the human stays engaged.  For these individuals, technology is not the problem, it is 
the human’s self-control, spirituality, and wisdom that is potentially the problem. 
 The second group of Hard Instrumentalists are distinguished only by the extent to which 
they see Christians allowing technology to impact their lives, and both scholars understand it in 
terms of technological addiction.  Tony Reinke, in his book, 12 Ways Your Phone is Changing 
You, argues—despite the misleading title—that phones do not change the person but simply 
provide a new way old sins can emerge.  In particular, Reinke argues throughout the book that 
self-addiction, harkening to the myth of Narcissus, is a growing trend among Christians given the 
                                               
80 Colleen Maura McGrane, “Practising Presence: Wisdom from the Rule on Finding Balance in a Digital Age,” in 
American Benedictine Review Vol. 64 Is. 4 (December 2013), P. 383. 
81 Jeff Vogel, “Manufactured Disruption: Why We Keep Checking Our Phones,” in Christian Century Vol. 132 No. 
13 (June 2015), P. 12. 
82 Rodney Clapp, “Blessed Technology,” in Christian Century (January 2013), P. 45. 
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reward feature of social media and texts messages (“likes” and “dings”).  But Reinke makes clear 
that “When we talk about ‘smartphone addiction,’ often what we are talking about is the 
addiction of looking at ourselves.”83  Similarly, Andrew Scott observe that, as a camp counselor, 
both children and adults demonstrate symptoms of “withdrawal” from their technological 
addictions on the very first day of “unplugging.”  He especially laments the problem among 
adults, stating, “While most counselors comply with the policy that forbids Internet use while on 
duty…most of them spend their off-hours online.”84  While both scholars go further than the 
previous Hard Instrumentalists in articulating technology’s addictive permeations, it is still a 
matter of self-control and wisdom, not technology itself. 
 Outside of the very use-based approaches to technology advocated by the Hard 
Instrumentalists, the Soft Instrumentalists are more insightful regarding the philosophical 
underpinnings of the technological society, offering heavier theological themes throughout their 
work, but still maintaining the position that technology is itself neutral.  There are two thinkers in 
recent scholarship who uniquely approach the technological society’s more philosophical bases 
with theological insights: Derek C. Schuurman and Marc J. de Vries. 
 In his book, Shaping a Digital World, Derrek Schuurman lays out a description of how 
the Christian is to positively approach the technological society.  As the title would suggest, 
Schuurman sees it as the Christian’s obligation to actively shape the technological society in 
order to align technology more with the Kingdom of God.  He argues this approach should be “A 
distinct cultural activity in which human beings exercise freedom and responsibility in response 
to God, to unfold the hardware and software possibilities in creation with the aid of tools and 
                                               
83 Tony Reinke, 12 Ways Your Phone is Changing You (Weaton, IL: Crossway Publishing, 2017), P. 110. 
84 Andrew Scott, “Unplugged at Church Camp: Tech Detox,” in Christian Century (August 2011), P. 13. 
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procedures for practical purposes.”85  Similar to a kind of technological social gospel 
movement,86 Schuurman sees the church as poised to proactively confront the technological 
society as a way of assimilating its own values into culture.  While Schuurman admittedly claims 
to reject technological neutrality, his understanding of the concept seems confused.  He states, 
“Computer technology is not neutral; it can either be directed in ways that comport well with 
God’s intentions for his world or in rebellious ways.”87  This description, it should be noted, is 
not technological non-neutrality.  Schuurman is still placing agency and the effects of technology 
completely in the realm of those who “direct” technology, which is consistent with Instrumental 
Theory’s claim of technological neutrality; technology is not bad, but those who direct it can be.  
Effectively, for Schuurman, technology is guidable, and it is the church’s obligation to do that 
guiding towards the benefit of the Kingdom. 
 De Vries offers a very helpful essay to modern Christian scholarship, initially critiquing a 
common refrain among some secular writers that the utopian sentiments that are so often 
attached to technology derive from the Christian conception of paradise.  De Vries astutely 
argues that such an oversimplification ignores a more dominant theme within the Christian 
tradition, which is sin.  De Vries uses his critique then as an opportunity to establish a new way 
of understanding technology based upon the Christian conception of a sinful world.  While his 
starting place regarding sin should be praised for its distinctiveness, he ultimately makes the 
same gesture as Schuurman in that he rests Christian engagement on the presumption that 
                                               
85 Derek C. Schuurman, Shaping a Digital World: Faith, Culture and Computer Technology (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2013), P. 23. 
86 Walter Rauschenbusch, who is largely considered the progenitor of the Social Gospel Movement, argued in his 
book, Christianizing the Social Order (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2011. P. 67, 69) describes its tenets in 
the following way: “The purpose of all that Jesus said and did and hoped to do was always the social redemption of 
the entire life of the human race on earth…. Christianity set out with a great social ideal.  The live substance of the 
Christian religion was the hope of seeing a divine social order established on earth.” 
87 Ibid., P. 65. 
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technology is entirely manageable and redeemable simply through a better worldview.  He states, 
“Instead of trying to realize a utopia, a Christian perspective should be aimed at developing 
technologies for an imperfect world.”88  In this way, his analysis is even narrower than 
Schuurman’s, placing the onus exclusively on Christian engineers, effectively summoning them 
towards a trade-off of less efficiency for more socially and ethically aware ends. 
 In conclusion, due to their presumptions regarding the question of technological 
neutrality, none of these Christian thinkers view technology itself as something that is actively 
changing oneself.  The human is the master over technology; therefore, one simply needs correct 
thinking to properly put technology back in its rightful place.  If there is a problem, these 
thinkers would argue, that problem would exist without technology just as easily.  Technology 
has no effect on ethical responsibility, the human is always transcendent enough to direct it. 
 Though it should be noted that the Soft Instrumentalism of Schuurman and de Vries 
imagine that the technological society itself has some impact on the person.  Like Mumford, both 
are capable of maintaining a critical spirit about them as they approach the technological society, 
even if the gadgets in themselves pose no direct impact to human behavior.  De Vries in 
particular is notable in that he grants a new dimension to technology in that he suggests a better 
orientation that is mindful of human sin.  However, both appear content with the presumption 
that humans are masters of technology, and neither address the problem of ethical responsibility 




                                               
88 Marc J. de Vries, “Utopian Thinking in Contemporary Technology Versus Responsible Technology for an 
Imperfect World,” in Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith Vol. 64 No. 1 (March 2012), P. 17. 
 31 
2. Christian Substantive Theorists 
 
In recent scholarship, there are eight Christian works which can be situated within the 
position of Substantive Theory.89  While all eight ascribe to Substantive positions, the latter four 
try to create a hybrid between Substantive and Instrumental theory.  While it could be argued 
that the latter four are more in-line with Critical Theory, there are too many significant 
differences that make such categorization ill-founded.90  This section will review these recent 
works in order to further show how this thesis fits within contemporary scholarship, first 
examining the Christian Substantive theorists, then those who articulate a type of 
Substantive/Instrumental hybrid. 
The first four scholars who demonstrate a more direct Substantive approach to 
technology are Shane Hipps, Albert Borgmann, Craig M. Gay, and John Dyer.  In his book, 
Flickering Pixels: How Technology Shapes Your Faith, Hipps is very clear that technology does 
indeed shape one’s faith, and that it is permeating every part of one’s understanding and 
existence.  In this way, he sees technology’s complete change of oneself as absolute.  He argues 
even that “God’s unchanging message has changed, is changing and will change.”91 Instead of 
offering a careful analysis of what Christians are to do, Hipps simply states, “…it’s about 
training our eyes to see things we usually overlook.”92  Thus, Hipps uses this thin opening of 
self-awareness to build his book upon; simply trying to make his readers aware of the ways 
                                               
89 These are the major works that can be categorized as Christian Substantive Theory since 2009, with the addition 
of Borgmann (2003) for his continuing influence on the field. 
90 As will be shown, the Christian Substantive/Instrumental hybrid all maintain that the technological society is at 
best a closing realm of Christian action, if it is not already closed entirely.  These views make philosophical 
concessions to the technological society which appear similar to Critical Theory, and construct liturgical means of 
carving out the realm of Christian action exclusively within the church that appears in some ways similar to Critical 
Theory’s goal of political redesign.  However, these Christian hybrid positions are more dualistic, fashioning an evil 
technological world “out there” and a safe liturgical design that is free from its dehumanization “in here,” i.e. the 
church. 
91 Shane Hipps, Flickering Pixels: How Technology Shapes Your Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), P. 13. 
92 Ibid., P. 14. 
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technology is changing everything by examining many forms of technology and how they are 
changing the way humans understand, love, act, and have faith.  Hipps’ understanding of self 
appears completely absorbed into the technological process.   
Borgmann, who is appropriately categorized as “neo-Heideggerian,”93 argues that the 
entire technological society is governed by what he calls, “the device paradigm,” which is 
rapidly absorbing or jettisoning all which is holy.  He states, “…reality today is ruled by the 
device paradigm and therefore inhospitable to the holy…. Thus as Christians we must be 
concerned to strengthen reverence and piety wherever we find it….”94  This statement of 
desperation is consistent with the mood and philosophical presuppositions all throughout 
Borgmann’s work.  Like Heidegger, Borgmann’s human being waits as “standing reserve,” 
moments away from complete absorption into the technological society, but one must hold on 
tightly to Christian piety as long as one can. 
Similar to Borgmann’s “device paradigm,” in his book, Modern Technology and the 
Human Future, Gay criticizes the “instrumentalism, functionalism, and engineering mentality”95 
which objectifies nature and human beings.  Drawing on Heidegger’s understanding of 
“enframing,” Gay traces the evil and deterministic qualities of the technological society to a 
worldview which predated industry: “a change of mind, a new way of looking at the world and a 
new estimation of human purposes within.”96  Despite this criticism, however, Gay borrows a 
way of understanding history from the very worldview he seeks to criticize, articulating the 
technological society on its own terms: its momentum and inertia.97  It never dawns on Gay that 
                                               
93 Larry Hickman, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture, P. 5. 
94 Albert Borgmann, Power Failure: Christianity in the Culture of Technology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2003), P. 127. 
95 Craig M. Gay, Modern Technology and the Human Future: A Christian Appraisal (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2018), P. 98. 
96 Ibid., P. 99. 
97 Ibid., P. 59-92. 
 33 
conceptualizing the technological worldview within its own deterministic language will result in 
the perception of a deterministic technological society.  Nevertheless, his ultimate conclusion for 
Christians, therefore, is an all-or-nothing attempt to halt and reverse the momentum of the 
technological society before it is too late, simply by wielding a better worldview: i.e. 
Christianity. 
The last of the pure Substantive theorists is John Dyer, who, in his work, From the 
Garden to the City: The Redeeming and Corrupting Power of Technology, altogether avoids the 
reconciliation of the non-neutrality of technology with his highly biblical reframing of the 
subject into the sequence of Creation, Fall, Redemption, and Restoration.98  What is strange 
about Dyer is that while he acts as if humans can “redeem” technology, he understands 
technology as having a latent value-changing power that he does not completely address.  He 
states, “…though a mobile phone is not itself morally evil, it cannot be considered ‘neutral’ 
either.  Instead, embedded in its design is a tendency of usage from which a set of values 
emerge.”99  Based upon his prescriptions for the Christian who lives in the technological society, 
one might otherwise classify him as an instrumentalist.100  However, his insistence that 
technology is accompanied by a set of values which are “embedded in its design” that can 
encroach upon the user’s own values is a very substantivistst portrayal of technology, not unlike 
Heidegger and Ellul.  This leaves more questions for Dyer on the non-neutrality front of 
technology than answers. 
                                               
98 John Dyer, From the Garden to the City: The Redeeming and Corrupting Power of Technology, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Kregel Publications, 2011), chapters 3, 5, 7, 9, respectively. 
99 Ibid., P. 178. 
100 Eric Eekhoff critiques Dyer’s work as bearing the same issues as many other Christian books on the same topic.  
He rightly points out that in the way that “most recent Christian books about technology” are very “use-centered,” 
Dyer wants to “change how they use” technology, as opposed to “what happens before you take it out of the box” 
(“From the Garden to the City: A Review” from Mere Orthodoxy, October 17, 2011, Web. November 15, 2015: 
http://mereorthodoxy.com/garden-city-review).   
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 The final four adherents to Substantive Theory appear to be hybrids which include certain 
concessions to technological determinism and non-neutrality within specific conceptual contexts, 
but a hard instrumentalism within a Christian view of the world.  Scholars who hold this view 
include James K.A. Smith, Jacob Shatzer, Brent Waters, and Douglas Estes.  The first three may 
be categorized as “Liturgical Resistance,” while the last is a form of “substantive alarmism.” 
 Smith concedes that the power of the technological society is a subconscious adherence 
to a kind of technological “liturgy” that is progressively taking over the human’s understanding 
of “space.”101  This all-consuming liturgy is a “covert incubator” of thought which makes us 
consider space as mere “nature” as opposed to God’s creation, “a competitive arena for my 
plunder and self-fulfillment,” and “a random assemblage for which we now claim ‘progress.’”102  
This technological liturgy has infected all of society where technology exists, and according to 
Smith, the relationships which appear even through social media exhibit “just this sort of 
disordering liturgy.”103  He states, “Twitter and Facebook are not just ‘media’ that are neutral, 
benign conduits of information and communication; they are world-making and identity-
constituting.”104  Appropriately, Smith’s answer to this is escaping into the framework of an 
“alternative liturgy.”  He states, “In a society of…debilitating self-consciousness, it is a special 
grace to be invited into a story in which we are hidden with Christ in God…. Christian 
worship…is an alternative imaginary, a way that the Spirit of God invites us into the story of 
God….”105  Essentially, Smith grants that the power of the technological society is manifested 
“on some unconscious level,”106 however God’s community serves as the external agent of the 
                                               
101 James K.A. Smith, “Alternative Liturgy: Social Media as Ritual,” in Christian Century Vol. 130 Is. 5 (March 
2013), P. 30. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., P. 31. 
104 Ibid., P. 33. 
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106 Ibid., P. 30. 
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technological society that can correct its negative influence through Christian liturgy.  This view 
embraces Ellul’s critique of the subconscious influence that the technological society has, but 
denies the substantivistst position that it overtakes Christian liturgy, as well, thus restoring an 
element of Instrumental theory while one is at church and away from social media.  Effectively, 
Smith sets up a dualistic structure of the world: those who think correctly and those who do not. 
 Similar to Smith, Shatzer and Waters begin with an all-consuming Substantive theory 
regarding the technological society, in that “technology disciples us” and manifests as a “liturgy 
of control.”107  However, both end with an effective escape plan by conceptualizing a liturgy of 
“judgment, confession, contrition, repentance, forgiveness, and amendment of life,”108 where one 
can reinstate one’s human-ness by way of a new language.  Both ultimately conceptualize a tug-
of-war match between the evil and subconscious powers outside the church, and the forces of 
good which can more fully conceptualize human-ness using an internal, seemingly secret 
knowledge. 
 Similar to Gay and Borgmann, Estes conceptualizes transhumanism as an all-consuming 
worldview that seeks to “redefine what it means to be human…[suggesting] that we are all that 
matters in our universe and that we must evolve to the next phase of human existence so that we 
can be truly self-reliant.”109  Much like Gay’s conclusion, for Estes, this worldview is infecting 
all parts of human advancement which is increasingly becoming more difficult to undo by the 
day.110  Effectively, much like those adherents of “liturgical resistance,” Estes believes that 
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longer the case.  Instead the faster the world evolves, the harder it becomes to extrapolate biblical truths into daily 
situations” (Ibid., P. 132). 
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Christianity holds the key to reversing the effects of transhumanism simply by becoming more 
devout.  He concludes, “Therefore, in a world of limitless tech, the more precise our 
interpretation of the Bible must become and the more diligently we need to study its pages and 
its history.”111  Estes seems to be engendering a type of technological alarmism, arguing that the 
only way Christians can combat the transhumanist drive of the technological society and reverse 
its negative effects is to simply become better Christians and evangelize more. 
 In conclusion, all of the Substantive and hybrid Christian thinkers envision an 
impenetrable force of technological reasoning that is totalizing in its effects.  While the first 
group of thinkers posit a scenario of complete absorption into the technological society, the 
second group imagines a worldview that swallows up the entire universe under technological 
control, and only a pious or liturgically devout church has the ability to carve out for itself an 
island safe from its effects.  None of which, however, confront the inherent temptations of 
viewing technology as non-neutral or human nature as pure object, nor do any address the 
implications those views have on ethical responsibility within the technological society.   
 Though it should be noted that hybrid theorists do envision some realm of freedom, even 
if it may be closing.  Like the Critical theorists and Marcuse in particular, these theorists do 
presume some modest capabilities of the human to control technology through some ecclesial or 
liturgical response.  However, all appear content with the presumption that humans are victims of 
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3. Technology as Ambiguous Instrument 
 
Perhaps the most insightful of all recent Christian technological theorists comes from 
Catholic theologian, Mark S. Latkovic.  Latkovic spends most of his essay giving a description 
of “ten models” of technological engagement, though ultimately argues for one approach over 
and against the other nine.  Nine of the ten models that Latkovic provides are various expressions 
of Instrumental, Substantive, and Critical Theory, however, the one model for which Latkovic 
argues in favor at first appears unique; what he calls, “Technology as Ambiguous Instrument.”112   
Predominantly borrowing from a singular line in Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI’s social 
encyclical, Caritas in Veritate,113 Latkovic argues, “Technology is ambiguous and therefore we 
should be ambivalent about it.  What is not in doubt is the fact that we will continue to be of two 
minds about technology and its role in our lives, even as we continue to rely on it more and 
more, whether we want to or not.”114  What is profound about this analysis is that Latkovic 
refuses to answer the question regarding technological neutrality, and instead posits what appears 
to be a phenomenological approach that expresses the difficulty in perceiving technology as 
either neutral or non-neutral.  What is less profound, however, is that Latkovic seems to be using 
this language only to accept all nine other models regarding how Christians are to approach 
technology, ultimately leading Latkovic towards resignation regarding the role of Christianity 
within the technological society, and defers instead towards a mere use-based, instrumental-type 
posture.  
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Nevertheless, Latkovic uses Benedict XVI’s brief musings about technology to admit 
what appears to be rather true about the challenge of technological neutrality: it seems the human 
is unable to properly estimate the extent to which technology is shaping human life and the 
extent to which the human has control over it.  While this is a rather small article that does not 
deeply explore the foundations or implications of such an observation, much less the specific 
challenges this thesis seeks to address, it should be noted that this indeed is a unique approach to 
the challenge of technological neutrality.  
Therefore, while Latkovic’s article does not clearly address the challenges of this thesis, 
and while the language of ambiguity is in no way unique to Latkovic and indeed shall be 
articulated henceforth more in the context of Niebuhr,115 this language shall be adopted to better 
orient a synthesis of Niebuhr’s anthropology, Mumford’s Instrumental Theory, and Marcuse’s 
Critical Theory.  Indeed, as part of its unique contribution to scholarship, this thesis will create a 
new Niebuhrian type which shall be referred to simply as “Technological Ambiguity.” 
B. The Relevance of Niebuhr and this Thesis to Current Scholarship 
The purpose of this section is to appropriately show how Niebuhr is to fit within current 
scholarship.  First, (1) this section will show what Niebuhr offers the current Christian 
scholarship regarding the challenges of this thesis.  Second, (2) this section will show what has 
already been accomplished in Niebuhrian scholarship relating to the technological society and 
how this thesis offers a unique contribution to his thought.   
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human’s dual relatedness as creature and creator places him in an “ambiguous position.”  Concerning the latter, in 
FAH (P. 16), Niebuhr states explicitly, “History is a realm of ambiguity.”  Regarding the relationship between the 
two, he states, “Man has an ambiguous position in this realm [the realm of history] because he is both the creature 
and the creator of its course.” (P. 18) 
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1. How Niebuhr Fits Within Current Christian Scholarship 
 
 “Each century,” Niebuhr proclaims, “originates a new complexity and each new 
generation faces a new vexation in it.”116  Niebuhr suggests that what humans face within every 
new era is a web of new considerations and challenges, and yet “…there is a perennially valid 
truth in the Gospel which clarifies a perennial human predicament and may redeem man from 
the constant tendency to aggravate his predicament by false efforts to escape from it.”117  
Whether one is a slave or CEO, a laborer or a king, each new generation, empire, or reigning 
philosophical persuasion presents new vexations and challenges for the human to overcome.  
However, according to Niebuhr, it is the Christian view of reality—in all its complexities and 
paradoxes—that has the ability to clarify human nature, and with it the new challenges of 
technology, as the basis for achieving its own solution. 
While current Christian scholarship concerning the technological society is ripe with 
arguments on how best to use tools or how the Christian church or Christian living is diminished 
or made increasingly impossible by technology, there has been little attempt to translate human 
beings into the technological society by way of a thoroughly Christian anthropology, or theology 
of sin.  Unlike the more Instrumental Christian scholars, this thesis will propose that the 
technological society truly presents new problems, new vexations, within which the human must 
now live and understand.  It is not as simple as scaling back the use of instruments to avoid the 
power of the technological society, any more than one can overcome an empire by simply 
protesting a vote.  There is a dimension to the technological society that involves human beings 
beyond their capacity to escape, and it is Niebuhr’s view of the Christian faith that offers serenity 
and guidance in the systems humans devise. 
                                               
116 MMIS, P. 1. 
117 FAH, P. 34. Emphases added. 
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 However, unlike the more Substantive Christian voices, Niebuhr grants this study ways 
of articulating the challenges of the technological society through the language of Original Sin, 
which implies both the inevitable evils which are endemic to all human endeavors, and the 
human’s capacity to positively respond to its challenges.  While there is a dimension to the 
technological society that seems all pervasive, Niebuhr’s use of Christianity posits another 
dimension to human nature that is never fully consumed and can act as a critical agent of the 
technological society while still existing within it. 
Ultimately, this thesis will use Niebuhr to offer a fuller approach to anthropology and sin 
within the technological society, a task for which de Vries effectively—though insufficiently—
argues, but will do so from the approach of ambiguity, the position Latkovic begins to 
synthesize.  However, through the Niebuhrian lens, ambiguity will be utilized in a way that is 
more than simply an opportunity to resign oneself to the idea that one cannot articulate how 
technology impacts or does not impact society, leaving one in the default position of 
technological neutrality.  Rather, this thesis will utilize the paradox that makes technology 
appear ambiguous to say something about the inherent tensions of human nature, and with those 
tensions will form the basis for ethical responsibility in the technological society; what Niebuhr 
calls, “the uneasy conscience.” 
2. How This Thesis Fits Within Current Niebuhrian Scholarship 
 
While it is evident that Niebuhr’s legacy is still alive and well in the political realm,118 
Niebuhrian scholarship in the realm of technology and the technological society is significantly 
underrepresented.119  There are only six contemporary scholars who have, to varying degrees, 
                                               
118 See Appendix A 
119 The most prolific scholars associated with Niebuhr today are all but silent on the issue of technology.  In his 
essays, “Christian Realism for the Twenty-First Century” (Journal of Religious Ethics Volum 37, Issue 4: December 
2009) and “Reinhold Niebuhr in Contemporary Scholarship” (Journal of Religious Ethics Volume 31, Issue 3: 
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drawn Niebuhr into the current dialogue concerning technology.  None of which, however, 
address this thesis’ challenges of technological neutrality and ethical responsibility within the 
technological society, and only two argue from the basis of Niebuhr’s anthropology.  This 
section will explore all six recent works to show what has been accomplished regarding Niebuhr 
and technology, and what has not, in order to show the unique contribution this thesis will grant 
current Niebuhrian scholarship.   
Among the least applicable for the purposes of this thesis are works published by Martin 
Halliwell, Jeremy Sabella, and Noreen Herzfeld.  In his essay, “Niebuhr and the Limits of 
American Culture,” Halliwell captures the essence of Niebuhr as he places him in dialogue with 
Critical Theorists such as Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Clement Greenberg.  However, 
the essay is limited as he does not frame Niebuhr’s anthropology as a centerpiece of the 
dialogue.  Additionally, the technological society is very secondary to Halliwell, as he is more 
interested in Adorno and Horkheimer’s conception of the ‘Culture Industry’120 and 
consumerism.121  Similarly, Sabella writes a much-needed essay exclusively on Niebuhr and 
technology, but he deals primarily with Niebuhr’s categories of irony, poetry, and prophecy, and 
does not deliver his argument from the basis of his anthropology as much as from the basis of 
Niebuhrian themes and literary devices.122  In her article, “More than Information,” Noreen 
                                               
Winter 2003), Robin Lovin gives no mention of future Niebuhrian studies in the realm of the technological society.  
In recent years there has been something of a Niebuhrian revival in scholarship, one that was so significant that 
Daniel F. Rice edited a major collection of the most recent work being published on Niebuhr (Reinhold Niebuhr 
Revisited).  However, of the 19 essays compiled, only one (Halliwell) hinted towards Niebuhr’s place within 
scholarship pertaining to the technological society, and as will be discussed, that was not even the main point of the 
essay. 
120 Adorno and Max Horkheimer define the “culture industry” as “…the compulsive imitation by consumers of 
cultural commodities which, at the same time, they recognize as false.”  See: Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, Edmund Jephcott (tr.), (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), P. 94-136; quote from P. 135. 
121 Martin Halliwell, “Niebuhr and the Limits of American Culture,” in Reinhold Niebuhr Revisited: Engagements 
with an American Original, Daniel Rice (ed.), (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2009). P. 286-301. 
122 Jeremy Sabella, “Poets and Prophets in a Machine Age: Reinhold Niebuhr on Technology” in Theory in Action 
Vol. 1 (January 2012). P. 103-118. 
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Herzfeld attempts to utilize Niebuhr’s conception of the Image of God to show the pride of those 
who advocate for transhumanism.  Herzfeld makes interesting observations regarding how 
Niebuhr may have treated such a subject, not least her use of Niebuhr’s concept of pride as a 
source for critiquing transhumanism, but she ultimately hardens Niebuhr’s view of the Image of 
God into a law, as opposed to Niebuhr’s more passive existential observation, and goes on to 
mount an attack on technology that appears to be more of a Christian-Luddite123 approach of 
desperate abstention—perhaps more in-line with the Substantive theory of Ellul, if fully 
analyzed.124 
 The current scholar who is most prolific in drawing Niebuhr into contemporary 
technological scholarship is Braden Molhoek, who has written two articles and given one 
presentation on the subject.  What distinguishes Molhoek is that he uses Niebuhr’s anthropology 
as a point of contact between theology and science, a point he makes clear in his first foray into 
the subject, in which he concludes, “It is my contention that theology and science makes an ideal 
conversation partner for Niebuhr because…his anthropology is constructed in a way that is open 
to the insights of science.”125  Using the conclusion of this presentation as a foundation, Molhoek 
first turns to publish on the question of artificial intelligence and transhumanism.  Arguing 
against Herzfeld’s approach to Niebuhr and transhumanism, Molhoek uses Niebuhr to show that 
while the transhumanist’s quest towards artificial intelligence has the potential for sin—as it is 
indicative of one’s anxiety surrounding death—the various technologies in themselves are not 
                                               
123 While today “Luddite” as an adjective can be defined as one who strictly opposes technological progression, the 
Luddites historically were a band of people who formed “armies” in late 18th century Nottinghamshire, England who 
ultimately caused “…damage to machines and property that amounted to more than £100,000.”  See: Kirkpatrick 
Sale, Rebels Against the Future (New York, NY: Perseus Publishing, 1995). Quote from P. 4. 
124 Noreen Herzfeld, “More than Information: A Christian Critique of a New Dualism” in Theology and Science Vol. 
14 No. 1 (2016), P. 84-92. 
125 Braden Molhoek, “Revitalizing the Originals: Reinhold Niebuhr’s Original Sin and Original Righteousness in 
Light of Theology and Science,” presentation at The Pacific Coast Theological Society (6-7 November 2015). 
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inherently evil, and can indeed be used to better society in positive ways.126  In his latest paper, 
however, Molhoek abandons Niebuhr’s anthropological and existential method and instead uses 
Niebuhr primarily as a virtue ethicist, only utilizing his anthropology as an initial contact point 
between genetics and the biological foundation of Niebuhr’s conception of self.127  While 
Molhoek’s work on the intersection of Niebuhr and technology is helpful in that he builds from 
Niebuhr’s anthropology to conduct his analysis of technology, he, in his words, tends “toward 
the philosophy of science side” of Niebuhr’s application and does not address the social 
dimensions of his work. 128 Additionally, he does not focus on Niebuhr’s understanding of 
responsibility within the technological society, nor does he directly answer the question of 
technological neutrality. 
 Perhaps the two contemporary scholars who have contributed most to the direction of this 
thesis regarding the intersection of Niebuhr and the technological society is Charles McDaniel 
and Anna Robbins; the former for his delineations of the contours of technology from Niebuhr’s 
perspective, and the latter for her diagnosis of the philosophical currents which largely govern 
contemporary culture.  McDaniel’s work is helpful in that it describes Niebuhr’s perception of 
technology’s effects as “indeterminate, depending largely on a society’s moral framework and 
social relations.”129 This idea partially assists in the development of what thesis will describe as, 
“technological ambiguity.” However, his development is, in his own words, “largely 
                                               
126 Braden Molhoek, “Sensuality and Altering Anthropology in Artificial Intelligence and Transhumanism,” in 
Theology and Science Vol. 14 No. 1 (2016), P. 99-104. 
127 In his article, “Raising the Virtuous Bar: The Underlying Issues of Genetic Moral Enhancement” (in Theology 
and Science Vol. 16 No. 3, 2018. P. 280), Molhoek expresses his reasoning for utilizing Niebuhr in the context of 
virtue ethics, stating, “Although traditional virtue ethics tends to draw upon the work of Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, I blieve that Reinhold Niebuhr provides a succinct answer to this question.  Niebuhr’s answer is easier to 
place into conversation with modern science than these classical thinkers.  Niebuhr assumes that the human 
condition is embedded in our biological and social nature.”   
128 Braden Molhoek, “RE: Out on a Niebuhrian limb here,” Message to R. Clifton Bailey (21 June 2019). Email. 
129 Charles McDaniel, “Development and ‘Technics’: A Niebuhrian Assessment of Technology’s Contribution to 
Social Progress,” at Global Poverty Symposium (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 26 October 2008), P. 1. 
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unrefined,”130 and never addresses the problem of ethical responsibility, nor does he begin from 
Niebuhr’s anthropology to fully support such a position.  Robbins’ work is helpful in that, from a 
Niebuhrian anthropological methodology, she clearly argues and supports the view that 
contemporary culture operates primarily from the philosophical presupposition of a “naturalistic 
determinism…[which yields] a nihilism that is not conducive to human flourishing….”131  
However, her analysis does not directly address the technological society, though it should be 
noted that her critique of determinism does briefly touch on ethical responsibility.132 
3. Original Contribution 
 
In conclusion, there is a lack of scholarship—both Christian and Niebuhrian—regarding 
the three mutually reinforcing challenges this thesis seeks to address: the implications of the 
technological neutrality/non-neutrality binary, human nature within the technological society, 
and ethical responsibility within the technological society.  Therefore, the purpose of this thesis 
is to apply Niebuhr’s understanding of Christian anthropology and ethical responsibility to the 
techno-critical approaches of Mumford and Marcuse to forge a new approach that does not 
simply reduce technology to mere instruments, nor demonize it as an all-consuming form of 
impending disaster.  Rather, this thesis will propose a Christian way of dealing with the 
technological society that is realistic about its negative effects without sacrificing the Christian’s 
agency within it.  In opposition to the dualism proposed by those who presume technology’s 
neutrality over and against those who presume its non-neutrality, the Niebuhrian perspective that 
will be articulated in this thesis will formulate what shall be called, “technological ambiguity.” 
                                               
130 Charles McDaniel, “RE: Niebuhr and Technology,” Message to R. Clifton Bailey (16 March 2018). Email. 
131 Anna Robbins, “It’s always right now’: framing the struggle for meaning in contemporary culture,” in Holiness 
Vol. 2 Is. 3 (2016), P. 359. 
132 Robbins states, “…determinism undermines the potential and reality of moral responsibility.” (Ibid., P. 365) 
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III: Scope, Contribution, Methodology, Outline 
A. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is limited theologically and in whom it can consider dialogically.  
Theologically, this thesis will be limited to the views of Reinhold Niebuhr and the various 
theologians he may reference, in the way Niebuhr references them.  It is not possible to seek 
every distinctive interpretation of theologians he references unless it is relevant to the material.  
This same reasoning should be applied to his uses of biblical texts; what matters for the purposes 
of this thesis is how Niebuhr views the texts that he uses.   
 Additionally, this thesis is limited as to whom it can consider dialogically.  There are a 
wide variety of views that permeate the scholarship concerning the technological society.  This 
initial chapter set up types (Instrumental, Substantive, Critical Theory) to account for most 
scholarship on the issue, and has already eliminated both Hard Instrumental Theory and 
Substantive Theory.  Furthermore, one primary voice has been distinguished to represent both 
remaining categories (Soft Instrumental Theory and Critical Theory) for the purposes of having a 
meaningful dialogue between these individuals and Reinhold Niebuhr.  While it may be 
necessary at times to include others, these two scholars (Mumford and Marcuse) will serve as the 
primary interlocutors for Niebuhr due to their significance in constructing and accurately 
representing each respective school of thought.  
B. Contribution: Synthesizing Towards a New Approach to Technological Engagement 
On the one hand, while Mumford and Marcuse establish realistic perspectives on the 
technological society in that both can remain critical of technology without succumbing to 
determinism, both negate such positions by presuming too high or too low of an anthropology, 
further complicating their ethical prescriptions by their inability to establish ethical 
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responsibility.  On the other hand, while Niebuhr does very little to construct a critique of the 
technological society in his own work, he frames human nature with enough dimension to 
maintain ethical responsibility so as to not succumb to apathy or resignation.  Therefore, the goal 
of this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the three that results in a fresh approach to the 
technological society that is grounded in Niebuhr’s anthropology and capable of maintaining 
ethical responsibility, while also remaining mindful of Mumford and Marcuse’s technological 
critiques.  This synthesis will culminate in a new type of technological engagement, which shall 
be called “technological ambiguity,” which shall grant enough dimension to house the critical 
elements of Marcuse and Mumford, without sacrificing Niebuhr’s anthropological center which 
is necessary to establish and maintain ethical responsibility.   
C. Methodology: Theological, Prophetic, Ethical 
The methodology of this thesis is composed of three parts: (1) theological, (2) prophetic, 
and (3) ethical.  The theological method of this thesis will be anthropological in nature, and will 
be utilized to expose the responsible self at the center of human experience as illuminated by 
Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology—what Niebuhr calls, the “uneasy conscience.”  The prophetic 
method of this thesis is to apply Niebuhr’s view of self in order to expose the problematic 
anthropologies of two prominent philosophers of technology, Lewis Mumford and Herbert 
Marcuse, on the basis of their inability to establish personal responsibility in their respective 
anthropologies, and to demonstrate how each respective philosopher’s view of self and 
responsibility obscures their understanding of the technological society.  Finally, the ethical 
method of this thesis is to synthesize key observations of Mumford and Marcuse with Niebuhr’s 




This thesis shall progress in an appropriate manner to methodology outlined above.  First, 
the following two chapters will focus exclusively on Reinhold Niebuhr. Chapter 2 will establish 
his methodology—upon which the methodology of this thesis is based—and Chapter 3 will 
establish his concept of the easy and uneasy conscience through his use of Christian 
anthropology, which shall act as the philosophical structure through which the uneasy conscience 
is understood and maintained.  Second, in keeping with the prophetic and apologetic 
methodology of this thesis, chapters 4-7 will serve as critical analyses of Lewis Mumford and 
Herbert Marcuse’s philosophies of technology, respectively, and will do so on the basis of each 
philosopher’s anthropology in relation to Niebuhr’s concept of the uneasy conscience.  Chapter 8 
will introduce a new type of ethical engagement with technology—Technological Ambiguity—
and do so in concert with the observations of Mumford and Marcuse from the ground of 
Niebuhr’s anthropology in order to contribute a novel approach to technology which maintains 
ethical responsibility without sacrificing a sober perspective on technology and its effects.  The 
final chapter will conclude with a summary of the research, its various implications, and suggest 




Chapter 2: Introduction to Reinhold Niebuhr and Methodology 
Introduction 
 
 The ultimate goal for this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Marcuse in order to create a new category of 
technological engagement from Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology.  However, before such a goal 
is to be undertaken, it is imperative to unpack the methodology that is to be employed.  While 
Niebuhr provides for this thesis the basic methodology to achieve its goal, it is admittedly a non-
traditional methodology within theological and philosophical circles.133  This means that it is all 
the more necessary to present a strong introduction and defense of Niebuhr’s methodology from 
the outset in order to provide a critical and instructive lens for the chapters to follow.   
Niebuhr is a complex intersection of three interdependent vocations: preacher, prophet, 
and theologian.134  He is at once concerned with exhorting the people of God towards action 
(preacher), “waging war,” in a prophetic sense,135 against a destructive and confused civilization, 
and utilizing the resources of theology to better articulate both human action and world events 
from the position of a biblical understanding of self and human nature (theologian).  Niebuhr 
sees this vocation as one that is a seamless and unified whole; he states, “Since I am not so much 
scholar as preacher, I must confess that the gradual unfolding of my theological ideas has come 
                                               
133 William Hordern claims that “Niebuhr lays a new basis for a rational defense of Christianity.” (A Layman’s 
Guide to Protestant Theology, Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1955. P. 154. 
134 Regarding preacher, in his “Intellectual Biography” (Kegley and Bretall, P. 3), Niebuhr likens himself to a 
“circuit rider” who is concerned with dramatizing scripture by placing “the gospel…in conflict with…customs and 
attitudes of our day.”  Regarding prophet, Abraham Heschel, famously compared Niebuhr to the “prophets of old” 
(“Reinhold Niebuhr: A Last Farewell,” Conservative Judaism Vol. 25, 1971, P. 62-63). Regarding theologian, in his 
article, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Contribution to Christian Social Ethics” (in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic Voice in 
our Time, Landon, Harold R. (ed.), Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1962, P. 58), John C. Bennett argues, “Reinhold 
Niebuhr is catalogued as a theologian more than anything else and he has done more than any other American to 
change the climate of theology.” 
135 Prophetic can be understood as a “relentless and incisive cultural criticism.” See: Sabella, P. 112) 
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not so much through study as through the pressure of world events.”136  Niebuhr’s theology is 
articulated in the context of his prophetic role in the world, and the outcome is the basis upon 
which his exhortation as a preacher becomes most pronounced. 
This tripartite vocation of preacher, prophet, and theologian come together to produce a 
multilateral, mutually reinforcing method of analyzing the intersection of faith, human nature, 
and behavior.  In her work, Methods in the Madness, Anna Robbins describes Niebuhr’s 
overarching methodology most concisely: “…Niebuhr was consistently and fairly clear that his 
purpose was apologetic, his…outcome was ethical, and his focus was the predicament of 
humanity in history.”137  As preacher, the end result for Niebuhr is ethical, but as both prophet 
and theologian, Niebuhr would wage an apologetic war against the predominant philosophical, 
political, and cultural influences of his day on the basis of Christian anthropology in order to 
achieve such ethical ends.   
This section will examine Niebuhr’s tripartite methodology in the following order: (I) 
Niebuhr the theologian’s anthropological method; (II) Niebuhr the prophet’s apologetic method, 
and (III) Niebuhr the preacher’s ethical method.  Each part will respond to common criticisms 
levelled against Niebuhr, and end with a brief statement regarding the correlation between 
Niebuhr’s method and that which is used in this thesis.   This section will then conclude with a 
synthesis of the three parts, demonstrating Niebuhr’s overall methodology, and a brief 
description of the overlap between Niebuhr’s methodology and the methodology used in this 
thesis. 
 
                                               
136 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Ten Years That Shook My World.” Christian Century Vol. 56 (April 1939)): P. 546. 
137 Anna Robbins, Methods in the Madness: Diversity in Twentieth-Century Christian Social Ethics (Waynesboro, 
GA: Paternoster Press, 2004), P. 93.  Emphasis added. 
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I: Niebuhr the Theologian’s Anthropological Method: Christian Realism 
 
As anthropological theologian, perhaps the most unique feature of Niebuhr’s 
methodology is best described as his “Christian Realism.”138  Both terms, “Christian” and 
“Realism,” it should be noted, offer their own distinct nuance to exactly how Niebuhr executes 
his anthropological method.  This subsection shall describe both parts of the term, “Christian 
Realism”—first “Realism” and then “Christian”—and will then show how his anthropological 
method works as a synthesis of the two.   
   “Realism,” according to Robin Lovin, “emerges primarily in a negative assessment of 
‘idealism.’”139 In other words, Realism is derived initially from a conception of what it is not.  If 
Idealism is “loyalty to moral norms and ideals, rather than to self-interest,”140 then Realism is 
“the disposition to take all factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to 
established norms, into account, particularly the factors of self-interest….”141  Realism, to 
Niebuhr, does not ignore the complexities of reality or human nature at the insistence of the 
ideal, but rather gauges reality from the aggregate complexities of human life with a view 
towards the ideal.142  Rather than beginning from the place where the human is not, or ought to 
be, Realism begins and ends from the place where the human is.  
                                               
138 In his book, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. P. 1), 
Robin Lovin makes it clear that Christian Realism “originated before Niebuhr took it up as his own.”  Other 
thinkers, such as D.C. Macintosh and Walter Marshall Horton, were also influential voices before Niebuhr.  
However, “Christian Realism” is a “term closely associated with Reinhold Niebuhr, when it is not exclusively 
identified with his thought.”  While others were a part of this movement before and during Niebuhr’s lifetime, 
Niebuhr is clearly its chief theologian and shaper.   
139 Ibid., P. 2. 
140 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Augustine’s Political Realism,” in Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York, 
NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), p. 119-120. 
141 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
142 In his essay, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Conception of Man” (in The Personalist Vol. 26, July 1945. P. 285), Walter G. 
Muelder argues, “…Niebuhr attacks and seemingly rejects…idealism.  Yet, it is idealistic concepts and categories 
which carry the weight of his argument.  Such ideas are: self-consciousness, transcendence, self-consciousness, self-
transcendence, freedom, reason, will, universality, and personality.”  However, this critique is without merit, as 
Niebuhr dialectically places limits on each idealistic category Muelder mentions. 
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Niebuhr’s Realism, when used as a foundation upon which his theology operates—the 
“Christian” part of Niebuhr’s “Christian Realism”—creates what Robbins aptly describes as a 
“theology from below.”143  As opposed to such systematic theologians as Karl Barth and Stanley 
Hauerwas—those who “began with God and [then] developed an ethic;”144 which is fittingly 
labeled, “a theology from above”—Niebuhr’s “entire theological system appears to be rooted in 
ethical concerns, existentially discerned, and approached through reason as a ‘theology from 
below.’”145  Operating as a “Realism,” Niebuhr’s theology does not begin with an ideal, or even 
the Ideal (God), but rather from the complexities of the human condition as exposed in Christian 
scriptures.  It is for this reason that Niebuhr-as-theologian should not be understood primarily as 
one who is on a quest to find God, but rather, Niebuhr utilizes theology as a resource that first 
and foremost clarifies the human situation.146  To Niebuhr, Christianity is at its best when it is 
revealing reality—who humans are, what the world is, what the nature of power is, etc.—and 
only secondarily does Niebuhr find its ideals instructive, and only then are they to be taken 
alongside the sobering realities that the Christian scriptures express. 
Niebuhr’s realist approach—his “theology from below”—would have no problem finding 
adversaries within both the liberal and neo-orthodox theological circles of his day—interestingly, 
for similar reasons: his “defeatism,” “pessimism,” and his rejection of Christian idealism on the 
                                               
143 In Methods in the Madness (P. 92), Anna Robbins describes Niebuhr’s work on a spectrum first devised by James 
Gustafson (“Theology in the Service of Ethics” in Richard Harries, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our 
Time, London & Oxford, UK: Mobray Press, 1986).  Robbins argues that if Karl Barth’s theology is characterized 
by its focus upon God (theology from above), Niebuhr’s thought is characterized by its focus upon the doctrine of 
humanity and human sin. 
144 Robbins, Methods in the Madness, P. 92. 
145 Ibid. 
146 The term, “human situation,” will be used until a more careful analysis of Niebuhr’s distinctions regarding 
human nature, self, and sin can be detailed later in this chapter.  What is meant by this term is essentially the 
aggregate of human existence, faculties (rational and physical), and engagements with the world. 
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basis of a more sober view of human nature.147 Upon publishing his Moral Man and Immoral 
Society, liberal pastor and academic, Charles Gilkey, after reading Niebuhr systematically tear 
down the optimistic tenets of the Social Gospel Movement—the movement upon which the 
hopes of early 20th century liberal Christianity rested—proclaimed to his family, “Reinnie’s gone 
and done it…Reinnie’s gone crazy.”148 
However, perhaps his most ardent adversary regarding his Christian realism for the 
majority of his life was a theologian many would often merge together with Niebuhr under the 
banner of neo-orthodoxy;149 who his biographer, Richard Fox, calls Niebuhr’s “old nemesis,” 150 
Karl Barth—and it is sufficient to say that the feelings were mutual.151  Barth’s most directed 
critique towards Niebuhr came rather implicitly, though through a thinly veiled lecture he gave at 
the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948, just after WWII.152  Barth exclaims: 
It is said that we should seek first after the kingdom of God and God’s righteousness, so that all those 
things of which we have need in view of the disorder of the world may then be added unto us.  Why 
would…we not take this sequence seriously?  God’s ‘plan of salvation’ is above, but the disorder of the 
world…is all below…. [T]he nature of this whole complex…only becomes visible and tractable from up 
there, only from the perspective of God’s plan of salvation downward—whereas there is no prospect or 
path upwards to God’s plan of salvation from the perspective of the disorder of the world….153 
 
                                               
147 Dorrien, P. 450.  Additionally, in his book, Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009. P. 95), Andrew S. Finstuen distinguishes Niebuhr apart from most protestant theologians, in that “for 
most people, his writings were either too difficult or too gloomy or both.” 
148 Langdon Gilkey, On Niebuhr: A Theological Study (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), P. 3-4. 
149 Niebuhr’s inclusion under the term “neo-orthodox” is largely dependent upon the definition.  According to 
Niebuhr himself, however, he does not see the connection: “I have never thought of myself in their category…their 
indifference to and lack of understanding of political and social problems has always made them foreigners to me 
(Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, NY: Pantheon Books, P. 214).”  Also see: Gary Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in 
Modern Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000. P. 7). 
150 Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, P. 178. 
151 Fox recounts a time when Niebuhr visited Basel for a lecture, which happened to be where Barth lived.  
Anticipating Niebuhr’s arrival, Barth was not sure whether “we would sniff at each other cautiously like two bull 
mastiffs, or rush barking at each other, or lie stretched out peacefully in the sun side by side.”  Barth recalled that 
they ended up having a “good conversation,” but Niebuhr, however, “made no mention of the visit.” (Reinhold 
Niebuhr, P. 231) 
152 In his book, An American Conscience: The Reinhold Niebuhr Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 
2017. P. 83), Jeremy Sabella described this meeting as being rife with tensions between the Niebuhrians and the 
Barthians, sparking “animated discussions,” even prompting both scholars to respond in kind in their respective 
lectures. 
153 Karl Barth, “No Christian Marshal Plan” reprinted in Christian Century (8 December, 1948), P. 1330. 
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Here Barth is arguing that the task above all others is the “plan of salvation.”  The Christian 
response to evil in the world is the witness that evil has already been dealt with by Christ on the 
cross.  Humans should not construct their witness from the “disorder of the world,” but from the 
Kingdom of God, which is “above.” 
 In response to Barth’s address, Niebuhr’s address at the same conference confronted the 
hypocrisy of Barth’s more cozy and cloistered post-war theology, compared to Barth’s more 
politically aware ethic through the span of WWII.  He states, “Yesterday they [Barthians] 
discovered that the church may be an ark in which to survive a flood.  Today they seem so 
enamored of this special function of the church that they have decided to turn the ark into a home 
on Mount Ararat and live in it perpetually.”154  In other words, during the war, Barth was keen 
on utilizing Christianity as a resource to realistically counter Nazi Germany, to use Barth’s term, 
from “below.”  However, after the war, Barth seems content to stay out of such political 
engagement and focus exclusively on the Kingdom “above.”  Niebuhr concludes that Barth’s 
approach appears to be able to “fight the devil if he shows both horns and both cloven feet.  But 
it refuses to make discriminating judgments between good and evil if the devil shows only one 
horn or the half of a cloven foot.”155  The hypocrisy here that Niebuhr is addressing is that 
Barth’s approach incorporates realism when it is overtly clear that evil is before it, but the 
perennial struggle humans face against sin and evil every day is not enough to merit a more 
nuanced and grounded approach to Christian anthropology and sin, over and against what 
                                               
154 Niebuhr, “We are Men and Not God,” reprinted in Christian Century (27 October, 1948), P. 1139. 
155 Ibid. 
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Niebuhr called the “sanctified futilitarianism”156 that Barth articulates from his idealistic 
theology from above.157 
Ultimately, it is within the frailty and complexity of the human situation that Niebuhr 
utilizes the Christian scriptures to inform his depiction of the human condition, as well as the 
most realistic means of achieving political, social, and ethical progress therein.  The idealism of 
Barthian neo-orthodoxy created, in Niebuhr’s words, a “new kind of fundamentalism,”158 while 
the idealism of the Social Gospel liberals created churches which were “irrelevant to the ultimate 
realities.”159 Christian Realism, therefore, is a demonstration that Christianity represents the best 
way forward that does not betray the complexities of life through blind devotion to its utmost 
ideals, but at the same time offers for the human the greatest resource for clarifying the human 
situation in which he or she stands. 
II: Niebuhr the Prophet’s Apologetic Method: Validation and Exposition 
 
 The way that Christian Realism operates as a method is largely distinguished in the 
journey from Christian revelation towards the prophetic use of Christian anthropology as 
apologetics;160 the apologetic component of Niebuhr’s process is a method known as “Negative 
Validation.”161  Donald Bloesch states that the task of Negative Validation “is to uncover the 
                                               
156 Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, P. 123. 
157 It must be noted that the differentiation between Niebuhr’s Realism and Barth’s Idealism may falsely appear 
synonymous with a “cautious” v. “optimistic” dichotomy, respectively.  While this may be the case between 
Niebuhr’s realism and some, including Barth, often Idealism manifests as a rather pessimistic perspective on history 
and humanity, as one’s quest for achieving what is decidedly beyond reality has a way of perceiving this world as 
further and further away from that Ideal.  Chapter 5 will show this is precisely the case with Mumford, as his 
Idealism finds its ultimate expression in a bitter pessimism. 
158 Ibid., P. 117. 
159 Niebuhr, “Intellectual Autobiography” (Kegley & Bretall), P. 7. 
160 In his “Intellectual Biography” (Kegley & Bretall, P. 3), Niebuhr defines his apologetic as a “defence and 
justification of the Christian faith in a secular age…” and unabashedly admits that what he is doing is clearly 
apologetic, despite categorical concerns from other prominent theologians. 
161 Donald Bloesch, Reinhold Niebuhr’s Apologetics (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002) p. 52. 
 55 
contradictions within the various alternatives to Christianity…[in order to] demonstrate its 
relevance….”162  The contradictions Niebuhr finds among competing approaches to ethics and 
politics are wide and varied, but generally are those views within a school of thought—often 
those he called “modern”163—that betray the realistic and complex position of human beings.  
Effectively, the method is to approach opposing schools of thought and their views on the self 
and human nature dialectically, in that “concepts are clarified by stating what they exclude, and 
positions are explained by specifying what they reject.”164  Practically, Niebuhr carries this out 
by consistently beginning with a close examination of prominent schools of thought or highly 
influential individuals who deal with a particular topic, then he dialectically demonstrates the 
flaws of their conclusions on the basis of their anthropological articulations or presumptions. 
At the bottom of this dialectical process between Niebuhr and his interlocutors is the 
negative validation of Christianity, which Niebuhr argues is “…involved in the paradox of 
claiming a higher stature of man and taking a more serious view of his evil than other 
anthropology.”165  Unlike other philosophies of human nature, Christian Realism argues that the 
Christian faith and Christian scriptures best illuminate the complexities at the center of the 
human condition, and in turn provides for the individual a clearer grasp on both oneself and 
one’s environment. 
 However, it is vital to note that Niebuhr’s Negative Validation is only the beginning of 
his prophetic stance against modern philosophy and culture.  While his apologetic in itself is 
                                               
162 Ibid. 
163 In NDHN, Niebuhr tends to limit the scope of modernity to four distinct approaches to human nature and history: 
Rationalism, Idealism, Naturalism, and Romanticism.  However, a wider definition of modernity would 
appropriately fit Niebuhr’s critique, as well.  See N.J. Rengger’s Political Theory, Modernity, and Postmodernity: 
Beyond Enlightenment and Critique (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1995. P. 37-76 for a larger description of 
the different ways modernity could be defined or approached. 
164 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 3. 
165 NDHN, P. 18. 
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framed as an anthropological attack against the major doctrines of his time, a Christian view of 
self and human nature that is left standing at the end of his negative validation is inherently 
prophetic in what it reveals about self and society; it is a warning about the inevitable confusion 
and destruction of pride, sensuousness, and anxiety at the center of the human condition.166  
Niebuhr’s approach to the prophetic “war against civilization” simultaneously acts, on the one 
hand, as a validation of a Christian view of humanity, but on the other hand, an exposition of 
humanity in order to turn humans towards God and mitigate the destructive inclinations of their 
nature.  This latter part of his prophetic “war against civilization” can be traced, at least partly, to 
the influence of John Calvin.167  In Book I of his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin 
states: 
Indeed, our very poverty better discloses the infinitude of benefits reposing in God…. Thus, from the 
feeling of our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity…and corruption, we recognize that the true light of 
wisdom, sound virtue, full abundance of every good, and purity of righteousness rest in the Lord alone…we 
cannot seriously aspire to him before we begin to become displeased with ourselves.168 
 
This statement by Calvin is an apt description of the expository facet of Niebuhr’s prophetic 
mission.  It is in this way that Niebuhr’s prophetic methodology is more than simply validating a 
Christian view of anthropology over and against competing anthropologies, but includes within it 
an exposition, or revelation,169 of human sin that serves as a warning unto humans, about 
                                               
166 In his book, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr: A Mentor to the Twentieth Century (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1992. P. 136), Ronald H. Stone argues, “As Niebuhr presents the Christian perspective on human 
nature, it is clear that he presents a particular form of that perspective.  He is arguing for a prophetic view that 
focuses on evil in society and its overcoming…. Human nature cannot be adequately comprehended in its greatness 
and its squalor outside of the relationship to God.” 
167 In his book, The Doctrine of Humanity in the Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2013. P. 22-23), Hamilton states, “A particularly pervasive motif in Niebuhr’s writings is his use 
of an argument found in Calvin’s interpretation of the relation between our knowledge of God and of ourselves…. 
The need for the contemporary world to aspire to God in earnest by beginning to be displeased with itself, 
individually and collectively, was an intense conviction of Niebuhr from nearly the beginning of his career.” 
168 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, John T. McNeill (ed.), Ford Lewis Battles (tr.), (Philadelphia, 
PA: The Westminster Press, 1960), P. 36-37. 
169 The term “revelation” in this context is to be understood, not necessarily as some truth from the great beyond, but 
as a truth about the world that has been exposed or brought to mind.   
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humans, and indeed an exposition of the very manner in which humans are destructive.  The goal 
of anthropological exposition, for Niebuhr, is ultimately to place the human within a better 
understanding of both God and oneself. 
 Regarding Niebuhr’s validation-as-prophetic-witness methodology, at the height of 
WWII, Niebuhr went so far as to argue that “…the task of redeeming Western society rests in a 
peculiar sense upon Christianity.”170  Indeed, it is very clear that Niebuhr’s magnum opus, The 
Nature and Destiny of Man, is a Christian attempt to clarify human nature from the position of 
the biblical view of sin in order to make sense of the problems which led up to WWII in an effort 
to better correct them.171  Niebuhr states, “By way of validating the relevance of the Christian 
conception of man as a possible source of light for the confusion of modernity, we must consider 
the problems of modern culture….”172  In other words, through his validation of a Christian view 
of human nature and sin, Niebuhr seeks to clarify the global confusions of his day.  Historian and 
ethicist, Gary Dorrien paraphrases Niebuhr’s in the following way: “Only Christianity had the 
resources to save Europe from fascist barbarism, but it had to be a Christianity that believed in 
the Christian doctrine of sin.”173  Niebuhr’s use of a Christian view of self, human nature, and 
especially sin would become the central lens through which he articulated and prescribed 
appropriate action within both a personal and global venue. 
                                               
170 Reinhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion?: A Study in the Social Resources and Limitations of 
Religion in Modern Life (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1927), P. 238-239. 
171 Friend and colleague, Paul Tillich, in his lecture on Niebuhr—since reprinted as “Sin and Grace in the Theology 
of Reinhold Niebuhr” (in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic Voice of Our Time, Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1962. 
P. 30)—said of Niebuhr’s work, “…I remember our walks along Riverside Drive in the two years in which Reinie 
worked on his magnum opus [Nature and Destiny]…and we talked about many of the problems which then came in 
such a wonderful way into this great book.” 
172 NDHN, P. 25. 
173 Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, P. 466. 
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 Perhaps Niebuhr’s strongest challenger regarding his view of apologetics-as-prophetic-
witness is the Barthian theologian, Stanley Hauerwas.174  Hauerwas defines the “apologetic 
theologian” as one who feels burdened to “…translate our archaic, inherited forms into modern 
ones.”175  For Hauerwas, this desire to translate the Gospel to the world amounted to the 
theologian’s capitulation to what Hauerwas called, “Constantinian Christianity”: “an adapted and 
domesticated gospel [within which Christians] could fit American values into a loosely Christian 
framework, and [Christians] could thereby be culturally significant.”176  He reasons, “The more 
theologians seek to find the means to translate theological convictions into terms acceptable to 
the nonbeliever, the more they substantiate the view that theology has little of importance to say 
in the area of ethics.”177  In essence, Hauerwas argues that the more a theologian can resolve the 
issues of the world on the world’s terms, the less one’s theology is actually needed, and the more 
the theologian is woven into the fabric of worldly dramas. 
For Hauerwas, Niebuhr was among the greatest offenders of this capitulation, arguing 
that “[Niebuhr] sought to naturalize theological claims in a manner that would make them 
acceptable to the scientific and political presuppositions of his day.”178  This to Hauerwas made 
Niebuhr’s theology weak at the expense of a more politically-involved activism179—that 
                                               
174 Hauerwas’ Barthian influence is well-documented, not least by himself—in With the Grain of the Universe 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001) Hauerwas effectively argues against both William James and Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and instead gives a defense of the Barthian position of Natural Theology—but perhaps the most detailed 
work on the topic is David B. Hunsicker’s The Making of Stanley Hauerwas: Bridging Barth and Postliberalism 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2019). 
175 Hauerwas, Resident Aliens (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), P. 20. 
176 Ibid., P. 17. 
177 Stanley Hauerwas, “On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological,” in The Hauerwas Reader (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), P. 31-32. 
178 Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe, P. 115. 
179 This is a rather common critique of Niebuhr, not least observed in Hauerwas.  While reflecting on Niebuhr in his 
book, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1984, P. 6), Hauerwas states, “…theological convictions…have lost their power to train us in skills of truthfulness, 
partly because accounts of the Christian moral life have too long been accommodated to the needs of the nation-
state…. As a result the ever present power of God’s kingdom to form our imagination has been subordinated to the 
interest of furthering liberal ideas through the mechanism of the state.”  Additionally, in his essay, “the curious fact 
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effectively “[Niebuhr’s] church was America”180—arguing that “Jerry Falwell181 now sounds 
like Reinhold Niebuhr.”182   
Hauerwas’ perspective, however, rests upon presuppositions that ultimately weaken both 
the relevance and effectiveness of his theology in the world.  His most detrimental 
presupposition is uniquely Barthian: that there is no “point of contact” between the human’s 
knowledge of God (Theology/Scripture) and the human’s knowledge of the world (philosophy, 
anthropology, worldly religions, etc.).183  Hauerwas quotes Barth as saying, “God is not ‘man’ 
said in a loud voice;”184 meaning, one cannot simply begin in secular anthropology or philosophy 
and expect to arrive at any divine knowledge.  This is precisely the presupposition Hauerwas is 
working from when he condemns Niebuhr’s apologetic and anthropological method.   
However, articulating more explicitly from the position of Calvin—and more implicitly 
from the position of Emil Brunner185—Niebuhr argues for the possibility of discovering God on 
                                               
that…the Lord always puts us on the just side” (in Studia Theologica Vol. 66, 2012. P. 42), Arne Rasmusson argues 
that Niebuhr’s insistence upon “…making America the primary context and neglecting the church…results in 
Niebuhr’s failure to display how theology could help him see the world differently and so influence his political 
analysis….”  However, both Both Hauerwas and Rasmusson misunderstand Niebuhr by neglecting the universality 
of his perspective as one that is fundamental to all sinners and held together by way of the Christian scriptures.  
America was merely the occasion for his otherwise universal theology. 
180 Gary Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell Publishing, 2009), P. 478.  Emphasis added. 
181 For non-American readers, this reference to Jerry Falwell is intended to be rhetorically harsh, given Falwell’s 
reputation in the United States.  Falwell was considered to be a “radical right” Christian whose ambition it was to 
utilize the “moral majority” to overtake the political sphere for the church in the United States.  See: J. Philip 
Wogaman’s Christian Perspectives on Politics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000. P. 103-122). 
182 Ibid., P. 32. 
183The phrase “point of contact” is used often by Barth to refer to that place where the capacity to know the world 
intersects with the capacity to know God; essentially the overlap of “general” (natural) and “special” (scriptural) 
revelation. See: Church Dogmatics (vol 1.1, New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2004. P. 236-237). 
184 Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, P. 25. 
185 In his essay, “Some Remarks on Reinhold Niebuhr’s Work as a Christian Thinker,” Emil Brunner criticizes 
Niebuhr for heavily borrowing from Brunner regarding his work on Natural Theology in Niebuhr’s work The Nature 
and Destiny of Man, stating, “I was somewhat astonished to find no mention of the fact that in this work Reinhold 
Niebuhr had been strongly preoccupied with certain ideas which I had put forward…four years before…. This was 
all the more surprising to me inasmuch as Niebuhr had informed me personally by word of mouth in the year 1938, 
just as he was beginning to prepare those lectures…” (Kegley & Bretall, P. 32-33).  Brunner states, “With us 
European scholars it is customary to give our readers some information as to the sources of our thought” (P. 32). 
 60 
the basis of God’s own image: human beings more clearly understanding themselves.186  While 
there has been much written on the debate regarding the validity of Calvin and Brunner’s 
position over and against Barth’s,187 it is important to note the impact Hauerwas’ position—that 
one is unable to translate scripture into the world—has upon the effectiveness of his ethic.  
Essentially, while it is possible that “God is not ‘man’ said in a loud voice,”188 as both Hauerwas 
and Barth affirm, the extent of Christian ethics cannot simply be a condemnation of the injustices 
of the world by speaking theologically “in a loud voice,” either.   
In his article, “Idolatry: the root of all evil,” David Novak astutely characterizes the 
weakness of Hauerwas and Barth’s approach to Christian theology by contrasting the work of 
Niebuhr with that of Barth, Bonhoeffer, and the Confessing Church189 in the years leading up to 
WWII.   While it should be noted that near the end of the war, both Barth and Bonhoeffer took a 
more realistic approach to their ethic,190 the application born originally of its theological 
presuppositions, and that which lasted that majority of the war, Novak describes as an 
“…opposition to the Third Reich [that] was theological…and not ethical-political….”191  In 
effect, the inability to translate a Christian ethic into the world—the presumption that there is no 
“point of contact” between the word of God and that of nature—resulted in one’s inability to 
                                               
186 This position is utilized all throughout Niebuhr’s Nature and Destiny of Man (first broached in NDHN, P. 13), 
but should be credited, at least partially, as an offshoot of Calvin’s “inward turn” in the first book of his Institutes 
and Brunner’s “Nature and Grace” (in Natural Theology, John Baillie, ed., London, UK: Geoffrey Bless: Centenary 
Press, 1946. P. 20). 
187 To understand the various contours of the Barth/Brunner natural theology divide, see Natural Theology: 
Comprising Nature and Grace by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply No! by Dr. Karl Barth (Peter Fraenkel, 
tr., Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002).  Additionally, for a defense of Calvin’s view of Natural 
Theology in light of Barth’s critique, see Stephen J. Grabill’s Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed 
Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2006. P. 70-96). 
188 Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, P. 25. 
189 While Novak makes a compelling point regarding Barth and, to a lesser extent, Bonhoeffer, it is admittedly unfair 
to cast such a pointed aspersion on an entire church. 
190 See Charles Marsh’s essay, “A Theologian for These Times?” (in The American Prospect, 20 February, 2002) for 
a description of Barth and Bonhoeffer’s realism during WWII.   
191 David Novak, “Idolatry: the root of all evil,” ABC Religion & Ethics, 23 August, 2011. Web: 
https://www.abc.net.au/religion/idolatry-the-root-of-all-evil/10101220 Emphasis added. 
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speak against Nazi Germany’s evil without reducing it to a theological disagreement or 
incommensurability.192  They chose not to reason with the German people how it was that what 
the Third Reich was doing, and of that which so many German people were a part, was “sinful,” 
“idolatrous,” or “injust,” outside of the church’s internal language and theological context.  
Novak, who himself is Jewish, is especially grateful for Niebuhr’s ability to grasp the 
magnitude of the problem earlier than most.193  He argues that it is because Niebuhr was capable 
of recognizing and condemning the idolatry and pride present from very early on in the Third 
Reich, and was able to label it as such on biblical terms as translated into the world, that he could 
ready the cause for a nation to utilize practical necessities to oust the Nazi government, even if it 
meant going to war.194   The piety of the Confessing Church, however, cloistered its prophetic 
voice behind a barricaded door, for no theological language pious enough could bridge them 
with the suffering world.195   
There is perhaps no better example of ethical irrelevancy than the hypothetical political 
engagement given by Hauerwas himself in the closing words of the second chapter of his, and 
co-author, William Willimon’s book, Resident Aliens.  Hauerwas196 describes a debate occurring 
                                               
192 It should be noted that Barth’s move away from politics after WWII was not strictly ideological, and there 
remains some nuance to be acknowledge regarding how his post-war political theology—or non-political theology—
developed.  In his essay, “’The New World’ of Karl Barth: Rethinking the Philosophical and Political Legacies of a 
Theologian” (The European Legacy Vol. 25 Is 2, 2020), Liisi Keedus argues Barth’s new disregard for politics was 
a reaction to the new idolatries of the times.  Keedus states, “Patriotism and Christianity seemed to have become 
inseperable,” and this new unification of the two “shocked Barth.”  It is in this way it seems there were additional 
concerns for Barth that had a “theology from below” essence, as Barth was concerned with theology becoming too 
integrated with political thought.  
193 Novak cites one of Niebuhr’s lectures from 1934 where he states, “It is significant that the amalgamation of 
nationalistic paganism and Christian faith attempted by the Nazi movement in the German Evangelical Church 
avails itself of the idea of God’s creation of the natural differences of race and blood for the purpose of giving a 
religious sanctification to the cult of race.” 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 It is assumed from the context of the chapter that Hauerwas wrote this story from his own experience, as opposed 
to Willimon, as Hauerwas is speaking about engaging with students.  Hauerwas taught at Duke University, while 
Willimon is a pastor. 
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between students regarding a decision that the United States’ president, Ronald Reagan, made 
regarding the bombing of certain “…military and civilian targets in Libya.”197  When the 
students saw Hauerwas standing nearby, they asked him about his opinion.  He responded, “[A]s 
a Christian, I could never support bombing…as an ethical act.”198  One student took umbrage 
with this response, and pressed Hauerwas about his hypocrisy, stating, “You get so upset when a 
terrorist guns down a little girl in an airport, but when President Reagan tries to set things right, 
you get indignant when a few Libyans get hurt.”199  Hauerwas then hypothetically constructs 
what he considers a “Christian response:”  He imagines, “…tomorrow morning, The United 
Methodist Church announces that it is sending a thousand missionaries to Libya.”  When the 
student told Hauerwas that Reagan would never allow missionaries into Libya, he responded, 
“I’ll admit that we can’t go to Libya, but not because of…Reagan.  We can’t go there because we 
no longer have a church that produces people who can do something this bold.  But we once 
did.”200  Thus, effectively, Hauerwas has nothing prescriptive to say about Libya sponsoring 
terrorism outside of sending missionaries that he knows he cannot send.201  It seems that, for 
Hauerwas, his Christianity can only speak from a position of transcended purity, and has no 
power to illuminate the truths of this world to improve it. 
 Niebuhr, however, can illuminate the truths of this world to improve it.  For Niebuhr the 
prophet, by validating a Christian view of self and human nature through a dialectical approach 
                                               
197 Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, P. 47. 
198 Ibid., P. 48. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 In his essay, “The Very American Stanley Hauerwas” (First Things, June, 2002. Web: 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/06/the-very-american-stanley-hauerwas), and in light of Niebuhr’s work, 
Stephen H. Webb convincingly argues that “Hauerwas is missing an ironic sensibility that understands how our best 
intentions often end up subverting the good we hope to achieve….”  In other words, despite Hauerwas’ clear 
conviction to maintain purity, Hauerwas is naïve to the fact that such fidelity to the Christian ideal can result in its 
opposite.   
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to modernity and contemporary culture, Niebuhr exposes an understanding of self that is—by its 
very nature—critical of human action in both a Christian and secular world.  This process of 
validation and exposition of a Christian view of self and human nature establishes for Niebuhr a 
potent “point of contact”202 regarding the universal sinful nature of human beings, through which 
he can both speak faithfully to scripture, yet realistically to the world in which he lives.    
III: Niebuhr the Preacher’s Ethical Method 
 
The aggregate of Niebuhr’s theological-anthropology and apologetic-prophetic 
methodology produces a very realistic and highly practical method of theological application on 
the basis of a Christian doctrine of sin.  Niebuhr the preacher utilizes biblical language and 
themes to construct an idea of Christian conduct which is suitable to his time, all without 
neglecting the timeless and foundational guidance of the Christian scriptures.  Once his prophetic 
voice is established—the validation and exposition of the modern human-as-sinner—Niebuhr 
would formulate a Christian way forward that does not betray the realities of sin, even as it 
strives to generate a better world at the direction of its ideals. 
At the center of Niebuhr’s ethical method is the fundamental conviction that the purpose 
of Christian ethics is to make the sinful individual and the sinful world more closely resemble the 
Christian ideal of agape love: “[A] love in which every life affirms the interest of the other;”203 a 
love which demonstrates “an attitude of the ideal of spirit without any prudential or selfish 
consideration.”204  However, it is important to emphasize that a Christian ethic is realized and 
                                               
202 Niebuhr uses the term “point of contact” when addressing Barth in NDHN (P. 158).  He argues that Barth 
effectively breaks with his Augustinian roots when he negates the “point of contact.”  He states, “It is significant that 
Karl Barth, who stands…in the general Augustinian tradition but who is interested to prove that revelation from God 
to man has practically no points of contact with man except those which it itself creates, finds Augustine’s 
definitions of the image of God in man very inconvenient and criticizes them severely.” 
203 Reinhold Niebuhr, Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, D.B. Robertson 
(ed.) (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1957), P. 50. 
204 Ibid., P. 220. 
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carried out by sinners, and for Niebuhr, myopically seeking the ideal of agape love without any 
regard for who humans are fundamentally is too often the source of the problem.  “Original sin,” 
Niebuhr proclaims, “is that thing about man which makes him capable of conceiving of his own 
perfection and incapable of achieving it.”205  For Niebuhr, the gulf at the center of the human 
situation that exists between an individual’s ideals on the one hand and one’s realistic capacities 
and limitations on the other, is where true ethical restraint and wisdom is most needed, for it is 
that place where humans so often confuse faithfulness for pride, and it is that place where 
humanity’s vain pursuit to enact justice and morality in a sinful world inevitably become the 
catalyst for destruction or irrelevance under the veil of a naïve self-righteousness.206 
While the ideal of agape love remains the ultimate hope for Niebuhr, he frames such an 
ideal as a necessary “impossibility” in the realm of human behavior.207  Niebuhr proclaims, 
“[E]very individual is a Moses who perishes outside the promised land.”208 Human sin is an 
inevitability that is never completely eradicated from human behavior, rendering the complete 
manifestation of any ideal effectively impossible.  However, this does not mean the Christian 
ideal of agape love has no place in Christian ethics.  Niebuhr argues, “The obligation to support 
and enhance [society] can only arise and maintain itself upon the basis of a faith that it is the 
partial fruit of a deeper unity and the promise of a more perfect harmony than is revealed in any 
immediate situation.209”  In other words, the ideal is to serve as an anchor of hope for sinful 
                                               
205 IAH, P. 84. 
206 In his essay, “Niebuhr’s World and Ours” (in Reinhold Niebuhr Today, Richard John Neuhaus, ed., Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1989. P. 14), Fox describes Niebuhr’s public theology as a “…vision of the 
secular world as a field of colliding, self-interested units [which] flowed out of his biblical understanding of human 
nature. The sinful self, whatever its pretensions to goodness and sociability, was always prone to put itself first.  The 
will to power pushed through even the most humble convictions.” 
207 In INCE (P. 62), Niebuhr argues, “Prophetic Christianity…demands the impossible; and by that very demand 
emphasizes the impotence and corruption of human nature….” 
208 NDHD, P. 308. 
209 INCE, P. 63. 
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Christians who live in a fallen world, but the intelligible realities of human limitation in the 
shadow of such an ideal should temper any illusion that humans alone can achieve it. 
Thus, the goal for Niebuhr’s ethical method is never to fully achieve the ideal of agape 
love on earth, but to more practically “enhance” society towards a “more perfect harmony” of 
human interaction by taking the Christian view of sin more seriously.  In Niebuhr’s words, it is 
“a method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems.”210  Effectively, Niebuhr 
believes the purpose of a Christian ethic is to improve oneself and the world, not perfect oneself 
and the world; for it is in the human’s quest towards ultimate purity and perfection—or even the 
mere illusion that either can be attained—that he or she becomes most prideful, self-righteous, 
and destructive.211 
While one might be tempted to reduce Niebuhr’s goal of Christian ethics to a formulaic 
and quantifiable utilitarianism, or perhaps more pointedly, to a latent pragmatism that is 
concealed by Christian language,212 it is more accurately derived from a clearer scriptural 
exposition of the human situation as sinner, and the fruits of such an exposition which lead one 
to take more seriously scripture’s warnings about the consequences self-righteousness and pride.  
Niebuhr states: “There is no deeper pathos in the spiritual life of man than the cruelty of 
righteous people.  If any one idea dominates the teachings of Jesus, it is his opposition to the 
                                               
210 While this statement by Niebuhr is originally used in the context of speaking about democracy (CLCD, P. 118), it 
is a clear demonstration of Niebuhr’s ultimate goal with ethics.   
211 In the conclusion to NDHD (P. 291), Niebuhr shows the importance of the Christian hope of the returning 
Messiah as an implicit refutation against the pride of utopianism.  He states, “Against utopianism, the Christian faith 
insists that the final consummation of history lies beyond the conditions of the temporal process.”  Therefore, any 
attempt towards ultimate perfection is in itself the rejection of the coming Messiah, and effectively asserts the 
Messiah is already with humans, prompting the deleterious pride that has plagued humankind throughout history. 
212 In his book, With the Grain of the Universe, Stanley Hauerwas’ central aim is to demonstrate how Niebuhr’s 
theology is essentially a synthesis of Ernst Troeltsch’s liberal Christianity and William James’ pragmatism.  While 
some of his more specific claims will be addressed later, it is important nonetheless to first clarify Niebuhr’s 
position with this more general accusation in mind. 
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self-righteousness of the righteous.”213  For Niebuhr, the enemy of Christian ethics is not simply 
the lack of will or desire to achieve its ideals, but the illusion that one can fully and perhaps 
already has. 
Niebuhr’s aversion to self-righteousness and pride is perhaps the central theme running 
throughout his work, but it is important to understand how it intertwines with his more developed 
theological perspective on anthropology.  While more will be discussed throughout this thesis 
regarding Niebuhr’s conception of sin, self, and human nature, in order to comprehend his 
ethical methodology, it is important to first understand that Niebuhr’s view of self is wrought 
with tensions and ironies.  “There are no simple congruities in life or history,”214 Niebuhr states.  
Human beings never experience a position of purity from which they may extrapolate their 
ethical conduct, and righteous behavior is never as simple to attain as humans might imagine.   
Therefore, self-righteousness derives predominantly from an overestimation of who 
humans are and what they can realistically achieve or know.  Niebuhr argues, “self-righteousness 
is the inevitable fruit of simple moral judgments….”215 In other words, ignoring the very real 
limitations of human beings and their capacity for sin results in a an overly simplified formula of 
morality, inevitably leading towards an unjustified illusion of one’s purity and transcendence.  
Such illusion may either lead to destruction—as one confuses oneself or one’s community with 
the divine purposes of God—or irrelevancy—as one perceives of one’s innocence as a pretext for 
inaction.216 
 Furthermore, Niebuhr observes that maintaining the Christian ideal without a sufficient 
grasp on the limitations of self and sin indeed acts as a barricade for Christians to achieve any 
                                               
213 INCE, P. 138. 
214 IAH, P. 62. 
215 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Moral World of Foster Dulles,” in New Republic Vol. 139 (1 December, 1958), P. 8. 
216 In IOAH (P. 37), Niebuhr describes the idealist’s tendency “to preserve…innocence by neutrality.” 
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measure of relevancy within culture or one’s own life.  Regarding cultural relevancy, Niebuhr 
advises that ministers “stop creating devotion to abstract ideals which every one [sic] accepts in 
theory and denies in practice,” and instead they must “agonize about their validity and 
practicability in the social issues which [one faces] in our present civilization.”217  Much like the 
Pharisees in Jesus’ day, who would devote their lives to the Law and traditions but “neglect 
justice and the love of God,”218 those who preoccupy themselves only with the unattainable, 
abstract, and transcendent ideals of Christianity inevitably neglect the ways in which those ideals 
must press upon—if only partially—a sinful world; the self-righteous moralists become 
irrelevant, or in the words of Jesus, “like unmarked graves, and people walk over them without 
realizing it.”219  
 Essentially, Niebuhr’s ethical method was to first observe the limitations and capacities 
of human beings—as described in scripture—to devise a more realistic ethic which is more 
suitable to the fallen people of God.  His priority to produce a Christian ethic that is “relevant” is 
not the result of a cold pragmatism, but emerged in a sincere reverence for God, a sober 
understanding of human capacity, and a genuine desire to more fully realize the power of agape 
love in the world. 
 However, the primary argument against Niebuhr’s ethical methodology, deriving once 
again from the work of Stanley Hauerwas, is that Niebuhr sacrifices “faithfulness” for 
                                               
217 Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic (Chicago, IL: Willett, Clark and Colby, 1929), P. 
X. 
218 Luke 11:41-44 (NRSV): “So give for alms those things that are within; and see, everything will be clean for you.  
But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and herbs of all kinds, and neglect justice and the love of God; 
it is these you ought to have practiced, without neglecting the others.  Woe to you Pharisees! For you love to have 
the seat of honor in the synagogues and to be greeted with respect in the marketplaces. Woe to You! For you are like 
unmarked graves, and people walk over them without realizing it.” 
219 Ibid. 
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“effectiveness.”220  In fact, regarding this split between Niebuhr and Hauerwas, Roger Olson calls 
it “…the single most important issue seemingly dividing them and their followers.”221  This point 
is so divisive that “Hauerwas himself declared Niebuhr not a Christian….”222  However, it must 
be emphasized that this was not necessarily a hollow, personal judgment on Niebuhr from 
Hauerwas’ perspective, but it was very clearly a result from the theological conclusions that 
sprang from his analysis of Niebuhr in his Gifford Lecture series, now titled, With the Grain of 
the Universe.223 
 In With the Grain of the Universe, Hauerwas’ general argument is this: “if you scratch 
deep enough beneath Niebuhr’s…practices of prayer and preaching, and his bold use of religious 
vocabulary, you find a Jamesian pragmatist.”224  Essentially, Hauerwas’ argument is that 
Niebuhr’s pragmatism—Niebuhr’s emphasis on “effectiveness”—is due to what Hauerwas sees 
as the very core to Niebuhr’s theology: a very “un-Christian” philosophy, first developed by 
William James.  He suggests Niebuhr is not a Christian, but a Jamesian philosopher 
masquerading as a Christian theologian. 
To be clear, while the connections between Niebuhr and William James are explicit 
enough,225 and while Hauerwas’ scholarship and research on the issue is unquestionable, his 
attempt to discredit Niebuhr on the grounds of just one of his many influences amounts to a 
                                               
220 Roger E. Olson, “Reinhold Niebuhr and Stanley Hauerwas: Can Their Approaches to Christian Ethics be 





223 Hauerwas’ With the Grain of the Universe was originally the content of his series presented at the University of 
St. Andrews’ august Gifford Lectures. 
224 David K. Weber, “Niebuhr’s Legacy” in The Review of Politics Vol. 64 No. 2 (Spring 2002), P. 339. 
225 William James’ influence on Niebuhr is apparent as early as his Bachelor of Divinity thesis, “The Validity and 
Certainty of Religious Knowledge.”  He also wrote the introduction to the 1961 reprint of James’ The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1961. P. 5), where he called the work a “milestone.”   
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sophisticated use of Bulverism;226 Hauerwas argues against Niebuhr by assuming that his 
Jamesian influence is both paramount to Niebuhr’s work and wrong, and then proceeds to 
explain his error: Niebuhr is secretly Jamesian.227  To accomplish this, however, Hauerwas very 
carefully has to minimize Niebuhr’s other, more robust Christian influences—Augustine, Calvin, 
and Kierkegaard228—who were just as impactful on Niebuhr’s approach to relevant/effective 
Christian ethics, and instead Hauerwas refashions Niebuhr’s work as predominantly Jamesian to 
fit within the narrower lens of a “disguised humanism.”229 
In contrast to this argument, Gilkey passionately defends Niebuhr, arguing that Niebuhr’s 
method of seeking Christian relevance is far from a “disguised humanism.”  He states: 
…Niebuhr’s theology is…a “God-centered” theology and not a humanistic or naturalistic one…. Such an 
interpretation is clearly untrue to Niebuhr’s texts; but even more, it completely falsifies what he wished to 
say in every line he wrote.  Without God…there are only the possibilities of idolatry and destruction or 
despair and enervation; without God…there is hope of neither meaning nor renewal in life or in history.  
Without God…the secure establishment of the self and its community [is] our only moral ideal.230 
 
Effectively, Niebuhr’s theology is the exact opposite of a “disguised humanism;” it is very 
clearly so dependent upon God that without God, the core of its central message against sin, 
pride, and idolatry falls to pieces.  Every facet of his theology is built upon the central 
                                               
226 Bulverism is the attempt to argue against someone by first assuming they are wrong, and then proceeding to 
explain their error.  It is a logical fallacy first recognized by C.S. Lewis, best explained in his article, “Bulverism” 
(The Socratic Digest Vol. 2, P. 16-20).  What is found to be problematic about this kind of reasoning is it is a form 
of circular reasoning where the conclusion is validated by its premises.    
227 It should be noted that Hauerwas and his neo-Barthian followers are not alone in reducing Niebuhr to 
pragmatism.  Cornel West, who identifies with pragmatism himself, calls Niebuhr “…the religious version of the 
Jamesian strenuous mood” and categorizes his method as a type of “Prophetic pragmatism…” (The Cornel West 
Reader, New York, NY: Basic Civitas Books, 1999. P. 150; 166). 
228 In With the Grain of the Universe, Hauerwas clearly attempts to break Niebuhr from his overtly Christian 
influences.  He minimizes the impact of Augustine on Niebuhr’s thought by stating (rightly) that Niebuhr came to 
Augustine later (but before writing his Gifford Lectures that would become Nature and Destiny of Man in 1939), but 
acknowledged that Niebuhr expressed “surprise” at the fact that he came to him so late, because 
“Augustine…answered many of his unanswered questions.”  It is important to note that finding affinity with 
Augustine, though mid-career, is no reason to minimize Augustine’s influence upon Niebuhr’s work, and it is 
furthermore no reason to suppose his work prior to that discovery is any less correlative to Augustine’s thought.  
Additionally, he makes mention of Kierkegaard’s influence on Niebuhr only twice: once in a brief footnote 
regarding Niebuhr’s use of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety (P. 119) and once in the context of Niebuhr’s 
development of sin: that “sin presupposes itself” (P. 120), and never once links Calvin to Niebuhr. 
229 Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe, P. 64. 
230 Gilkey, P. 188. 
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presupposition of God’s existence, and without it, there is no check upon the pride of 
humankind.231 
 Furthermore, from his own work, Niebuhr explicitly asserts the interaction of humans 
with the true God—and this God is not some placeholder of gaps in an elaborate philosophy, or 
the hypothetical character in a Christianized humanist mythology.  Consider the following 
statement from Niebuhr regarding God choosing Israel: 
…God choosing Israel…is, in a genuine sense, the beginning of revelation; for here a nation apprehends, 
and is apprehended by the true God and not by a divine creature of its own contrivance.  The proof of the 
genuineness of His majesty and of the truth of His deity is attested by the fact that He confronts the nation 
and the individual as the limit, and not the extension, of its power and purpose.232 
 
For Niebuhr, God genuinely exists.  God is not a character created by the Israelites; God is one 
who genuinely interacts with the people of God to reveal to them, among many things, the limits 
of their power.  It is upon this truth and in accordance with God’s revelation that Niebuhr 
establishes the concepts of humility, sin, idolatry, and pride. 
However, it should be admitted that despite Hauerwas’ attempt to unfairly eschew the 
complexity of Niebuhr’s influences and work, in so doing, Hauerwas does indeed reveal what 
appears to be a flaw in Niebuhr’s work that is rather difficult to ignore.  In his essay, “Niebuhr’s 
Legacy,” David Weber starkly boils Hauerwas’ fundamental problem with Niebuhr down to this: 
“Niebuhr’s theology lacked dogmatic commitments, and so had no moral authority.”233  This 
critique, while it cannot be attributed solely to James’ influence on Niebuhr, as Hauerwas would 
suggest,234 proves problematic for Niebuhr, not because it is entirely true, but because it is true 
                                               
231 In his essay, “The Story of an Encounter” (in Reinhold Niebuhr Today, Richard John Neuhaus, ed., Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1989. P. 105), Paul T. Stallworth recounts his conversation with theologian Paul 
Ramsey.  Ramsey states, “It’s impossible to recognize Niebuhr in what Hauerwas has written.” 
232 FAH, P. 104. 
233 Weber, “Niebuhr’s Legacy,” P. 347. 
234 It is very clear that the influence of Augustine is just as responsible for Niebuhr’s hesitance to apply absolute 
dogmatics in the realm of Christian ethics.  Augustine’s influence, as according to Gilkey (On Niebuhr, P. 128) tells 
Niebuhr, “…sin is not always (in fact almost never) a conscious and deliberate choice of known evil; on the 
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enough to require some level of explanation.  It is no secret that Niebuhr actively opposes such 
absolutes as moral dogmatism;235 he states, “The worst form of intolerance is religious 
intolerance, in which the particular interests of the contestants hide behind religious 
absolutes.”236  For Niebuhr, absolute dogmatic commitments were a large part of the problem, so 
this allegation, at least initially, appears merited.   
 In response to this claim, David Novak convincingly rejects the argument fully.  He 
argues, “Niebuhr remained sufficiently tethered to a Christian (and Jewish) understanding of 
absolutes—especially…the absolute prohibition against idolatry.”237  While this singular 
commitment may not be enough for Hauerwas and Weber to retract their critique outright, the 
absolute prohibition against idolatry is a “foundation of what could be considered his ethics.”238  
While Novak remains hesitant to fully distinguish idolatry as the foundational dogmatic 
commitment to Niebuhr’s ethics, his hesitance is perhaps due only to another, more pronounced 
dogmatic commitment: Niebuhr’s prohibition against sin itself.239  But as Novak shows, there is 
an interconnected relationship between idolatry and sin in Niebuhr’s work that stands as an 
absolute commitment throughout his life.  
 It is in this way that Niebuhr’s emphasis on effectiveness and relevance is bound up in his 
resolute commitment to faithfulness.  Faithfulness—as manifest in his stance against idolatry as 
an absolute commitment—is precisely what tempers Niebuhr’s ethic to refrain from the illusion 
                                               
contrary, it is done believing it is the good.”  Reducing the concept of sin merely to an unquestionable duty to 
dogma conceals the very home where sin so often resides. 
235 In his essay, “Barth—Apostle of the Absolute” (in Christian Century, 13 December 1928, P. 1523-1524), 
Niebuhr wrote that Barthianism produced “a new and more terrifying subjectivism” that is dangerously “asserted” 
by “dogmatism.”  In other words, dogmatic absolutes tend to both mask and justify the subjective whims of the 
adherent.   
236 NDHN, P. 200-201. 
237 David Novak, “Defending Niebuhr from Hauerwas,” Journal of Religious Ethics Vol. 40 No. 2 (2012), P. 286. 
238 Ibid., P. 287. 
239 In NDHN (P. 93) Niebuhr himself calls the doctrine of original sin a “dogma.” 
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that one can achieve the Christian ideal of agape love, and it is what presses Niebuhr to fashion 
his ethical concerns more concretely within the realistic constraints of human life.  
Conclusion 
Niebuhr’s tripartite methodology can be described concisely as the validation and 
exposition of a Christian view of self and anthropology, over and against the anthropologies of 
modernity, with a view towards establishing a relevant Christian ethic in today’s world.  
Likewise, the methodology of this thesis will mirror that of Niebuhr’s, but go further by 
developing his concept of the “uneasy conscience” as a way of validating and exposing personal 
responsibility within a technological society.  This fuller development will operate as the basis 
upon which a Christian view of self is validated over and against Lewis Mumford and Herbert 
Marcuse, and become the lens through which relevant and effective human conduct can flourish 
in the technical age. 
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The ultimate goal for this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Marcuse in order to create a new category of 
technological engagement from the basis of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology.  This chapter will 
serve as the anthropological base from which this thesis shall critique Mumford and Marcuse, 
but also construct a new type of ethical engagement with technology.  While the following four 
chapters (Chapters 4-7) will highlight Mumford and Marcuse’s perspectives on the self as it 
exists within the technological society—and do so with a Niebuhrian critical/prophetic response 
to those perspectives—this chapter will focus exclusively on constructing the basis for that 
response.   
As the theological foundation of this thesis, this chapter will do two things. First (I), this 
chapter will examine Niebuhr’s central premises regarding human nature and the self from this 
basis of his theological and philosophical claims.  Second (II), this chapter will demonstrate 
Niebuhr’s theological basis for ethical responsibility as expressed in his concepts of the easy and 
uneasy conscience, and show the pitfalls inherent to other anthropologies which results in an 
easy conscience.   
I: Christian Anthropology: Human Nature, Spirit, and the Self 
 The bulk of the analysis regarding Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology in the present 
section are derived from Niebuhr’s Nature and Destiny of Man, particularly Volume I which is 
 74 
subtitled, “Human Nature.”  With both volumes taken together, it is without doubt Niebuhr’s 
most comprehensive work240 and has been heralded as “…a masterpiece of contemporary 
exposition of fundamental Christian themes.”241  Yet, despite its rather sweeping reach, it is still 
decidedly not a Summa, like Aquinas, Barth, or Paul Tillich set out to construct.242  This is not a 
work regarding all the doctrines of scripture, but rather just one, but one fully: his doctrine of 
anthropology, radiating outward to touch every part of theology. William John Wolf effectively 
describes the centrality of Niebuhr’s anthropology in Nature and Destiny in the following way: 
“[Niebuhr] makes one doctrine, brilliantly plumbed to its depths, the basis of his whole 
thought.”243  It is in this work that Niebuhr’s method of Christian Realism is most fully on 
display, composed truly as a “theology from below.”244 
 However, while Nature and Destiny is most aptly described as a book which deals with a 
Christian doctrine of anthropology, as Wolf observes,245 only describing it as such diminishes the 
full purpose and weight of what Niebuhr intended to accomplish.  While, traditionally, 
scholarship has rightly reflected at least part of Niebuhr’s central goal, by both identifying the 
work and utilizing it as a resource in terms of a Christian anthropology, another, perhaps more 
nuanced goal is in some ways more central.  Niebuhr himself describes his purposes with Nature 
and Destiny in the following way: “to analyze the meaning of the Christian idea of sin more fully 
and to explain the uneasy conscience expressed in the Christian religion.”246  Niebuhr’s magnum 
opus was not written merely to give an account of Christian anthropology and sin, but also to 
                                               
240 In his dictionary entry titled, “Niebuhr, Reinhold” (entry in New Dictionary of Theology, Sinclair D. Ferguson 
and David F. Wright, eds., Leicester, UK: InterVarsity Press, 1988, P. 469), J.W. Gladwin calls The Nature and 
Destiny of Man Niebuhr’s “fullest theological statement.” 
241 Ibid., P. 470. 
242 William John Wolf, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Doctrine of Man” (Kegley & Bretall), P. 230. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Robbins, Methods in the Madness, P. 92. 
245 Wolf, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Doctrine of Man,” P. 230. 
246 NDHN, P. 18. Emphasis added. 
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highlight a specific feature of a Christian view of self that he calls, “the uneasy conscience”—
that which he describes as “the protest of man’s essential nature against his present state.”247  It is 
this concept of the uneasy conscience which serves as the basis for his understanding of personal 
responsibility: the ability to “not only understand the reality of the evil in himself but escape the 
error of attributing…evil to any one [sic] but himself.”248 
It should be noted that while his view of the uneasy conscience is central to this thesis, a 
deeper analysis of Niebuhr’s construction of a Christian view of self is necessary to fully 
understand the basis, implications, and import of such a concept.  Therefore, working alongside 
Nature and Destiny, the purpose of this section is to more fully detail Niebuhr’s Christian 
anthropology and the foundation from which his concept of the uneasy conscience emerges.  
Along with this analysis, a more fully developed picture of the easy and uneasy conscience shall 
emerge. 
This section is foundational to this thesis because it acts at the “point of contact” between 
Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology and that of Mumford and Marcuse.  For this purpose, this 
section will be structured in a way that can be cross-examined during the prophetic and 
dialectical phase of this thesis, while simultaneously remaining in fidelity with the progression of 
Niebuhr’s thought.249  All three thinkers will be examined along the following three categories of 
anthropology: (A) the human’s relationship to nature, (B) how the human understands and relates 
to nature, and (C) how each conceptualize human consciousness.  As for this section regarding 
Niebuhr’s thought specifically, these three categories will be correlatively named in the 
following way: (A) Human Nature: the human as a problem unto itself, (B) The Human Spirit: 
                                               
247 Ibid., P. 267. 
248 Ibid., P. 17. 
249 Chapters 3 and 5, respectively. 
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reason, freedom, and self-transcendence, and (C) Consciousness: understanding oneself and the 
world from a governing center.   
A. Human Nature: Human Beings as a Problem Unto Themselves 
From the outset, it is vital to note for the purposes of this thesis that what Niebuhr puts 
forth regarding human nature is, in his mind, so “obvious”250 it is indeed indisputable, and those 
characteristics for which he describes about human nature are so foundational, they are timeless 
and immutable.251  While the act of simply calling a description about human nature “obvious” 
may not inspire much confidence epistemologically,252 it must be presumed that what Niebuhr 
means by this is that his observations about human nature are so basic and irreducible that they 
would be foolish to question; and, indeed, if one were to question his foundational observations, 
one may even, by the very act of questioning, affirm his preliminary observations.253 
                                               
250 NDHN, P. 3. 
251 While sometimes described as “absolute,” “permeance,” or “the primordial structure” of human nature, the term 
“immutable,” preferred by Tex Sample in his work, Human Nature, Interest, and Power: A Critique of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s Social Thought (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013. P. 4) is best at describing Niebuhr’s stance regarding 
those which he opposes: views of human nature which are malleable, fungible, and dynamic.  But Niebuhr’s 
position on human nature is one that is unchangeable in what is revealed existentially about the self.  “There is no 
escape,” Sample states, “by the self from his existential condition…. Niebuhr is adamant that human nature itself is 
immutable; only its particular historic expressions can be changed.”  However, it must be noted that elements of the 
human’s nature can change, all the while one’s existential problem does not.  See: Molhoek, “Sensuality and 
Altering Anthropology in Artificial Intelligence and Transhumanism,” P. 100.  
252 Due in part to his pragmatism on the one hand, and his Christian conviction that the human is fallen even in one’s 
perception of the cosmos (which is indeed part of his critique of modernity), Niebuhr has long experienced a fraught 
relationship with those who champion epistemological clarity. In the opening of his essay, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
Doctrine of Knowledge” (Kegley & Bretall, P. 36), Paul Tillich states, “The difficulty writing about Niebuhr’s 
epistemology lies in the fact that there is no such epistemology.  Niebuhr does not ask, ‘How can I know?’; he starts 
knowing. And he does not ask afterward, ‘How could I know?’, but leaves the convincing power of his thought 
without epistemological support.”  Similarly, Henry Nelson Weiman (Ibid., P. 336) states, “The word ‘reason’ has 
many different meanings.  Niebuhr constantly refers to it, but to my knowledge never explains what he means by it.”  
In her book, Courage to Change (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1961. P. 233), June Bingham once 
recounted as story where Niebuhr was put on the spot by a student regarding the question of his epistemology: “A 
student once asked in class for Niebuhr’s definition of reason. ‘Analytic and logical faculty,’ was the snap answer, 
and Niebuhr promptly recognized another questioner.” 
253 Niebuhr’s opening to the problem of human nature is his attempt to resolve the ironies that he discovers in the 
question, “How shall he think of himself?”  Through his inability to do so clearly, however, suggests a problem at 
the center of humankind: “Every affirmation which he may make about his stature, virtue, or place in the cosmos 
becomes involved in contradictions when fully analysed” (NDHN, P. 1).  Essentially, it is possible that by 
questioning this basic of a question is to more firmly establish the problem.  
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Niebuhr argues that human beings—most fundamentally—are a problem unto 
themselves.  On the very first page of Nature and Destiny, Niebuhr states,  
Man has always been his own most vexing problem.  How shall he think of himself?  Every affirmation 
which he may make about his structure, virtue, or place in the cosmos becomes involved in contradictions 
when fully analysed.  The analysis reveals some presupposition or implication which seems to deny what 
the proposition intended to affirm.254 
 
What stands at the center of human nature is not a clearly demonstrated pronouncement, but a 
rather stubborn and unanswerable question.  The question at the center of human nature is so 
confounding, that the more one aspires towards its answer, the more one complicates one’s 
means of comprehending it.   
 Niebuhr proceeds by establishing two “obvious facts” through his unsuccessful attempt to 
answer the question of who humans are.  First, “If man insists that he is a child of nature and that 
he ought not to pretend to be more than the animal, which he obviously is, he tacitly admits that 
he is…a curious kind of animal who has both the inclination and capacity to make such 
pretensions.”255  Thus, on the one hand, if the human is an animal, the human is at least a 
peculiar animal who can label him or herself as an animal.  Humans not only has the ability of 
self-awareness, but also has the ability to utilize language and reason to distinguish oneself from 
animals, categorize, and create symbols to understand the world around them. 
 Second, however, if the human chooses to understand him or herself as that which 
decidedly transcends the animal, “…there is usually an anxious note in his avowals of 
uniqueness which betrays his unconscious sense of kinship with the brutes.”256  In other words, 
while the question in itself suggests a uniqueness about human beings, one’s obvious affinity 
with the animals can never be fully abandoned without neglecting that which appear to be 





fundamental qualities intrinsic to human life.  The human must eat, drink, and use shelter; the 
human must procreate and survive; the human must die.  These are indispensable qualities the 
human shares with the animals that cannot be denied in one’s claim of human uniqueness.   
 For Niebuhr, the implicit structure of humanity which preconditions the question of who 
humans are can be reduced to two general facts—one obvious, one less obvious—about human 
nature.  Niebuhr states, “The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to its 
vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and confined within the brevity 
of the years which nature permits its varied organic form….”257  The less obvious fact is that to 
some degree, “…man is a spirit who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the 
world.”258  To this point, Niebuhr appears—at least to some degree—to both partially affirm and 
deny the validity of both as expressed within the original unanswerable question. 
 While the following subsection will describe more clearly Niebuhr’s “less obvious fact” 
regarding the human-as-spirit, it must be emphasized that Niebuhr observes from nature—though 
later validated and clarified by scripture—that the self appears to be unified.259 While humans 
have the capacity to stand outside of one’s environment—to observe the position of the object 
from a position of subjectivity—the two for Niebuhr are entirely bound up into the same nature.  
In other words, the human’s capacity for self-transcendence is a feature of its nature.  One 
example Niebuhr gives regarding this unity is the necessary subordination of mind (spirit) to 
natural impulses.  He states: 
                                               
257 Ibid., P. 3. 
258 Ibid. 
259 It is significant in this regard that Niebuhr insists upon the unity of self, given the widely accepted and influential 
Freudian construction of id, ego, and super-ego of his day.  In his book, Psychology, Religion, and the Nature of the 
Soul: A Historical Entanglement (Kent, UK: Springer Books, 2011. P. 54), Graham Richards clarifies Niebuhr’s 
distinction with the Freudian divisions, stating, “[Niebuhr] is insistent on the comprehensive nature of the self, 
rejecting Psychological images of the self being influenced, challenged or affected by entities such as the id, super-
ego, passions etc. as if these were not all, ultimately, aspects of the self.” 
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Man is never a simple two-layer affair who can be understood from the standpoint of the bottom layer, 
should efforts to understand him from the standpoint of the top layer fail…The freedom of man consists not 
only…of the windows of mind which look out from his second story; but also of vents on every level which 
allow every natural impulse a freedom which animals do not know.260 
 
In other words, the human’s animalistic drives towards survival, procreation, and power are 
never simply animalistic, as they find their ultimate expression in the freedom of one’s rational 
and transcendent faculties.  The human must eat, but he or she pursues that goal strategically.  
The human must survive, but that drive is partially expressed in the use of its more unique 
faculties of rationality and communal coordination.  Humans must clothe and shelter themselves, 
but that need is met skillfully and creatively with a certain freedom over their environment.  
Niebuhr’s conflicting “facts” about human nature are not entirely distinct from one another and 
most often do not conflict, but are rather compounded in an internal unity which humans cannot 
fully grasp without an all transcendent “…vantage point…from which to understand the 
predicament of [human beings].”261 
  Niebuhr argues that the human’s inability to fully stand outside of the self renders the 
task to answer the question, “who am I?” in any satisfying way impossible.  Thus, while Niebuhr 
does believe there to be unity within the composition of self—a unity of both nature and spirit—
full compliance with or knowledge of that fact, Niebuhr argues, is only offered through the 
Christian perspective of anthropology—one of unity between the “lower” (animal) features and 
“higher” (spiritual) features—known as the Imago Dei.262  Furthermore, without the unifying 
principle of Imago Dei, Niebuhr argues that the tendency among human beings is to assume easy 
                                               
260 NDHN, P. 40. 
261 FAH, P. 9. 
262 Niebuhr describes the Imago Dei (Image of God) in the following way: “In its purest form the Christian view of 
man regards man as a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest 
spiritual dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his 
natural life.” (NDHN, P. 150) 
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solutions to the problem by subordinating one essential component to the other, if not fully 
demonizing one essential component in an effort to unify all of life with the other.263 
 In conclusion, given the human tendency to assuage the complexities of human nature 
through “premature solutions,”264 it is vital to refrain Niebuhr’s insistence that the “obvious 
facts” of his observation regarding the central problem of human nature are immutable.  Niebuhr 
resolutely states: “No philosophy or religion can change the structure of human existence.  That 
structure involves individuality in terms of both the natural fact of a particular body and the 
spiritual fact of self-transcendence.”265   Niebuhr’s emphasis here on the immutable essence of 
the problem which stands at the center of human nature will be the basis upon which his 
conception of the uneasy conscience will emerge.  Likewise, the negation of this problem, and its 
“premature solution,” will be the basis upon which his conception of the easy conscience will 
emerge.  Before his analysis of these two concepts are examined, however, a closer study of his 
understanding of the human-as-spirit is necessary. 
B. Human Spirit: Reason, Freedom, and Self-Transcendence 
While the human is certainly what Niebuhr calls, “a child of nature,” the human being 
also expresses itself as “spirit”—one who “…stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason 
and the world.”266  The concept of “spirit” for Niebuhr expresses itself in three dominant ways—
Reason, Freedom, and Self-Transcendence—but importantly, always remains tethered to the 
human as “a child of nature.”  For Niebuhr, this construction of self culminates to create his 
                                               
263 Niebuhr states, How difficult it is to do justice to both the uniqueness of man and his affinities with the world of 
nature below him is proved by the almost unvarying tendency of those philosophies, which describe and emphasize 
the rational faculties of man or his capacity for self-transcendence to forget his relation to nature and to identify him, 
prematurely and unqualifiedly, with the divine and the eternal; and of naturalistic philosophies to obscure the 
uniqueness of man.” (Ibid., P. 4) 
264 Ibid., P. 4. 
265 Ibid., P. 69. Emphasis added. 
266 NDHN, P.3. 
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understanding of the Imago Dei, but, as he argues, it is also the source from which one engenders 
the potentiality for misunderstanding the self and committing sin. 
Niebuhr observes that, classically,267 reason had held the distinction of being the human’s 
unique faculty through which he or she understands and relates to the world.  While Niebuhr 
affirms the usefulness of reason,268 he argues that reason is obscured both in its roots and in its 
branches.  In its roots, Niebuhr argues that reason is ambiguous in that the human’s “…impulses 
are more deeply rooted than his rational life…”269 and that reason is so often subjugated to the 
will, “…as kings use courtiers and chaplains….”270  Reason can be used for any given purpose to 
justify any given action.  It is in this way, Niebuhr argues, that the classical understanding of 
reason is often misunderstood in its relation to the human’s lower, more animalistic, faculties. 
On the other hand, at its branches, Niebuhr utilizes Augustine’s later writings on the mind 
to argue that reason is obscured in the heights of self-transcendence. 271  Reflecting simply on the 
concept of memory, Augustine first plunges deep into his mind to demonstrate its capacity for 
self-transcendence.  He states: 
…even while I dwell in darkness and silence, in my memory I can produce colours if I will…yea I discern 
the breath of lilies from violets, though smelling nothing… These things I do in the vast courts of my 
memory…. There also I meet with myself, and recall myself and when and where and what I have done and 
                                               
267 Niebuhr gives the examples of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics as “classical” examples of misunderstanding 
human uniqueness as reason.  (NDHN, P. 4-11) 
268 In MMIS (P. 26), Niebuhr argues, “Reason enables [the human], within limits, to direct his energy so that it will 
flow in harmony, and not in conflict, with other life…. Reason may extend and stabilise [sic]…the capacity to affirm 
other life than his own.”  In his NDHN (P. 263), regarding logic as a structured approach to reason, Niebuhr allows 
that “The laws of logic are reason’s guard against chaos in the realm of truth.  They eliminate contradictory 
assertions.” 
269 MMIS, P. 26.  This view from Niebuhr regarding reason is highly present in his early work and demonstrates a 
certain level of dependence upon the work of David Hume.  In his work, A Treatise on Human Nature Vol. II 
(London, UK: J.M. Dent & Sons Publishing, 1966. P. 127), Hume states, “Reason is…the slave to the passions, and 
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” 
270 Ibid., P. 44. 
271 In NDHN (P. 157), Niebuhr makes a distinction between Augustine’s earlier, more Platonic work, and his later, 
more explicitly Christian work regarding the Imago Dei as consciousness.  He states, “As a neo-Platonist Augustine 
sought God in the mystery of self-consciousness; and there are passages in his earlier writings in which he is still 
close to the deification of self-consciousness.”  However, “When some of Augustine’s earlier lapses into neo-
Platonism are discounted, it must be recognized that no Christian theologian has eer arrived at a more convincing 
statement of the relevance and distance between the human and divine than he” (P. 158). 
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under what feelings…. I will do this or that, say I to myself, in that great receptacle of my mind, stored with 
images of things so many and so great, and this or that might be.272 
 
For Niebuhr, these words evince a power to self-consciousness that stirs “…a sense of 
amazement in Augustine and the conviction that the limits of the self lie finally outside the 
self.”273   
On this basis, Niebuhr argues that the height of self-consciousness goes beyond mere 
“ideas” presented through reason, but one that presents the self as that which has “…the capacity 
to transcend temporal process, and the ultimate power of self-determination and self-
transcendence….”274  Niebuhr states:  
The human spirit in its depth and height reaches into eternity and that this vertical dimension is more 
important for the understanding of man than merely his rational capacity for forming general concepts.  
This latter capacity is derived from the former.  It is, as it were, a capacity for horizontal perspectives over 
the wide world, made possible by the height at which the human spirit is able to survey the scene.”275 
 
Simply stated, self-transcendence goes infinitely beyond reason,276 as it is capable of capturing a 
broader and deeper view of the self.  Therefore, human uniqueness, and the way in which the 
human should regard one’s “spirit” or transcendence, should not be on terms of reason alone, but 
additionally self-consideration.  
Furthermore, while there is more to one’s transcendence than mere reason, there is indeed 
still a limit to that self-transcendence, even in the mind.  Augustine states, “Great is the power of 
memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the 
mind, and this am I myself.  What am I then, O my God?  What nature am I?”277  Appropriately, 
                                               
272 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, E.B. Pusey (tr.), (New York, NY: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937), 
P. 228-229 
273 NDHN, P. 156. 
274 Ibid. 
275 NDHN, P. 157. 
276 In his book, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr: A Mentor to the Twentieth Century (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1992. P. 137), Ronald Stone states, “The image of God interpreted by Augustine uses and moves 
beyond the faculty of reason in human effort to transcend its limits and find its home only in God.” 
277 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, P. 238. 
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Augustine finds the limit of his mind at the very place Niebuhr is most vexed: what is the human 
being?  Thus, reason is not the sole unifying principle of human existence, and cannot 
understand itself from the position of its cognitive faculties alone. 
Based upon his conception of self-transcendence and the lingering problem of self-
understanding, Niebuhr turns to Kierkegaard to construct his understanding of freedom as an 
aspect of self-transcendence.278  Kierkegaard likens the human spirit to dreaming; he states, “The 
spirit in man is dreaming…. In this state there is peace and repose…for there is indeed nothing 
against which to strive.”279  Similar to Augustine’s self-transcendence, Kierkegaard’s 
“dreaming” spirit is above all constraints and is essentially free.  Kierkegaard continues, 
“Dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality….”280 In other words, the self has the capacity for 
self-determination.  From this conception of self-transcendence, Niebuhr constructs the basis for 
his understanding of freedom.  He states: 
Human capacity for self-transcendence is also the basis of human freedom and thereby the uniqueness of 
the individual.  Human consciousness not only transcends natural process but it transcends itself.  It thereby 
gains the possibility for those endless variations and elaborations of human capacities which characterize 
human existence.  Every impulse of nature in man can be modified in countless variations.  In consequence 
no human individual is like another, no matter how similar their heredity and environment…”281 
 
In other words, self-transcendence is that basis upon which freedom is realized.  One can draw 
from the limitless abyss of the human mind—for which “there is indeed nothing against which to 
strive”—towards the actualization of its own self-determination.  
                                               
278 The influence of Søren Kierkegaard on Niebuhr’s dialectical framework, particularly as it regards human nature, 
is widely acknowledged in the academic community.  In his book, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007. P. 47), Edward J. Carnell states that Kierkegaard “bequeathed” to Niebuhr his 
“dialectical framework.”  According to Robert H. Ayers in his essay, “Methodological, Epistemological and 
Ontological Motifs in the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr” (in Modern Theology Vol. 7 No. 2, January 1991. P. 154), 
what makes Niebuhr’s dialectical framework so similar to Kierkegaard’s is that it is focused on the self (as opposed 
to history) and “…opts for a both/and rather than an exclusive either/or appraisal of alternate doctrines.”   
279 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, Reidar Thomte (tr.), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1980), P. 41. 
280 Ibid. 
281 NDHN, P. 55. 
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However, self-transcendence is not only limited in its necessary service of the human will 
and in what it can imagine (“What am I then, O my God?”), but it is also limited in what it can 
achieve, as the infinite powers of the mind are limited in their ultimate expression to the confines 
of nature and the realm of choice.  The collision of utter freedom of the mind on the one hand, 
and the finite realm of action on the other, creates for both Kierkegaard and Niebuhr the ultimate 
“paradox” humans experience in the concepts of self-determination and natural or historical-
determination.  Niebuhr quotes Kierkegaard to express this paradox: 
Truth [in the human situation] is exactly the identity of choosing and determining and of being chosen and 
determined.  What I choose I do not determine, for if it were not determined I could not choose it; and yet if 
I did not determine it through my choice I would not really choose it.  It is: if it were not I could not choose 
it.  It is not: but becomes reality through my choice, or else my choice were an illusion…. I am myself the 
eternal personality…. But what is this myself?  It is the most abstract and yet at the same time the most 
concrete of all realities.  It is freedom.282 
 
Effectively, for both Niebuhr and Kierkegaard, the paradox of freedom and finiteness is a reality 
of the human situation.  However, for Niebuhr, while this paradox appears troubling, the goal is 
to not break this apparent tension, lest one be consumed with illusions about oneself.  Niebuhr 
knows that through this paradox, one can understand “…that the self in the highest reaches of its 
self-consciousness is still the mortal and finite self.”283  Niebuhr will argue that this arrangement 
of self—while immediately observable through self-understanding—is uniquely expressed and 
held together in the Christian doctrine of the Imago Dei, while other non-Christian perspectives 
tend to negate one in their effort to assert the other. 284   
 Additionally, for Niebuhr, one’s freedom is especially important in the realm of ethics.  
For Niebuhr, freedom provides the occasion for both human creativity and action within one’s 
environment, but also the occasion for destruction.  He states, “The freedom of his spirit enables 
                                               
282 Ibid., P. 163. 
283 Ibid., P. 170. 
284 Ibid. 
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him to use the forces and processes of nature creatively; but his failure to observe the limits of 
his finite existence causes him to defy the forms and restraints of both nature and reason.”285  In 
essence, freedom is not in itself ethically good or bad, it is ambiguous.  However, freedom is also 
the basis upon which good and evil emerge, and ultimately, one’s responsibility.  Niebuhr states, 
“The essence of man is his freedom.  Sin is committed in that freedom. Sin can therefore not be 
attributed to a defect in his essence.  It can only be understood as a self-contradiction, made 
possible by the fact of his freedom but not following necessarily from it.”286  To put it another 
way, if human beings were not free, all destruction and evil, all creativity and goodness, would 
be a product, not of the self, but of certain determined or designed features which lie outside and 
over top the human; i.e. causality, history, divine providence, etc.  Therefore, Niebuhr argues 
that responsibility exists uniquely as a product of a free, transcendent self. 
In conclusion, Augustine’s understanding of consciousness and Kierkegaard’s paradox of 
freedom present the basis upon which Niebuhr understands self-transcendence.  According to 
Augustine, on the one hand, human spirit is a powerful feature of humanity that stretches beyond 
reason.  However, it is limited in what it can understand about the self.  According to 
Kierkegaard, human spirit is ultimately free, but is tempered in the realm of nature to the point 
that it expresses itself as paradox.  Therefore, Niebuhr’s view of human spirit is an uneasy realm 
of infinite possibilities that can only be expressed in a finite realm of action.  This uneasiness is 
that place where good and evil must be articulated, and where responsibility must be realized and 
maintained. 
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C. Consciousness: Understanding Oneself and the World from a Governing Center 
“Consciousness,” Niebuhr defines, “is a capacity for surveying the world and 
determining action from a governing centre.”287  To put it another way, Niebuhr views 
consciousness as the ability of the human spirit to direct the self towards preferable actions from 
the position of a presumed authoritative and unifying principle.  In order to explain this view of 
consciousness in more detail, this section will demonstrate Niebuhr’s understanding of how 
one’s “governing centre” emerges as a necessity, the tendency of obscuring one’s governing 
center, and Niebuhr’s argument for myth—specifically, the Christian myth—as the most 
clarifying form of a governing center. 
Due to the paradoxes of transcendence and creatureliness, freedom and finiteness, and 
due to the vexing problem that stands at the center of self-understanding, Niebuhr argues that the 
human spirit is homeless.288  The human is not entirely a “child of nature,” nor is the human 
entirely transcendent.  Therefore, the question of what the human is presses him or her beyond 
the self to find some unifying principle.  Niebuhr states: 
The rational faculty by which he orders and interprets his experience…is itself a part of the finite world 
which man seeks to understand.  The only principle for the comprehension of the whole (the whole which 
includes both himself and the world) is, therefore, beyond his comprehension.  Man is thus in the position 
of being unable to comprehend himself in his full stature of freedom without a principle of comprehension 
which is beyond his comprehension.289 
 
It is in this way that the human being’s homelessness “…is the ground of all religion; for the self 
which stands outside itself and the world cannot find the meaning of life in itself or the 
world.”290  Essentially, the human cannot remain homeless without also rejecting all meaning 
and purpose in human life.  It is necessary for one to find a home in order to understand oneself, 
                                               
287 Ibid., P. 14. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid., P. 125. 
290 Ibid., P. 14. 
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one’s purpose, and one’s actions.  The human needs a “principle of comprehension which is 
beyond his comprehension.”291 
 Ultimately, Niebuhr articulates the religious grounds for understanding human nature in 
terms of faith.  The unifying principle from the position of the human’s homelessness is not 
understandable from its animalistic or transcendent natures, but instead must presuppose an 
ultimate perspective through which one may be known and understood.  Niebuhr states: “Human 
life points beyond itself… It can, therefore, understand the total dimension in which it stands 
only by making faith the presupposition of its understanding.”292  In other words, faith is the only 
means by which one can understand the self from an external position, thus only faith can offer a 
governing center most true to human capacity and limitation. 
 However, at this point it must be stressed once again that no governing center or 
presupposition of faith can change the human.  To quote Niebuhr once more, “No philosophy or 
religion can change the structure of human existence.  That structure involves individuality in 
terms of both the natural fact of a particular body and the spiritual fact of self-transcendence.”293  
The tension between the two “obvious facts” about human nature remain the same in perpetuity.  
“But,” Niebuhr continues, “religions and philosophies have an important bearing upon the 
possibility of…maintaining itself in such a position of transcendence.”294  In other words, while 
no religious or philosophical presuppositions can change human nature, they can position human 
nature in a way that either better reveals or obscures the way in which the human can positively 
or negatively impact reality. 
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 Unfortunately, for Niebuhr, humanity tends towards philosophical and religious 
presuppositions that resort to “premature solutions” of the self to unify one’s perspective of the 
world.  This in turn produces illusions of self that become woven into the fabric of human 
understanding, tempting one to become more natural on the one hand, or more transcendent on 
the other, than what he or she in reality is.295  “Nature and reason,” Niebuhr proclaims, “are thus 
the two gods of modern man….”296  Nature and reason are the dominant presumptions of faith in 
the modern world, which vie for preeminence as the ultimate unifying principle of reality.  
However, as Niebuhr argues, these principles are ultimately expressed in the loss of the self 
entirely, whether it is articulated as “…pure mind or pure nature.”297  These presuppositions do 
not maintain the self “…in such a position of transcendence.”  Effectively, the self loses its 
transcendence in its very attempt to articulate it more fully, by doing so exclusively from the 
position of nature on the one hand, or the human spirit on the other. 
 Niebuhr calls the loss of self-transcendence simply, “the loss of self,”298 and 
demonstrates generally two categories of thought coming from each direction of the question 
regarding human nature.  The first category, Niebuhr argues, articulates the question of human 
nature from the position of one’s animalistic or base faculties—the god of nature. The second 
category articulates the question of human nature from the position of one’s unique or 
transcendent categories—the god of human spirit. 
 Regarding the god of nature, Niebuhr addresses Naturalism and Romanticism,299 arguing 
that in their very attempt to seek utter freedom from the position of the human’s animalistic 
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297 NDHN, P. 23 
298 Ibid., P. 68-92 
299 In NDHN (P. 92), Niebuhr argues that while Romanticism loses self-transcendence because the self is 
subordinated to the tribe, he does make one exception in the case of Nietzsche.  He states, “Only in Nietzschean 
romanticism is the individual preserved; but there he becomes the vehicle of daemonic [sic] religion because he 
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features, they ultimately either reduce “…consciousness itself to purely mechanical 
proportions,”300 or the self is “quickly subordinated to the unique and self-justifying individuality 
of the social collective.”301  In other words, the more one seeks to find freedom by throwing off 
the shackles of civilized life or reason so that one may resemble ever closer the human’s animal 
kin, the less free—and more bound—the human is to natural impulses, will, and basic causality, 
thus losing self-transcendence in either the machinery of nature or in its subordination to the 
tribe. 
 Regarding the god of human spirit, Niebuhr argues that Rationalism, Mysticism, and 
Idealism obscure—if not demonize—the human as a child of nature in order to discover one’s 
unity in a transcendent mind.  Niebuhr begins by asserting Augustine’s observations regarding 
the seemingly eternal depths and heights of self-transcendence, but then reasserts Augustine’s 
discovered limitation: “[the human] stands too completely outside of both nature and reason to 
understand himself in terms of either without misunderstanding himself….”302  Niebuhr argues 
that while those adherents to the god of human spirit rightly observe the transcendence of the 
self, they do not detect the limitations of such a position and its implications.  Niebuhr argues 
that, effectively, “…if man lacks a further revelation [faith presupposition]…he will also 
misunderstand himself when he seeks to escape the conditions of nature….”303  Therefore, “He 
will end by seeking absorption in a divine reality which is at once all and nothing.”304  The 
unfettered freedom of the transcendent self—that which seeks complete release from the 
                                               
knows no law but his own will-to-power and has no God but his own unlimited ambition.”  His observations about 
Nietzsche more closely resemble “the sober, sceptical [sic] and earth-bound Montaigne” (P. 64): the self is lost in 
the impulses of the will. 
300 Ibid., P. 70. 
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constraints of nature—loses the self by reducing it to “…merely an aspect of universal mind” 
(Idealism),305 one that is “…swallowed up into an undifferentiated divine unity” (Mysticism),306 
or “…lost in the attainment of a rationality” (Rationalism).307 
 Essentially, faith in “the two gods of modern man” results in the loss of self-
transcendence through their “premature solutions” to the problem of Niebuhr’s original question 
of self-understanding.  One loses self-transcendence in an ironic effort to discover more freedom 
within the human’s natural impulses or tribe, while the other loses self-transcendence by 
negating the nature over which the self transcends. 
 The challenge then for Niebuhr is to discover a governing center or presupposition of 
faith which presumes neither the preeminence of nature over self, nor the preeminence of self 
over nature, but rather can maintain both within a state of tension which can “…do justice to 
both the uniqueness of man and his affinities with the world of nature below him….”308  This 
challenge appears difficult, for whatever form of reason Niebuhr must use seems already 
grounded in a pre-determined foundation which presupposes either the human’s affinity with 
nature or the human’s transcendence over it. 309  Niebuhr states, “…for reason which seeks to 
bring all things into terms of rational coherence is tempted to make one known thing the 
principle of explanation and to derive all other things from it.  Its most natural inclination is to 
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American Original (Daniel Rice, ed., Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2009. P. 278); Naveh, Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Non-Utopian Liberalism (Sussex, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2002);  Ronald Stone, “Review of 
‘Reinhold Niebuhr and Non-utopian Liberalism’” in Journal of Religion (Vol. 84 Is. 4, October 2004. P. 639). 
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make itself the ultimate principle….”310  In other words, if one presumes nature’s preeminence 
over self or the self’s preeminence over nature, reason will follow from that foundation 
accordingly, ultimately obscuring the self in its attempt to understand it.  Therefore, Niebuhr’s 
unifying principle must by some measure be unreasonable for it to reasonably maintain both the 
human as a “child of nature” and the human-as-spirit. 
 Regarding his process of establishing reason from a place that is unreasonable, in his 
book, Beyond Tragedy, Niebuhr sets out to detail his unifying principle by reflecting on a 
passage of scripture, taken from II Corinthians 6:8, where the apostle Paul observes that 
Christians are “deceivers yet true.”311  Given that the preceding clause states, “by evil report and 
good report,”312 Niebuhr suggests that certain reports “…were circulated about [Paul] as charges 
of deception and dishonesty.”313  Niebuhr, however, interprets Paul’s response as being, on the 
one hand, an admission of his deception, yet on the other hand, “true.”  This construct of 
reasoning affirms for Niebuhr a way of understanding reality that must first make passage 
through a lie: “For what is true in the Christian religion,” Niebuhr proclaims, “can be expressed 
only in symbols which contain a certain degree of provisional and superficial deception.”314  In 
other words, in regards to understanding the self in its full dimension, the truth of one’s unity 
must emerge from a principle that is at first unreasonable. 
 In order to perceive a fuller picture of self without succumbing to a form of reason which 
already presupposes—and prematurely resolves—the unity of self from an insufficient position, 
Niebuhr argues for the explanatory power of myth over and against that of more modern forms 
                                               
310 Niebuhr, Nature and Destiney of Man Vol. I, P. 13. 
311 In the New Revised Standard Version, the full verse of II Corinthians 6:8 states, “in honor and dishonor, in ill 
repute and good repute. We are treated as imposters, and yet are true.” 
312 This is Niebuhr’s translation.  The New Revised Standard Version states, “in ill repute and good repute” instead. 
313 BTR, P. 3. 
314 Ibid. 
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of reason. To do this, Niebuhr uses the example of a painter to demonstrate how an artist has to 
effectively “lie” on a two-dimensional canvas in order to depict something that is three-
dimensional in reality.  Niebuhr states: 
…artists are forced to use deceptive symbols when they seek to portray two dimensions of space upon the 
single dimension of a flat canvas.  Every picture which suggests depth and perspective draws angles not as 
they are but as they appear to the eye when it looks into depth.  Parallel lines are not drawn as parallel lines 
but are made to appear as if they converged on the horizon; for so they appear to the eye when it envisages 
a total perspective.315 
 
Likewise, without a mythical governing center, the self appears only by way of two contrasting 
dimensions (nature and spirit) that cannot make sense of the full stature of self.  The symbolism 
of myths, however, can create a level of deception that is necessary to present a fuller depiction 
of reality.  Niebuhr concludes, “The necessity of picturing things as they seem rather than as they 
are…is a striking analogy, in the field of space, of the problem of religion in the sphere of 
time.”316  In order to more clearly see and understand the unity of self which mere observation 
only implicitly portrays,317 Niebuhr needs the deceptive qualities of myth as a unifying 
principle—presupposed by faith—to tell the truth. 
 Ultimately, Niebuhr needs a unifying principle of self which grants a proper height of 
self-transcendence and freedom without sacrificing its “obvious” depth of creatureliness and 
finiteness, which can serve as the basis upon which one articulates both the self and the world.  
Thus, this understanding of myth is the manner in which Niebuhr will correlatively affirm the 
authority of biblical revelation on the basis of its ability to answer his central question regarding 
                                               
315 Ibid., P. 5. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Regarding the self, it is important to remember, as Daniel James Malotky states (Reinhold Niebuhr’s Paradox: 
Groundwork for Social Responsibility” in Journal of Religious Ethics Vol. 31 Is. 1, Spring 2003. P. 114), that “First, 
this concept [of the self] arises from general revelation and the negative apologetic.  Second, it points not to our 
ability to escape mythological representations of ourselves but the need to cast human history in the form of a story.  
It posits that the contradiction between freedom and finitude in the concrete can only be resolved in the moment, 
near in advance.  Only narrative can represent this, though we must take care to specify that even narrative 
represents a level of abstraction from reality.”  In other words, the self arises from nature, but is more clarified—
particularly in the realm of action and ethics—in the realm of myth or revelation. 
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human nature.  While Niebuhr’s view of revelation to this end has been criticized by some for its 
lack of authority,318 it should be stressed that to Niebuhr, scripture has all the authority possible 
as a presupposition of faith; one that illuminates the self and the world in a way nothing else 
can.319  Scripture, for Niebuhr, is the only means by which humans can clarify the unity of self 
and its implications in the realm of ethics.320 
Over and against the human tendency to prematurely resolve the question which stands at 
the center of human nature and spirit, Niebuhr discovers in scripture a symbolic expression of 
self that articulates the fullness of self-transcendence without sacrificing the very obvious fact of 
one’s animalistic nature.  That symbol in the Christian scriptures is the Imago Dei—the Image of 
God.  Niebuhr states, “In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of 
God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual 
dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest 
                                               
318 In his book, With the Grain of the Universe (P. 131), Hauerwas criticized Niebuhr, stating, “Niebuhr felt free, in 
an almost Alice-in-Wonderland fashion, to make words mean anything he wanted them to mean.”  In her work, The 
Omission of the Holy Spirit from Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theology (New York, NY: Claredon Press, 1997. P. 216), 
Rachel King places revelation in the category of “Ideas Reinhold Niebuhr Loves but Does not Believe to be True.” 
It should be said that both of these critiques, however, imply a knowable intentionality behind Niebuhr’s work that 
is impossible to draw from his texts.  For an elaboration on this response to both Hauerwas and King, see: Kevin 
Carnahan, “Reading Reinhold Niebuhr against Himself Again: On Theological Language and Divine Action” in 
International Journal of Systematic Theology Vol. 18 No. 2 (April 2016). 
319 If anything, Tillich criticizes Niebuhr for his use of scripture as an exclusively correct text.  In his lecture, “Sin 
and Grace in the Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr” (Landon, P. 33), Tillich states, “He has a rather low evaluation of 
the non-Biblical literature, especially if this literature has the bad luck to have been written by a philosopher from 
Plato on.  He has a special method of dealing with representatives of Western philosophy, a method which one 
perhaps could call the critical-comparing method.  He quotes a passage of Paul, and then in opposition to it a 
passage of Plato, or of Spinoza, or even worse, of Hegel; and then he says, ‘Now here you have the Biblical truth 
and there you have the philosophical error.’” 
320 By the term “clarify” this does not mean that myth or revelation resolves the problem of the human’s 
understanding of self, but it does grant a fuller picture of self in order to better position oneself to understand 
answers regarding conduct.  In his book, Making the Best of It: Following Christ in the Real World (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 90), John G. Stackhouse describes this “clarifying” effect of Niebuhr’s approach 
to scripture best when he states, “To reveal truth in a way that properly balances various elements and communicates 
well across a variety of cultures, God has resorted to the genre of story, of myth—understood as a narrative and 
symbol set that articulate abiding truth (‘this is the way things are and have been’) but not, as Christian tradition has 
believed, historical truth (‘this is the way things once happened’).” 
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aspects of his natural life.”321  For Niebuhr, such a myth that renders the human as the Image of 
God simultaneously “lies” and yet tells the truth; it is a lie in so far as its unity cannot be made 
sense of from the position of nature or reason; it is true, however, in that it conveys a unity of 
self which makes better sense of the paradox in which one stands.  Niebuhr states, “[the human] 
can, therefore, understand the total dimension in which it stands only by making faith the 
presupposition of its understanding….”322  The symbol of the Image of God does not reduce the 
human to nature, nor absorb one into an undifferentiated eternity, but understands the self in its 
complete unity, properly situated between the twin traps of ultimate transcendence and complete 
uniformity with nature. 
 In conclusion, Niebuhr views consciousness as a transcendent self which surveys the 
world and determines action from a governing center.  However, that governing center cannot be 
found through reason or nature alone, as one is obscured once the other is regarded as 
preeminent.  Therefore, the basis upon which a governing center must be understood is 
established from the position of homelessness.  While the human’s homelessness is a problem 
unto oneself, that problem is aggravated by premature solutions which flatten out one’s 
perspective of self and reality by subjugating one aspect of the self unto the other, thus losing the 
self entirely to either the mechanistic properties of nature and tribal unity on the one hand, or an 
undifferentiated realm of spirit or reason on the other.  Therefore, Niebuhr argues, one must 
render a unifying principle of faith to act as one’s governing center, one which transcends reason 
to establish a unity of self that does not presume such height as to destroy one’s depth, and does 
not presume such depth so as to destroy one’s height.  The initial presupposition of faith which 
Niebuhr sees as the foundation of such a governing center is the Imago Dei. 
                                               
321 NDHN, P. 150. 
322 Ibid., P. 158. 
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II: Ethical Responsibility and the Easy & Uneasy Conscience 
Niebuhr’s understanding of ethical responsibility should first be understood in the 
negative, as an attack upon what he calls the “easy conscience” of the modern human.  It is 
through this process of critique that he, at least in part, negatively validates the Christian 
perspective of human nature, which generates what he calls the “uneasy conscience.”  Therefore, 
this section will first examine (A) the loss of responsibility through his concept of the “easy 
conscience,” then will turn to (B) his more positive argument from Christian scriptures for his 
conception of the “uneasy conscience.”  Finally, this section will conclude (C) with an analysis 
of the two primary consequences of maintaining an easy conscience, which shall foreshadow the 
Niebuhrian critiques of Mumford and Marcuse yet to come. 
A. The Easy Conscience 
Up to this point, Niebuhr’s conceptualization of humans as a problem unto themselves—
and the human’s tendency to avoid that problem through premature solutions—has 
predominantly been expressed abstractly as a philosophical or theological problem.  However, 
Niebuhr’s primary concern regarding the problem of self emerges in the realm of ethics,323 as 
that problem is “aggravated” by establishing an “easy” or “complacent conscience” at the center 
of human behavior.324  Effectively, prematurely solving the paradoxes at the center of the human 
                                               
323 It should be noted at this point that all of Niebuhr’s work regarding the self and transcendence was directed 
primarily towards developing his understanding of ethics.  As Gilkey notes in his essay, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
Theology of History” (in The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, Nathan A. Scott Jr., ed., Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974. P. 42 fn), “…when Niebuhr explicates the meaning of this transcendence and yet relatedness, it 
is not the ontological meaning of such a concept that concerns him, but the ethical and political meanings; i.e., a 
relation to transcendence answers the question of how a group can find meaning in its common life without making 
itself the center of history and so doing injustice to others.” 
324 Niebuhr begins his chapter, titled, “The Easy Conscience of Modern Man” (NDHN, Chapter 4), with the 
following pronouncement: “Our introductory analysis of modern views of human nature has established the 
complacent conscience of modern man as the one unifying force amidst a wide variety of anthropological 
conceptions.” Emphasis added. 
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situation is problematic because it removes both the complicity and responsibility of the human 
being that motivates one in the realm of action, thereby externalizing both evil and moral 
obligation. 
Niebuhr argues that the easy conscience is a product of premature solutions regarding 
one’s understanding of self.  Niebuhr states, “Nature and reason are thus the two gods of modern 
man, and sometimes the two are one.  In either case man is essentially secure because he is not 
seriously estranged from the realm of harmony and order.”325  In other words, the human’s 
tendency towards premature solutions—seeking to understand oneself either primarily from the 
position of one’s nature or one’s reason—more fully aligns the self with that which one 
presumes is the dominant feature, thus leading one to presuppose a certain goodness about 
oneself.  One is “secure” because he or she is never too far from the realm of harmony and order, 
whether that harmony and order arises from nature or descends from the mind.  Ultimately, in the 
realm of ethics, the human only has to become more like what one already is.  Niebuhr states, 
“Either the rational man or the natural man is conceived as essentially good, and it is only 
necessary for man either to rise from the chaos of nature to the harmony of mind or to descend 
from the chaos of spirit to the harmony of nature and order to be saved.”326  To put it another 
way, the easy conscience occurs either when one places undue faith in spirit to resolve the 
problems of nature, or undue faith in nature to resolve the problems of spirit.  The human being 
is “secure” in one’s goodness, and is easily saved by simply becoming more of what one already 
is perceived to be. 
 According to Niebuhr, perhaps the most destructive feature of the easy conscience is the 
inability to discover evil in the self; it is reduced, rather, to some “defiance of nature’s and 
                                               
325 NDHN, P. 95. Emphasis added. 
326 Ibid., P. 25. 
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reason’s laws.”327  Niebuhr states, “He always imagines himself betrayed into this defiance either 
by some accidental corruption in his past history or by some sloth of reason.”328  The Naturalist 
and Romanticist may lose the innocence of nature,329 the Rationalist may err, and the Idealist 
may suffer from “cultural lag;”330 but none of these, however, can articulate evil and 
responsibility from the position of human choice or human freedom.  No human can help the fact 
that they are subject to a loss of innocence, that they err, or that they are part of a culture whose 
educational, and therefore ethical, development has stagnated.  There is no responsibility here 
because there is no freedom here, as self-transcendence has become flattened by way of a 
singular dimension of self-perception. 
B. The Uneasy Conscience 
If the easy conscience is the result of the human’s “premature solutions” regarding the 
problem of the human’s homelessness, the uneasy conscience is the product of a sober 
recognition of the complexities and mysteries of the human condition, unified by its apparent 
paradoxes and tensions.  The uneasy conscience is “…the protest of man’s essential nature 
against his present state…the sense of inner conflict which expresses itself in all moral life.”331  
This inner conflict and protest against the human’s present state, however, should not be 
understood as a defect of human nature, but is the necessary seedbed for ethical responsibility 
                                               
327 Ibid., P. 96. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Niebuhr argues, “The modern naturalist, whether romantic or rationalistic, has an easy conscience because he 
believes that he has not strayed very far from, and can easily return to, the innocency [sic] of nature.” (NDHN, P. 
104) 
330 In NDHN (P. 112-113), Niebuhr argues that the idealism of Alfred N. Whitehead and Dewey “…both arrive at a 
‘cultural lag’ theory of human evil and both hope for a society which will ultimately be governed purely by rational 
suasion rather than force.  Their arrival at this common goal by contrasting methods is indicative of the power of 
moral optimism in modern culture… [They] are forced to construct a very shaky and inadequate point of reference 
from which they can operate against the confusion of natural impulse.”  Essentially, what Niebuhr means by cultural 
lag is that the people of a given society simply have not caught up yet to establish a functional morality over their 
society.  All evil is, thus, a group of people who are effectively uneducated in the correct way to live. 
331 NDHN, P. 263. 
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and motivation.  Reflecting on Niebuhr, Thomas C. Berg cogently states, “It is precisely our 
‘uneasy conscience’…that helps spur our unrealized moral possibilities.”332  Effectively, it is not 
the human’s uneasy conscience which should be avoided or mitigated, but rather it should be 
exposed, enlarged, and maintained.  This maintenance of the uneasy conscience, the inner 
tensions of the self, will be supported by Niebuhr’s use of the Christian doctrines of the Imago 
Dei and Original Sin.   
As previously demonstrated, Niebuhr’s understanding of the human as the Imago Dei 
supplies for him a truth told by way of a “lie.”  It is a lie in that it is a view of self that is false 
from the position of human-as-transcendent or human-as-contingent.  However, it tells the truth 
in that it does not forsake the human’s contingency to nature in favor of its transcendence, nor 
does it forsake the human’s transcendence in favor of its natural contingencies.  In other words, 
evil does not exist as a necessary concomitant to the human’s composition: evil is not purely 
one’s animalistic impulses, nor is it purely one’s rational or spiritual faculties. Niebuhr states, 
“[The Christian doctrine of Imago Dei] insists on man’s weakness, dependence, and finiteness on 
his involvement in the necessities and contingencies of the nature world, without, however, 
regarding this finiteness as, of itself, a source of evil in man….”333  The doctrine of Imago Dei, 
for Niebuhr, properly situates the human being in a way that pays proper tribute to both one’s 
height and depth, but one that must be maintained within the proper tensions of itself in order to 
maintain freedom, and therefore, responsibility. 
For Niebuhr, then, a secondary myth is necessary to maintain the human-as-Imago-Dei 
within its proper position of tensions: the Christian doctrine of Original Sin.  The doctrine of 
                                               
332 Thomas C. Berg, “Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr,” in North Carolina Law 
Review Vol. 73 No. 4 (1995), P. 1590. 
333 NDHN, P. 150. 
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Original Sin, as expressed in the myth of the Garden of Eden, is a story of human beings 
wrestling with the limits their own freedom.  Essentially, Satan tempts Adam and Eve “to break 
and transcend the limits which God has set” for them.334  In other words, the human is tempted to 
extend beyond what he or she was created to be: the Imago Dei; it is to reject the uneasy 
homelessness in which the human is grounded. 
However, this temptation does not arise out of nowhere, but it was occasioned by the 
serpent, who simply made Adam and Eve cognizant of “the limited and dependent character of 
[their] existence and knowledge.”335  Ultimately, sin is the inevitable result of one’s rejection of 
the parameters of the Imago Dei, but that rejection is preconditioned by an anxiety regarding the 
human’s lowly condition.   
For Niebuhr, the concept of anxiety, as borrowed from Kierkegaard,336 is central to his 
conception of sin, and by extension, the uneasy conscience.  While Satan was necessary to hold 
the position of the progenitor of anxiety,337 Niebuhr argues that anxiety is an inevitable—though 
not necessary—byproduct of the immutable human composition.  He states, “In short, man, 
being both free and bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious.  Anxiety is the inevitable 
concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved.”338  As a 
“homeless” creature who cannot be understood completely from the position of one’s 
                                               
334 Ibid., P. 180. 
335 Ibid., P. 181. 
336 In his book, The Constant Dialogue: Reinhold Niebuhr and American Intellectual Culture (New York, NY: 
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. P. 158), Martin Halliwell makes the Kierkegaard-Niebuhr connection 
complete on the point of an inescapable sense of anxiety: “Like Kierkegaard…[Niebuhr] saw anxiety as a 
precondition of being human….”  In NDHN (P. 182 fn) Niebuhr also footnotes Kierkegaard as being a source for his 
concept that anxiety leads to sin.  He states, “Kierkegaard’s analysis of the relation of anxiety to sin is the 
profoundest in Christian thought.” 
337 For Niebuhr, the character of Satan was a necessary feature of the myth of the Garden of Eden.  In NDHN (P. 
180) he states, “The devil fell before man fell, which is to say that man’s rebellion against God is not an act of sheer 
perversity, nor does it follow inevitably from the situation in which he stands.” 
338 Ibid., P. 182. 
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transcendence or one’s creatureliness, the human is anxious, as he or she can always imagine 
what one can never possess.  The human can transcend nature, but in so doing knows he or she 
must die.  The human can act upon one’s reason, but there is no guarantee of the desired 
outcome.  The human can have unlimited ambitions, but must face very limiting historical or 
natural realities.  Anxiety is an inevitable existential collision of freedom and transcendence with 
finitude and contingency, and it is due to one’s immutable composition. It is what Kierkegaard 
calls “the dizziness of freedom.” 339   
But, as in the case of the Garden, anxiety is also the seedbed for sin.  Niebuhr states, 
“Anxiety is the internal precondition of sin.  It is the inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in 
the paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness.  Anxiety is the internal description of the 
state of temptation…. Yet anxiety is not sin.”340  Anxiety tempts the human to sin, for the 
human’s imagination and freedom far exceeds one’s natural limitations, and drives the human to 
carry out that which is destructive in order to attain that which is unattainable.  In Niebuhr’s 
words, the human is “…tempted by the situation in which he stands.”341 
Furthermore, Niebuhr argues that there are generally two forms of sin—both of which are 
a result of the human’s anxious disposition, and both commit the original sin of denying one’s 
intractable composition in favor of illusion.  These two sins are pride and sensuality, and both 
correspond to the two directions that one may be drawn to obscure the uneasiness of the human 
condition.  Niebuhr states: 
When anxiety has conceived it brings forth both pride and sensuality.  Man falls into pride when he seeks 
to raise his contingent existence to unconditioned significance; he falls into sensuality when he seeks to 
escape from his unlimited possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of self-
determination, by immersing himself into a ‘mutable good,’ by losing himself in some natural vitality.342 
 
                                               
339 Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, P. 61. 
340 NDHN, P. 182-183. 
341 Ibid., P. 17. 
342 Ibid., P. 186. 
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For Niebuhr, pride is choosing and acting upon an illusion of transcendence in an effort to 
mitigate one’s natural limitations, while sensuality is choosing and acting upon an illusion of 
one’s limitations in an effort to mitigate one’s capabilities.  Essentially, the anxiety which 
accompanies the human’s homeless condition tempts one to falsely eliminate those tensions in 
favor of an illusion of control when one has none, or an illusion of not having control when one 
indeed does. 
Given the uneasy and paradoxical anthropology upon which Christian responsibility is 
established, the human’s chief ethical obligation therefore is to properly discern the capabilities 
of one’s freedom and transcendence in relationship to one’s finiteness and limitations.  For 
Niebuhr, it is for this reason that the primary goal of ethics is to clarify the human being and the 
world, not simply to make oneself better or to more closely aspire towards one’s ideal, as that in 
itself can lead towards pride.  The uneasy conscience is precisely that internal struggle that 
actively resists both the pride of one’s transcendence, and the sensuality of one’s contingency.  
The application of the uneasy conscience is perhaps best expressed in Niebuhr’s serenity prayer: 
“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I 
can, and wisdom to know the difference.”343  In other words, humans must be aware of and 
accept their limitations, know when their transcendence can better themselves and the world, and 
ultimately have the discernment and clarity to distinguish one from the other, for each vexation 
harbors its own temptations to sin. 
While other views concerning human nature disregard anxiety as an impetus in their 
construction of self, Niebuhr argues that Christian anthropology places it directly at the center of 
                                               
343 While the authorship of this prayers has been in question, new evidence has all but concluded that Niebuhr was 
indeed the person who authored it.  See: Fred R. Shapiro, “Who Wrote the Serenity Prayer?” in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education (28 April 2014). 
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human freedom.  This makes the human’s capacity for evil an inevitable result of human 
freedom, and not a defect of one’s nature or some purely external force.  This is why, Niebuhr 
argues, all other anthropological views invariably express themselves as an easy conscience, 
while Christianity expresses itself as an uneasy conscience.  Niebuhr’s Christian conception of 
sin is attributable to human choice—or human freedom—not to some external or essential force.  
Niebuhr states, “Original sin, which is by definition an inherited corruption, or at least an 
inevitable one, is nevertheless not to be regarded as belonging to his essential nature and 
therefore is not outside the realm of his responsibility.”344  Essentially, because sin is an 
inevitable corruption and not a necessary corruption—because sin comes from the same realm of 
freedom as one’s goodness—the human is responsible.  Evil is not due simply to some natural 
defect, miscalculation, or cultural lag, but it is deployed from the realm of one’s free will. 
 Therefore, based upon the faith presupposition of the Imago Dei, as properly maintained 
with its corresponding doctrine of Original Sin, Christianity maintains the proper position from 
which ethical responsibility can be maintained by way of an uneasy conscience regarding the 
human’s very composition.  Niebuhr states: 
Christianity, therefore, issues inevitably in religious expression of an uneasy conscience.  Only within 
terms of the Christian faith can man not only understand the reality of the evil in himself but escape the 
error of attributing that evil to any one but himself.  It is possible of course to point out that man is tempted 
by the situation in which he stands.345  
 
In other words, Niebuhr argues that, between its doctrines of the Imago Dei and Original Sin, 
Christianity offers a unique basis upon which responsibility can be maintained by way of an 
uneasy conscience.   
                                               
344 Ibid., P. 242. 
345 Ibid., P. 17. 
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C. Consequences of the Easy Conscience: Salvation and Anxiety 
The easy conscience, as derived from premature solutions regarding the vexations 
inherent to the human situation, has further consequences than simply the elimination of ethical 
responsibility.  The easy conscience is also the basis by which one’s understanding of the world 
and self are further compounded and obscured.  This section will describe two consequences of 
the easy conscience: the first (1) will show how the easy conscience obscures one’s perception of 
the world, culminating in unrealistic attempts to save oneself from its various evils, and the 
second (2) will show how the easy conscience compounds the problem of anxiety. 
1. Obscured World; Unrealistic Salvation 
 
The easy conscience tempts the human towards illusions that are inconsistent with the 
reality one experiences in two ways: pride and sensuality.346  Regarding pride, for those who do 
not consider the limitations of one’s transcendence—one’s reason and ideology—the realms of 
history, nature, and systems appear unrealistically manageable, changeable, and bendable 
towards one’s predetermined harmony of nature.347  Regarding sensuality, for those who forsake 
one’s transcendence—one’s capacities to enact change in those places governed by reason—the 
realms of history, nature, and systems appear incalcitrant, hopeless, and irredeemable; isolation 
and escapism then become the sources of salvation for the self.  Regardless of whichever way 
one errs—towards pride or sensuality—due to the presumption that evil is always located in 
                                               
346 In CLCD (P. 9-10), Niebuhr makes a distinction between two types of self-righteousness—or easy consciences.  
First, “the children of light” are those whose high opinion of the self tempts them towards the illusion that self-
interest can be brought “under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good.”  
To the children of light, their high opinion of self obscures their understanding of world as one that is manageable.  
The second form of the easy conscience is “the children of darkness” who are so aware of self-interest that there is 
no possibility for “law beyond the self.”  Thus, the cynicism of the children of darkness is a paralyzing, if not 
escaping or resigning, response to the easy conscience.  For the children of darkness, their high opinion of self 
obscures their understanding of the world as one that is very much unmanageable.   
347 In IOAH (P. 66-67), Niebuhr observers the human’s tendency to ignore “…his ambiguous position of being both 
creature and creator of the historical process and become unequivocally the master of his own destiny.” 
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realms beyond one’s freedom, the easy conscience must either conquer or escape that evil which 
originates outside of the self in order to establish a new realm of harmony and order.  Thus, those 
with the easy conscience are perennially cursed to obscure the world they perceive, and evil is 
always either too easy to escape, or too easy to shape.  
 It is in this way that the easy conscience becomes observable within at least two positions 
on technological neutrality already observed.  The Hard Instrumental Theory of Horton 
represents that expression of an easy conscience which posits that the addition of technology to 
society merely creates a new dynamic under which the human can manage, control, and bend to 
its will.  While Horton’s view of human nature was not specifically elaborated, it can be assumed 
that a very high view of human beings is necessary to imagine that its technological creations are 
essentially benign and manageable.  The Substantive Theory of Ellul, on the other hand, 
represents that expression of an easy conscience which posits that the addition of technology to 
society creates a new form of evil which can only be escaped via mystical, historical, or 
eschatological events; the human is simultaneously evil and a helpless victim to evil due to some 
natural or historical defect, and therefore one is non-complicit.  Both expressions are that of an 
easy conscience because neither detect evil as originating from within the realm of freedom and 
choice.  
2. Compounded Anxiety 
 
As previously shown, anxiety is what humans experience as a result of observing, or even 
fighting against, the permanence and immutable composition of one’s homeless state.  Niebuhr 
calls anxiety, “…the inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the paradoxical situation of 
freedom and finiteness.”348  The human, endowed with the seemingly infinite capacities of spirit, 
                                               
348 NDHN, P. 182. 
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can never fully translate that which it can imagine into the finite realm of existence, thus the 
human is anxious.  It is truly as Kierkegaard states, “the dizziness of freedom.” 349  However, 
while anxiety is an inevitable concomitant to the human situation, such anxiety is ultimately 
compounded by the easy conscience. 
“No philosophy or religion,” Niebuhr states, “can change the structure of human 
existence,”350 and as previously established, that structure is the seedbed for anxiety’s inevitable 
manifestation.  What this means is that no matter how transcendent or contingent one imagines 
the human being, one may establish an easy conscience, but one cannot escape anxiety.  In fact, 
as it built upon premature solutions to the problem of the human situation, all philosophies and 
religions which espouse an easy conscience invariably lead to a compounded point of anxiety 
when fully realized.  All that one can extrapolate most fully and completely regarding the human 
and one’s ideals must at some point confront a limiting and finite reality.  All forms of optimism 
eventually find their end in some form of dizziness.  It is in this way that while philosophies and 
religions cannot change this internal structure of human nature—that structure which inevitably 
leads to anxiety—they can indeed flatten out, or diminish the self by premature solutions, and in 
so doing assuage the conscience of its guilt.  Therefore, philosophies which harbor an easy 
conscience follow a predictable model; one which begins in optimism and ends in either despair, 
or a paralyzing anxiety that cannot articulate the self fully enough to conquer the evil it perceives 
in the world.  Either way, however, the easy conscience results in a functional determinism; 
while one may affirm a changeable world, one’s prescriptions are never enough to change the 
evil it perceives. 
 
                                               
349 Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, P. 61. 




At this point it is important to reiterate that the easy conscience is a product of one’s too 
simple solutions regarding the question of human nature.  It is one’s presumed anthropology—as 
either too transcendent or too naturally or historically contingent—that ultimately leads to 
whether one can articulate ethical responsibility.  It is for this reason that this thesis will use this 
aspect of Niebuhr’s thought to show that while Mumford and Marcuse are rightly aware that they 
cannot articulate technology as beyond critique nor fundamentally determined, each thinker’s 
anthropology presumes an easy conscience that eliminates ethical responsibility and obscures 
their understanding of the technological society in a way that betrays their original conclusions.  
Both discover sources of salvation that are simply unrealistic, as both perceive evil as either too 
easy to escape or too easy to shape, and both consequently end with a compounded anxiety that 
repeatedly denies the conclusions to which their presumptions impel them. 
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Chapter 4: Lewis Mumford and the Easy Conscience 
Introduction 
 
The ultimate goal for this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Marcuse in order to create a new approach of 
technological engagement from the basis of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology.  While the 
previous chapter established the theological grounding of Niebuhr’s anthropology with an 
emphasis on his construction of the easy and uneasy conscience, this will be the first of four 
chapters which will turn towards the prophetic method of applying Niebuhr’s anthropology to 
expose the problematic anthropologies of Lewis Mumford and Herbert Marcuse—beginning 
with the former—by showing how both lead to an easy conscience. 
In keeping with the goal of this chapter, this chapter will do three things.  First, (I) this 
chapter will introduce Lewis Mumford’s background and his particular goals as an Instrumental 
theorist.  Second, (II) this chapter will analyze Mumford’s anthropology, with special attention to 
how it contrasts with that of Niebuhr’s.  Finally, (III) this chapter will conclude by arguing that 
Mumford’s anthropology expresses itself as an easy conscience, thus rendering ethical 
responsibility in the technological society problematic. 
I: Lewis Mumford and Instrumental Theory 
 This section will explore the chosen representative of the Instrumental school of thought: 
Lewis Mumford.  Born in New York City in 1895, Mumford became the 20th century’s “leading 
proponent of…ecological thinking.”351  His contributions to art, philosophy, technological 
                                               
351 Donald Miller, ed., The Lewis Mumford Reader (New York, NY, Pantheon Books, 1986), P. 6. 
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criticism, and politics had, according to Henry Steele Commager, Jr., “a deeper and more lasting 
impact on the thinking of his generation than almost any other figure in public life.”352   
This section will accomplish two things.  First (A), this section will look at Mumford’s 
philosophical background, methodology, and his general goals for writing.  The second part of 
this section (B) will analyze the kind of instrumentalism Mumford employs, showing how 
Mumford is indeed an instrumentalist, but also how he differs from others within the same 
school of thought. 
 A. Platonic Generalist, Romantic Humanist 
Mumford’s philosophical and methodological approach to technology begins from two 
places: (1) his self-styled “generalism,” which is guided by a type of Platonic dialectic, and (2) 
his affinity for Humanism and Romanticism. This section will further detail each aspect to draw 
together a unified picture of Mumford’s methodology and goals. 
1. Mumford the Platonic Generalist 
 
 For Mumford, a Generalist is more than a person with a certain predetermined 
epistemology or method; a Generalist is an office.  Mumford describes the burden of the 
Generalist as such:  “…the generalist has a special office, that of bringing together widely 
separated fields, prudently fenced in by specialists into a larger common area, visible only from 
the air.353  Mumford’s understanding of a Generalist, and by extension himself, is akin to a 
vocation that is tasked with tying together the loose ends of all human thought that the 
“specialists” tend to disregard or overlook due to the specialist’s myopia.  Mumford states, “As a 
generalist I have taken advantage of a license too often self-denied by the specialized scholar: 
                                               
352 Henry Steele Commager, Jr., A Tribute to Lewis Mumford (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute, 1982), P. 10. 
353 MOM, P. 16-17. 
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that of assembling the data from widely different areas in order to bring out a larger pattern that 
otherwise escapes observation.”354  In short, both Mumford’s method and goal is to piece 
together the fragments of other scholars’ work in order to create a more cohesive and 
comprehensive picture of human beings, society, and technology. 
When considering the term, “generalist,” it is important to understand the implied 
dichotomy tethered to its origin.  Mumford is a generalist, over and against what he would 
consider a specialist.  Mumford states, “What really prepared me for my career was a negative 
decision: I didn’t want to be a specialist.”355  It is apparent from his writings that, by “specialist,” 
Mumford means to say a scholar who is limited to a specific area of interest, and therefore 
incapable of understanding the full measure of human life.356  Allen Davis states, “Mumford…all 
his life had a certain disdain for narrow, academic research and the pinched, overspecialized life 
of the university scholar.”357  Mumford distrusts “abstract intellectual system-making,”358 he 
never completed even a Bachelor’s Degree—largely because of the specialization it required—
and once remarked later in life that “To be read by Ph.D.s is nothing short of a second burial.”359  
When his fiancé once introduced him as a sociologist, Mumford objected, saying he was “as 
much an artist as the poets and playwrights who submitted their work to the Dial.”360  He 
continued, speaking of sociologists on the one hand and artists on the other, “…I am Ishmael in 
                                               
354 TOM, P. 1. 
355 MWD, P. 431. 
356 Mumford states, “All too easily in our segmented and regimented society one gets ticketed as being fit for only 
one task; and though I have spent my life in avoiding just such pigeonholing, even now I find that it is hard to avoid 
that fate in other people’s minds.” (SFL, P. 185) 
357 Allen F. Davis, “Lewis Mumford: Man of Letters, and Urban Historian” Journal of Urban History Vol. 19 Is. 4 
(August 1993): P. 123. 
358 William T. Cotton, “The Eutopitect: Lewis Mumford as a Reluctant Utopian” Utopian Studies Vol. 8 Is. 1 
(1997): P. 3. 
359 Davis, P. 123. 
360 This is Cotton’s description (P.2) of events that are recorded in a letter to his fiancé, Sophie Wittenberg (4 
August, 1921), published in Works and Days, P. 86. 
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both camps, and am about as popular a corpse that has lain too long in no man’s land between 
the trenches.”361 
 With his Generalist-as-opposed-to-Specialist vocation, it is not surprising to know that 
many find Mumford’s method difficult to categorize.362  In fact, as Guy Beckwith states, 
“Mumford has on occasion been accused of applying no rigorous method at all, but instead 
adducing intuitions and insights in an impressionistic fashion, long on movement and dynamism, 
short on depth.”363  However, Beckwith counters, “But many of Mumford’s closest readers find 
in his work a genuine unity-in-diversity,”364 and find that he “provides a classic example of 
rigorous and effective interdisciplinary thought.”365  
 To support Beckwith’s point that Mumford is more than simply a “dilettante” or a 
“cumulative polymath,” and that he indeed has a specific method supporting his work, Beckwith 
points to a fundamental dialectic underpinning and connecting the whole of Mumford’s 
academic contributions: namely, the dialectic of the “organic and the mechanical.”366  Consistent 
with the instrumentalist view that technology in and of itself has no value except the ends for 
which the agent creates and utilizes it, Mumford sees the primary problem with the technological 
society, not in terms of more technology being present, but rather the kind of thought employed 
by the people directing it and the kinds of ends towards which it is directed.  Mumford 
                                               
361 MWD, P. 86. 
362 Davis (P. 124) states, “It is a task both difficult and pleasurable, for Mumford is always a joy to read but just as 
difficult to categorize.”  However, in his essay, “City as Community: The Life and Vision of Lewis Mumford” 
(Quest Vol. 4 Is. 1, January 2001. P. 1), Robert Wojtowicz argues that the difficulty of categorizing Mumford is 
intentional: “Part of the difficulty in evaluating Mumford lies in his own refusal to be pigeonholed intellectually.  In 
a used bookstore, for example, one might as easily find his books shelved in the social sciences as in the arts or 
humanities.” 
363 Guy V. Beckwith, “The Generalist and the Disciplines: The Case of Lewis Mumford,” Issues in Integrative 
Studies No. 14 (1996): P. 8. Emphasis added. 
364 Ibid., P. 2. 
365 Ibid., P. 1. 
366 Ibid., P. 2. 
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consistently advocates for an “organic balance” in the ends towards which technology is 
directed, as opposed to the cold, regimented, “mechanical” thought processes which so often 
prevail.367  In his essay, “Lewis Mumford: Prophet of Organicism,” Leo Marx captures the 
centrality of this dialectic in Mumford’s writing when he states the following: 
The opposition between the organic and the mechanical…dominates Mumford’s thinking.  Allusions to this 
all encompassing conflict…recur at crucial junctures of his writing, and they provide it with a telling 
coherence and persuasiveness.368 
 
While his vocation as an academic is defined by his goals to be a generalist, the dialectic 
between the organic and mechanical shapes the contours of his method more than any other 
feature in his writing.   
 Furthermore, the dialectic Mumford creates between organic and mechanical is, by his 
own admission, Platonic.369  Indeed, upon a close reading, one discovers that Mumford’s 
Platonism is the operative feature of his work in more ways than simply his dialectical style of 
writing.370  While this chapter will later turn to examine this dialectic more closely, it is 
important to note that a very clear Platonic dialectic is always at work, supporting and guiding 
his goals as a self-described generalist. 
2. Mumford the Romantic Humanist 
 
 Closely linked to his “generalist” duties to rise above what he sees as the regimented, 
myopic analyses of so many of his contemporaries, Mumford’s work is motivated by a strong 
                                               
367 From his first major work to his last, Mumford maintained the theme of the organic v. mechanical.  In SOU, 
Mumford calls society “mechanical puppets” whose “values have not been human values” (P. 252).  In POP, nearly 
50 years later, Mumford contrasts a “life lived in accordance with Nature,” and “the later exponents of a new life 
framed in conformity to the Machine.” 
368 Leo Marx, “Lewis Mumford: Prophet of Organicism,” in, Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes (ed.), Lewis 
Mumford: Public Intellectual (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1990), P. 168. 
369 In his autobiography, Mumford continuously either compares his writing to, or openly envies the acumen of 
Plato’s dialectical style (MWD, P. 116, 182, 357). 
370 Cotton (Eutopitect, P. 4) makes explicit what Mumford had only implied: the whole of Mumford’s critical agent 
hangs upon the affirmation of a Platonic epistemology.  Mumford’s use of “Idolum” to confer upon the agent a 
contrary perception of reality depends quite heavily on the assumption of an internal “world of ideas” that 
transcends experience, closely resembling a Platonic conception of rationalism.   
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optimism in humankind, which he attributes primarily to the various disciplines of the arts and 
humanities.  In particular, Mumford’s work is energized by a strong affinity for romanticism and 
humanism—impulses he utilizes as a unified front against the perceived horrors of modern life.  
This section will explore the way the two impulses come together in Mumford’s work. 
 First, as William Cotton states, “In all his writings, Mumford is an avowed humanist.  
The term always had for him the strongest positive connotations.”371  Mumford always holds at 
the core of his analysis the centrality of the human being.  He states, “the chief end of man is that 
he should grow to the fullest stature of his species,”372 and that “Man himself…is the central 
fact.”373  The human being is not only the center of Mumford’s world, but is the world’s greatest 
hope, and is the greatest resource for one’s own salvation.  Mumford praises the proclamations 
of Pico della Mirandola concerning human nature, that “Thou [humans] shalt have the power, out 
of thy soul and judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine,” responding thus: 
“There have been many attempts during the past century to describe man’s peculiar nature, but I 
am not sure that a better characterization has yet been made than that of the Renascence [sic] 
humanist, Pico della Mirandola…That choice recurs at every stage in man’s development.”374  It 
is from this very optimistic and anthropocentric vision of humanism that Mumford first turns to 
address the problems of the technological society. 
 The irony of Mumford’s optimism is that he is exceedingly critical of the technological 
society—what most instrumentalists, as previously shown, might call humanity’s crowning 
achievement.  However, there is a simple explanation for this irony: Mumford fully embraces the 
spirit of romanticism, and with that “…opposed to the scientific the artist—where the artistic 
                                               
371 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
372 SOU, P. 78. 
373 MWD, P. 469. 
374 MOM, P. 47. 
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comprised not only the aesthetic…but also, more generally, all the subjective-affective capacities 
and experiences of the individual…”375  For Mumford, there is a critical imbalance in the 
technological society, and he sees art, particularly the 19th century transcendentalists, as a key 
counterbalance to American culture’s turn towards science and industry.376  It is within his trust 
of the artist—not science—that Mumford finds his optimism in humanity.   
 While this point will be elaborated more fully in Chapter 4, it is important to note that 
Mumford sees art as culture’s savior, and did so all throughout his life.  His biographer, Donald 
Miller, argues that Mumford “…developed a closely related theme that runs through all his later 
work—the idea of the creative artist as prophet and revolutionary.”377  For Mumford, art and the 
artist are near-deified, akin to Mirandola’s image of humankind, capable of reaching higher with 
each new epoch of history.  Forman describes Mumford’s romanticism as a “sacralization of 
Art” and argues, “…Mumford’s ideologies…were largely typical for partisans of ‘art and 
idealism.’  …[He] took art as a mode, even the only mode, of access to the transcendent, and 
took the artist as the medium for communication with that realm of truth.”378  For Mumford, the 
artist is the hero who will rescue the human from the horrors of technological society, and 
essentially redeem it through the process of drawing art and the fruits of science closer together.  
Mumford proclaims, “It is out of the vivid patterns of the artist’s ecstasy that he draws men 
together and gives them the vision to shape their lives and the destiny of their community 
anew.”379 
                                               
375 Paul Forman, “How Lewis Mumford Saw Science, and Art, And Himself,” Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences Vol. 37 Is. 2 (March 2007): P. 276. 
376 In his book, Lewis Mumford: Critic of Culture and Civilization (New York, NY: Peter Lang AG, International 
Academic Publishers, 2009. P. 15), Shuxue Li states, “By establishing the Golden Day writers, Emerson, Thoreau 
and Whitman, Mumford wants to create a pantheon of American literature to maintain the balanced way of life 
between the subjective and the objective in a technological society.” 
377 Donald Miller, Lewis Mumford: A Life (New York, NY, Grove Press, 1989), P. 163. 
378 Forman, P. 278-279. Emphasis added. 




 Taken together, Mumford’s method is that of a dialectical generalist, whose optimism for 
human life within the technological society is found in the transcendent and holistic approach of 
the romantics.  In particular, where all of these parts come together, is within his construct of the 
organic/mechanical dichotomy.  Kenneth Stunkel states: 
The single big idea that dominates all of Mumford’s writing is organicism, or the organic.  It is the standard 
against which virtually all history and human activity is measured.  The best thinking, he believes, supports 
organic values.  Faulty thinking drifts into partiality and atomism.  Parts are necessary and indisputable, but 
what really matters is the whole.380 
 
The organic/mechanical dialectic is the clearest explanation of his entire method, and represents 
the foundation for the goals he seeks to achieve.  Mumford is a generalist and not a specialist, 
because “what really matters is the whole,” and Mumford champions the romantic critique of 
pure science, because “faulty thinking drifts into partiality and atomism.” It is through this 
dialectic that Mumford believes a salvific organic synthesis through the artist will emerge.   
 B. Mumford’s Instrumentalism 
 Mumford sees technology as a gadget that contains in itself no value,381 and treats 
technology as something that has its own essence apart from the person creating and wielding 
it.382  In his book, Technics and Civilization, Mumford uses the metaphor of an orchestra to 
describe the technological society: “For the instrument only in part determines the character of 
the symphony…. Looking backward on the history of modern technics, one notes that from the 
                                               
380 Kenneth R. Stunkel, Understanding Lewis Mumford: A Guide for the Perplexed (Lampeter, United Kingdom, 
Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 2004), P. 207. 
381 Mumford has another name for value-neutrality, but it functions the same way.  He calls the machine or 
instrument “ambivalent,” but the way he uses it is indistinguishable from “neutrality.”  In TAC (P. 283), Mumford 
states, “One is comforted…by the fact that the machine is ambivalent.” 
382 For Mumford, the machine embodies a separate essence from the person using it or benefiting from it.  In TAC 
(P. 323) he makes this distinction clear when he states, “From the beginning…the most durable conquests of the 
machine lay not in the instruments themselves, which quickly became outmoded, nor in the goods produced, which 
quickly were consumed, but in the modes of life made possible via the machine and in the machine…” 
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tenth century onward the instruments have been scraping and tuning.”383  Technology, for 
Mumford, is an instrument in the hands of the musician.  Tuning is needed and the musicians 
must be synchronized, but the completed work is still in the hands of the musician.   
Mumford sees the world of machines and the will of humans to be quite separate.  
Machines are not evil, but rather, as an instrumentalist, it is merely a question of use and the 
human thought wielding that use.  Li states, “For Mumford, the question is not whether to have 
the machines or consign them to the rubbish heap.  It is a question of whether to use the machine 
for the benefit of human life or to subordinate human life and personal freedom to the 
bureaucratic domination of the machine.”384  Even in his earliest and most polemical writings, it 
was never the factory that “damaged culture,” it was the political, ethical, and conceptual 
systems guiding it.385 
 However, while Mumford clearly demonstrates the traits of an instrumentalist, there are 
two important caveats to consider that distinguish Mumford from other instrumentalists.  First, 
(1) Mumford is by all accounts an avowed critic of the technological society in its present state, 
which is decidedly rare among instrumentalists.  And second (2), Mumford’s optimism, while 
unquestionably present through most of his life, appears to waver at times, especially later in his 
career.  Ultimately, this section introducing Mumford will conclude by showing how both of 
these unique qualities are what make him a particularly suitable fit for the goals of this thesis. 
1. Mumford the Critic 
 
 What sets Mumford apart from other instrumentalists is that he is critical of the 
technological society.  Mumford sees human beings within the technological society exercising a 
                                               
383 TAC, P. 434. 
384 Li, P. 51. 
385 Li, P. 5. 
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certain type of thinking that leads to their acquiescence towards the bidding of a valueless social 
megastructure he calls, “The Megamachine.”386  Like an instrumentalist—as well as a good 
humanist—Mumford understands the human to have the will and the capacity to master and 
direct the Megamachine,387 but unlike other instrumentalists, Mumford believes it is necessary to 
level a career-long critique against the technological society to achieve it.388  
 Additionally, unlike other instrumentalists, Mumford sees the aggregate of the 
technological society—functioning itself as if it were a machine—to be particularly deleterious 
to the conditions of the human.  Reflecting upon what he calls the “paleotechnic phase” of the 
technological society (1700-1900 in industrial nations), Mumford describes its inhabitants’ lives 
as such: “The operations themselves were repetitive and monotonous; the environment was 
sordid; the life that was lived…was empty and barbarous to the last degree.”389  For Mumford, 
the Megamachine that humans created is guided towards objectionable ends.  Like an 
instrumentalist, Mumford does not object to the gadgets themselves, but rather the ends towards 
which the technical-social apparatus is directed.390  However, his insistence upon the inherent 
                                               
386 While an expanded definition for the Megamachine will be provided in Chapter 5, Mumford provides a more 
appropriate usage of the term in MWD (P. 472), that is better suited to the intentions of this section.  He states, “By 
now a large sector of the population of the planet feels uneasy, deprived and neglected—indeed cut off from 
‘reality’—unless it is securely attached to some part of the megamachine: to an assembly line, a conveyor belt, a 
motor car, a radio or a television station, a computer, or a space capsule.”  Here Mumford describes technology in 
the aggregate and he describes the human’s apparent dependence upon or acquiescence towards it, as if it is a social 
structure within which the human is designed to fit. 
387 In his book, The Human Prospect (London, UK,: Secker & Warburg, 1956. P. 311), Mumford makes clear that 
the human has it within one’s power to conquer the forces of the machine; he states, “With the knowledge man now 
possesses, he may control the knowledge that threatens to choke him; with the power he now commands he may 
control the power that would wipe him out; with the values he has created, he may replace a routine of life based 
upon a denial of values.” 
388 Mumford claims “mastery” of the machine as the prime objective of his magnum opus, Technics and 
Civilization, by way of distinguishing and defining “the specific properties of a technics directed towards the service 
of life.” (P. 7) 
389 TAC, P. 153-154. 
390 Mumford continually argues that the end goal of technology should be driven towards the benefit of what he 
called the “whole man.”  In COM (P. 336), Mumford states, “…the whole man [is] the necessary goal of a fully 
humane system of production…the whole man must rest upon a theory of production which itself takes into 
consideration the underlying needs of the human personality.”  In SOU (P. 254-255), Mumford calls for an end to 
“purely temporal ends” that regard “efficiency or organization…the very touchstone of social improvement.” 
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problems of these cumulative ends indeed makes him unique from the bevy of instrumentalists 
that populate today’s technical discourse.   
2. Mumford the Gloomy Optimist 
 
 The second feature that sets Mumford apart from a general trend in instrumental theory is 
that Mumford’s optimism tends to waver at the end of his career.  While he changed very little, if 
at all, in his overall philosophical structure, and while he seems to consistently maintain his 
articulation of human nature and self throughout his life, Mumford struggles to show any 
positive signs for the future, and according to Miller, he tends to reflect “a growing 
disenchantment with modern life and a gathering pessimism…about the possibilities of human 
renewal.”391 
 It is generally agreed that Mumford begins to turn pessimistic following World War II, 
though his pessimism does not hit its peak until the completion of his final major works, The 
Myth of the Machine, and The Pentagon of Power.392  There are many notable reasons given for 
this gradual turn towards pessimism.  The first is personal, as Mumford suffered the death of his 
son—who was a soldier in World War II—once even admitting in a letter that he had 
demonstrated “a heavy load of depression which might reach suicidal depths”393 due to the 
lasting anguish over his loss.  The second reason is, in the words of Miller, “The invention and 
deployment of the atomic bomb,”394 for which, according to Mumford, “…showed me Hitler 
                                               
391 Miller, P. 300. 
392 Miller (Lewis Mumford Reader), Michael Zuckerman (“Faith, Hope, Not Much Charity: The Optimistic 
Epistemology of Lewis Mumford” in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, P. 362), and Frank G. Novak (The 
Autobiographical Writings of Lewis Mumford: A Study in Literary Audacity, USA, University of Hawaii 
Press/Biographical Research Center, 1988, P. 53) argue that Mumford begins his “different drift” (Zuckerman) or 
“pessimism” (Miller) immediately after WWII, and such pessimism reaches its climax in MOM and POP.   
393 MWD, P. 430. 
394 Miller, The Lewis Mumford Reader, P. 300. 
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had…conquered the minds of the most democratic governments.”395  The third reason often 
given to explain Mumford’s turn towards pessimism is his growing impatience with the scientific 
community to do anything about the problems of the technological society.  Everett Mendelsohn 
states, “He expressed a disappointment at being let down or abandoned by science and scientists.  
He expected more….”396 
 While the varied explanations that scholars give for this pessimistic turn may very well 
contribute to Mumford’s change later in his career, it is still nonetheless a curious shift, given his 
overall unchanged epistemology and his otherwise optimistic view of human nature.397  Indeed, 
it appears that the shift from his still-optimistic outlook in Technics and Civilization (1934) to his 
overt pessimism in The Myth of the Machine (1963) is less to do with a change in sentiments—
be it the loss of his son, the existential threat of the atomic bomb, or his impatience with the 
scientific community—but rather a necessary outgrowth from his thought.398  In his essay, 
“Faith, Hope, Not Much Charity,” Michael Zuckerman provides a very telling description of the 
end to this process for Mumford—one which shall be explored in more detail later—that despite 
his fidelity to his earliest convictions and constructions regarding the power of human nature 
within the technological society, “he disdains the conclusions to which his intellect impels 
him.”399  In other words, it is Mumford’s intellect that guides him to his later pessimistic 
                                               
395 Quoted from a letter Mumford wrote to Buno Zevi, 12 October, 1973, in Miller, The Lewis Mumford Reader, P. 
300-301. 
396 Everett Mendelsohn, “Prophet of Our Discontent: Lewis Mumford Confronts the Bomb,” in Lewis Mumford: 
Public Intellectual, P. 342. 
397 In his essay, “Faith, Hope, Not Much Charity,” Zuckerman argues that Mumford’s epistemology remains 
unchanged throughout his career, and with it, his “latent” optimism for the human project.  Zuckerman states, “In 
just such tortured turns, Mumford keeps faith with his understanding of the contingency of history.  At the same 
time…he keeps faith with himself…Mumford does not doubt that ours is a culture drifting ever further from human 
fullness…Yet almost always, he refuses to give in.” (Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, P. 376) 
398 Zuckerman states, “The Myth of the Machine scouts the far frontiers even as it goes over old ground.  It is his 
most searching reconnaissance of contemporary culture and consciousness, yet it returns to his earliest intellectual 
attachments.”  (Ibid., P. 376) 
399 Hughes & Hughes, P. 376. 
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conclusions, in opposition to his sentiments.  His optimistic articulation of human nature—and 
by extension, his optimism for humankind—is ultimately betrayed by his conclusions. 
II: Mumford’s Anthropology 
 As structured in the third chapter, this thesis is working from the understanding that self 
is one’s perception of one’s own stature within the cosmos, and is expressed by way of three 
mutually reinforcing dimensions: (A) the human’s relationship to nature and/or history, (B) how 
one relates to and understands the external world, and (C) how these assessments manifest within 
the aggregate state of the human’s consciousness.  Respective to each section, this section will 
(1) trace Mumford’s philosophical definition of self through these categories and (2) highlight 
his more fundamental differences with Niebuhr.   
A. The Human’s Relationship to Nature 
1. Mumford: Emerging From and Over Nature 
 
 Mumford’s view of the self as it relates to nature comes in three distinct, yet mutually 
reinforcing, parts: (a) the self’s attachment to nature, (b) the self’s emergence from nature, and 
(c) the self’s creativity over nature.  This section will describe each part, and how all come 
together to create his most central ethical axiom: (d) organic balance. 
a. Attachment to Nature 
 For Mumford, in the beginning was nature.  Drawing partially upon the ideas of 
Democritus, Mumford states, “The world…is a random mixture of atoms: chance created solid 
aggregations out of endless atomic collisions, and man’s nature was formed, essentially, by 
extraneous forces.”400 Mumford sees the human as one who is completely attached to and 
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composed of the nature surrounding him or her.  There is no escaping nature; the human is 
nature. 
 However, parting with Democritus, the relationship between the human and nature is 
anything but static.  Mumford argues that nature is constantly in flux and follows a very specific 
trajectory to which all organisms must inevitably submit. Indeed, Mumford even goes so far as to 
elevate the natural processes that surround and run through human nature to the level of fate or 
providence.  Mumford states, “First of all, all organisms follow a life-plan peculiar to their 
species.  Until death, the most radical changes that take place within an organism proceed in a 
directed orderly sequence, determined partly by its own nature.”401  Mumford sees the human as 
a vessel, composed of and guided by nature simultaneously.  He states, “Life is directional in 
tendency, goal-seeking, end-achieving, in short, purposive.”402  He continues, “Nature’s 
induction to every organism…is: ‘Be yourself.  Fulfill yourself!  Follow your destiny!’”403 
Mumford even extends this “life-plan” into what he calls, “the fundamental morality of 
nature.”404   
b. Emergence from Nature 
 In Mumford’s view, the second part of all organism’s relationship to nature is a certain 
“emergent” quality.  Effectively, Mumford recognizes a “higher state” for all creatures—what he 
describes as the organism’s ability to “regulate the processes outside of it.”405  For Mumford, the 
organism itself is in constant flux as it remains within a perpetual state of emergence out from 
and alongside nature, and yet to survive it adapts internally to the rhythms of its environment just 
                                               
401 Ibid, P. 28. Emphasis added. 
402 Ibid., P. 31. Emphasis added. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Ibid., P. 32. 
405 Ibid., P. 28. 
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enough to enjoy some measure of control over the elements of nature within and surrounding the 
organism.  Mumford states, “Continuity and emergence greet one everywhere.  The shape of any 
living thing depends not merely upon outside pressure but upon inner, self-maintaining, self-
restoring, and self-fulfilling processes.”406  This higher state of the organism, by Mumford’s 
admission, is “paradoxical,” in that nature develops for the organism a means by which the 
organism can control nature to varying degrees. 407  Mumford states, “The organism enregisters 
and remembers: it remembers and reacts: it reacts and it anticipates: yes, it proposes and 
projects.”408 
c. Human Creativity over Nature 
 As stated, Mumford maintains that attachment and emergence are universal among all 
living things—everything alive is in constant contact with its biological and physical 
environment and everything alive attempts to grow in conformity with and (paradoxically) over 
nature in order to survive.   However, Mumford maintains that where human nature is separate 
from other organisms is decidedly in the realm of creativity, and it is by way of two 
developments that were unique to human nature: the human’s ability to create symbols and 
language, and the human’s ability to dream.409  These extra developments stretched human 
nature beyond the simple memory-reaction-anticipation-projection sequence shared by other 
organisms,  and created the possibility for “mindedness”—a complex inner life that granted the 
human a limitless world of ideas that could challenge or enhance the pre-existing ordering 
processes of nature, and permitted the human to do more than survive, but also to thrive and 
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enjoy life.  Mumford states, “Given this original organic equipment, man ‘minded’ more of his 
environment than any other animal, and so has become the dominant species on the planet.”410 
 Regarding the first aspect of human creativity, Mumford maintains that the ability to 
create symbols and language is the initial sign of the human’s uniqueness.411  The development 
of symbols and language had to precede any tool or gadget the human could ever devise.  The 
human is more than Homo Faber412—the tool making animal; the human is the symbol-making 
animal, the dreaming animal, the ritualistic animal.413  Mumford states, “The invention and 
perfection of these instruments—rituals, symbols, words, images, standard modes of behavior 
(mores)—was, I hope to establish, the principal occupation of early man, more necessary to 
survival than tool-making, and far more essential to his later development.”414  In other words, 
preceding all other accomplishments related to work or survival, the human developed a 
symbolic universe of communication and action.  It is this creative element that allowed for the 
human to do more than simply emerge from and over nature, but to also be its creator. 
For Mumford, the second distinguishing development that is central to the human’s 
capacity for creativity is the uniquely human and seemingly superfluous adaptation he calls 
“dream life.”415   Mumford holds that through dreaming, “man became conscious of a haunting 
super-natural environment,” yet it “opened man’s eyes to new possibilities in his waking life.”416  
For Mumford, dreaming opened the human to establishing a bifurcation in reality: an “inner and 
outer world;” the latter informed the human’s immediate perspective on reality, the former 
invited the human to imagine the endless possibilities for reality.  Mumford claims that the 
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human is “the only creature who ever had the intuition that there is more in nature than meets the 
eye,” and that “opening up his specific human capacities, the unknown, indeed, the unknowable, 
has proved an even greater stimulus than the known…”417  While the human is like all organisms 
in that he or she is a continuation of nature and emerges from nature, the human goes beyond 
other organisms in that he or she considers what is not in nature; the human can draw upon 
imagination—the inner world of ideas that reveal what is possible, and even that which is 
impossible.  
 Regardless of how much or how little the dream life and the human’s ability to create 
symbols truly distinguishes the human from other organisms, Mumford sees the culmination of 
these traits as the beginning of human creativity—or what he calls “purposeful novelty as 
distinguished from randomness.”418  The human has the ability to draw from the infinite 
possibilities of the imagination and create what was not previously there, to live for more than 
mere survival, and to belong to something more than a species, but a family, a tribe, and a 
culture.419  
d. Organic Balance 
 Taken together—the human’s necessary attachment to nature, the process of emerging 
from nature, and the human’s creativity over nature by way of language and an inner-world of 
ideas—these truths comprise for Mumford the key triumvirate of organic living; in other words, 
these are the key features to living within the purpose or “life-plan” provided in nature.  The 
human must not neglect one’s biological self, the human must grow, adapt, evolve, and 
transform in accordance to that natural self, and the human must incorporate the two into one’s 
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creative inner-world of ideas.  The central axiom of organic living is therefore to maintain 
balance between the three.420 
 It is vital to note that much of Mumford’s analysis of the organic self rests upon the 
concepts of balance and imbalance.  Summarizing Mumford, Duane Miller states, “Man can only 
survive in a meaningful and creative way if he recognizes and respects all parts of his nature.421  
For Mumford, a deep self-awareness is needed to live organically, and one must become 
conscious of the whole self in a balanced way to sustain and create the meaningful life provided 
and directed by nature.  Inversely, the absence of balance for Mumford is marked by the 
occasion of death; radical imbalance is the very end of life.422  These natural trajectories towards 
organic and balanced life on the one hand, and mechanical and imbalanced death on the other, 
will be more pronounced the further he enters into his analysis of the technological society.423  
 It is also important to note that Mumford’s balanced organic self is not static, but is 
dynamic, constantly transcending and reinventing itself.  One of the key components of balance 
is the recognition that human nature is constantly emerging from nature.  It is either growing, 
evolving, and adapting—thus fairly balancing its trait of emergence—or it is dying.  For 
Mumford, this takes place primarily for the human in the collaborative pursuits of both the 
human’s inner-world of ideas and the human’s external physical world. Mumford states, 
“Organic growth and repair have their counterpart in the personality in the process of renewal: a 
continued making over of ideas and attitudes, of sentiments and plans, so that the person will 
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dichotomy throughout Mumford’s work: “Thus Mumford presents us with a variety of technological Manicheeism 
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overcome the animal tendency to repetition, fixation, automatism.”424  As the inner-world 
develops in conjunction with the human’s external world of attachment and emergence from 
nature, the human’s direction is more in-line with one’s natural life-plan.  However, as Mumford 
mentions, there is a tendency to lose one’s true humanity through imbalance, reverting to lower 
forms of nature: i.e. animals and automatons.   
 Ultimately, Mumford maintains that human nature can change, and has changed radically 
throughout human history.  Indeed, both his critique of the technological society, and his 
salvation plan from the technological society are heavily dependent upon changing the very 
nature of humanity.  In his book, The Conduct of Life, Mumford opens the work with a warning: 
“Perhaps never before have the peoples of the world been so close to losing the very core of their 
humanity.”425  Furthermore, in The Human Prospect, Mumford outlines the gradual development 
of the “new person;” he states:  
One phase of civilization does not replace another as a unity, in the way that a guard assigned to sentry duty 
takes over its post.  For a while they mingle confusedly, until a moment comes when one realizes that the 
entire scene has changed and all the actors are different.  So with internal change that will produce the new 
person.426 
 
In both of these examples, what remains consistent is his very clear position that the human is 
one who “emerges from the matrix”427 of various external and internal developments, and that 
characteristic of change is inherent to the human’s very nature, and is within the human’s control 
in collaboration with nature.  Indeed, as expressed in the very first example, the human is 
capable of losing the core of one’s humanity.  The concern that remains central for Mumford is 
not whether human nature evolves, but what is the thing into which humanity is evolving? 
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2. Mumford and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding Humans and Nature 
 
a. Nature as Human’s Home or the Homelessness of the Human 
 While Mumford begins his analysis of human nature within and emerging from the 
processes of nature itself, Niebuhr begins simply with the acknowledgement that humans have 
the capacity for self-awareness, and upon this single observation, Niebuhr assesses that the 
human is by some measure distinct from nature, yet still somewhat tethered to it.  This 
differentiation in starting point is noteworthy in that Niebuhr views the human as one who is, by 
nature, in a state of homelessness,428 whereas Mumford’s human clearly finds one’s home in 
nature.  Even Mumford’s view of human creativity is still very much working in confluence with 
nature, and is seemingly designed to work in such a way in accordance to nature’s “life-plan.” 
b. Benevolence or Ambiguity of Nature 
 Related to the first difference, Mumford assumes a benevolent—nearly divine—quality 
about nature, whereas Niebuhr sees nature as—for the most part—ambiguous and amoral.  
While Niebuhr admits to at least some vague traces of morality in Natural Law,429 nature alone 
contains no dimension high enough to unify itself without human interpretation, carrying the 
human’s “perennial corruptions of interests and passion” with it.430  In perhaps his clearest 
statement about the morality of nature, Niebuhr states, “But there is, after all, little freedom or 
purpose in the evolutionary process—in short, little morality; so that if we can find God only as 
                                               
428 NDHN, P. 14. 
429 In CLCD (P. 72), Niebuhr argues that there is at least some value in Natural-law theory, but it is at its best when 
it remains generic, and it becomes more unhelpful, potentially dangerous, when its laws become calcified into 
specific applications.  In this same section, Niebuhr gives the feudalistic medieval Catholic Church as an example. 
430 CLCD, P. 70. 
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he is revealed in nature we have no moral God.”431  The implication of this statement is clear: all 
that comes from nature is seemingly amoral, including a naturally perceived god.432 
c. Balance or Tension within Human Nature 
 The third major difference in how Mumford and Niebuhr articulate the inherent 
relationship between the human and nature springs first from a point of relative agreement: there 
is a “higher state” about the human which makes him or her unique among the animals, and that 
“higher state” exists alongside the human’s more animalistic nature.  While Mumford calls such 
a state “creativity,” the human’s “inner world,” or what will be discussed shortly, the human’s 
“idolum,”433 Niebuhr calls this status one which is “transcendent,” “spirit,” or just simply the 
human’s “uniqueness.”434  In either case, both Mumford and Niebuhr recognize the uniqueness 
of humanity as existing, at least partially, within its higher abilities to consider itself, and to 
varying degrees control nature and interpret history.   
 Where Mumford and Niebuhr differ on this point is how each perceive the relationship 
between the “higher self” and the “lower,” more animalistic self.  Mumford renders all parts of 
the human—both the human’s animalistic impulses and creativity—as natural, and therefore 
good.   Because of this, Mumford articulates the human’s highest virtue as that of balance: each 
natural trait cultivated and acknowledged equally in order to conform more fully with the “life-
path” of nature—a virtue he calls “organicism.”  Mumford describes this balanced person, “The 
Organic Person,” as one who maintains “…a balanced personality: not the specialist but the 
whole man.  Such a personality must be in dynamic interaction with every part of his 
                                               
431 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Our Secularized Civilization,” Christian Century Vol 43 (22 April, 1926), P. 508. 
432 It was previously mentioned that Mumford assigns divine-like qualities to nature (provision, purpose, morality, 
life-plan directionality), but he also, albeit rarely, articulates quite a literal god—though existing in his language as 
just that: language used to proximate a certain push of nature towards future ends.  See: COL, P. 71. It is precisely 
this kind of god for which Niebuhr articulates his critique concerning the ‘God only as he is revealed in nature.” 
433 SOU, P. 13. 
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environment and every part of his heritage…the whole personality must be constantly at place, at 
least at ready call, at every moment of its existence….”435  To strive towards the organic, 
Mumford’s human must hold all parts of the self wholly, equally, and simultaneously.  If nature 
is home, the path of organic balance is how one arrives and exists most optimally within that 
home. 
 In contrast to Mumford, while Niebuhr firmly acknowledges similarly apparent divisions 
in human nature, “balance” is perhaps the last word Niebuhr would use to describe the human 
situation.  Rather, Niebuhr sees the human being, in its very composition, as one who exists in a 
perpetual state of tension, predisposed to angst.  As explored in the third chapter, Niebuhr views 
human nature as that which is in conflict with itself.  Niebuhr states, “Man is insecure and 
involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which 
overreaches the limits of human creatureliness.  Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations 
of a finite mind; but he pretends that he is not limited.”436  Niebuhr sees this tension between 
creatureliness and transcendence, nature and spirit, as an “inevitable concomitant” of anxiety.437  
For Niebuhr, the human was never in a state of complete balance, but rather has always been 
conditioned for imbalance. 
d. Entirely Emerging Human or Timelessly Conditioned Human 
 The final difference between Mumford and Niebuhr regarding each scholar’s view of the 
self within nature and history is that while Mumford sees the human being as a constantly 
changing, morphing, and evolving creature, Niebuhr is quick to highlight the inner-
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contradictions about humans that will never be resolved or fade into history.438  Niebuhr calls the 
tensions within human nature the “perennial human predicament,”439 arguing that the human can 
never fully resolve the problems of self, thus contrasting Mumford’s highest objective with 
Niebuhr’s most central premise.  Essentially, Niebuhr’s human is one who embodies a condition 
that never changes, while Mumford’s human remains in constant flux. 
B. Humans Relating to and Understanding the World 
1. Mumford: Inner Balance 
 
 Mumford’s human emerges from nature in a balanced state and is tasked with 
maintaining that balance through the constant changes of the self and one’s external 
environment.  While constant progress and adaptation is a necessity for all living organisms, 
Mumford maintains that the two variables the human must continually cultivate symmetrically 
are the inner-world of ideas on the one hand, and the external—natural and social—world on the 
other.  It is from this dualistic approach that Mumford will place together two theorists to 
articulate how the human relates to and understands one’s environment: (a) Plato and (b) Carl 
Jung.440  This section will describe his use of each thinker and conclude with a broad statement 
on how he integrates both into his thought. 
 
 
                                               
438 Niebuhr argues for a “Biblical-Augustinian” view of historical recurrence, where the the histories of peoples and 
nations repeat themselves in an inevitable cycle of pride and self-destruction.  Niebuhr states, “[Civilizations] perish 
at their own hands; and the instrument of their destruction is the pride by which they make some ephemeral 
technique, structure or instrument of history into a false absolute.  This conception of pride as the cause of a 
civilization’s destruction is a Biblical-Augustinian addition to the classical idea of historical recurrence.” (FAH, P. 
109) 
439 Ibid., P. 34. 
440 Swer rightly points out, “…Mumford was notoriously selective in acknowledging and referencing his sources” 
(The road to Necroopolis, P. 4), therefore scholars have taken great liberties to centralize any number of influences 
that could or could not be central to Mumford. 
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a. Modified Platonism and the Idolum 
 It was previously mentioned that Mumford models his dialogical method following Plato, 
but Plato’s influence upon Mumford in no way ends with methodology.  While his position 
concerning the self is greatly colored in with Jung and—to a lesser extent—Sigmund Freud, 
Mumford’s most fundamental articulation of how the human relates to and understands nature is 
very much Platonic.441  In fact, it is in the midst of his critique of Plato that Mumford discovers 
where his work should fit; Mumford criticizes Plato for seeking “only the salvation of 
enlightened individuals,” and for having “nothing to offer the mass of men, and no vision of the 
general renewal of society.”442  But “Above all,” Mumford continues, “we need an ideology so 
profoundly organic that it will be capable of bringing together the severed halves of modern 
man….”443  To put it in Platonic terms, Mumford desires a marriage and balance of Form and 
Receptacle—soul and body—in order to unify the human being.  In Niebuhrian terms, Mumford 
seeks to resolve the contradictions of the human predicament.   
 The inner-world of ideas—forged in the early experiences of dreams and the human’s 
ability to create symbols—establishes for Mumford a duality of worlds for which the human 
experiences simultaneously.  Mumford describes the inner-world as such: 
What makes human history such a…fascinating story is that man lives in two worlds—the world within and 
the world without—and the world within men’s heads has undergone transformations which have 
disintegrated material things with the power and rapidity of radium.  I shall take the liberty of calling this 
inner world our idolum (ido’lum) or world of ideas.  The word ‘ideas’ is not used here precisely in the 
                                               
441 Speaking of his own immersion into the thought of Plato, (SFL, P. 142) Mumford himself claims that in his 
earliest forays into the field of philosophy, “Plato himself took possession of me,” and continued to proclaim, 
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ideas with Plato’s use of forms (P. 4). Zuckerman argues that while Plato was a major influence his whole career, he 
became more prominent to Mumford’s thought in his latter years.  In his essay (Hughes & Hughes, P. 363), 
“Tragedy, Responsibility, and the American Intellectual, 1925-1950” (Hughes & Hughes, P. 326), Richard 
Wightman Fox called his Platonic vision of the world “Mumford’s Platonic conception.” 
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ordinary sense.  I use it rather to stand for…what the theologians would perhaps call the spiritual 
world….444 
 
For Mumford, the idolum functions as a “spiritual” world, full of subjective observation, 
containing both fantasies and rationalizations, alike, and his Platonism is most clearly on display 
as he articulates internally constructed values as the prime mover of human history. 
 Moreover, it is the purposes for which Mumford categorizes the human in this way that 
makes him especially Platonic.  Mumford claims that the inner-world of ideas births a “pseudo-
environment” that has the ability to instruct the human on how best to change the external world; 
he argues that utilizing the idolum is like consulting “…a surveyor and an architect and a mason 
and proceed to build a house which meets our essential needs….”445  For Mumford, it is from the 
inner world of ideas—the idolum—that a concept of utopia446 is born and is capable of providing 
for humanity a blueprint to create an environment that forms the external world of nature and 
society in a way that can allow for the human to achieve its highest values.  In fact, this 
ideation—separating the internal and external, formulating conceptions of utopia from the 
idolum—derives its influence specifically, by his own admission, from Plato’s Republic.447 
 Additionally, there is a strong correlation between Plato’s use of knowledge-as-mastery 
and that of Mumford.  Mumford saw the idolum as a source of power over nature that could 
achieve near—if not complete—perfection within and alongside nature.  He states, “What man 
still finds within him only at rare moments he may yet project and establish in the world outside: 
the beginning if not the completion of the Kingdom of Heaven.”448  While Plato rejects the idea 
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that any perfection could be found in the natural world, Plato nonetheless, particularly in his 
Republic, ascribes to a view of rationalism that is capable of transferring truths from the inner-
world of ideas to the outer-world, manifesting in more true and just power.449  It is in this way 
that Mumford equates knowledge with mastery.  While Mumford’s understanding of knowledge 
differs from that of pure science, Mumford’s inner-world of ideas, what he articulates as 
“organic balance,” is the key to correctly guiding nature, as opposed to being a slave to it.450 
 While Plato’s influence appears to be the driving force behind his assessment of how the 
human relates to and understands the natural world, there is one major problem in utilizing Plato 
completely: Mumford also sees the natural world as essentially good—indeed, the source of 
knowledge and the goal (life-path) of human life.  This position is, of course, directly in 
opposition to Plato’s metaphysical view, as Plato regards nature as temporal and evil, and the 
soul and mind as eternal and good.451  It is precisely this dualism of the natural and rational—
body and soul—that establishes Plato’s dialectic.  Therefore, it stands that Mumford must find a 
source within nature, within the organic world, that has the effect of a transcending nature.  In 
other words, in order for Mumford’s Platonic and dualistic categories to find a home, he must 
conjure a spirit or soul from the material world, so to speak.  For this, Mumford turns to the 
unconscious depths of Carl Jung and psychoanalysis.452  
                                               
449 In Republic (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1992. P. 152-156), Plato makes the argument that 
philosophers, or those rulers who study philosophy, are superior to those who love opinions.  Here he is making the 
argument that those who rule should be those who “embrace the things that knowledge is set over” (P. 156).  The 
inner-world of ideas is in some ways linked to the mastery of nature. 
450 In TAC (P. 7), Mumford states the relationship between understanding and mastery in the following way: “The 
study of the rest and development of modern technics is a basis for understanding and strengthening this 
contemporary transvaluation: and the transvaluation of the machine is the next move, perhaps, toward its mastery.”  
According to Paul Costello, Mumford here is channeling Nietzche’s understanding of “transvaluation” as used in 
Anti-Christ, where Nietzsche argues that Christianity has inverted values to mean the opposite of their appearance in 
nature (H.L. Mencken, trans., New York, NY: Knopf Inc., 1918. Ch. 61).  See: Paul Costello, World Historians and 
Their Goals (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993. P. 175). 
451 See Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus 
452 In his essay, “Matter and psyche” (History of the Human Sciences Vol 19 No 3, 2006: P. 41), Adam Green 
describes Mumford’s rejection of pure materialism as a part of his naturalism in this way: “In dismissing the ideal 
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b. Jung and Psychoanalysis 
 While it has been argued that  Freud has a much greater impact upon Mumford’s 
thought,453 the overwhelming consensus is that Jung is his preferred resource.454  Regardless, 
Mumford uses both Freud and Jung as a dialectic of sorts to synthesize his own construction of 
self.  While Mumford borrows some terminology and his general structure from Freud, Mumford 
mostly uses him as a foil to fuse his more Jungian interests of overlaying nature with a subjective 
essence into a more common psychoanalytical structure.  All of which, however, is to find a 
depth to nature that can house the Platonic categories of “inner-world” and “outer world.” 
 Mumford begins with the Freudian tripartite psyche of id, ego, and super-ego, but alters 
the definition and scope of each towards a more creative, Jungian, and less determinative 
composition that grants freedom to the individual.  Regarding the Id, Mumford sees it as more 
than the animalistic sex drive as Freud saw it, but rather, and additionally, the drive for “love and 
companionship.”455  The super-ego, for Mumford, is more than simply a set of inherited social 
                                               
faculty of humanity as epiphenomenal, Mumford believes Marx made an evaluative error.  Marx also tried to 
marginalize the ongoing psychological agency shaping material conditions.  It is these two lacunae in Marxian 
theory, therefore, that Mumford sought to rectify by looking towards the psychoanalytic philosophy of Carl Jung.”  
As Green argues, psychoanalysis offers a dimension to nature that Marx’s materialism does not warrant.  
Psychoanalysis provides space for Mumford’s idolum to operate in and over nature. 
453 In his essay, “Technics and (para)praxis: the Freudian dimensions of Lewis Mumford’s theories of technology” 
(History of the Human Sciences Vol 17 No 4, 2004), Swer argues that Freud had the greater influence upon 
Mumford’s thought, over and against Jung.  He makes this argument upon the basis of Mumford’s continued use of 
the tripartite psyche—divided into id, ego, and super-ego (P. 52)—and Mumford’s use of “Thanatos” or the “death 
drive” to describe the “profound disorientation of the whole personality, tending toward destructive aggression…” 
that exists within the technological society.  Swer argues that Mumford “…openly admired Freud’s theories and 
repeatedly expressed his belief in their ability to usher in a new era of human self-knowledge.” 
454 Green makes the very persuasive case that Mumford is almost exclusively Jungian in his use of psychoanalysis.  
While Swer rightly points out that Mumford uses the Freudian tripartite structure of mind, Green argues that his use 
of it is “situated between Jung and Freud,” and not an exclusively Freudian construct (P. 43).  Green notes 
Mumford’s “dynamic and creative picture of mind as powerfully expressive rather than a prison of repressed 
materials…” clearly demonstrates Mumford’s preference for Jung (P. 43).  This observation bears out in Mumford’s 
writing, as well.  In COM (P. 364), Mumford calls Freud’s view of the subconscious and its interplay with art 
“weak,” then subsequently praises the “heresies” of Jung, claiming they “opened the way for more vital application 
of this knowledge.”  Additionally, others have noted Jung’s unmistakable influence upon Mumford; see: Charles 
Molesworth, “Inner and Outer: The Axiology of Lewis Mumford,” in Hughes & Hughes, P. 254;  Leo Marx, “Lewis 
Mumford: Prophet of Organicism,” in Hughes & Hughes, P. 178. 
455 Swer, “Technics and (para)praxis,” P. 53. 
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constraints that repress the id, but also has the ability to “[create] wholesome, positive standards 
which canalize and direct the id energies…guiding the ego in directing id energies into 
wholesome and fulfilling directions.”456  Mumford states, “In its positive aspect, the super-ego 
does not merely check the self but strengthens and enhances it: as a creator of positive standards 
the super-ego nurtures the capacity for expression and life-fulfillment, through art, ethics, 
religion, science.”457  On both extremes of the human’s psyche, Mumford sees the potentiality 
for positive interaction.  The id’s drive for love, sex, and companionship can be met, ideally, 
with the structures of a “motherly” super-ego that nurtures the id and guides it towards a more 
fulfilling life.458  It is in this way that Mumford’s tripartite view of self most greatly differs from 
that of Freud: Mumford “…rejects the Freudian notion of the necessary struggle between the id 
and the super-ego”459 and proposes a goal to, in his words, “…effect a working harmony 
between the three operative parts of the personality, thus doing away with abrasive conflicts and 
disruptions.”460  Consistent with his organic view of balance, Mumford understands the self to be 
congruous, and not necessarily conflicted, by nature. 
 Furthermore, while Mumford’s understanding of ego “…is taken essentially unaltered 
from the standard Freudian theory”461 in that the ego acts as a mediator between the id and super-
ego, Mumford’s addition of the idolum grants the ego extraordinary powers of imagination, 
cultural critique, and freedom.  Mumford’s version of the ego “…decides in which directions and 
to what ends it should direct its id-energies…and takes into account the directions of the…super-
                                               
456 Green, “Matter and psyche,” P. 43. 
457 COM, P. 424. 
458 Ibid., P. 363. 
459 Swer, P. 56. 
460 COM, P. 424. 
461 Swer, P. 52. 
 135 
ego.”462  Essentially, and in opposition to Freud’s “psychological determinism,”463 the ego 
“…chooses to direct its will toward the alteration of the world….”464  For Mumford, the ego has 
freedom, and mediates the id and super-ego towards the pursuits of the idolum. 
 These embellishments of the Freudian tripartite psyche are necessary for Mumford’s 
project to critique the technological society.  As Green states, “Were Mumford to take a 
pessimistic view of psyche in the line of Freud…there would be no potential for positive 
transformation or redemption from our current state because there would be no internal force of 
leverage.”465  To supplement Freud with these embellishments, Mumford is reliant upon the 
alchemy of Jung: somehow turning the unconscious world into resources of positive, artistic, 
even spiritual growth.466  In other words, Jung creates a Platonic soul of sorts within which 
Mumford can house the idolum—the world-altering source of Mumford’s Platonic aspirations. 
 Effectively, Jung offers to Mumford a subjective blanket to lay over the entire tripartite 
psyche, entering first though the subconscious, but manifesting ultimately in the freedom of the 
ego by way of art and culture.  The human dreams, and such an action is not simply a source of 
observable impulses or an outgrowth of the repressed id, but rather is a “fountain of creative 
activity: active and fecund, with cunning powers of transposition and symbolization comparable 
to those of a Shakespeare.”467  Mumford attributes the discovery of an ‘independent and eternal’ 
unconscious state to Jung,468 but builds upon it, claiming that the dream world “…transforms the 
experience of life into more enduring and more endurable patterns: the function of art.”469  For 
                                               
462 Ibid., P. 56. 
463 Green, P. 43. 
464 Swer, “Technics and (para)praxis,” P. 56. 
465 Green, “Matter and psyche,” P. 45. 
466 Green argues that Mumford’s optimism in itself is reason to suspect that he is more influenced by Jung than 
Freud.  See: “Matter and psyche,” P. 62. 
467 COM, P. 364. 
468 Green, P. 45. 
469 COM, P. 364. 
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Mumford, there is a direct line between the unconscious state and artistic expression; a 
connection he sees as vital to the freedom and critical power of the ego.  
 While Freud sees art and culture as little more than “…a release for otherwise 
uncontrollable or unrepressed energies…”470 both Jung and Mumford see art as a source of 
liberation that displays “excess energies…not repressed ones.471  Green argues, “…contrary to 
Freud’s psychological determinism…Mumford and Jung believed [the unconscious] forces are in 
some ways dynamic and generative, as well as stretching far beyond the individual life….”472  
Mumford describes the origins of art in this way:  
Art arises out of man’s need to create for himself, beyond any requirement for mere animal survival, a 
meaningful and valuable world: his need to dwell on, to intensify, and to project in more permanent forms 
those precious parts of his experience that would otherwise slip too quickly out of his grasp, or sink too 
deeply into his unconscious to be retrieved.473 
 
In other words, art is the halfway point between the “independent and eternal” features of the 
subconscious on the one hand and the “outer world” of experience on the other, used to create a 
world of meaning and value.  Art and symbols add depth to an otherwise material world.  
 The subconscious, for Mumford, becomes the “independent and eternal” foundation from 
where his Platonism, romanticism, and organicism emerge and converge.  His Platonism finds a 
“hidden rationality” in nature—the idolum—to oppose whatever at present in nature constrains 
him, and the blueprints for a greater environment not yet fully realized.  His romanticism finds in 
the subconscious an often-neglected artistic transcendence that can empower the human over and 
against the social forces that currently repress the self.  And lastly, Mumford’s organicism finds 
a new depth to self that must be balanced along with the other more apparent, seemingly 
necessary aspects of personhood. 
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471 Ibid., P. 43. 
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 Mumford’s human is an extraordinarily free and powerful creature.  Armed with the 
power of the subconscience, art, and the idolum, Mumford’s human can master nature through 
the might of its holistic understanding.  While the ego can be constrained by the limits of the 
world, it can also imagine a world that is very different, and then proceed to transform that world 
into the conformity of its idolum.  In the words of Mumford, “Man internalises his external 
‘world’ and externalises his internal ‘world,’”474 and it is “…by means of the idolum that the 
facts of the everyday world are brought together and assorted and sifted, and a new sort of reality 
is projected back again upon the external world.”475 
2. Mumford and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding the Human’s Relationship to and 
Understanding of Nature 
 
a. Organic Capacity to Think or Prideful Inclination to Self-Deception 
 For Niebuhr, there is no home for the human, and the temptation towards sin and 
destruction is found in the human’s feeble attempts to completely assuage the incongruities of 
self.  Niebuhr states: 
Though man has always been a problem to himself, modern man has aggravated that problem by his too 
simple and premature solutions.  Modern man, whether idealist or naturalist, whether rationalist or romantic, 
is characterized by his simple certainties about himself.  He has aggravated the problem of understanding 
himself because these certainties are either in contradiction with each other or in contradiction with the 
obvious facts of history…476 
 
The differences between Mumford and Niebuhr on this point are key to understanding the 
forthcoming Niebuhrian critique of Mumford.  Mumford’s defense of nature and his insistence 
                                               
474 Lewis Mumford, “An Appraisal of Lewis Mumford’s ‘Technics and Civilisation,’” Daedalus Vol 88 No 3 
(1934): P. 528-529. 
475 SOU, P. 15. 
476 NDHN, P. 4. 
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upon the capacities of human beings to live in balance and harmony with its varying parts, and 
conversely, Niebuhr insistence upon the unwavering self-contradiction of human nature, place 
the two on different paths regarding the question of how the self relates to and understands the 
world.  Mumford seeks resolution to the imbalances of self to properly know and master nature; 
Niebuhr seeks to clarify, or reveal, the contradictions of self to properly know the limitations of 
understanding the world and the realistic arena of human action within it.   
 While both thinkers consider the self in order to correct the human’s understanding of the 
world, Niebuhr is extraordinarily weary of the human’s “…constant tendency to aggravate his 
predicament by false efforts to escape from it.”477  Niebuhr does not see a special kind of organic 
reasoning that can drag the brute realities of human nature into perfect symmetry with mind and 
spirit; for the “mind sharpens nature’s claws”478 just as much as it draws the human into “relation 
to his environment and in relation to other life.”479  Niebuhr states: 
Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power 
which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness.  Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a 
finite mind; but he pretends that he is not limited.  He assumes that he can gradually transcend finite 
limitations until his mind becomes identical with the universal mind.  All of his intellectual and cultural 
pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride.480 
 
It is here one discovers Niebuhr’s true concern for how a human understands and relates to the 
world: pride.  For Niebuhr, pride is that which obscures the self, and therefore, the human’s 
picture of the world.  It is not Mumford’s forthcoming mechanical view of the world in itself that 
creates the imbalance of self, it is the disregard for the original imbalance of self that causes the 
human to make a hurried attempt to capture the world; for “man’s pride and will-to-power 
disturb the harmony of creation.”481 
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479 Ibid., P. 26. 
480 NDHN, P. 178-179. 
481 Ibid., P. 179. 
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b. Balance of Mind and Correction or Clarification of Tensions and Acceptance 
 For Niebuhr, the answer to pride—that which obscures the realities of self and nature—is 
found first in the clarification of the human situation as it exists in its homeless and anxious state.  
It is the recognition that “No philosophy or religion can change the structure of human 
existence”482 and that “The final wisdom of life requires, not the annulment of incongruity but 
the achievement of serenity within and above it.”483  In other words, while Mumford seeks to 
correct one’s thinking to overcome a problematic external world, Niebuhr argues that the mere 
recognition that such a goal is unreachable is of the utmost value when understanding how one 
should relate to the world.  The human can never completely alter one’s environment through 
mere reason, therefore the serenity to accept the realities of human limitation is a necessary 
concomitant to real change. 
 In a way, Mumford’s epistemology is an inversion of Niebuhr’s.  While both see an 
“imbalance” in human nature, Mumford sees the correction of that imbalance as the basis for 
understanding, and Niebuhr sees the acceptance and acknowledgment of that imbalance as the 
basis for a clearer understanding of reality.  Mumford attempts to create a system that weds the 
mind with the organic world—rationalism with naturalism—while Niebuhr’s acknowledgement 
of self-contradiction makes him equally suspicious of both. 
C. Human Consciousness 
1. Mumford: Balance of Self-Awareness 
 
 Mumford never grants his readers a concise definition of consciousness, though he 
speaks of it often.  Therefore, the purpose of this section is to outline the way Mumford writes 
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about consciousness in order to better compare and contrast his views with those of Niebuhr.  
This section will cover the way Mumford understands consciousness in three areas: (a) 
Consciousness of Nature, (b) Consciousness within Society, and (c) Religion and Myth as a 
function of Consciousness. 
a. Consciousness of Nature 
 Like everything else in his descriptions of human nature, consciousness has an emergent 
and organic quality to it.  Mumford states, “At some stage…man must have awakened from the 
complacent routines that characterize other species, escaping from the long night of instinctual 
groping and fumbling…to greet the faint dawn of consciousness.”484  Mumford explains 
consciousness as if all of nature had been working towards this one moment of human awareness 
for nature to finally be known, observed, measured, and interpreted.485  Natural history plays out 
like a drama: from its humble origins—the “long night of instinctual groping and fumbling”—
until that moment of consciousness, for which Mumford exclaims, “Let there be light!”486  
 It is here, in Mumford’s description of consciousness, that his optimistic humanism is 
most clearly on display.  He states, “the light of human consciousness…[is] the central fact of 
existence.”487  For Mumford, without human consciousness, “…the physical universe would be 
as empty of meaning as a handless clock: its ticking would tell nothing.”488  What is central to 
this interpretation of nature is that all value is projected by human consciousness, implying that 
nature is inherently without value.  It is in this way that Mumford’s humanism emerges: human 
consciousness is both the climax of natural processes and the very source of its value. 
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 Mumford’s view of consciousness is also the place where his modified Platonic 
rationalism most clearly emerges.  He states, “No other creature has man’s capacity for creating 
in his own image a symbolic world that both cloudily mirrors and yet transcends his immediate 
environment.”489  This, of course, is the beginning of Mumford’s conception of the idolum—the 
inner world of ideas.  Humans can create conceptual imitations of the world, and use those 
imitations to transcend it. 
 One could expect at this point that Mumford might go headlong into rationalism—
perhaps articulate the human as the master of nature, wielding one’s idolum towards the 
construction of nature to one’s liking.  However, there is an anxious note—not completely unlike 
the self-contradictory human that Niebuhr so clearly articulates.  Mumford sees consciousness as 
something that not only grants the human rational powers over nature, but ironically a humility 
as she or he considers themselves inside the vastness of the cosmos.  Mumford states: 
Man’s reason now informs him that even in his most inspired moments he is but a participating agent in a 
larger cosmic process he did not originate and can only in the most limited fashion control.  Except through 
the expansion of his consciousness, his littleness and his loneliness remain real.  Slowly, man has found out 
that, wonderful though his mind is, he must curb the egoistic elations and delusions it promotes; for his 
highest capacities are dependent upon the cooperation of a multitude of other forces and organisms, whose 
life-courses and life-needs must be respected.490 
 
In a way, it appears Mumford is tapping into the Niebuhrian paradox at the center of the human 
situation.  However, within the context of his work, it is clear that Mumford is not highlighting 
some connection between the human and an unwavering source of existential angst, but rather to 
a realization of one’s connection to the “life-courses” inherent to nature.  The human’s “littleness 
and his loneliness” are indicative of the human’s identity found in nature, not awkwardly 
estranged from it, as Niebuhr would have it.  He effectively ignores the irony of the greatness of 
humankind as it reveals the inescapable weakness of humankind.   
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b. Consciousness within Society 
 The most significant part of nature from which the human finds him or herself emerging 
is in relation to other humans.491  For Mumford, the “littleness” and “loneliness” associated with 
consciousness drives the human into relationships and towards a naturally emergent formation of 
society.  Again, using what would otherwise be considered strongly Niebuhrian language, 
Mumford states, “All men are, in some sense, fractional and incomplete,” but unlike Niebuhr, 
Mumford holds that the human finds that completion within society.492  What was lacking in 
isolated self-consciousness is fulfilled in the construction of human society and culture.  
Mumford states, “Thus human society, unlike animal societies, is an agency of self-
consciousness and self-exploration and self-revelation.”493   
 Fractured and small in isolation, yet completed within society, Mumford’s sees human 
culture as an “…extra-organic means of changing man’s nature and his environment, without 
leaving indelible marks on his organism or curtailing his essential flexibility and plasticity.”494  
Mumford views human nature as something that has the capacity for change—and indeed, it 
must—and the source for that change is human culture.  However, Mumford needs to maintain 
the power of the ego over and against society, so he states the connection between human and 
culture in a way that has it both ways: culture “changes man’s nature” yet preserves the human’s 
“flexibility and plasticity.”   
 Looking forward to his coming objections to the technological society, specifically 
regarding his assessment of human consciousness and the community, Mumford must not drive 
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too hard a wedge between the two.  On the one hand, Mumford needs culture to have an 
intractable influence upon the human in order to envisage a technological society that is actively 
transforming human nature to be fit like a gear into a machine.  On the other hand, Mumford 
needs to maintain the “flexibility” and power of the human ego, so that it is still able to utilize 
the idolum as a means of transforming culture.   
 While Niebuhr will expose a necessary conflict between self and society,495 and Marcuse 
will ultimately swell the influence of collective consciousness to the point of individual 
absorption,496  Mumford remains vague on the relationship, outside of his continual prescription 
for “Balance: autonomy: symbiosis….”497  It is not until Mumford analyzes the technological 
society that there becomes a clear point of conflict between the self and society—a conflict he 
interprets as “imbalance.”  But in its most “organic” and “balanced” state—in accordance with 
his more optimistic Jungian articulation of the tripartite self—Mumford sees no necessary 
conflict between id, ego, and super-ego, therefore no inherent conflict between self and 
society.498   
c. Religion and Myth as a Necessary Function of Consciousness. 
 To interpret nature, the human and society are drawn to open what Mumford calls, “the 
fourth dimension” of consciousness: religion and myth.499  Mumford describes the interpreting 
power of religion and myth in the following way: “This sphere is the realm of religion: the 
sphere beyond knowledge and certainty, where ultimate mystery itself adds a new dimension to 
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meaning…. Against the enveloping darkness man throws the searchlight of his intelligence…. 
The ultimate gift of conscious life is a sense of the mystery that encompasses it.”500  Religion is a 
“searchlight” the human uses, projecting the interpretive light of consciousness upon the 
unknowable mysteries of nature.  The myths of religion are subjective and holistic, unlike the 
atomizing and “piecemeal knowledge” of science.501  Myth prods the deeper questions of life: 
“Why? Wherefore?  For what purpose?  Toward what end?”502  Mumford states, “Religion 
seeks…not a detailed causal explanation of this or that aspect of life, but a reasonable account of 
the entire sum of things.”503 
 For Mumford, the questions that myth and religion evoke are concomitant to the 
existence of consciousness.  Mumford states, “Once man achieves consciousness, there is no way 
of casting off these [religious] questions or of evading a provisional answer, without repressing 
an essential quality in life itself.”504  Effectively, there is no ridding human consciousness of 
mythology without causing the individual’s understanding of meaning, purpose, and value to 
suffer. 
 In his final analysis of human consciousness, Mumford observes that all human beings 
are involved in the emergent process of balancing one’s external social relationships with one’s 
inner-world of ideas, and these ideas are developed, cultivated, and replenished in-turn by one’s 
external social relationships.  Furthermore, society’s interpretive instruments of myth and 
religion represent the nexus of the human’s interpretation of one’s present value.  Self-
consciousness emerges from a “matrix” of society, myth, and religion to grant ultimate meaning 
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to the self presently by granting meaning to the self historically. Without the interpretation of the 
“…past that he helped to make and in the future he is still making, human life would shrink in all 
its dimensions.”505  For Mumford, both individual and collective history are interpreted and 
granted meaning by social myth and matrix.506 
2. Mumford and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding Human Consciousness 
 
a. Consciousness as Center of Nature or Consciousness of Creation 
 One of the more significant areas that the two disagree is found in Niebuhr’s view of 
consciousness as it relates to nature.  “Consciousness” as Niebuhr defines it, “is a capacity for 
surveying the world and determining action from a governing centre.”507  From this definition of 
consciousness, particularly the use of the word “surveying,” Niebuhr is implying a markedly 
passive existence in the world—a state of contingency—for which Niebuhr has acknowledged a 
likeness to Heidegger’s thrownness.508  While Mumford proclaims, “the light of human 
consciousness…[is] the central fact of existence,”509 Niebuhr assumes an existence that is 
contingent upon the external world, passively observing the natural world around him or her.  
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509 MOM, P. 30. 
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Subsequently, the human proceeds in all one’s actions—be they symbolic, interpretive, ethical, 
etc.—from the basis of a “governing centre.”  
 The difference between “passively observing” and interpreting or acting from a 
“governing centre” is a key distinction for Niebuhr, and further highlights a significant difference 
between he and Mumford.  Niebuhr warns that “Every philosophy of life is touched with 
anthropocentric tendencies” that inevitably tempt humanity into “pretending to occupy the centre 
of the universe.”510  However, “The obvious fact,” Niebuhr argues, “is that man is a child of 
nature, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and 
confined within the brevity of the years which nature permits its varied organic form.”511  
Existence is contingent upon nature—the human is a “child of nature.” However, instead of 
constructing a philosophy that negates that fact by way of “pretending to occupy the centre of the 
universe” (à la Mumford), Niebuhr removes the realm of absolute meaning from the center of 
human interpretation altogether.  In so doing, Niebuhr finds resonance in the Christian language 
of creation to articulate his view further. 
 For Niebuhr, the language of creation establishes an external realm of meaning upon 
which the human is contingent.512  Through the doctrine of creation, Niebuhr is able to articulate 
the human as one who maintains contingency with nature without sacrificing an objective—
albeit limitedly comprehended—realm of meaning.  Alternately stated, the language of creation 
allows for the human to understand the world without occupying its center.  Therefore, while 
Mumford sees the human as one who projects all meaning and value upon nature, Niebuhr sees 
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the human as one who receives one’s meaning and value as a part of creation, and ultimately 
from its Creator. 
 Furthermore, the language of creation offers to Niebuhr a framework that houses the 
unresolved tensions of consciousness without unjustifiably annulling or abstracting them by way 
of some oversimplified pristine state of organic balance.  Mumford discovers the paradox of 
consciousness and assuages its isolating and humbling effects through a seamless absorption of 
self into the social matrix.  Niebuhr, on the other hand, uses the language of creation to establish 
a concept of self that can frame its perennially unresolved tensions in relation to one another, 
apart from—yet remaining within—the construction of social identity.   
 However, it is important to note, Niebuhr argues that creation in itself is not a source of 
interpretation.513  While it supplies the basis for human understanding and the presumption of 
contingency and value, creation without revelation or myth is arbitrary, and any clear grasp of 
meaning would remain outside the realm of understanding for its creatures.  This characterization 
assures for Niebuhr a distinction between the human as a passive observer who interprets nature 
from a “governing centre,” over and against a human who is the governing center, as in the case 
of Mumford. 
b. Consciousness As and Within Society or Consciousness in Conflict With Society 
 As mentioned previously, Niebuhr and Mumford greatly differ in their respective 
approaches to the way in which self exists in relation to society.  While Mumford sees the human 
finding resolution in the organic community, Niebuhr argues that the tensions of consciousness 
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are intensified when examined in the context of social life.514  Most notably in his work, Moral 
Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr reveals various complexities within the relationship between 
self and society, but all his elaborations begin with the premise that while the human is 
contingent upon certain natural relationships for the purposes of survival, the individual is 
ultimately distinct from the collective.515  On the one hand, Niebuhr argues that humans are 
“…endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses,”516 however, on the other hand, 
“…the inability…to transcend their own interests sufficiently to envisage the interests of their 
fellow men as clearly as they do their own…”517 creates a natural imbalance between the 
interests of self—which are clearly known—and the interests of the collective—which are 
partially veiled.   
 Furthermore, Niebuhr argues that the reigning minority of any social group always 
translates the interests of the few into the interests of the many,518 culminating in the 
consolidation of power centered around those interests, making “…force an inevitable part of the 
process of social cohesion.”519  For Niebuhr, it is only through coercing the individual that the 
community can achieve relative measures of peace, as the interests of the few are inevitably 
incongruent with the interests of many.  However, those “coercive factors” ultimately “create 
injustice in the process of establishing peace,”520 for, according to Niebuhr, “…the same force 
                                               
514 Niebuhr: “A distinction between group pride and the egotism of individuals is necessary…because the 
pretensions and claims of a collective or social self exceed those of the individual ego… An inevitable moral tension 
between individual and group morality is therefore created.” (NDHN, P. 208-209) 
515 Niebuhr: “The individual is a nucleus of energy which is organically related from the very beginning with other 
energy, but which maintains, nevertheless, its own discreet existence.” (MMIS, P. 25) 
516 MMIS, P. 25. 
517 Ibid., P. 6. 
518 In MMIS (P. 7), Niebuhr claims that historically, the reigning minority are either militaristic, economic, or 
religious in nature, and often some combination of the three.  Niebuhr states, “While some of the pretensions of 
privileged classes are consciously dishonest, most of them arise from the fact that the criteria of reason, religion and 
culture, to which the class appeals in defense of its position in society are themselves the product of, or at least 
colored by, the partial experience and perspective of the class (P. 140-141).” 
519 Ibid., P. 6. 
520 Ibid., P. 16. 
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which guarantees peace also makes for injustice.”521  This action intensifies the tensions of social 
life by aggravating the moral pretensions of the individual on all sides, for “individuals believe 
that they ought to love and serve each other and establish justice between each other.”522  Every 
action directed by an individual towards the correction of society offends the conscience of 
another, as every act directed towards peace is invariably interpreted by an inferior class as an 
instrument of injustice, while every action directed towards the achievement of justice is 
invariably perceived as anarchy from the position of the ruling class. 
 The result for the individual is a permanent tension between self and society.  Niebuhr 
argues that “one of the tragedies of the human spirit…[is] its inability to conform its collective 
life to its individual ideals.”523  He concludes: “A realistic analysis of the problems of human 
society reveals a constant and seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the needs of society and 
the imperatives of a sensitive conscience.”524  In other words, society must create for itself some 
semblance of stability to exist, but the cost for that peace and stability is at least some measure of 
injustice that impinges the rights of the individual.   
 Mumford believes that the balance between self and society is not only possible, but 
historical.525 Niebuhr, on the other hand, once again speaks to the stubborn contradictions of self-
consciousness; the individual’s ability to imagine rational and moral solutions will forever 
exceed one’s realistic ability to achieve those solutions.  
                                               
521 Ibid., P. 6. 
522 Ibid., P. 9. 
523 Ibid., P. 9. 
524 Ibid., P. 257. 
525 One of Mumford’s more central arguments against the technological society is that the human has “…detached 
himself as far as possible from the organic habitat (MOM, P. 3).”  Throughout all of his work, Mumford constantly 
speaks of transforming the self and progressing in human evolution, but in keeping with his romantic proclivities, 
his thesis is contingent upon a former state that has, to some degree, been lost.  In particular, Mumford tends to 
glorify the Medieval Age and the Renaissance for having “formed together a living unity (SOU, P. 285).”  See also: 
Leo Marx, Hughes & Hughes, P. 173. 
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c. Religion and Myth as Ideal or Religion and Myth as Cautionary Consciousness 
 Regarding religion, Niebuhr and Mumford are quite similar in that both see religion as a  
necessary outgrowth of consciousness that emerges to assist in the interpretation of the external 
world.  Like Mumford, Niebuhr argues that religion emerges from self-consciousness: “The 
essential homelessness of the human spirit is the ground of all religion; for the self which stands 
outside itself and the world cannot find the meaning of life in itself or the world.”526  Self-
consciousness allows the human to see him or herself from a god-like or transcendent 
perspective, but is compelled to make sense of that self which is far from god-like in stature.  
This for Niebuhr is the beginning of religion. 
 However, Niebuhr and Mumford disagree in how myth or religion should be used.  
Mumford describes the use of myth as “…the ideal content of the existing order of things…by 
being consciously formulated and worked out in thought…[myths] perpetuate and perfect that 
order.”527  For Mumford, the social myth should contain the highest values of society; it should 
contain the collective construction of a society’s utopia, and must be projected upon nature and 
the community from the individual’s idolum.528   While Niebuhr acknowledges that religion and 
myth are commonly used this way, he argues that this is precisely how religion becomes 
dangerous.  He argues, “Religion, declares the modern man, is consciousness of our highest 
social values.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  True religion is a profound uneasiness 
about our highest social values.”529  Mumford’s use of myth is a “searchlight” that projects 
ultimate meaning and values upon the self and the world, while Niebuhr’s use is a microscope 
into the vexations and anxieties of the human spirit. 
                                               
526 NDHN, P. 14. 
527 SOU, P. 194. 
528 SOU, P. 194, 267. 
529 BTR, P. 28. Emphasis added. 
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III: Mumford’s Easy Conscience 
 Ultimately, the primary way Niebuhr and Mumford differ in their respective 
constructions of anthropology and the self is that Niebuhr expresses what he calls the “uneasy 
conscience” at the center of the human situation, while Mumford maintains what Niebuhr would 
consider an “easy conscience.”  That is to say, the latter interprets the self and world from the 
presumption of humanity's essential goodness, while the former interprets the self and world 
from the position of suspicion, cognizant of the ironies and ambiguities which lie at the 
foundation of human understanding.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the easy conscience is indicative of a premature resolution of 
the contradictions of self, and occurs either when one places undue faith in the mind to resolve 
the problems of nature, or undue faith in nature to resolve the problems of mind. It is important 
to consider that Niebuhr takes the faith aspect of the easy conscience seriously; Niebuhr states, 
“Nature and reason are thus the two gods of modern man, and sometimes the two are one.  In 
either case man is essentially secure because he is not seriously estranged from the realm of 
harmony and order.”530  By faith, the human estimates him or herself primarily from the 
standpoint of whichever perspective is perceived as the greater component, and so any 
interpretation of wrong-doing is attributed either to a defect of nature on the one hand, or an error 
of reason on the other, but never to self.  The easy conscience is “secure” in its goodness, and 
this “goodness” is ultimately expressed in the human’s inability to “…not only understand the 
reality of evil in himself but escape the error of attributing that evil to any one but himself.”531  
Therefore, regarding the easy conscience, the path to salvation always remains within the human 
realm of achievement.  Niebuhr states, “Either the rational man or the natural man is conceived 
                                               
530 NDHN, P. 95. 
531 Ibid., P. 17. 
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as essentially good, and it is only necessary for man either to rise from the chaos of nature to the 
harmony of mind or to descend from the chaos of spirit to the harmony of nature and order to be 
saved.”532  For the easy conscience, there is nothing evil in humanity that the goodness of 
humanity cannot correct. 
 Such is the easy conscience at the center of Mumford’s construction of consciousness.  
“Our first duty,” Mumford argues, “is to revamp our ideas and values to reorganize the human 
personality around its highest and most central needs.”533  Mumford proclaims this as though 
society’s quest for its “highest and most central needs” were never among the greatest catalysts 
for evil throughout human history.  However, Mumford insists that his organization towards 
these ends is unique, for the integration of the rational and natural—the idolum and the external 
world—will bring together the full picture of the organic self to produce “…balanced 
personalities: personalities that will be capable of drawing upon our immense stores of energy, 
knowledge, and wealth without being demoralized by them.”534   
 Whether Mumford should be read as a rationalist who spiritualizes nature, or a naturalist 
with rationalist impulses, Niebuhr’s characterization of the “modern man” appears all the more 
applicable: “Nature and reason are thus the two gods of modern man, and sometimes the two are 
one.”535  Mumford’s two gods of reason (idolum) and nature (organic balance) coalesce to 
obscure both the height and depth of his conception of self; he forsakes the perilous 
contradictions of self to establish an optimistic anchor of organic balance, and he forsakes the 
inherent limitations of reason to establish the revolutionizing force of the idolum.  The human 
emerges from an ideal state, one for which the human must only assume the correct approach to 
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 153 
reason and nature to return.  To this point, it is almost as if Niebuhr is speaking directly to 
Mumford’s easy conscience when he states the following: “The modern naturalist, whether 
romantic or rationalistic, has an easy conscience because he believes that he has not strayed very 
far from, and can easily return to, the innocency of nature.”536  In all his elaborations—fittingly 
with both rationalistic and romantic strains to his thought—Mumford carefully articulates for his 
human a “home state” of consciousness to which the human must simply return.   
 Furthermore, by his own premises, any disruption or imbalance of the home state must be 
attributed, by necessity, to moving away from the home state by way of developmental or 
environmental factors.  In its weakest form, Mumford attributes the imbalances of self to 
“controlled” and “mechanically-conditioned” habits,537 environmental misplacement,538 or 
“unconscious bias,”539 and in its strongest form, a kind of psychosis,540 “spell,”541 or religious 
adherence to a “cult of power.”542  Regardless of the external factors he may blame for upsetting 
the human’s balanced organic environment, Mumford never articulates any problem as somehow 
derivative of human freedom.  Even in his articulation of imbalance-as-psychosis, Mumford 
vaguely points to “Disturbances in [the] internal environment”543 as the lone culprit.  It is in this 
way that Niebuhr’s critique of modern culture seems most applicable to Mumford’s assessment 
of the self when he states, “The idea that man is sinful at the very centre of his personality, that is 
in his will, is universally rejected [in modern culture].”544 
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 In contrast to Mumford, Niebuhr begins from a place of an uneasy conscience—that the 
human is “…tempted by the situation in which he stands.”545  The human’s very state of freedom 
imperils the self with its temptations to resolve its homeless state through premature solutions.  
Niebuhr argues, “…there is no level of moral achievement upon which man can have or actually 
has an easy conscience,” and this is the case no matter if good and evil is conceived from the 
position of nature, reason, or both.546 
 For Niebuhr, the human transcends nature enough so as to remove one’s bondage to 
impulse, and so too removes the folly of attributing to nature the wrong-doing of the self.  On the 
other hand, the human is never quite rational enough to justify one’s actions purely from the 
standpoint of ideology or reason, for “The will-to-power uses reason, as kings use courtiers and 
chaplains to add grace to their enterprise.”547  This finely constructed awareness of the 
limitations and perplexities of human consciousness achieve for Niebuhr an uneasy conscience, a 
condition for which he maintains can only be revealed through the presumptions of the Christian 
view of self. Niebuhr states, “Christianity, therefore, issues inevitably in the religious expression 
of an uneasy conscience.  Only within terms of the Christian faith can man not only understand 
the reality of the evil in himself but escape the error of attributing that evil to any one but 
himself.548  For Niebuhr, the Christian view of anthropology—and by extension, the Christian 
view of sin—provides for the human the unique ability to understand the self as one who has the 
very real capacity for both good and evil.  Essentially, Christian anthropology constructs a 
human who stands in judgement, not before the throne of prejudicial reason or natural necessity, 
but before a transcendent God, under whom all truth, nature, and history are unified. 
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 The ultimate goal for this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Marcuse in order to create a new type of technological 
engagement from the basis of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology.  This chapter will continue with 
the prophetic methodology of critiquing the work of Lewis Mumford from the position of 
Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology. While the previous chapter demonstrated how Mumford’s 
anthropology expresses itself as an easy conscience, the present chapter will introduce Lewis 
Mumford’s critique of the technological society, and demonstrate how his anthropology—
constructed as an easy conscience—obscures the ethical implications of that critique.   
 In keeping with the goal of this chapter, this chapter will do two things.  First, (I) this 
chapter will lay out Mumford’s critique of the technological society.  Second, (II) this chapter 
will critique the ethical implications of Mumford’s easy conscience in the technological society.  
Essentially, while the first section of this chapter will provide helpful insights for the final 
synthesis of the three thinkers observed in this thesis, the second section of this chapter will 
continue the prophetic critique of the anthropology supporting Mumford’s observations. 
I: Mumford’s Self in the Technological Society 
 Mumford’s picture of the technological society is presented as an historical unraveling of 
what makes the self, in Mumford’s assessment, human.  Indeed, in much the same way Mumford 
constructs his idyllic state of organicism, society’s progression towards the technological society 
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slowly deconstructs the delicate balance of the human’s organic home state. This section will 
demonstrate how Mumford’s view of self and human nature unravels from the dawn of the 
technological society until the present state, what he calls “the Megamachine.” 
 While this section will describe how the Megamachine came together, it is important to 
state here its working definition.  Mumford defines the Megamachine as “…an invisible structure 
composed of living, but rigid, human parts, each assigned to his special office, role, and task, to 
make possible the immense work-output and grand designs of this great collective organism.”549  
While this definition rightfully mentions the “invisible” quality of the Megamachine, it more 
greatly emphasizes its physical reality and goals.550  However, it is important to also highlight, in 
the words of Adam Green, its “ideological structure” which merges together “a concatenation of 
machines into one sprawling complex built from the coexistence of multiple mechanical units, of 
which human beings become part.”551  Essentially, the Megamachine is a social and ideological 
construction which exists as a web of interwoven religious, economic, philosophical, and 
historical conceptions that effectively integrate the human, society, and machines into one 
singular grand and ever-expanding machine.552 
This section will show the process by which the organic human is psychologically and 
philosophically deconstructed and then fit into the Megamachine in the following three ways: 
(A) human imbalance, (B) mechanistic thinking, and (C) the rise of what Mumford calls, “the 
myth of the machine.”  This section will close with Mumford’s final analysis of the human 
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condition as it exists within the technological society, what he calls (D) “Organization Man.”  
All three of these aspects of the technological society are mutually reinforcing, and culminate to 
create a new and, to Mumford, dreadful social matrix—one for which the individual and her 
society must overcome. 
A. Human Imbalance 
 Before one can fully understand Mumford’s articulation of human imbalance, it is 
important to define what Mumford calls, “technics.”  Mumford defines technics as “…that part 
of human activity wherein, by an energetic organization of the process of work, man controls and 
directs the forces of nature for his own purposes.”553  While he never explicitly differentiates 
“technics” and “technology,” it is widely agreed that Mumford chose “technics” to imply 
“technical practices on all levels.”554  While this differentiation is brief, it is concise.  For 
Mumford, technics is an all-encompassing attitude, order, and “process of production” that is 
comprised of “tools, machines, knowledge, skills and the arts.”555  Mumford seemingly opted to 
use the word “technics” over “technology” precisely because the former integrates the “industrial 
arts” into its definition, while “technology” indicates a more reductionist “systematic study.”556  
For Mumford, “technics” is understood to be more permissive of an holistic approach, while 
“technology" is more prone to atomism. 
 The distinction between technology and technics is important, as Mumford will describe 
technics as something that is “more than hardware,”557 and is rather more akin to the culture of 
technology.  Most importantly, however, is that Mumford sees technics as the process of the 
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human integrating his- or herself into work.  Like his construction of the self, the process of this 
integration for Mumford must carry with it a sense of balance, or the human, like any other 
organism, will suffer.  It is, therefore, Mumford’s goal to discover and demonstrate where the 
imbalance of today’s use of technics lies. 
 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Mumford’s view of the self is one who emerges 
from nature, is cognizant of its natural necessities, and can creatively influence its environment 
towards the benefit of one’s person and culture.  However, at the root of the human being who 
today practices technics, Mumford detects a “psychosis” or a “psychic disharmony [that] 
disrupt[s] the equilibrium of the whole physical organism….”558  In keeping with his 
instrumentalist perspective, the problem with technics is primarily psychological, and the 
external technological or mechanistic environment is simply symptomatic, or at most symbiotic, 
of the deeper “psychic imbalances” at work in the human.559  In other words, Mumford 
articulates the problem of technics as one that exists first in the mind.  In fact, Mumford himself 
claims that one of his most essential goals is to “…describe what has happened to the Western 
European mind.”560 
 The psychosis Mumford sees at work within modern technics is the product of an 
unhealthy imbalance in the human’s relationship to two activities he calls “work” and “play”—
two activities he sees as central to healthy technics.  Mumford describes work as simply 
“compulsory labor” that is necessary for survival, and he describes the goals of work as 
“economic.”561  Play, on the other hand, is the seemingly “superfluous” activities (from the 
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perspective of the technological society) that are “just as essential to human development as the 
economic.”562  Speaking on the concept of play, Mumford states, “…in these realms man gains a 
fuller insight into his surroundings, his community and himself.”563  Play is what Mumford calls 
the human’s “higher activities,” or leisure;564 they are what allow the human to transcend the “… 
dumb repetitions of his animal role.”565  Play is formulating one’s actions, not from a position of 
necessity or repetition, but from the seemingly random and organic superfluities of human 
behavior.   
 For Mumford, work and play are conjoined at the “trunk” and “cannot be detached.”566  
Without work, Mumford argues, humans “…would not have produced enough spare energy to 
maintain their higher activities.”567  Essentially, to repeat the old adage, without work, there is no 
play.  However, on the other hand, if all of life is work, “man cannot enjoy these higher 
activities.”568  The balance between work and play is essential for organic balance, and 
represents for Mumford the key to maintaining a healthy use of “technics.” 
 Additionally, while both work and play are equally necessary for Mumford, he admits 
that play, and all the activities that emerge from play (art, music, etc.), spring forth from work 
and economic goals.  Mumford states, “Thus man’s released activities grow out of his 
conditioned activities: the esthetic flower out of the economic leaf.”569  This is not to say that 
work is more important than play, but rather that work has an additional justification for 
existence than just simply surviving.  Mumford states, “Man gains, through work, the insight into 
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nature he needs to transmute work into artifacts and symbols that have a use beyond ensuring his 
immediate animal survival.  The ultimate justification of work lies not alone in the performance 
and the product but in the realm of the arts and sciences.”570  For Mumford, humans work not 
only to ensure survival, but to grow the arena of human play.  If technics are only devised to 
produce necessary human ends without expanding its more subjective and aesthetic needs, the 
imbalance in the self grows and psychosis sets in.   
 Therefore, the first imbalance Mumford detects within contemporary technics is the 
disregard for the seemingly superfluous aspects of human life.  Mumford argues that technics is 
only sought for the purposes of “enlarging [humanity’s] capacities to consume,” and no longer 
for “liberating [humanity’s] capacities to create.”571  For Mumford, the superfluous is the 
seedbed for freedom and creativity. 
 The psychological consequences of technics shifting from one that enlarges the human’s 
capacity to consume and produce over and against liberating one’s capacity to create are 
profound.  For Mumford, as the human becomes more inclined to the strictly economic goals of 
life, namely production and survival, the “…super-ego, exclusively preoccupied with its own 
order, denies the function of the id and cuts itself off from the vitality that should serve it.”572  
Mumford concludes, “Carried far enough that repression must lead to the destruction of the 
personality….”573  Stated succinctly, only a fraction of the self is maintained in modern technics, 
and the person as a whole, particularly its “higher activities,” becomes repressed and inhibited.    
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B. Mechanistic Thinking 
 The psychotic imbalance of the individual is perpetuated in part by an “unconscious bias 
of mechanism,” or what he calls “mechanistic thinking.”574  Mumford maintains that mechanistic 
thinking started in the medieval period and stretched all the way until the Industrial Revolution, 
but reached its climax, so far as the development of the modern mind is concerned, in the 17th 
century—a period he calls the “eotechnic phase.”575  For Mumford, the eotechnic phase is the 
period of incubation that developed the psychology, philosophy, and culture—the mechanistic 
thinking—that would form the epistemic foundation from which the technological society would 
grow. This phase would see the rise of what Mumford considers to be the three most influential 
developments of modern technics: the clock, the Scientific Revolution, and capitalism. 
Of the three developments Mumford sees as most consequential for mechanistic thinking, 
the clock is the only development that is a physical object.  However, it is more than simply a 
gadget; the clock, in the words of Mumford, is a “new medium of existence.”576  It is for this 
reason that Mumford claims “The clock, not the steam-engine, is the key machine of the modern 
industrial age.”577  While Mumford maintains that the use of the mechanical clock was initiated 
in the Benedictine monasteries of the 10th century, eventually “The instrument…spread outside 
the monastery; and the regular striking of the bells brought a new regularity into the life of the 
workman and the merchant.”578   
 The clock’s gradual ubiquity throughout Europe set the stage for the eotechnic phase.  
Mumford states, “The bells of the clock tower almost defined urban existence.  Time-keeping 
                                               
574 Ibid., P. 35. 
575 Mumford does not give hard dates for these ages, but the eotechnic phase generally stretches from the medieval 
period until the 18th century.   
576 TAC, P. 17. 
577 Ibid., P. 14. 
578 Ibid. 
 162 
passed into time-serving and time-accounting and time-rationing.  As this took place, Eternity 
ceased gradually to serve as the measure and focus of human actions.”579  It is important to 
highlight two aspects of the clock revealed in this statement: how time-keeping passes into time-
serving and how time-keeping passes into time-rationing.  He is ultimately claiming that both the 
human (time-serving) and the organic world (time-rationing) are now subjected to the abstract 
measurements of a machine.  It is in this way that the clock, for Mumford, represents not only 
the literal beginning of both the eotechnic phase and modern technics, but also a metaphor for 
what is to come with what he calls the “Megamachine.”  The human enslaves the self and one’s 
environment to the abstract measurements of a machine that the human created.  
If the clock represents the beginning of the organic world’s enslavement to the abstract 
measurements of the fourth dimension, Mumford maintains that the Scientific Revolution is the 
beginning of the organic world’s enslavement to the abstract measurements, principles, and laws 
of the other three dimensions.  According to Mumford’s articulation of organic balance, there is 
more to the human and nature than what is quantifiable, predictable, and controllable;580  
however, the integration of science as an ideology into human consciousness has for Mumford 
supplanted the human’s more holistic understanding of nature and self, giving way to a more 
mechanistic and partial perspective on reality.581  Mumford states: “For the world, as conceived 
by Galileo, Newton, and Descartes was a world stripped of all its dionysian qualities: a world in 
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which color, form, pattern, sound were [sic] meaningless, except as mathematical quantities, and 
in which feeling and desire and imagination were disreputable.”582  While there remains some 
controversy over whether Mumford was completely against all things scientific,583 he is quite 
clear at minimum that the new world the Scientific Revolution created destroyed the former 
realms of meaning that gave the human purpose and demonstrated one’s most creative and 
unique characteristics.  
The final major development during the eotechnic phase that, according to Mumford, 
proceeded to complete society’s penchant for mechanistic thinking is the development of 
capitalism.  Capitalism introduced a “…concentration on abstract quantities…[that] isolated 
from the tissue of events just those factors that could be judged on an impersonal, quantitative 
scale.”584  Much like science and the clock before it, Mumford argues that capitalism enslaves 
modern thinking to a way of valuing the world in monetary, abstract terms, thus ridding the 
organic, qualitative, and subjective properties of life from conscious thought. 
When taken together, these three create mechanistic thinking, which, according to 
Mumford, would go on to destroy the reigning mythologies that once contained the highest 
values of society.  Mumford states, “…it tended to destroy the lingering mythologies of Greek 
goddesses and Christian heroes and saints…this process took place in all the arts; it affects 
poetry as well as architecture.”585  Effectively, these abstractions destroyed the old sources of 
meaning without immediately replacing them, leaving culture ready and waiting to construct new 
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myths to describe its world, its meaning, and its purpose, but do so from the basis of these 
abstractions.  This for Mumford will be the window through which society will develop and 
adopt what he calls the “myth of the machine.” 
C. The Myth of the Machine 
 As previously described, mechanistic thinking is the cognitive act of assigning that which 
is organic or non-organic to abstract properties, functions, and goals.  It is effectively the kind of 
thinking necessary to make machines.  However, Mumford is not content with simply stating that 
a technological society thinks mechanically.  Instead, Mumford observes a wide-ranging, all-
inclusive social phenomenon that culminates in the creation of what he calls, “the myth of the 
machine.” 586 
 While Mumford’s understanding of meaning is derived from his myth of organicism, 
balance, and wholeness, he argues that modern technics is derived from a myth that dehumanizes 
and objectifies humanity and nature.  By extracting the human and nature’s functional value 
from their otherwise organically balanced state, and fit together as if they were cogs in a 
machine, a new relationship is forged between the human and nature; one that is defined by its 
mutual exploitation and total integration of one to the other. 
 However, the myth of the machine is far more than an explanation of two coexisting 
entities (human and nature), but rather it is cradled and perpetuated by a new social order that 
works to affirm the overarching myth.  For Mumford, the myth of the machine is what fills the 
vacuum left by the disintegration of art and religion, and becomes the new element of social 
cohesion that would go on to create the ultimate object of mechanization: human society itself.  
For Mumford, the move towards this new social myth is an historical event that can be traced to 
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a particular time period at the end of the eotechnic phase, bridging into what he would call the 
paleotechnic and neotechnic phases, respectively.587 
 While Mumford articulates the switch from the paleotechnic phase (17th century to 20th 
century) to the neotechnic phase (early 20th century to present) with varying levels of 
significance throughout his career,588 what will remain most significant for Mumford is the 
manner in which he sees society change from the eotechnic phase to the paleotechnic phase. On 
the one hand, for all the innovative abstract thought that came to define the eotechnic phase, 
Mumford views this period as harboring a relatively admirable organic balance of its own.589  
However, on the other hand, the perception of the world that was developed in the eotechnic 
phase would become the physical reality of the paleotechnic phase.  The human’s environment, 
culture, and social world would ultimately be fit to conform to the cognitive instruments of 
abstraction previously conceived.  In his own words, the human at this point in history will have 
“…not only conquered nature, but detached himself as far as possible from the organic 
habitat.”590 
 In Mumford’s view, a massive upheaval took place between the eotechnic and 
paleotechnic phases that can only be described as a kind of religious transformation of culture.  
In his Myth of the Machine, Mumford argues that what appears to be a very new religious 
construction of culture is actually quite old, embedded in the mythology and praxis of ancient 
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Egypt—which, according to Mumford, is the earliest known appearance of the Megamachine.591  
The ancient empire that built the pyramids and boasted a highly complex economy with 
extraordinary agricultural efficiency derived, not simply from a linear progression of 
innovations, but rather from a religiously devout constituency of workers.  These workers, who 
Mumford calls “servo-mechanisms,” married together in their minds the exploits of labor with 
spiritualized servitude, existing symbiotically with zealous subservience to a king who 
represented a “…fusion of sacred and temporal power.”592   
 Regarding the first Megamachine—the prototype developed in Egypt—Mumford claims 
that “The myth of the machine and the cult of divine kingship rose together.”  In other words, the 
religious servitude of the people and its corresponding social mythology emerged concomitantly 
with the deification of their king.  The work of the people as a collective machine was in and of 
itself the divine reason for their existence and simultaneously the work of their god-king.  The 
place of the divine and the place of a people’s identity in society as workers came together in the 
identity of Pharaoh: the commander of workers and divine ruler—who Mumford calls, the 
“prime mover.”593  Their faith in a god-king transmuted into the religiously justified slavery of a 
people.   
 Regarding the new Megamachine that Mumford saw at work in modern technics, there is 
no king, but rather the machine itself would become the object of worship.  The myth at work 
supporting today’s Megamachine is not like the Egyptian’s divine pharaohs or gods, but rather a 
certain historical perspective of humanity.  Mumford describes the myth of the machine as an 
historical distortion of human nature in the mind of the worker.  He states: 
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Modern man has formed a curiously distorted picture of himself, by interpreting his early history in terms of 
his present interests in making machines and conquering nature.  And then in turn he has justified his 
present concerns by calling his prehistoric self a tool-making animal, and assuming that the material 
instruments of production dominated all his other activities.594 
 
Effectively, Mumford is arguing that the reigning mythology in a technological society is a 
warped view of history that perceives the self—at its very origin and nature—primarily as a 
worker in an economy, not as one who works in order to play in a community.  In other words, 
humans have constructed a flawed view of self that justifies its own servitude and further 
intensifies its own psychosis.  This is the essence of Mumford’s articulation of the “myth of the 
machine.” 
D. Organization Man 
 As stated from the outset of this chapter, Mumford’s picture of the technological society 
is presented as an historical unraveling of what makes the self, in Mumford’s assessment, 
human.  The exaltation of abstract thought and the reduction of the entire organic world into 
mechanistic thinking and value has for Mumford created a certain psychosis among humans who 
both participate in (laborers) and benefit from (consumers) modern technics.  For Mumford, the 
result of this unraveling is a severe imbalance of the self, leaving humanity careering towards the 
loss of its most essential organic nature.595 
 Mumford’s view of the self as it exists within the technological society culminates in his 
concept of the “Organization Man.”  Mumford defines the Organization Man as one who 
“…takes all his orders from the system, and who…cannot conceive of any departure from the 
system even in the interest of efficiency, still less for the sake of creating a more intelligent, 
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vivid, purposeful, humanly rewarding mode of life.596  As harrowing as it may seem, Mumford 
believes this description awaits all humans within the technological society unless there is some 
intervention.  For Mumford, the Megamachine produces “…imprisoned minds that have no 
capacity for appraising the results of their process, except by the archaic criteria of power and 
prestige, property, productivity and profit...”597   
But what exactly is the binding element that infuses the self to the machine in this way?  
What, in Mumford’s view, is the nature of the relationship between the human and machine, so 
as to create such a bleak picture of the self?  Comparing the relationship of human-to-machine 
that he analyzes during his own time with that which is observable before modern technics, 
Mumford is moved to ask a similar question at the beginning of his major work, Technics and 
Civilization: “How did this happen?  How in fact could the machine take possession of European 
society until that society had, by an inner accommodation, surrendered to the machine?”598  The 
manner in which Mumford phrases this question reveals three distinguishing elements to the 
problem he sees at the core of the human’s relationship to the Megamachine: (1) the 
Megamachine’s possession of the individual, (2) the inner accommodation of the individual, and 
(3) the surrender of the individual to the Megamachine.  The purpose of this section is to 
investigate all three elements of this statement alongside Mumford’s work in order to show the 
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1. The Megamachine Taking Possession of Self 
 
For an Instrumental theorist, Mumford comes extraordinarily close to ascribing agency to 
the Megamachine by drawing a nearly indistinguishable comparison between society and a 
machine that has an intractable grasp on the consciousness and activities of human beings.  In his 
essay, “Lewis Mumford: Prophet of Organicism,” Leo Marx wrestles with this very question 
regarding the nature and extent of the Megamachine’s “possession” of the individual, and 
demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing Mumford’s overly ‘Manichean’ (mechanical v. 
organic thinking and living) and abstract rhetoric with his more concrete assessment regarding 
the kind of society within which one is actually living. 
On the one hand, as Leo Marx argues, it appears at times that this large and menacing 
depiction of the all-controlling Megamachine is strictly rhetorical for Mumford.  Marx argues 
that it adds “persuasive power” and “conceptual unity” to Mumford’s argument to portray the 
Megamachine as a type of ideologically-conjured mechanical demiurge holding the angelically 
organic world captive.  Marx states: 
…this Manichean vision lends an admirable coherence and drama to Mumford’s work…at times in fact it 
makes his oeuvre seem like a huge, panoramic morality play in which actors representing key 
abstractions—especially those indefatigable rivals, Organicism and Mechanism—contend on a world-
historical stage.599  
 
If it is simply a rhetorical jolt Mumford is employing when he claims “…but now that the [myth 
of the machine] idea has been completely embodied, we can recognize that it had left no place 
for man.  He is reduced to a standardized servo-mechanism,”600 Marx would find that this 
wording “…lends an admirable coherence and drama to Mumford’s work.”601  However, if 
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Mumford really means that such a mythically conjured social structure really takes possession of 
the human, Marx rightly argues that such an assertion of a “totalizing doctrine” would indeed be 
a “disconcertingly tendentious…aspect of Mumford’s writing.”602 
 Aside from the potential rhetorical value of describing such a daunting and all-controlling 
social machine, the question of whether or not Mumford really means that the Megamachine 
takes possession of the human through one’s own mythical and mechanistic thinking is integral 
to understanding how Mumford perceives the relationship between the human and machine or 
technology.  One must ask, does Mumford truly believe that mechanistic ideas, mediated through 
and perpetuated by the myth of the machine, can hold human beings hostage in potentially 
harmful social and political structures?  Perhaps more precisely, “can ideas control humans?” 
 To answer this question, Marx turns to one of Mumford’s most overt statements 
regarding the self as it exists within the technological society.  Regarding his conception of the 
socially and mythically constructed Megamachine, Mumford states: 
Now to call these collective entities machines is no idle play on words…. [T[he great labor machine was in 
every aspect a genuine machine: all the more because its components, though made of human bone, nerve, 
and muscle, were reduced to their bare mechanical elements and rigidly standardized for the performance 
of their limited tasks.  The taskmaster’s lash ensured conformity.603 
 
Like any other material within a machine, the human is merely another resistant component that 
is flattened out, specialized, and fit into the machine—the victim of a “lash-ensured conformity.”  
By his own admission, Mumford is stating this is no idle play on words.  There is no mere 
metaphor or analogy to be interpreted with this description.  He means this quite literally: the 
human is now a part of the machine, and thereby in its possession.   
 However, what is perplexing is Mumford’s insistence that the Megamachine still operates 
under “human control.”  Regarding his view of the prototypical model, ancient Egypt, this is 
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easier to imagine, as there is such a figure as the Prime Mover who is guiding and directing the 
machine and all the human “servo-mechanisms” there within.  But there is no Prime Mover in 
Mumford’s contemporary description of the Megamachine, so how is a machine controlled by 
humans while humans are also the ones who are “possessed?”   
Mumford’s confusion on this point is quite revealing, as his more innocuous 
presuppositions regarding technology as an Instrumentalist are in conflict with his more critical 
and romantic impulses.  Mumford needs to be able to argue that modern technics are destructive 
as they possess the human (romanticism), all the while maintaining that the human who creates 
and employs modern technics is still somehow good and in control of the machine. 
While the next two sections will examine the exact process that Mumford describes 
regarding the Megamachine’s possession of humanity, it is important to note that no matter how 
he conceives of this process, Mumford clearly posits that the Megamachine literally takes 
possession of the human.  As quoted previously, “this is no idle play on words…[the 
Megamachine is] in every aspect a genuine machine…the taskmaster’s lash ensured conformity.”  
In his conclusion regarding whether it is the case that Mumford truly believes this possession is 
the case, Leo Marx states the following: 
…here I am not questioning the extent or the quality of his learning.  My doubts, rather, have to do with 
his…tendency to impute historical agency to disembodied abstractions—especially the controlling organic 
and machine metaphors…. [Mumford] regard[s] history as driven by unmoored ideas afloat….above the 
surface occupied by people and events.604 
 
Marx argues that the core of Mumford’s thought rests on the presupposition that the ideas 
upholding the Megamachine can somehow truly take possession of a person and culture in 
history—that this construct has social and historical agency.  Marx further points out that as early 
as 1934, Mumford advocates for a “virtually autonomous agent of history.”605  To put it another 
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way, Mumford envisions a kind of Frankensteinian Demiurge—a socially created body of ideas 
that enslave their angelic creators.   
2. The Inner Accommodation of Self 
 
In order for the myth of the machine to consume the human being, even to the point of 
becoming possessed by the Megamachine, Mumford must articulate a certain internal 
psychological or philosophical breaking point where the human finally gives in to such 
oppression.  For Mumford, this begins with what he calls, the “Megatechnic Bribe,”606 and ends 
with one’s tacit worship to the system itself.  
Mumford’s understanding of the Megatechnic607 Bribe is exactly how it sounds: the 
human effectively gives up the self and its freedom in exchange for the privileges one can 
possess in the technological society.  Mumford states: 
Provided the consumer agrees to accept what megatechnics offers, in quantities favorable to the continued 
expansion of the whole power system, he will be granted all the perquisites, privileges, seductions, and 
pleasures of the affluent society.  If only he demands no goods or services except those that can be 
organized or manufactured by megatechnics, he will without doubt enjoy a higher standard of material 
culture….608 
 
For Mumford, that which is organic is rejected for the glimmering jewels of the Megamachine.  
The Megatechnic bribe is an “addiction” to a variety of idols like “progress,” the “conquest of 
nature,” and “silly fantasies” that mistakenly justifies the human’s willingness to “…accept this 
totalitarian control…not as a horrid sacrifice but as a highly desirable fulfillment.”609 
For Mumford, it is the bribe that opens the door to the “unconscious bias of 
mechanism.”610  However, the mechanical bias, once firmly entrenched in the psyche, is 
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perpetuated by the governing myth and social structure of the Megamachine.  The interaction of 
the Megatechnic Bribe and the socially reinforcing mythos of the Megamachine trap the 
individual into a self-perpetuating loop of inorganic thinking, living, and relating, to the point 
that the human “…detach[es] himself as far as possible from the organic habitat.”611  From here, 
once human consciousness—which is for Mumford the sole creator and supplier of meaning in 
the universe—becomes integrated into the machine, all of the known universe is enveloped into a 
totalizing system of meaning within the mind of the individual.  People are laborers and 
consumers, the organic world is a heap of dead resources, and time is the tick of the clock. 
In his own words, Mumford calls the myth of the machine “absolutely irresistible…That 
magical spell still enthralls both the controllers and the mass victims of the Megamachine 
today.”612  Through the tandem forces of the human’s inner accommodation on the one hand, and 
the Megamachine’s ubiquitous and possessive qualities on the other, Mumford holds that the 
human inevitably surrenders wholly to the myth of the machine.  Mumford calls today’s humans, 
“system worshippers.”613  The human has bought into the idea that he or she exists only to work 
and consume, and therefore directs one’s worship to that structure from whence those needs are 
fulfilled.  In the Megamachine, human surrender is the apex of holiness according to the myth of 
the machine. The one who surrenders is, what Mumford calls, “The Hero of our Time.”614 
Along these lines, Mumford argues that the “ideal creature [of] this present age [is] the 
robot,” 615  one who is made in the image of the machine itself: 616  what he calls, Organization 
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Man.  Like the most efficient gear in a machine, the most successful and highest-ranking humans 
in status are those who work most efficiently within the Megamachine—those who obey without 
a hitch, as it were.  Effectively, the highest aim for those who surrender to the myth of the 
machine is the Organization Man: one “whose further potentialities for life and growth have been 
suppressed for the purpose of controlling the fractional energies that are left, and feeding them 
into a mechanically ordered collective system.”617 
To drive this point to its conclusion, Mumford uses the example Adolf Eichmann, one of 
the chief organizers of the Holocaust, as an example of one who has surrendered completely, and 
thus should be revered by the standards of the Megamachine.  He states: 
…Eichmann, the obedient exterminator, who carried out Hitler’s policy and Himmler’s orders with 
unswerving fidelity, should be hailed as the ‘Hero of Our Time.’  But unfortunately our time has produced 
many such heroes who have been willing to do at a safe distance, with napalm or atom bombs, by a mere 
press of the release button, what the exterminators…did by old-fashioned handicraft methods.618 
 
Mumford points to Eichmann as one who exemplifies every value within the myth of the 
machine.  Eichmann offered no resistance, he followed orders, and was in turn appropriately 
rewarded with promotions and plaudits that a worshipper of the Megamachine should receive 
according to its own values.  Eichmann exists purely as a laborer, and a laborer he shall be to his 
fullest extent.  Yet the horrifying results of such a person speak for themselves: one dehumanized 
servo-mechanism exterminating those he can only perceive as millions of other dehumanized 
servo-mechanisms.  And it does not stop there, as there “are now countless Eichmanns in 
administrative offices, in business corporations…in the armed forces…ready to carry out 
any…sanctioned fantasy, however dehumanized and debased.”619  For Mumford, Eichmann 
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represents both the present and the future of humanity,620 absent some disruption of the myth of 
the machine. 
II: Ethical Implications of Mumford’s Easy Conscience in the Technological Society 
 While Mumford establishes a particularly cogent analysis regarding what the 
technological society is through his concept of the “myth of the machine” and the “Megatechnic 
Bribe,” his anthropology as expressed as an easy conscience limits his ability to prescribe a 
realistic way forward.  As demonstrated in Chapter 3, there are two consequences of the easy 
conscience: first, the easy conscience obscures one’s perception of the world, culminating in 
unrealistic attempts to save oneself from its various evils; second, while the easy conscience 
assuages any suspicion that evil could come from one’s volition, it cannot assuage the problem 
of anxiety, and indeed compounds it.  This section will address how Mumford’s anthropology 
leads to both under the following headings, respectively: (A) Obscured World; Unrealistic 
Salvation and (B) Compounded Anxiety. 
A. Obscured World; Unrealistic Salvation 
As established in the previous chapter, for Mumford, consciousness is the center of the 
universe, and in one’s original state of consciousness, the human is good.  This anthropological 
formulation establishes for Mumford an easy conscience which obscures his understanding of the 
technological society by articulating its problems primarily as a defect of consciousness.621  As a 
result, Mumford will extrapolate various means of salvation from the evils of technological 
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society which require simply a retreat towards a certain original and ideal state: that of organic 
balance. Effectively, given the easy conscience at the center of Mumford’s anthropology and his 
presumptions that technology is neutral, the technological society is manageable simply by 
correcting one’s thinking. 
Mumford’s easy conscience, specifically expressed as a mind which harbors the 
supremely powerful conscious (idola), leads towards a confusing ethical complex: the human 
must save the human from one’s own mind, with the power of one’s own mind.  On the one 
hand, Mumford states, “We cannot save our cunning inventions and our complicated apparatus 
of scientific research unless we save man.”622  In other words, the human needs saving from its 
psychosis.  On the other hand, armed with human consciousness, humanity can “[re-orient] our 
technics [by] bringing it more completely into harmony....”623  Mumford’s goal is to cure one’s 
psychosis by changing and implementing the idola in one’s mind—change the Megamachine that 
humans created by changing the way humans think.  Essentially, good and evil originate from 
the same consciousness, so the good consciousness—that of organic thinking—must will out 
against the evil consciousness—that of mechanistic thinking. 
Ultimately, Mumford must find a way to transform the sickened and fractured 
mechanistic mind into that which is natural, balanced, and organic; to create an “ideology so 
profoundly organic that it will be capable of bringing together the severed halves of modern 
man…”624  This goal will express itself in the form of two forms of salvation: (1) psychological 
re-orientation and (2) myth-making.  This section will describe both forms of salvation and then 
(3) respond in turn with a Niebuhrian response suited to each. 
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1. Psychological Re-Orientation 
 
As stated previously, Mumford articulates the problem of the technological society as an 
“unconscious bias of mechanism”625 that must be remedied by way of “transforming the 
psychological.”626  The problem is not simply a desire for the mechanized life, but rather it is a 
psychosis at the center of the unconscious that is perpetually pushing the self further and further 
into more fragmentary and abstract categories of self- and natural-valuation.  Because the 
problem is so deep within the psyche, Mumford argues that one must essentially deprogram, then 
reprogram the psychoses of individuals who are trapped within the mechanistic culture.  The 
goal is to rediscover the idolum of organic balance that, he contends, still exists within the 
unconscious, and then find a way to refashion that idolum within common practice.   
 The first step in finding salvation, in true Romantic and Thoreauvian form,627 Mumford 
argues that one must move towards “withdrawal and rejection.”628  For Mumford, mechanization 
is so attached to one’s unconscious that one must leave society and its luxuries to find something 
transcendent about the self.  True psychological healing, he argues, is simply not possible 
without first abstaining from the technological society.  Mumford even states that withdrawal 
and rejection is necessary for “a recovery of inner autonomy,” as if the human’s very sense of 
self-determination is lost in the technological society. 
 Once one has withdrawn and rejected the mechanistic society, Mumford posits that one 
will find the “archetypal pattern of The Great Good Place,”629 a term he borrows from the book 
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by Henry James of the same name.630  This archetypal pattern will house his concept of the 
idolum of organic balance, and will essentially be the manifestation of that idolum over and 
against the mechanistic society.  It is placing the emphasis of life, not on efficiency and work, 
but on the “spiritual” necessities of the organic self.  It is a mindset built upon and around 
withdrawal and introspection.   
It is important to note that Mumford is not necessarily advocating for all to physically 
withdraw permanently from society to create this environment of convalescence, but rather to 
grant a level of space for one’s imagination to clearly construct a new vision of life towards 
which one should live that reflects organic balance.   Mumford states, “Each one of us…may 
play a part in extricating himself from the power system by asserting his primacy as a person in 
quiet acts of mental and physical withdrawal.”631  Effectively, Mumford believes that if one is 
bold enough to “extricate” oneself from the Megamachine, one may release oneself of the 
psychosis of the technological society and regain some semblance of organic balance. 
2. Myth-Making of the Idolum 
 
Running parallel to and supporting Mumford’s program of psychological re-orientation 
and reconstruction emerges perhaps his most valuable insight regarding the technological 
society: his recognition of the power of myths and religion in society, and his diagnosis of the 
mechanistic society as harboring a generative myth of its own.  For Mumford, the problem of the 
technological society is primarily psychological, but he found that myth is a powerful tool 
utilized to convey psychological meaning.632 
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As mentioned previously, the emergence of mechanistic thinking had a deleterious effect 
on the old mythologies, leaving culture increasingly free from the older religious notions of 
value and meaning, and opening the door for the myth of the machine to prevail.  However, in 
order to resist the myth of the machine, Mumford argues for the importance of creating new 
myths, even as the old myths die away: “If our knowledge of human behavior counts for 
anything…we cannot put aside old myths without creating new ones…. The nearest we can get 
to rationality is not to efface our myths but to attempt to infuse them with right reason, and to 
alter them or exchange them for other myths when they appear to work badly.”633  For Mumford, 
abandoning myths must lead to the creation of new myths.  Without the conscious development 
of myths, the myths that society will inevitably develop will not reflect the highest consciousness 
of humanity.  Here Mumford is simply advocating for myths that more closely resemble “right 
reason.” 
As previously discussed, the Megamachine is the result of the collective adherence of 
society to what Mumford calls, “the myth of the machine.”  Utilizing ancient Egypt as an 
archetype,634 Mumford describes the human’s relationship with the Megamachine as “…a 
profound magico-religious faith in the system itself, as expressed in the cult of the gods.”635  
Thus, in order to counteract the myth of the machine, Mumford constructs a bevy of central 
tenets for a myth of his own making that all counter that of the myth of the machine.   
First, Mumford addresses what he sees as the very root of the Megamachine: how the 
human understands the self. In Myth of the Machine, Mumford argues that the human has a 
                                               
633 SOU, P. 301. 
634 While not stated explicitly, it is widely held that Mumford uses Jung’s understanding of an archetype as a 
timelessly engrained image within the collective consciousness which forms a “…preconscious psychic 
disposition…” (Carl Jung, The Undiscovered Self, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990. P. 121).  See: 
Greene (“Matter and Psyche,” P. 62), Marx (Hughes & Hughes, P. 176) and Miller (Lewis Mumford, P. 530). 
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serious misconception of self, as one whose primary value is economic and labor-oriented: 
“Homo faber, Man the Tool-Maker.”636 However, Mumford attempts to correct this myth with 
that of the organic myth: the human was not created to work, but also to play;637 the human was 
not created to specialize in one means of survival, but was created to evolve and adapt, “to come 
up with more than one answer to the same problem;”638 the human mind is not fashioned for 
mere survival, but for creativity.639 
As opposed to the myth of the machine, which suggest the human was created for the 
Megamachine,640 Mumford corrects this understanding by arguing that humans belong to an 
emerging nature.641  From there, Mumford argues that the human’s nature is not simply work, 
but play, art, and creativity,642 and in granting those more subjective qualities as a part of nature 
and the human being, technology should be directed towards an organic balance of nature, not 
simply efficiency and production. 
The final trait Mumford seeks to implement into his myth of organic balance is a 
reorientation of God.  To be clear, Mumford sees God as little more than that concept towards 
which humans have traditionally attempted to “…affix his own special interests and 
preoccupations, often of the most limited range to cosmic and organic processes.”643  While he 
does not see a problem fundamentally with belief in a god, Mumford argues, “we err merely in 
our effort to cast this intuition in a too-familiar mold, in order to pass more freely from the 
known to the unknown.”644  In short, Mumford argues that the human’s concept of God should 
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641 See: Chapter 4.II.A. 
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not be one that is grounded immutably in nature, but rather as one who “…emerges from the 
universe, as the far -off event of creation that that ultimate realization of the person towards 
which creation seems to move.”645  Mumford proclaims, “God exists, not at the beginning, but at 
the end.”646 
Mumford’s concept of God is quite indicative of his entire program of thought.  Mumford 
all but embraces and promotes a Manichean duality to his mythological metaphysic.  Mumford 
states: 
A sound philosophy…must embrace the facts of human experience hitherto represented in the symbols of a 
creative god and a destructive devil: the one directed toward greater fulfillment of life, the other tempting it 
to lose sight of its higher goals and regress to lower planes of evolution…. Thus God, as I seek here to 
interpret human experience, is not the foundation of human existence: he is the pillar of cloud by day and 
the pillar of fire by night that lead men onward in their journey toward the Promised Land.647 
 
Articulated within theological language, it becomes clearer how Mumford interprets reality and 
his sources of salvation.  Mumford needs the human to truly believe in the ideas of organic 
balance to move human culture towards its rightful place.  The human must reorient one’s 
worship so that the emphasis is upon true organic progress as aligned in nature, not a regression 
into the “…animal tendency to repetition, fixation, automatism.”648   
3. Niebuhrian Critique 
 
The Niebuhrian response to Mumford’s salvation comes in two parts: first, the evils of 
the technological society cannot be eradicated simply by returning to one’s original state 
(organic balance), and second, the technological society is not manageable simply by conforming 
to one’s highest ideals (myth-making).  Mumford’s insistence that both can be achieved is 
uniquely dependent upon an easy conscience which is incapable of understanding “the reality of 
                                               
645 Ibid., P. 71. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid., P. 73, 75. 
648 COL, P. 33. 
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evil in himself,” and commits the “error of attributing evil to any one but himself.”649  For 
Mumford, the human is essentially good, both naturally and rationally, and it is only the 
corruption of that good that one can too easily correct. 
Both of his projects—psychological re-orientation and myth making—culminate to create 
a muddled form of salvation that is one part naturalistic and one part rationalistic. He states, “we 
need an ideology so profoundly organic that it will be capable of bringing together the severed 
halves of modern man…”650  While Mumford may presume that combining both approaches of 
naturalism and rationalism better equips him to address the evils of the technological society, the 
two are compounded in such a way so as to remove responsibility even further from the realm of 
human freedom.  As Niebuhr states, “Nature and reason are thus the two gods of modern man, 
and sometimes the two are one.  In either case man is essentially secure because he is not 
seriously estranged from the realm of harmony and order.”651  Effectively, combining the two 
simply gives Mumford more ways to think highly of humanity, and more ways to evade 
responsibility. 
Regarding his naturalistic project to withdraw from society in order to re-orient the 
human psyche with some lost state of organic balance, Mumford evades responsibility by way of 
what Niebuhr identifies as the impulse of sensuality.  Niebuhr states, “…he seeks to escape from 
his unlimited possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of self-determination, 
by immersing himself into a ‘mutable good,’ by losing himself in some natural vitality.”652  In 
this mode of salvation, Mumford forsakes the human’s ability to enact change in the 
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technological society in one’s current state, and in so doing, he obscures the technological 
society as one that appears incalcitrant, hopeless, and irredeemable. 
This process of obscuring the technological society so that it seems utterly irredeemable 
is built on the presumption that the Megamachine harbors within it possessive powers of 
psychological manipulation.  Mumford presumes that whatever is evil about the technological 
society is not a result of human will, but rather a closed system of increasing psychological 
defect: the human’s defect of mechanical thinking causes the Megamachine, which causes more 
of the defect which produces mechanical thinking.   However, it is unclear how Mumford 
believes that simply withdrawing from society can cause the kind of re-orientation necessary to 
allow the human to return to society without the need for clocks, science, or capital, which are 
necessarily wed to the technological society.  Does simply withdrawing more somehow disrupt 
the psychological effects of time-keeping, science, and capital?  This suggestion not only seems 
unrealistic, but it is more a retreat from evil than it is an ethic of technology. 
Regarding his rationalistic project of utilizing a new myth of organic balance to 
reinstitute an appropriate consciousness of self, Mumford evades responsibility by way of what 
Niebuhr identifies as the impulse of pride.  Niebuhr states, “Man falls into pride when he seeks 
to raise his contingent existence to unconditioned significance.”653  Mumford clearly places an 
unrealistic hope in human imagination, or what he calls, “the idola.”  He states, “So far we have 
found no limits to the imagination, nor yet to the sources on which it may draw.  Every goal man 
reaches provides a new starting point, and the sum of all man’s days is just a beginning.”654  The 
problem is that, ironically, though his ideal which uses natural language, he does not see the 
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natural contingencies and limitations that necessarily imperil his highest values.  The human is 
not responsible for the evil effects of the technological society; the human is its very salvation. 
In keeping with his easy conscience, Mumford believes that the key to overturning the 
myth of the machine is believing more in one’s good original self by way of a myth that is more 
consistent with organic balance.  Mumford argues that myths are the “…ideal content of the 
existing order of things…by being consciously formulated and worked out in thought…[myths] 
perpetuate and perfect that order.”655  Believe in the happier and more balanced myth, and the 
dehumanizing structures of the Megamachine come crashing down.  However, opposite his 
posture when proposing psychological re-orientation, Mumford is not considering the limitations 
of human transcendence—one’s reason and ideology—and, in so doing, he obscures the 
technological society as one that is manageable, changeable, and bendable towards one’s 
predetermined harmony of nature.   
Whether Mumford is advocating for escaping the technological society or overtaking the 
technological society with a greater governing myth, his original self and his ideal self are 
fundamentally indistinguishable as ideas;  both champion organic balance, and both represent for 
Mumford a wholeness, subjectivity, and freedom that he sees as clashing with the Megamachine.  
Furthermore, the ethical prescriptions for the self that he puts forward amount simply to 
reflecting more on the latter so as to become more like the former, be it through withdrawal or 
transvaluating culture through its alternative myth.  For Mumford, what is fundamentally wrong 
with society is simply a pattern of habits formed in ignorance of organic balance.  For all intents 
and purposes, Mumford’s view of sin is naivete: a problem that is self-correctible and hardly the 
fault of the individual. Therefore, in Niebuhrian terms, Mumford effectively betrays the uneasy 
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conscience by pretending the only resolution for humankind is found in an idealized future that 
has not yet emerged, or an idealized past that one can never fully revive.656    
In opposition to Mumford, Niebuhr argues, “Ultimate confidence in the goodness of life 
can…not rest upon confidence in the goodness of man.”657  Effectively, there is a fundamental 
tension between what humans can imagine and what humans can realistically achieve; whether 
that is an idealistic view of the past or a naively optimistic view of the future.  As previously 
established, the tension between human imagination and human action is one that Mumford 
completely ignores.   
While the final chapter will argue that Mumford is at least partially correct in his 
diagnosis of the technological society as a problem of mythology, the kind of myth he suggests 
in its place—one that contains the “ideal content of the existing order of things”—is inherently 
problematic, as it simply supports a new illusion in the place of the old one.  Instead, Niebuhr’s 
use of myth and religion will be particularly useful, as it is a revelation, not simply of 
unachievable ideals, but a revelation that clarifies reality in a way that exposes its fullest 
dimension.   
In what seems to be a direct critique of Mumford’s understanding of myth, Niebuhr 
states, “Religion, declares the modern man, is consciousness of our highest social values.  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  True religion is a profound uneasiness about our highest 
social values.”658  For Niebuhr, the purpose of myth is to clarify the limitations and ambiguities 
of life and to instruct the human how best to live within the parameters of those limitations and 
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ambiguities, as opposed to obscuring the self by its self-aggrandizing illusions.  Ultimately, from 
Niebuhr’s perspective, Mumford does not understand that when he imagines the human as being 
greater than he or she is and forsakes the human being’s unremitting complicity in the evil of the 
world, he also robs the human of one’s ability to improve the world through a heightened 
awareness of one’s involvement in both human achievement and human failure. 
In one of his rare critiques of Mumford, Niebuhr states that Mumford “dismissed the 
religious myths a little too readily….”659  He argues that Mumford had taken upon himself the 
task of creating new “scientifically informed” myths, but unjustifiably looked over the more 
timeless teachings of the religiously-informed myths.  While Niebuhr remains vague about what 
those “religious myths” are, it can be reasonably assumed that is speaking about the Judeo-
Christian stories which inform the human of one’s own nature and self.  It should be mentioned, 
however, that it is curious that Mumford disregards the Judeo-Christian myths so readily as he 
turns to generate new myths of counteracting the Megamachine, as Mumford himself at times 
points towards these myths in particular as those which granted grounds of resistance and 
dimension to self during the reigns of ancient Egypt and the Roman empire.660 
A. Anxiety in the Self 
As established in Chapter 3, anxiety is an inevitable concomitant to the human situation.  
The human, endowed with seemingly infinite capacities of imagination and spirit, can never fully 
translate that which it can imagine into the finite realm of existence.  While certain thinkers, 
Mumford included, may assuage the conscience by its elaborate constructions of self to create 
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the easy conscience, anxiety can never fully be assuaged.  In fact, this section will demonstrate 
how Mumford’s anthropology—his expression of an easy conscience—compounds anxiety 
through his premature solutions regarding the problems of self. 
What will unfold throughout Mumford’s career is in many ways a case-study for 
Niebuhr’s Christian conception of human nature, in that Mumford’s career represents a 
predictive model for one who is anxiously resigned to his optimistic position.  Mumford cannot 
“determine whether he shall understand himself primarily from the standpoint of the uniqueness 
of his reason or from the standpoint of his affinity with nature,”661 and this confusion leads 
Mumford to seek resolution after resolution in hopes of aligning the self with an illusory sense of 
unity that is not permitted by either presupposition.  Ultimately, Mumford’s easy conscience and 
presumptions regarding technological neutrality on the one hand, and his harrowing description 
of a possessive, psychologically manipulating technological society on the other, compounds 
anxiety in a way that creates an endless complex of hopeful paralysis. 
In opposition to Mumford’s frictionless, Jungian construction of self, Niebuhr argues that 
the self is plagued by its own homelessness.662  The human is neither one with reason or 
creativity, nor is the human ever fully unified with nature; the human can imagine that which is 
infinite and complete, but must be anchored in that which is finite and perceivably incomplete.  
Given the human being’s homelessness, that he or she is never at home within nature or reason, 
“anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is 
involved.”663  The human suffers from anxiety so long as he or she is tempted to do and be what 
the human simply cannot do or become.  Therefore, the human is never resolved enough to move 
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past the self in an effort to establish one’s own form of salvation, either from the position of 
rationality or from the position of nature or history.   
However, as in the case of Mumford, the human is invariably “tempted”664 to 
“[aggrevate] that problem by his too simple and premature solutions” to the inherent tensions of 
self.665  In other words, the anxiety concomitant to the human condition of homelessness tempts 
the human to transcend the homeless state in order to save him or herself from it.  Describing 
self-consciousness as if it were a “high tower looking upon a large and inclusive world,” Niebuhr 
states, “[the human] imagines that it is the large world which it beholds and not a narrow tower 
insecurely erected amidst the shifting sands of the world.”666  The anxious human resolves what 
cannot be resolved (shifting sands) by assuming a higher perspective than one’s nature grants. 
Regarding Mumford, his difficulty in locating the salvific avenues of humanity reveals 
the inherent anxiety of his work.  He is determined to keep reaching for a rational or creative 
unity that betrays the reality of the human condition.   His central goal of creating an “ideology 
so profoundly organic that it will be capable of bringing together the severed halves of modern 
man…”667 presumes a view of self that is in stark contrast to one’s fractured nature; a human so 
easily solvable that one’s very thoughts can cure him or herself.   
However, this construction leads to Mumford’s perennial angst.  Near the end of his life 
when it dawns on Mumford that no salvation of organicism is near and the prospects for such a 
totalizing makeover of society become increasingly remote, Mumford is confronted with the 
anxiety that is inevitable to the human condition; he is left within a paralyzing anxiety that is 
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intensified by a perfection which he can imagine, but a perfection he is doubtful the world can 
ever achieve.  
At the center of Mumford’s error is his inability to attribute the problems of humankind 
to the inherent tensions and freedom of the self.  Mumford confuses the endless battle at the core 
of the human condition with an illusory battle of rationality and creativity against the 
Megamachine.  The moment he commits this error is when he locates the problem of modern 
technics within an independent realm of ideas as opposed to within human nature itself.668   
By ignoring the inner tensions inherent to human freedom and placing human 
consciousness at the center of the realm of meaning, Mumford grants unlimited power for the 
human to use symbols and ideas to “transcend his immediate environment” and improve the 
world, culture, and society through the process of intellection and creativity,669 but in so doing—
by granting such power to human rationality and creativity—Mumford also creates the 
possibility of enslaving oneself by the same all-powerful consciousness.  Therefore, all of what 
Mumford perceives as good and evil is invariably absorbed into a rationalistic framework—a 
certain type of thinking over and against another type of thinking.  Ultimately, this leads to 
Mumford cornering himself into a cul-de-sac of Manichaeism, where one must either be saved 
through right reason (organic balance) or doomed by wrong reason (mechanistic thinking). 670 
Essentially, by establishing the easy conscience and obscuring the limitations and 
weaknesses inherent to humanity, Mumford’s criticism of the technological society is 
compounded in a labyrinth of mutually inflating oppositional forces.  Mumford sees the human 
as so powerful in one’s consciousness that, essentially, anything that can co-opt that power and 
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force it into submission would be equally powerful.  Effectively, the Megamachine is so utterly 
powerful precisely because human consciousness is so utterly powerful.  Therefore, any salvation 
plan that Mumford could articulate is necessarily tasked to become that much greater than the 
Megamachine the humans create.  To effectively fix the problems of the Megamachine, the 
human must achieve a greater and more holistic consciousness than ever achieved before. 
One of the driving forces behind this Manichean struggle of warring ideals is Mumford’s 
conflicting sentiments of humanism and romanticism that are infused both in his worldview and 
occupation as a critic.671  His humanism establishes an unjustified faith in humanity and tempts 
him to grant unlimited powers to the human through the unconscious powers of the idolum, but 
his romanticism requires an unrelenting assault upon industrialized civilization and tempts him to 
despair the technological and scientific projects of humankind.672   These sentiments further 
establish and compound his Manichean tendencies, as the more comprehensive his romantic 
critique is established, and the more ubiquitous technologically appears, the more Mumford must 
spiritualize his humanism, and by extension, his high estimation of humankind in order to find 
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salvation. The more he sees the Megamachine as unconquerable and ubiquitous, the more his 
prescriptions must become idealized and spiritually extracted from the world. 
Mumford’s final articulation of the technological society is anxious because he is 
compelled to articulate a harrowing and unsalvageable world while maintaining a high 
estimation of self.  His high estimation of self and his increasingly monstrous depiction of the 
Megamachine lead Mumford towards an unending oscillation between extremes.  A revealing 
example of this oscillation between extremes can be found in his response to the growing arms 
race with the Soviet Union during the Cold War: Is this a dream?  Naturally, it is a dream, for all 
challenges to animal lethargy and inertia begin in a dream.  The dream of flight eventually 
produced the airplane, and the dream of brotherhood will bring forth…an effective world 
government.  But it is better to sink one’s last hopes in a dream than to be destroyed by a 
nightmare….”673  Consistent with his Manichean worldview, Mumford begins with a high 
estimation of self—that one can simply dream and thus provide the “engine” for change—but 
ends his analysis in a bitter ultimatum: one must dream, lest he or she be “destroyed by a 
nightmare.” 
 Mumford’s ultimatum as one that is necessarily tied to his organic versus mechanistic 
Manichaeism is invariably expressed through an all-or-nothing ethic which is as condemning as 
it is unrealistic.  This tendency mirrors his bilateral approach to salvation from the 
Megamachine: either leave, overcome the mythology, or some combination of the two.  He most 
starkly expresses this tendency also in his essay, “The Art of the Impossible,” where he states 
that humanity “…must either bring about an open world or perish within a closed world.” 674  
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From the Niebuhrian perspective, such an ultimatum—that the future of the world and human 
existence is contingent upon the world becoming “open” or democratic—is at once an 
overestimation of human capacity by his implicit belief that the entire world can indeed become 
“open,” and an underestimation of the human’s capacity to progress in spite of its limitations, 
which is explicit in his clearly expressed ultimatum.675   
 In a rare published critique of Mumford, Niebuhr addresses his Manichaeistic and 
unrealistic approach to the nuclear age, and does so in a way that reveals the difference between 
the two thinkers.  Niebuhr states, “Mr. Mumford’s prescription…would seem to be analogous to 
advising [that] ‘You haven’t a chance to escape disaster by walking on the edge of the precipice.  
Your only chance is to fly.  I know you haven’t any wings, but you must sprout them.  The 
impossible must become possible in extreme situations.676  While this statement is in the context 
of nuclear age foreign policy, it implicitly supports the position that Niebuhr’s approach to ethics 
is one that is centered upon the realistic limitations and capabilities of human beings, and aids as 
a further indictment of Mumford regarding his Manichean approach to the problems of the 
technological society that is created by his high-estimation of self.  Mumford is essentially 
calling on the human to achieve the impossible in order to avert disaster, which is unrealistic by 
its own admission. 
                                               
675 For perspective, Mumford never could have advocated for what Niebuhr fought for in the nuclear age, and that is 
the United States’ “containment strategy” (also known as the Truman doctrine) which is considered “…a middle 
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 Mumford’s anxiety is at last expressed in the bitter pessimism677 that would develop from 
his Manichean view of the technological problem, but it is important to understand that this 
pessimism is the direct result of Mumford’s high estimation of humankind, thereby placing the 
human under the burden of perfection.678  In his final major work, Mumford states an ultimatum 
in its most all-encompassing form: essentially, the only way humanity can be saved from the 
Megamachine is by experiencing a near-mystical, religious revolution. 679  Mumford states, “For 
its effective salvation mankind will need to undergo something like a spontaneous religious 
conversion: one that will replace the mechanical world picture with an organic world picture, and 
give to the human personality, as the highest known manifestation of life, the precedence it now 
gives to its machines and computers.”680  In this concluding analysis, which is found in the 
closing pages of his final major work, The Pentagon of Power, Mumford is at once surrendering 
to the Megamachine and positing one final leap of faith into a mystical hope of a coming 
eschatological event.  Absent such an event, there is essentially no hope.  Despite whatever 
dreams may have for a spontaneous conversion to the organic, it appears that the dualistic 
struggle that Mumford imagined taking place between the organic and mechanistic ideals would 
end, at least in his mind, in the defeat of the organic world.  In a letter he writes late in his life, 
                                               
677 In his review of Mumford’s Myth of the Machine (New York Times Book Review, April 1967, P. 1), Edmund 
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Mumford ominously reflects, “I have not the heart to tell [people]…what I actually think about 
our human prospects…unless something approaching a miracle takes place….”681 
 Regarding his critique against both Romanticism and the humanist notes that invariably 
find prominence in its full expression, Niebuhr argues that Romantic “pessimism” is indicative 
“…of the despair which modern man faces when his optimistic illusions are dispelled.”682  By 
ignoring human limitation by way of fantasies of human creativity and power, Mumford is 
bound to recognize the “obvious fact” of human limitation. 683 Niebuhr states: 
The fact is that man is never unconscious of his weakness, of the limited and dependent character of his 
existence and knowledge.  The occasion for his temptation lies in the two facts, his greatness and his 
weakness…taken together…. He stands at the juncture of nature and spirit; and is involved in both freedom 
and necessity.  His sin is…always partly an effort to obscure his blindness by overestimating the degree of 
his sight and to obscure his insecurity by stretching his power beyond its limits.684 
 
From the Niebuhrian perspective, human weakness is always presently intelligible, but 
Mumford’s illusions regarding his high-estimation of human nature obscures the tensions 
between human ambition and real human capacity, culminating in Mumford falsely despairing 
the latter when failure seizes the former.   
 Moreover, the Niebuhrian view of human nature reveals a deep irony at the center of 
Mumford’s work that further compounds his latter-day anxieties.  According to Niebuhr, there is 
a direct relationship between ambition and the awareness of one’s limitations.  Niebuhr states: 
The fact that human ambitions know no limits must therefore be attributed not merely to the infinite 
capacities of the human imagination but to an uneasy recognition of man’s finiteness, weakness and 
dependence, which become more apparent the more we seek to obscure them, and which generate ultimate 
perils, the more immediate insecurities are eliminated.685 
 
Essentially, as applied to Mumford, the more he attempts to escape the Megamachine, the more 
fully he reveals his own limitations.  This is why Mumford appears to move from prescriptions 
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for personal responsibility and practicality earlier in his career, to the more eschatological and 
mystical hope he exposits later in his career.  The growing incongruity between Mumford’s 
ambitions and his limitations flatten the human the more he tries to grant it dimension.  The more 
he asks of humanity, the more clearly the human’s limitations are revealed, the more monstrous 
the mechanistic society then appears, and the more he again must ask of humanity.  This cycle 
continues until the task appears overwhelmingly impossible near the end of his life, and he must 
rely upon that which is otherworldly, spiritual, and eschatological to save humanity. 
Effectively, Mumford’s pessimism is caused by ambitions that are outrunning his 
limitations.  He does not see—or refuses to see—that his optimism and high-estimation of 
human nature is directly causing his pessimism, lending special credence to Michael 
Zuckerman’s description of Mumford’s latter career: “…he disdains the conclusions to which his 
intellect impels him.” 686  To state it in another way, Mumford’s pessimism is directly the result 
of his overly optimistic view of human nature.  Mumford simply does not see that the more faith 
he has in humanity, the more he is ultimately let down by humanity. 
It should be noted that despite how prolific and how grand a story Mumford tells, the 
issues Niebuhr would have with his work are really quite basic to all humanity.  At any given 
point, it is possible for Mumford to recognize the tensions within the self that expose the ironic 
relationship between human limitation and human capacity.  In fact, the following statement 
from Mumford, if placed without qualification at the center of his thought, may have tempered 
his ambitions and clarified his understanding of human nature enough to withstand the 
temptations of both optimism and pessimism: “Man’s reason now informs him that even in his 
most inspired moments he is but a participating agent in a larger cosmic process he did not 
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originate and can only in the most limited fashion control.  Except through the expansion of his 
consciousness, his littleness and his loneliness remain real.”687  In this statement, Mumford 
affirms what is most apparent to Niebuhr: the inner tensions of self; that the greater the arena of 
human understanding, the more revealed also is one’s limitations and weaknesses.  As in the 
Fall, knowledge will always lead to the revelation of nakedness.  However, Mumford 
prematurely resolves this “littleness and loneliness” by absorbing the self into a rationalistic 
depiction of nature and collective consciousness, thus deadening the import of his claim, and 
readying the human for ambitions beyond one’s capabilities in the form of a quixotic Platonic 
mission of discovering “…an ideology so profoundly organic that it will be capable of bringing 
together the severed halves of modern man.”688  Mumford betrays the tensions he himself 
observed in order to empower the human, yet he ironically only reveals a clearer picture of 
human limitation. 
From Niebuhr’s perspective, Mumford’s pessimistic turn in his later life is less of a 
failure of Mumford or human kind in the grips of a technological society, but should rather be 
seen more as a clarifying moment; one which illuminates the uneasy conscience at the heart of 
the human condition, and yet remains concealed by Mumford’s optimistic illusions regarding the 
self.  What is waiting for Mumford near the end of his career is not an answer to the problems of 
the technological society, but rather the realities of the human condition, clearly expressed in 
Niebuhr’s understanding of Original Sin: “…that thing about man which makes him capable of 
conceiving of his own perfection and incapable of achieving it.”689  Instead of finding this 
realization and discovering serenity within it, Mumford tirelessly peers through his Platonically 
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conceived hope of actualizing those dreams which can only be imagined, and therefore Mumford 
remains in his paralyzing angst until the bitter end.690 
The final irony for Mumford is that through the course of his criticism of the myth of the 
machine—criticism for its reductionist and abstract impositions upon nature and human beings—
Mumford in response creates perhaps the ultimate abstract reality, imposed upon the world and 
self by way of a most reductionistic dualism (organicism v. mechanism).691  In his attempt to 
break his bondage to modern technics and the Megamachine, Mumford creates a new world 
under which he is imprisoned.  Mumford flattens the self into a binary in his very attempt to 
grant it dimension. 
Though he grants invaluable insights regarding the technological society, Mumford’s 
career is a cautionary tale to those who attempt to elevate the human beyond the human’s 
capacity to achieve; self-transcendence is not discoverable in actualizing its highest ideals over 
and against human society, but by clarifying the human condition, and maintaining the tensions 
within, which so clearly constrain, yet empower the human towards proximal solutions.  It is for 
this reason that Niebuhr finds within the Christian faith the most revelatory perspective of human 
nature: 
Without the presuppositions of the Christian faith the individual is either nothing or becomes everything.  
In the Christian faith man’s insignificance as a creature, involved in the process of nature and time, is lifted 
into significance by the mercy and power of God in which his life is sustained.  But his significance as a 
free spirit is understood as subordinate to the freedom of God.  His inclination to abuse his freedom, to 
overestimate his power and significance and to become everything is understood as the primal sin.  It is 
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 198 
because man is inevitably involved in this primal sin that he is bound to meet God first of all as a judge, 
who humbles his pride and brings his vain imagination to naught.692 
According to Niebuhr, the Christian view of self is vital for the realization of how one should 
operate within contemporary society, for it is within the limitations and tensions which the 
Christian faith reveals that one might find the full dimension of the self. 
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Chapter 6: Herbert Marcuse and the Easy Conscience 
Introduction 
 
The present chapter will repeat the prophetic methodology utilized in the previous two 
chapters, but instead will switch focus to Herbert Marcuse.  Specifically, this chapter will show 
how Marcuse’s anthropology expresses itself as an easy conscience.  Ultimately, this chapter is 
to support the primary goal of this thesis, which is to construct a synthesis of the work of 
Niebuhr, Mumford, and Marcuse in order to create a new type of technological engagement from 
the basis of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology. 
In keeping with the goal of this chapter, this chapter will do three things.  First, (I) this 
chapter will introduce Marcuse’s background as derived from the Frankfurt School, which is also 
Critical Theory’s place of origin.  Second, (II) this chapter will analyze Marcuse’s anthropology, 
with special attention to how it contrasts with that of Niebuhr’s.  Finally, (III) this chapter will 
conclude by arguing that Marcuse’s anthropology expresses itself as an easy conscience, thus 
rendering ethical responsibility in the technological society problematic. 
I: Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School 
 Critical Theory’s genesis is ultimately traced to the Frankfurt School (also known as the 
Institute of Social Research), and in particular can be traced to an essay written by the director of 
the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer.693  In his essay, Traditional and Critical Theory, 
Horkheimer argues for a bold move away from the traditional Marxist-Hegelian goals of 
understanding society and culture, and instead towards a much greater emphasis on the critique 
                                               
693 Raphael Schlembach, “Negation, Refusal and Co-Optation: The Frankfurt School and Social Movement Theory,” 
Sociology Compass Vol. 9 (28 October, 2015): P. 988. 
 200 
of society and culture, exposing contradictions within capitalism and the misery Horkheimer saw 
as concomitant to industry and commercialization.694  Ultimately, it was Horkheimer’s goal to 
guide the Frankfurt School in the direction of becoming “…a critical, promotive factor in the 
development of the masses.”695 
 The move from a more descriptive role in society to that of a critic or ‘shaper’ of society 
was the result of a confluence of events and influences that would serve as the philosophical 
foundation for both the Frankfurt School and Marcuse, as well as their ultimate goals going 
forward.  This section will detail the thought of three individuals who would lay the groundwork 
for Critical Theory as it developed within the Frankfurt School, and then demonstrate these 
thinkers as the basis for Marcuse’s perspective on the self, society, and technology.  The three 
individuals covered in this section are (A) Karl Marx, (B) Max Weber, and (C) Georg Lukács, 
and this section will conclude (D) by showing Marcuse’s continuity with these thinkers as a main 
interlocutor for this thesis.  
A. Karl Marx and the Frankfurt School 
 Marx is without question the single most important driving force behind the Frankfurt 
School.  Long before the Frankfurt School would become synonymous with Critical Theory, the 
institute was established by philanthropist, Hermann Weil, with the central aim of taking “…an 
avowedly Marxist perspective on economic and social questions.”696  However, what had 
become apparent between the years of its inception in 1924 and the publication of Horkeimer’s 
essay in 1937 were a number of “failures”—a number of reasons the Marxist project had to that 
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point stalled—that ultimately prompted Horkheimer to redirect the school towards the more 
suitable aims of social critique, rather than simply understanding and describing the social and 
historical trajectory.  It is therefore discovered in the reasons why Marx apparently failed that the 
Frankfurt School sought a new direction, seeking the outside influence and social critiques of 
Weber and Lukács to better articulate a way forward, while still also maintaining a number of 
Marxist directives, convictions, and concepts at its core.   
The aim of this subsection is to show Karl Marx’s influence on the Frankfurt School by 
detailing (1) the Marxist tenets that would remain central, while also (2) demonstrating the 
failures that necessitated the school to change course. Both sections will show the Marx still 
within Marcuse, and thus set a framework for a Niebuhrian analysis of Marcuse’s uniquely 
constructed Marxist anthropology.  This section will conclude (3) with a summary regarding how 
Marx is generally used by the Frankfurt School 
1. Central Marxist Components 
 
 The first and most overt Marxist component central to Critical Theory’s project is the 
shared ultimate goal to liberate the proletariat from the economic and social controls of the 
bourgeoisie, who oppress the proletariat primarily through the alienation of their labor and 
ultimately their dehumanization.  This much is clearly present from one of the very first projects 
undertaken by the Frankfurt School,697 to the very last major publication by Marcuse.698  As will 
                                               
697 In Dawn and Decline: Notes 1926-1931 (trans. Michael Shaw, New York, NY: Seabury Press, 1978. P. 62), 
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698In The Aesthetic Dimension, Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1978. P. 46), 
Marcuse, states, “Art is…the promise of liberation…. The promise is wrested from the established [bourgeois] 
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be revealed in the next section (2), this central goal remains untouched in the Frankfurt School, 
but will be expressed in new dimensions and avenues in their now transformed view of society; 
namely, that of a technological society, enamored with new distractions and engrossed in new 
challenges for the Marxist to expose and address.  This central concern is not unlike Niebuhr’s 
central concern of sin, in that “Each new century originates a new complexity and each new 
generation faces a new vexation in it;”699 while Niebuhr sought to uncover new expressions of 
sin within these new complexities, the Marxist is called to address those old categories of class 
struggle within a new language that more accurately reflects the current proletarian condition 
within a technological society.700 
 The next concept that will remain central is Marx’s synthesis of Ludwig Feuerbach and 
G.W.F. Hegel to create what is known as “historical materialism.”  Most extensively articulated 
in his essay, “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General,” Marx synthesizes a 
new view of Hegel’s dialectical history that incorporates Feuerbach’s negation of spirit, 
metaphysics, religion, and philosophy to create a unified theory of history that depicts truth as 
“not only an attribute of thought, but of reality in process.”701  In other words, truth is a cognitive 
extension of reality in the mind of the subject that transcends history by understanding it. 
 To the critical theorist, all language is to be directly referential to the historical-material 
world, and warned against language becoming “…abstracted from the ongoing historical 
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process.”702  The critical theorists take seriously the idea that their work is intimately connected 
to and firmly anchored within the reality they seek to change—or perhaps preferably stated, the 
historical process they seek to reveal or unfold.  While there remain differences of opinion on 
how exactly Marx’s materialism is to be understood,703 there is a very firm understanding that 
what critical theorists are doing is a part of the grounded, necessary historical process; it is to, as 
Hegel put it, “concern itself only with the glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the History of the 
World.”704 
 Among the more pertinent implications of Marx’s historical materialism springs from the 
critical theorist’s linguistic fidelity towards material history even while articulating self-
consciousness.  “Consciousness…” Marx proclaims, “…does not determine life, but life 
determines consciousness.”705  For both Marx and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, 
the problem of subject/object in relation to the self will prove a precarious one.  If the self is 
above the historical process, the self is by definition immaterial, and therefore one is incapable of 
speaking of the self while remaining faithful to a materialistic orientation towards reality.  
However, if the self is purely an object, a product of nature and the historical process, this makes 
change impossible except by the socio-historical process.   
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 There are times within Critical Theory that the individual is perceived overwhelmingly as 
an object; a victim of historical process, economic systems, and power.706  At best, the 
individual, as Marcuse articulates, maintains a “determinate choice” within history, 
paradoxically maintaining both the fruits of the subjective and objective forms of self 
simultaneously.707  However, at the base of Marxist understanding, one must begin from a state 
of “non-identity” and any unity between subject and object in the self is “symptomatic of ‘naive’ 
consciousness,” therefore, “the experience of non-identity between these two spheres (i.e. in the 
final analysis, of subject and object) [is] the starting point, and its admission a matter of 
intellectual integrity.”708 
 Ultimately, regardless of the problem of self, both for Marx and the critical theorist, what 
must exist is a Hegelian dialectic of time where the process of conflicting ideas is pressing 
human beings towards the reality of ultimate freedom.  “Thought is the vehicle of this process,” 
Marcuse states, “The individuals become conscious of their potentialities and organize their 
relations in accordance with their reason…the free rationality of thought must come into conflict 
with the rationalizations of the given order of life.  Hegel saw in this process a general law of 
history, as unalterable as time itself.”709  What once was to Hegel the “realization of the 
Spirit…the justification of God in History,”710 is to the Marxist materialist the complete 
manifestation of human liberation.  For all involved—Hegel, Marx, the Frankfurt School—
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history progresses only through the conflict of ideas that are rooted in reality.  Marcuse states, 
“No power whatsoever could, in the long run, stop the march of thought.”711  The process of 
conflicting ideas over time is the means by which the proletariat is freed—a central idea both 
Marx and the Frankfurt School share. 
 The Marxist components central to the Frankfurt School are (1) the goal for the 
proletariat to be freed from bourgeois control—united again with one’s work, (2) the 
materialistic composition of the world and all human beings, (3) rational fidelity to that material 
world, (4) the subject/object problem within materialism, and (5) the Marxist dialectic of history 
which necessarily leads to the liberation of humankind.  These five Marxist influences will 
continue to form the basis of their critiques and reconstruction efforts.  While there are scholars 
who question the Frankfurt School’s ultimate loyalty to Marx,712 these five features are 
undeniably represented in the body of their publications. 
2. The Failures and Reinvention of Marx in the Frankfurt School 
 
 Along with the Marxist influences within the Frankfurt School come a number of Marxist 
failures that will at once alarm the early-to-mid 20th century Marxist, and yet provide space to 
adapt.  The following “failures” will show how the Frankfurt School, and by extension Marcuse, 
evolved the Marxist project alongside a number of new challenges.  For the purposes of 
Niebuhr’s dialogue with Marcuse, this section will show the non-Marxist philosophical 
foundation that Niebuhr must also confront. 
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 The first clear failure of Marxism in the 20th century, especially in the eyes of the 
Frankfurt School, was the failed German Revolution of 1917, and the subsequent dissolution of 
nations into authoritarian states.  On the one hand, the once praised Soviet Union was assuming 
larger control of the German Communist Party, displaying “suspicious” inclinations towards 
“dictatorship” with its “Stalinist trials and prison camps.”713  On the other hand, and most 
alarming to the Frankfurt School, was the rise of fascism.  To understand the motives for the 
Frankfurt School, the response to the National Socialist party cannot be overstated.  Kellner 
states: 
The triumph of fascism in central and southern Europe and the barbarism of the Second World War seemed 
 to refute the optimistic elements in the Marxian theory of history that saw inexorable progress towards  
 socialism as the direction of history.  Instead of socialism, a pseudo-revolutionary fascist movement gained  
 power, and the working class suffered fascist domination while again being sacrificed in a murderous war.   
 The regressive nature of fascism put in question the Marxian theory of history and revolution, since it  
 appeared that history was not progressing towards democratic socialism and the liberation of the working  
 class.714 
What was at stake in the rise of fascism was the entire Marxist conception of history and 
liberation.  For the socialist-led German Revolution to fail and give way to a more totalizing and 
devastating form of dehumanization than before was a clear sign for the Frankfurt School that 
their former conceptions of history must be re-articulated in light of the alarming progress of 
dangerous new forms of rationality and politics.  Perhaps just as puzzling to the Marxist 
perception of history, the entity which previously embodied their hopes for liberation and 
revolution, the Soviet Union, moved towards an alliance with fascism through its pact with Nazi 
Germany.715 
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 Furthering the dismay of the still-Marxist Frankfurt School was the economic 
stabilization and overwhelming affluence of capitalist societies following World War II.716  To 
witness these events unfold, from the victorious Russian Revolution along with the hope of a 
prospective global revolution, to now the rise of fascism in its place and global capitalism 
assuming more and more controls in the world economy, the Frankfurt Marxist cannot help but 
feel what Horkheimer laments: “…so close has truth come.”717  Kellner states, “In sum, Marxism 
seemed to have lost its moorings, no longer possessing its integrative practical and theoretical 
vision which could chart the course of historical development and give concrete political 
directives.”718 
 Seemingly without a home within western academia, the Frankfurt School found a 
window for Marxist thought to flourish—ironically—from the ground of one of Marx’s more 
overt failures.  Marx reasoned that alienation is “not only inhumane but [is] also an obstacle to 
growth of the productive forces; therefore, the normative demand for a more humane society [is] 
congruent with the purely technical goal of increasing productivity.”719  With the rapid 
development of technology among the fascist and capitalist societies that surrounded them, and 
with special attention to their ever-increasing rates of production, the Frankfurt School was left 
to conclude that not only has production increased without humane treatment of workers, but 
there seems to be a correlation: increased production is occurring because of the alienation.720 
 To those in the Frankfurt School, one question becomes central: if alienation is now so 
pervasive in its most ruthless and dehumanizing form despite the unprecedented rise of 
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technological innovation, why is it that the workers are not revolting?  Why has the Marxist 
dialectic failed?  In his quest to find answers, Horkheimer conducted a study of the German 
working class a decade after the German Revolution and shortly before the rise of the Nazi Party.  
What he found was a largely disillusioned and distracted class of people.  He states in his notes, 
“Unlike the prewar proletariat, these unemployed…do not possess the capacity for education and 
organization…Their impatience…is found, on an intellectual level, only in the mere repetition of 
Communist party slogans.”721 Impatient and lacking the capacity for education and organization, 
the workers appeared to be drifting towards a new vision of work; one that is based upon self-
interest, growing more isolated and independent of one another.  A new rationality seemed to be 
sweeping over the working class in the wake of its failed revolution. 
 This very early observation by Horkheimer will spark the beginning of a new form of 
Marxist thought that will examine the relationship between rationality and technology to 
decipher the new ways bourgeois society is apparently alienating the proletariat.  To the 
Frankfurt School, the relationship between the working class and technology has become 
symbiotic, and many, not least Marcuse, will argue that technology pacifies the proletariat in 
ways not unlike Marx describes religion: technology itself has become “…the opium of the 
people.”722  The technological society would then become the focal point of Critical Theory.  In 
the eyes of the Frankfurt School, technology is the reason the revolution never came, it is the 
reason the workers are happy when they should be furious, and it is the reason for the apparent 
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“glitch” in the Marxist dialectic of history.  The path to liberation is dependent upon the misery 
of the workers, and the workers are presently incapable of discontent. 
3. Conclusion: Marx and Critical Theory 
 
 In conclusion, while several foundational Marxist concepts will remain central to the 
Frankfurt School—including the overall goals, materialism, and the historical dialectic—the 
notable failures of Marx in the events leading up to and following World War II caused a 
substantial shift in focus for the Frankfurt School.  The failures proved alarming for the 20th 
century Marxist, as the proletariat now seemed incapable of seeking, or even desiring, their own 
liberation. However, the Frankfurt school would then discover within capitalist societies what 
seemed to be the ultimate pacification of its subjects: technology.  What will then follow is the 
Frankfurt School’s attempt to supplement their Marxist foundation with new ways to 
conceptualize the new technological society to better understand the current forms of oppression 
in hopes of recapturing the lost energies that once propelled the Marxist dialectic forward.  They 
will turn to two thinkers who will prove highly significant for forming the new identity of the 
Frankfurt School: (B) Max Weber and (C) Georg Lukács.   
B. Max Weber and the Frankfurt School 
 Karl Marx’s views on technology were at best vague, and at worst contradicting.723  
Thus, to progress the Marxist discussion further within modern society following the apparent 
collapse of the Marxist dialectic, the Frankfurt School had to incorporate an additional critique of 
the technological society that would prove strong enough to explain the extinguished 
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revolutionary energies of the proletariat, all the while capable of linking back up with Marx to 
depict technology as a source of bourgeois control.  Those ideas would come in the form of the 
German sociologist, Max Weber.   
 While expressly contrary to the Marxist economic goals,724 Weber supplied for the 
critical theorists the necessary ground for their assault on the technological society with his 
concept of Rationalisation. While more will be discussed on this particular use of Weber in the 
following chapter on Marcuse, it is important nevertheless to briefly detail the central 
components of his concept of Rationalisation independently.   
 For Weber, Rationalisation is a tacitly agreed upon standard of reason within capitalist 
societies that effectively dehumanizes workers in order to fit them more efficiently within a 
broader social mechanism.  This form of reason is integrated into the fabric of the social contract, 
wielded for the management of workers and the production of goods and services.  It is a logic 
that is totalizing, all-permeating, and psychologically penetrating—reaching the depths of human 
consciousness—and is intrinsic to both the process and ultimate outcome of every human 
endeavor in society.  Andrew Arato defines Rationalisation as: 
 …the principle of orientation of human action to abstract, quantifiable and calculable, and  
 instrumentally utilizable formal rules and norms.  The key to formal rationality is the phrase ‘without  
 regard for persons’ which was first expressed in its purity in the battle of early modern science against  
 anthropomorphic nature philosophy.725 
In short, Weber’s Rationalisation is the willful repression of one’s liberation by the tacit 
agreement of, and conformity to, a uniformed logic that abstracts, quantifies, and calculates 
                                               
724 Arato expounds upon Weber’s disagreement with Marx: “Once bureaucratized, the system of modern production 
could be democratized only at the cost of industrial efficiency. Once bureaucratized, the modern state and its 
military arm can be destroyed and replaced only by enemies equally well organized.  The Marxist goals of freedom 
and material wealth are therefore incompatible with one another and with the proposed means of the political 
conquest of power.” (The Essential Frankfurt School, P. 193) 
725 Arato & Gebhardt, P. 191. 
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human behavior and culture.  For the Marxist, it is the alienation of workers by the strictures of 
their own rational faculties.  Weber sees that what once was a force of liberation, rationality has 
now become the ultimate source of enslavement, which all works to the benefit of the 
bourgeoisie.   
 As he further describes the capitalist Rationalisation, Weber shows why this tacit 
agreement to dehumanizing reason is now necessary for survival in capitalistic economies: 
“There was repeated what everywhere and always is the result of such a process of 
rationalization: those who would not follow suit had to go out of business.”726  And in perhaps 
his most haunting description of the matter, Weber states: 
This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day 
determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism…with irresistible force….  In 
Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, 
which can be thrown aside at any moment.’ But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.727 
The mere goal of self-preservation must be accompanied by a Rationalisation that enslaves the 
proletariat; to live one must trap him or herself within an “iron cage” of rationality bent on 
technological and economic expansion.  Unlike Mumford’s Megatechnic Bribe as a catalyst 
which begins the process of “mechanistic thinking,” Weber’s worker is bound by the survival 
impulse to this new dehumanizing form of reason. 
 Perhaps the most brutal example of this Rationalisation was witnessed in the 
concentration camps of Nazi Germany.  In his book Modernity and the Holocaust, noted 
Weberian scholar, Zygmunt Bauman,728 explains the level of rationality the entire process of 
                                               
726 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (trans. Walcott Parsons, London, UK: Harper 
Collins, 1930/1991), P. 68. 
727 Weber, P. 181. Emphasis added. 
728 For a helpful essay which demonstrates Weber’s clear influence in Bauman, see: Paul du Gay, “Is Bauman’s 
bureau Weber’s bureau?: a comment,” in The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 50 Is. 4 (15 December 2003). 
 212 
Jewish extermination exhibited.  He states, “All single acts…were rational from the point of 
view of the administrators of the Holocaust; most of them were also rational from the point of 
view of the victims.”729  Even the victims had a shared Rationalisation that excused many of the 
atrocities.  Commenting on the new Rationalisation that was exposed in the Holocaust, 
Horkheimer describes it as “reason revealing itself as unreason.”730  The Holocaust seemed fully 
rational, yet disturbingly irrational.   
C. Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School 
 The third and final significant influence upon critical theory and the Frankfurt School 
was the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, Georg Lukács.  Of the three thinkers described in this 
section, Lukács was most directly linked with the Frankfurt School, and is owed the most credit 
for the school’s unique development and identity.  Lukács laid the methodological groundwork 
for the Frankfurt School in two unique ways: (1) his integration of Weber into Marxist language 
and categories, and (2) his re-establishment of the Marxist dialectic through a renewed 
understanding of Hegel. 
1. Integration of Weber and Marx 
 
 Despite Marx’s incoherence on the nature of technology, Lukács will effectively read 
Weber’s thoughts on Rationalisation into Marx, thus subjecting Marx to a type of revision that 
accentuates his more pessimistic views on technology and draws his economic language of 
commodification closer together with Weber’s understanding of Rationalisation.731  The 
synthesis of Marx’s commodification with Weber’s Rationalisation is what Lukács calls, 
                                               
729 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), P. 143. Emphasis 
added. 
730 Horkheimer, The Essential Frankfurt School, P.46. 
731 Arato & Gebhardt, P. 192. 
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“reification” or “thingification.”732  The reified person is one who Rationalizes others and even 
him or herself to be a commodified product within the capitalist market, doing so 
subconsciously, without objection or resistance.  The workers see one another and themselves as 
a “thing,” devoid of their more organic and human qualities.  Furthermore, the reification 
becomes increasingly entrenched within the proletariat conscience.  Lukács states: “Just as the 
capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher 
levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more 
definitively into the consciousness of man.”733  The more capitalism succeeds, the more deeply 
entrenched Reification becomes in human consciousness. 
2. The Return of the Dialectic 
 
 Perhaps the most challenging Marxist ‘failure’ outlined previously is the apparent failure 
of the Marxist dialectic.  The revolution failed and the workers no longer seem interested in 
liberation.  This failure seems difficult to reconcile with the Hegelian-influenced historical 
dialectic, as, allegedly, “No power whatsoever could, in the long run, stop the march of 
thought.”734 However, Lukács will return to Hegel to discover a hidden explanation for this 
failure and impose this discovery upon his reading of Marx.  This new use of Hegel will reinstate 
the Marxist dialectic and subsequently cause Horkheimer to focus the Frankfurt School’s mission 
upon cultural critique rather than simply observation and description. 
                                               
732 Karl Marx first analyzes reification in Capital Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy (translated by Ben 
Fowkes, New York, NY, Penguin Classics, 1992, Chapter 1, Section 4: The Fetishism of the Commodity and its 
Secret), but it is in the context strictly of fetishization and commodification, and prior to any incorporation with 
Weber’s ‘rationalisation.’ 
733 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (trans. Rodney Livingstone, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968.), P. 93. 
734 RAR, P. 239. 
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 In Hegelian thought, and by extension Marxist thought, there must exist a “negative” or 
antithesis within reason, a cognitive rejection of the status quo, for the historical process to move 
forward; “The negative is a means for the self-revelation of the Absolute.”735 However, given the 
complacency of the proletariat, and indeed the now coercive properties of reason itself 
(Rationalisation/Reification), there is no negative reasoning to press the process forward.  In his 
essay, “A Note on Dialectic,” Marcuse states, “Today this dialectical mode of thought is alien to 
the whole established universe of discourse and action.  It seems to belong to the past and to be 
rebutted by the achievements of technological civilization.  The established reality seems 
promising and productive enough to repel or absorb all alternatives.”736  However, a central 
conception Lukács refashions for the critical theorist’s Marxist project is the idea of a “dead 
period” of history, that is a period “…of non-conflict, of happiness…”737  In other words, the 
dialectic has stalled, but, as Lukács hopes to demonstrate, the historical process can resume if the 
masses are able to realize a new class consciousness as it exists within the technological society 
through the realization of their true alienation. 
 It is here that Lukács—and later Adorno—fashions the Hegelian concept of “mediation.”  
Mediation is an isolated break from Marxist materialism—the materialism which seeks rational 
fidelity to the material world—and instead allows for abstract theory to positively impact it.  
Hegel states, “…thinking [of] the empirical world essentially means altering its empirical form, 
and transforming it into something-universal; so thinking exercises a negative activity with 
regard to that foundation as well.”738  Because reason itself is compromised through the 
                                               
735 Ivan A. Boldyrev, “Faust and the Phenomenology of Spirit,” Russian Studies in Philosophy, trans. M.E. Sharpe, 
vol. 49, no. 4 (Spring, 2011), P. 81. 
736 Herbert Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic,” in The Essential Frankfurt School, P. 445. 
737 Arato & Gebhardt, P. 401. 
738 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing, 1991), P. 96. 
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processes of Rationalisation or Reification, the Marxist must at this singular point break with its 
fidelity with materialism to rescue the entire Marxist project by way of abstract negative 
thinking. In a sense, Lukács has no choice but to endorse a kind of negative thinking that is 
drawn from abstraction to impose on the world so that class consciousness may awaken from its 
technological trance. Lukács, despite this relatively obscure concept of Hegel,739 believes that 
“…a theory mediates the frozen, immediately given, ‘reified’ surface of reality…to the extent 
that it first recognizes…and reduplicates, and second raises to self-consciousness…the immanent 
tendencies of its object moving toward self-realization.”740  Essentially, abstract theory can 
provide a “jolt” to the seemingly content working class that lays a new ground work for 
negativity to reemerge.   
 From his use of mediation, Lukács lays out the new Marxist method in two parts.  First, 
the Marxist must work from a theoretical basis, framing an abstract dialectic that negates the 
present reality.  Second, the Marxist must critique society from the basis of that theory.  It is 
from this reasoning that Horkheimer established the new goals of the Frankfurt School in his 
paper, “Traditional and Critical Theory;” the new Marxist shall not simply describe or 
understand society, but must now be moved to critique it.  Without mediated theory and the 
proactive attempt to critique society, the proletariat shall remain content in their alienation, and 
the Marxist dialectic shall remain dead. 
 In conclusion, Lukács effectively provided for the Frankfurt School and critical theory a 
new foundation from which to work.  His synthesis of Weber and Marx granted the Frankfurt 
                                               
739 In his essay, “Hegel’s Conception of Mediation” (Hegel Bulletin, vol. 20, Is.1-2, January 1999, P. 84) Brian 
O’Connor states, “Hegel gives little specific explanation of the concept of mediation.  Surprisingly, it has been the 
subject of even less attention by scholars of Hegel.  Nevertheless, it is casually used in discussion of Hegel and post-
Hegelian philosophy as though its meaning were simple and straightforward.” 
740 Arato & Gebhardt, P. 198. 
 216 
School a way of articulating the technological society in critical fashion, and his new use of 
Hegel provided hope for the Marxist dialectic to reemerge.  What is left now for the Frankfurt 
School is to mount a forceful critique against the technological society in a way that awakens the 
proletariat to the old forms of alienation expressing themselves in new ways.  
D. Herbert Marcuse’s Continuity with Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School 
This section will briefly describe how Marcuse is a continuation of the Frankfurt School, 
and by extension, Critical Theory.  In general, there are three ways Marcuse is a continuation of 
the Frankfurt School’s project: first, his admitted continuation of the Marxist dialectic; second, 
his use of Weber and Lukacs’ understanding of Rationalisation and Reification as a critical lens 
into the technological society; and third, his reinterpretation of Hegel to provide a way forward 
through Critical Theory. 
Both the Frankfurt School and Marcuse are still unequivocally Marxist in their 
conceptions of the self, history, and their central goals.741  Asked during a BBC interview in 
1978 why indeed Marcuse and the Frankfurt School remained loyal to the Marxist project, 
Marcuse responded: 
 Easy answer: because I do not believe that the theory…has been falsified.  What has happened is  
 that some of the concepts of Marxian theory…have had to be re-examined; but this is not  
 something from the outside brought into Marxist theory, it is something which Marxist theory itself, as an  
 historical and dialectical theory, demands.742 
It is interesting to note that Marcuse would appear to even see Weber and Lukács’ additions as 
part and parcel to the Marxist project.  In his mind, there is no break from Marx, but rather the 
                                               
741 In his book, Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1974. 
P. 13), Sidney Lipshires states, “This theory, called ‘critical theory’ by members of the Frankfurt school, was in fact, 
an idiosyncratic euphemism for their own brand of Marxism, a Marxism of more or less the Hegelian type already 
described as part of the intellectual armament of Herbert Marcuse.” 
742 Herbert Marcuse, in Men of Ideas, ed. Bryan Magee (London: BBC Publications, 1978). 
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re-examination of Marx in light of new perspectives, is perhaps even a continuation of the 
dialectic. 
 Second, Marcuse will incorporate Weber and Lukács’ understanding of 
Rationalisation/Reification to contextualize the new expressions of class struggle, or lack 
thereof, as they exist within the technological society.  There is no break from the Marxist 
conceptual basis in these particular additions, though it should be noted that Marcuse will 
aggravate his ability to find liberation within the technological society in part because of it. 
Third, Marcuse will attempt a way forward by reinterpreting Hegel and constructing a 
salvation plan for the proletariat in the form of various, partially integrated philosophies and 
expressions.  This is by design Marcuse’s most firmly counter-Marxist exercise.743  He will 
attempt a Hegelian mediation of critique that is directed towards the worker, believing that 
theory, mediated through various avenues, will ultimately galvanize and revolutionize the 
proletariat’s understanding of history and the world.  Marcuse states, “The common element is 
the search for an ‘authentic language’—the language of negation as the Great Refusal to accept 
the rules of the game in which the dice are loaded.  The absent must be made present because the 
greater part of the truth is in that which is absent.”744 His new expression of Hegelian mediation 
is the attempt to create “self-conscious efforts to make the existing antagonisms work in the 
interest of the whole.”745 
                                               
743 Lipshires draws attention to Marcuse’s break from the standard Marxist theory—as derived from Engels and 
Soviet Marxism—stating, “Their Marxism, based upon a mechanical view of man’s reason as a passive reflection of 
the material world, failed to explain how human consciousness could rise above the world as given and thus 
effectively bring about change.” (P. 3) 
744 Marcuse, The Essential Frankfurt School, P. 448. 
745 RAR, P. 77. 
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II: Marcuse’s Anthropology 
As structured in the third chapter, this thesis is working from the understanding that self 
is one’s perception of one’s own stature within the cosmos, and is expressed by way of three 
mutually reinforcing dimensions: (A) the human’s relationship to nature and/or history, (B) how 
one relates to and understands the external world, and (C) how these assessments manifest within 
the aggregate state of the human’s consciousness.  Respective to each section, this section will 
(1) trace Marcuse’s philosophical definition of self through these categories and (2) highlight his 
more fundamental differences with Niebuhr.   
A. Humans in Conflict with Nature and History 
1. Marcuse: The Self as Negation and Historical Unification 
 
 Marcuse’s view of the self as it relates to nature and history comes in three distinct, yet 
mutually reinforcing, parts: (a) the self’s historical alienation and self-negation, and (b) the self’s 
negation as a resource for its reunification.  This section will describe each part in detail, and 
how all come together to create his most central goal: liberation. 
a. History and Negation 
Both the Frankfurt School and Marcuse begin assessing human nature primarily through 
Marx’s Hegelian historical structure.  Essentially, the fullness of human nature is only found 
completed within the historical process as an abstract universal,746 though exists presently in 
alienation, as the human currently “contradicts his essence.”747  Similar to Niebuhr, Marcuse’s 
understanding of human nature is one which exists in a state of contradiction, though for 
                                               
746 Ibid., P. 227. 
747 Ibid., P. 277. 
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Marcuse, that contradiction is gradually becoming more assuaged through the historical process 
with each new step towards the realization of liberation.748 
 Ultimately, drawing heavily from Hegel, the goal of history for Marcuse is to bring the 
subject (conscience) into unity with the object (externally experienced world, property, labor, 
physical self).749 The human is to become fully unified with one’s universal identity, though at 
this present moment of history, the proletariat represents a profound negation of that universal.  
Marcuse states, “The existence of the proletariat contradicts the alleged reality of reason, for it 
sets before us an entire class that gives proof of the very negation of reason.  The lot of the 
proletariat is no fulfillment of human potentialities, but the reverse.”750  Essentially, the human-
as-laborer is living in stark contradiction with one’s universal self because the human has been 
stripped of the potential to reach that which “constitute[s] man’s essence.”751  The alienation of 
one’s labor is the alienation of one’s property: “…the first endowment of a free person…”752  
The subject is not in unity with that which it possesses. Property and labor (object) is “severed” 
from the subject through economic forces governed by the bourgeoisie.753   
b. Negation and Unification 
Marcuse’s entire goal is to create new conditions that allow for the severance of subject 
and object to once more set itself on a trajectory towards unification.  The self is to be unified by 
fully beholding that which he or she possesses within a seamless integration.  As for now, 
                                               
748 Ibid., P. 227. 
749 Ibid., P. 260 
750 Ibid., P. 261. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid.  
753 Ibid. 
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however, the human is “a definite historical antagonism,”754 existing as a divided entity, severed 
from its unified essence, and living in contradiction with its true self.  However, Marcuse sees 
that simultaneously the proletariat is both evidence of the negation, and the source of its own 
solution: “The truth of the materialist thesis is thus to be fulfilled in its negation.”755  In 
opposition to the human’s disunity and division, Marcuse proclaims, “The individual is the 
goal.”756  In other words, the undivided self (individual = not devisable) is that for which 
Marcuse is reaching. 
2. Marcuse and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding Humans, Nature, and History 
 
a. Historical Conflict or Existential Conflict 
Niebuhr’s starting point for understanding the subject/object in many ways precedes 
Marcuse.  While Marcuse’s assessment of human nature begins with the Hegelian assumption 
that history is the universalizing, transcendent force of nature, Niebuhr begins simply from the 
position of self-awareness—the subject considering itself as both subject and object.  It is not 
until Niebuhr finds himself to be a very conflicted creature that he later turns to consider his 
place within history.  But for Marcuse, the Hegelian dialectic is the resource from which he 
interprets the human condition as one that is in contradiction with itself. 
  Regardless of where history comes into each thinkers account, both very quickly realize 
that the human’s relationship to nature and history reveals a creature who is in utter conflict with 
itself.  Both understand there to be very concrete limitations which obscure the human’s capacity 
to fully realize its true essence, and both are apparently severed in their desired link between the 
                                               
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid., 273. 
756 Ibid., 283.  Emphasis added. 
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subject (conscience) and object (that which is observed/experienced).  For Marcuse, this comes 
from the Hegelian philosophical system of history; for Niebuhr, it is observed existentially 
through the very process of self-awareness.  
b. Resolvable Human or Irresolvable Human 
 Furthermore, for both Niebuhr and Marcuse, the goal for the human is composed within 
the very way they perceive the internal contradiction of humans operating within nature.  
Because the historical dialectic reveals the human’s nature progressively, the goal for Marcuse is 
ultimately unification, assuaging the severance of the divided self in hopes of becoming 
complete.  He then must proceed with Critical Theory in hopes of jolting the proletariat free from 
the technological snag in the dialectic so that history may proceed to reveal the full self.   
 However, for Niebuhr, because the contradiction is perceived existentially, before any 
application of Hegel and before even considering the human-as-laborer, the problem of 
contradiction appears inherent to the human condition, and therefore impossible to assuage 
through reason or historical process.  Niebuhr reasons that the human must accept the 
contradiction; the subject will never be fully integrated into the external world and will, indeed, 
forever remain to some degree in tension with it.757  To use Hegelian terms, Niebuhr proposes an 
inherent, non-progressive internal dialectic.758  The negative is a permanent characteristic of 
human nature.759  Though, to translate into Niebuhr’s more Christian terms, the permanent 
                                               
757 IOAH, P. 62-63: “The final wisdom of life requires, not the annulment of incongruity but the achievement of 
serenity within and above it.” 
758 In his essay, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Theology of History” (in The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. Nathan A. 
Scott, Jr., Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1975. P. 40), Gilkey posits Niebuhr’s dialectic not in terms of a 
temporal Hegelian dialectic, but rather a vertical dialectic, “between transcendence and creatureliness, between 
eternity and time…between God and world…vertically related to past, present, and future.” 
759 Gilkey: “As for Niebuhr, the ontological structure of man remains constant throughout history, characterizing the 
future as it has the past and the present, so the ambiguous, ‘sinful’ character of man’s actualization of that structure 
is a permanent characteristic of history.” (Ibid.) 
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negative found within the subject/object relationship is manifest as anxiety: the conditions 
necessary for sin.760 
B. The Subject Relating to and Understanding the Objective World 
1. Marcuse: Revising Marxist Thought 
 
In true Marxist form, Marcuse argues that true understanding comes from a 
perspective and language that is grounded in nature and history.  However, Marcuse argues 
that the traditional Marxist view of knowledge and understanding is severely lacking in its 
deemphasis on what Marcuse would consider the most basic realities of nature.  This section 
will explore the following foundations regarding Marcuse’s epistemology: (a) that which is 
most akin to traditional Marxism, the primacy of dialectical materialism, and (b) the unique 
guiding principles in Marx’s earlier writings—which Marcuse will reintegrate into dialectical 
materialism—namely, “Sensuousness and Needs.” 
a. Primacy of Dialectical Materialism 
For Marcuse, the self-as-subject is disjointed and in conflict with the self-as-object, and 
fully relies upon the governance of history to propel both aspects towards unity.  However, 
working alongside history, and in accordance with Marx, Marcuse maintains that a certain 
perspective occurs “…when we conceive things as they really are and happened,”761 where 
“…speculation ends, namely in actual life, [that] real, positive science begins as the 
                                               
760 Niebuhr: “In short, man, being both free and bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious.  Anxiety is the 
inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved.  Anxiety is the internal 
precondition of sin (NDHN, P. 182).”  Essentially, the subject/object distinction, the alienation and contradictions 
inherent in human nature display themselves within an anxious position.  It is this anxiety, as opposed to serenity, 
that harbors the capacity for sin.  This “negation” is for Niebuhr, the conditions for sin: the sinful nature. 
761 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology, Pt. 1” in Selected Writings, P. 113. 
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representation of the practical activity and practical process of the development of men.”762  As 
stated in the previous section (I), the Frankfurt School maintains that reason or logic, so long as 
it maintains fidelity with the material world, is a necessary tool for progressing the Marxist 
dialectic.  Marcuse affirms his continuity of this fidelity:  
Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man and nature exist in 
conditions of alienation…. Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is a faulty 
logic.  Thought ‘corresponds’ to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory 
structure…. For to comprehend reality means to comprehend what things really are…763 
 
The most important aspect of Marcuse’s epistemology—or his subject relating to and 
understanding the objective world—is that it maintains a dual foundation of history and nature 
that is unified in the universal structure of truth.  History unfolds the Absolute, and 
understanding is housed within a kind of thinking which directly corresponds with a historically-
guided nature. 
 In terms of the negative, or alienation, expressed in the current nature of the proletariat, 
Marcuse proclaims, “The realization of reason therefore implies the overcoming of this 
estrangement, the establishment of a condition in which the subject knows and possesses itself in 
all its objects.”764  Firmly within the Hegelian structure of historical epistemology, it is reason 
which works alongside history to create the conditions for the proletariat’s unification.   
b. Expanding Materialism: Sensuousness and Needs 
While reason provides for Marcuse the ability of the proletariat to overcome 
estrangement, he sees that the current kind of reason utilized by contemporaneous Marxists was 
                                               
762 Ibid., P. 112. 
763 Marcuse, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, P. 446. 
764 RAR, P. 260. 
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“…ossifying into a rigid orthodoxy which was serving as a legitimating ideology for the political 
practice of Marxian parties or governments.”765  It is in this way that Marcuse’s understanding of 
epistemology must be contrasted with the more “mechanical” view of human nature posed by 
those Marxists who would represent the key interpreters of Marx during Marcuse’s time. 
 The predominant view of Marx at the time, represented in the work of Engels and the 
Soviets, stated that the nature of humans was that of an “ontological materialism,” where “matter 
is the essence of Being.”766  Essentially, human beings are directly integrated with nature and are 
unwittingly determined by the historical process which ultimately progresses towards the 
liberation of the proletariat; the human being’s reason is a part of the historical process, and 
therefore, exists within a determined state.  However, the central distinguishing element of the 
Frankfurt School as previously described was its insistence that the current formulation of both 
society and reason must be critiqued, changed, theoretically mediated to awaken the proletariat 
from the bonds of alienation which are now present even within reason itself.  The mission is no 
longer to rationally describe the human as he or she exists within history, but rather to change 
the human’s reason to overcome its bondage to another form of reason 
(Rationalisation/Reification) which has set humanity on a dark and destructive trajectory.  
Essentially, the nature of humans must be transformed by changing how the proletariat 
reasons.767  Human nature as it currently exists—the way the subject currently understands and 
relates to the object—is the problem.  A fundamental change in the way the human sees the self 
is necessary for revolution and unification. 
                                               
765 Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, P. 58. 
766 Lipshires, P. 3. 
767 In Counter Revolution and Revolt (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972), Marcuse proclaims that there can be “no 
radical social change without a radical change of the individual agents of change (P. 48).” 
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 Thus, Marcuse’s view on epistemology springs primarily from his revision of Marx’s 
early writings—particularly Marx’s Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts.768  In his interpretive 
article on the work, Marcuse argues that these early writings are the key to understanding Marx’s 
view of human nature.  He states, “These Manuscripts put the discussion of the origins and 
original meaning of historical materialism…on a new basis.”769  First and foremost, Marcuse 
affirms the Marxist basis that humans are by nature laborers, and that the alienation of one’s 
labor “…is not only the cornerstone of political economy, but contains a fundamental 
anthropological dimension.”770  Human-as-laborer is the starting point for both Marx and 
Marcuse, and the negative within the dialectic is that which is currently present: alienation of 
labor.   
 However, the “new basis” that Marcuse would discover within Marx is highlighted in the 
sensuousness and needs of the human-as-laborer, as opposed to its more traditional “rational” 
faculties.  This is to say that humans are not merely passive material objects carried forth 
determinately, mechanically, and rationally, but rather harbor within them “potentialities” 
grounded in their sensuousness (over and against mechanical) aims to “fulfill basic needs.”771  
Marcuse shows that “[early] Marx stresses the primacy of human agency, the creative ability to 
produce objects and to recognize one’s self and one’s humanity objectified in the human-social 
world.”772  Concerning Marcuse’s findings, Douglas Kellner states: “Labour is thus an activity in 
which basic human powers are manifest: it develops one’s faculties of reason and intelligence, it 
                                               
768 Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, P. 77. 
769 Marcuse, Herbert, “New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism” in Studies in Critical Philosophy 
(trans. Boris de Bres, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1972. P. 136-174), P. 138. 
770 Kellner, P. 80. 
771 Bertell Ollman and Agnes Heller both argue Marcuse was the first with this translation of Marx.  See: Alienation 
(New York, NY: Cambridge Press, 1971); The Theory of Need in Marx (London, UK: Allison & Busby Press, 
1976). 
772 Kellner, P. 82. Emphasis added. 
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exercises bodily capabilities, it is social and communal activity, and it exemplifies human 
creativity and freedom.”773  Marcuse’s reinterpretation of Marx, therefore, injects a certain 
power of creativity over the historical process, grounded within a certain sensuousness that 
appears more primal than reason.  “Labor,” Marcuse declares, “…is the existential activity of 
man, his free, conscious activity…”774  Humans are historical and material in nature, but are not 
subject to the descriptive rationality that seems to accompany history in correlative unity.  There 
is a creative element that engages with the world through labor, and the human embodies 
therefore a more potent, less predictable, less rational self than that which the more mechanical 
Marxists perceived. 
 The concepts of sensuousness and need provide for Marcuse a window into Marx—a 
window many of his contemporaries neglected or refused775—that would open a door for the 
previously described “mediation” that Hegel described: the proactive application of theory upon 
history as a creative tool that fulfilled a particular need that is not subject to the prevailing forms 
of Rationalisation.  
As will be discussed in the next chapter, Marcuse would explore many resources for the 
framework of this creativity, but is particularly indebted to Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
Feuerbach’s naturalism, and Freud’s psychoanalysis.  With each school, Marcuse attempts to 
create a dimension of the self that is creative and capable of expressing the dialectic in a world 
where reason has been co-opted by the current reigning techno-bourgeois program of thought.   
                                               
773 Ibid., P. 82. Emphasis added. 
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775 According to Kellner (P. 78), Marcuse’s contemporaries largely neglected the early writings of Karl Marx, 
claiming it was “an opening stage which Marx completely abandoned in his later critique of political economy,” 
though would later engage themselves in “heated polemics against those who would found their Marxism on the 
early Marx.” 
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 It is important to note, however, that Marcuse never abandons the materialist dialectic of 
history.776  No matter the goals of the various philosophers he will use, no matter the 
anthropological foundations from which these thinkers begin, Marcuse’s goal is to create an 
epistemic dimension outside of modern reason, yet still firmly grounded within the material 
world, that can mediate the theory of history to the proletariat.  Marcuse will eventually utilize 
the ideas of Heidegger, Feuerbach, and Freud to add dimension to the Marxian self, but it should 
be noted that despite whatever Marcuse wishes to call it (Heidegger’s authentic existence, 
Feuerbach’s sensuousness, Freud’s instinctual liberation), he is still attempting to close the gap 
between subject and object through an appeal to a higher reason and consciousness, a subject that 
understands the truth of the self through its materially-based, implied negation. 
2. Marcuse and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding the Human’s Relationship to and 
Understanding of Nature and History 
 
a. Co-opted Reason or Ambiguous Reason 
Similar to Marcuse, Niebuhr distrusts pure reason as the basis of epistemology, though 
his suspicion comes from a very different place.  While Marcuse is suspicious of reason because 
it is currently coopted by technological Rationalisation/Reification, Niebuhr is fundamentally 
suspicious of reason, because “…the self is always the master, and not the servant, of its 
reason.”777  The full complexity of human impulse—one’s animalistic desires, needs, drives, and 
illusions—is at work in the construction of reason.  In Niebuhr’s words, “The will to power uses 
reason as kings use courtiers and chaplains, to add grace to their enterprise.  Even the most 
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views human nature as materialistic.  Kellner states, “…for both Marx and Marcuse, although the activity of 
objectification is a ground for the possibility of alienation, ‘alienation’ itself is historically constituted by the 
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Crisis of Marxism, P. 80-81).” 
777 SDH, P. 17. 
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rational men are never quite rational when their own interests are at stake.”778  While Marcuse 
trusts “right” reason—that which rightfully reflects the dialectic, one’s needs and 
sensuousness—and distrusts Rationalisation, Niebuhr seems to echo Hume: “Reason is…the 
slave to the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”779 
 However, it is important to note that while Niebuhr is suspicious of reason, he does not 
view reason as inherently evil.  For Niebuhr, reason is an ambiguous tool which accentuates all 
human drives—those which are both destructive and harmonizing.  Niebuhr states, “Reason 
enables [the human], within limits, to direct his energy so that it will flow in harmony, and not in 
conflict, with other life…His social impulses are more deeply rooted than his rational life…[but] 
Reason may extend and stabilise [sic]…the capacity to affirm other life than his own.”780  While 
reason is often a primary tool of evil, reason also appears to be a tool for good.   
It is in this way that Niebuhr’s view on reason can be described as “ambiguous.” Gilkey 
describes Niebuhr’s view on the ambiguity of reason in the following manner: 
On the one hand, reason is for Niebuhr the principle by which men and women transcend their own partial 
interests to achieve a more universal viewpoint; thus it is the principle of creativity in human life… At the 
same time, however, reason is the principle by which those partial and selfish interests are defended, 
justified, and expanded. 781 
Reason is the instrument used to establish, and “more universalize,” the human’s perception of 
the highest good from a more transcendent perspective, though it is ultimately motivated by 
highly irrational goals—be they malevolent or benevolent.  Reason is ambiguous in that it is 
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relative, that it can be used for both harm or good, and that it is more finite and non-universal 
than the self may otherwise deceptively imagine.782 
b. Reason Concealing Truth or Reason Concealing Human Irrationality 
The key difference between Marcuse and Niebuhr is that Marcuse distrusts reason 
because it (Rationalisation/Reification) conceals the truth within human nature, whereas Niebuhr 
distrusts reason because it conceals the irrationality within human nature.  This difference is 
what essentially sets the two thinkers into opposing methodological directions.  For Marcuse, the 
project is at first critical in that he attempts to counteract the prevailing forms of reason so as to 
expose the true self.  However, for Niebuhr, the project is to clarify human nature so that reason 
may instruct the agent more realistically; or as Lovin states when describing Niebuhr’s method, 
“…to have an imaginative grasp of possibilities for one’s life as well as an accurate picture of its 
realities.”783 
C. Consciousness  
1. Marcuse: True and False Consciousness 
 
By his own admission, Marcuse’s definition of human consciousness is highly 
sociological, and it is vital to note from the outset that he views society as the primary foundation 
upon which the individual achieves transcendence over the historical process.784  For Marcuse 
consciousness is “…a disposition, propensity, or faculty.  It is not one individual disposition or 
faculty among others, however, but in a strict sense a general disposition which is common, in 
various degrees, to the individual members of one group, class, society.”785  Effectively, the 
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individual maintains a collective consciousness that emerges within and over the individual’s 
group that comes to inform the human of all natural, historical, political, and economic realities. 
It is from this sociologically-bound definition that Marcuse proceeds by differentiating 
two opposing views of consciousness: (a) “true consciousness,” a collective consciousness that is 
aware of the dialectic, and (b) “false consciousness,” a collective consciousness that is unaware 
of the dialectic.  Additionally, (c) Marcuse speaks of the ability to transfer a “false” collective 
consciousness to a “true” collective consciousness.  This section will further explain each in 
more detail. 
a. True Consciousness 
 “True consciousness” is the collective synthesis of “the data of experience in concepts 
which reflect, as fully and adequately as possible, the given society in the given facts.”786  
Essentially, true consciousness is society understanding itself truly.  Integrated into this true 
understanding, is the truth that is “negatively present,” as well; in other words, that which is 
known dialectically—that which is absent, yet true.787   Although humans are alienated from 
their labor at present—although the subject is currently perceived as separate from object—the 
group consciousness sees the truth that this is not reality as a historical necessity; their 
consciousness is both the true declaration of their current condition, and the true negation of that 
current reality.788 
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freedom from want.  Marcuse considers that this substance can be achieved through direct action (Marx’s praxis) 
and, in this case, revolutionary action is meant.” 
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b. False Consciousness 
 “False consciousness,” on the other hand, is simply the repression of truth and the social 
acceptance of the perceived reality as necessity without negation.  Marcuse states, “[False] 
Consciousness is absolved…by the general necessity of things…One man can give the signal 
that liquidates hundreds and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all the pangs of 
conscience, and live happily ever after.”789  For Marcuse, accepting what is perceived as what is 
true is the origin of false consciousness, because it negates the potentialities Universal to humans 
and becomes “overpowered by the things he has himself made,” be it economic, religious, or any 
object perceived as “other.”790 
c. False Consciousness to True Consciousness 
 For Marcuse, the change from false consciousness to true consciousness is dependent 
upon the acceptance of theory.  He claims that true consciousness is “represented by correct 
theory, which transcends the form of the production process in the direction of its content,”791 
while false consciousness is that which “remains on this side of such transcendence and 
considers the historical form of the production process to be eternally valid.”792  Theory is 
presented by Marcuse to be the great savior of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie.  “Theory,” 
Marcuse proclaims, “…has the task of moving beyond appearance to essence and explicating its 
content as it appears to true consciousness.”  For Marcuse, true consciousness is a class of people 
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who embody the “essence” of truth which emerges from the negative in the material realm, not 
unlike a Platonic form experienced beyond the shadowy receptacles of common perception.793 
2. Marcuse and Niebuhr: Differences Regarding Consciousness 
 
a. Resolvable Consciousness or Irresolvable Consciousness 
Superficially, Niebuhr at first appears similar to Marcuse.  For Niebuhr, there does appear 
to be a kind of “good” and “bad” consciousness, though to label them as such is quite 
misleading.  There is never a truly “good” consciousness in that it is “true” or purely moral for 
Niebuhr.  However, for Niebuhr, there is a preferable perception of self that is more realistic 
about human limitations and power than other perceptions; one that is understood through the 
Christian myth and is true to both human capacity and limitation. 
 Like Marcuse, Niebuhr’s consciousness is one that can be deceived; however, while 
Marcuse views “false consciousness” as that which can be remedied through correct theory, 
Niebuhr argues that the chief deception is that one could ever fully resolve oneself at all.  What 
is more, Niebuhr argues that the self is plagued with an anxiety as it seeks to overcome the 
seemingly irresolvable disunity within—precisely the goal Marcuse seeks to accomplish.794  The 
self as subject is in a sense free and limitless, it transcends nature in its perspective and 
imagination; yet as object it is bound and limited, incapable of completely overcoming death, 
need, and its animalistic drives.  Human consciousness is seemingly limited and limitless, 
simultaneously.  These internal contradictions of consciousness never go away, yet Marcuse 
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insists that a special kind of “theory” or critical reason can eventually liberate one’s alienation 
through the affirmation of a “true consciousness.”   
In what appears to be a direct counter to Marcuse, Niebuhr argues that the condition in 
which the human finds him or herself is a bitter state where one desires to reconcile what it lacks 
in the objective realm (for Marcuse, alienation) with those resources it can imagine in the 
subjective realm (for Marcuse, negative thinking), but the human ultimately fails to ever do so 
completely within every context of history.  “In short,” Niebuhr states, “man, being both free and 
bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious.  Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the 
paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved.”795  While Marcuse affirms that a 
human can perceive the realities of self in order to overcome one’s current contradictions, 
Niebuhr sees those contradictions as an existential reality that one simply cannot overcome, and, 
indeed, Marcuse compounds the problem of the human condition in every attempt to do so.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that Marcuse never addresses anxiety as an inevitable concomitant 
to all human action, as his goal is always to resolve the tensions of consciousness through a 
collective consciousness that “rightly” understands the self.  However, Niebuhr argues that 
anxiety is an inevitable feature to the human condition that reveals the human’s inability to 
completely resolve him or herself enough to fully align with one’s highest values.   
 For Niebuhr, it is at the point of anxiety that the human being leaps into some form of 
understanding that harbors the potentiality to falsely assuage or prematurely unify the fissured 
presentation of self through one’s adherence to some illusory universal form of meaning.  
Niebuhr states, “Man’s freedom is unique because it enables him, though in the temporal 
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process, also to transcend it by conceptual knowledge, memory and a self-determining will.  
Thus he creates a new level of coherence and meaning….”796  Essentially, while the anxious and 
homeless human, endowed by one’s freedom, can leap beyond the fractured self to find meaning, 
too often one is tempted towards illusion through “too simple and premature solutions;”797 an 
illusion which has the dual consequence of aggrandizing the self (pride) and obscuring the self’s 
relationship with the natural world in a way that eliminates personal responsibility (sensuality).   
b. Right Reason or Faithful Serenity & Clarity 
While the desire for Marcuse is to overpower and resolve self-contradiction by way of 
affirming “true consciousness,” this to Niebuhr is precisely the problem: it is a betrayal of natural 
limitations and drives, and a deception of the highest order.  But the Christian view of the sinful 
condition, on the other hand, “requires, not the annulment of incongruity but the achievement of 
serenity within and above it.”798  While Marcuse chiefly desires the self to attain liberating truth 
and to effectively “annul” one’s “incongruities,” Niebuhr chiefly desires a clarity of self, which 
he argues is a byproduct of faith and acceptance.  To put it another way, Marcuse desires to 
resolve an historical dialectic through reason, while Niebuhr’s desire is to more clearly perceive 
and accept the existential dialectic. 
Niebuhr argues that while anxiety is an inevitable byproduct of the human condition, 
faith in a God who provides the necessary ground of meaning is essential for finding serenity 
within and above it.  Quoting Kierkegaard, Niebuhr states, “Anxiety…is the dizziness of 
freedom.” 799 In other words, anxiety is caused by the presumption of unfettered power and 
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freedom as it clashes with the reality of human limitations.  Human consciousness allows for 
infinite imagination, unending theoretical speculation, and perfect ideology, yet only finite 
action, in a finite amount of time, with highly fallible agents of execution.  The clash between the 
freedom of consciousness and the limited features of lived experience will inevitably lead to the 
“dizziness” of that freedom, or in Niebuhr’s assessment, anxiety.  The temptation of this anxiety 
is to leap into a faith of one’s infinite consciousness or into one’s completely bound state.  
However, Niebuhr continues: “…but it is significant that the same freedom which tempts to 
anxiety also contains the ideal possibility of knowing God.”800  In other words, discoverable in 
that clash between subject and object—between limitless consciousness and limited action—is a 
God who not only provides serenity in the given anxiety, but also houses the contradictions of 
the human condition without resolving them prematurely. 
While “right thinking” is essential for Marcuse’s “true consciousness,” the presumption 
that such right thinking can ever occur is for Niebuhr what is most damning and destructive.  
Instead, what is needed is a clearer picture of self by way of a faith principle which is more 
revelatory of the human’s homeless state. 801  To Niebuhr, the faith principle—particularly, on 
this occasion, faith in the Christian God—is the fullest deterrent against the human’s capacity for 
evil and destruction within its imagined transcendent state of consciousness.  Faith, as opposed to 
self-illusion masquerading as “right reason,” is the honest admission of one’s weakness in its 
pursuit to derive meaning from an attainable universal.  
Ultimately, the primary difference between the two thinkers in how they perceive 
consciousness is that Marcuse sees a theory-based collective class-consciousness that is capable 
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of overcoming its historical self-contradiction, while Niebuhr sees an anxious self-consciousness 
that is incapable of overcoming its self-contradiction, though has the ability to find serenity in its 
limitations through faith.  Because of these differences, Marcuse seeks critique and unification, 
while Niebuhr seeks clarification and serenity. 
III: Marcuse’s Easy Conscience 
 Ultimately, the greatest distinction between Niebuhr and Marcuse’s construction of 
anthropology is that Niebuhr’s results in an uneasy conscience, while Marcuse’s anthropology 
results in an easy conscience.  To make this distinction is to say that Marcuse’s anthropology 
analyzes evil and immorality as necessary defects to one’s historical and rational position, while 
Niebuhr maintains the idea that the human is “…sinful at the very centre of his personality, that 
is in his will…” and in the realm of human freedom and choice.802  It is in this way that 
Niebuhr’s construction of anthropology allows for ethical responsibility—the freedom to act 
benevolently and malevolently; capable of conceiving of evil as derived from the self—while 
Marcuse’s anthropology attributes evil to either historical or rational defect.  
 Similar to Mumford’s easy conscience, one which articulated evil as originating from the 
realms of natural and rational defect as opposed to human freedom, Marcuse makes the same 
mistake in presenting an alternative hybrid of historical dialecticism and rationalism.  Evil is 
traceable, not to the self, but to errors in reasoning (false consciousness) or the dialectical 
“glitch” he and other critical theorists perceive in the historical rise of technology, capital, and 
fascism.   
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 It is in this way that one error effectively leads Marcuse to make a second.  The “glitch” 
in the dialectic necessarily leads the Frankfurt School to articulate evil in a new sphere because 
their prior conception of dialectical materialism was simply irredeemable on its own.  Thus, 
Marcuse and the critical theorists partially remove the evil from history to place it within the 
realm of rationality; a realm he sees as more capable of redemption through simply correcting 
one’s thought. 
However, while Marcuse seeks to establish a realm of freedom within the Marxist-
Hegelian dialectic of history by rediscovering a seemingly more pliant form of reason—that in 
accordance with his conception of sensuousness and need—such freedom liberates the self 
enough to perhaps think more freely, but that freedom does not extend enough into the realm of 
history and action so as to attribute evil to the self.  Evil is still an historical defect, but now it is 
additionally a rational defect, complicating the goal of liberation by making it a rational 
unification of a victim of history.  Therefore, Marcuse’s human is still essentially good, only in 
need of time and proper “negative thinking” for its salvation. 
Furthermore, while Marx and Marcuse’s conception of alienation exists necessarily as a 
part of the proletariat’s historical existence and attributes wrong-doing and injustices to those 
forces outside of one’s control, the Christian view of sin, Niebuhr argues, “can therefore not be 
attributed to a defect in his essence.  It can only be understood as a self-contradiction, made 
possible by the fact of his freedom but not following necessarily from it.”803  The potentiality for 
sin resides in the state of the human’s self-contradiction, or homelessness, but the actuality of sin 
emerges only from human freedom, rendering the individual responsible for one’s actions and 
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not the result of historical or natural necessity.  This construct provides the possibility for what 
Niebuhr calls, the uneasy conscience. 
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The primary goal for this thesis is to construct a synthesis of the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, and Herbert Marcuse in order to create a new type of technological 
engagement from the basis of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology.  This chapter will continue with 
and complete the prophetic methodology of this thesis by critiquing the work of Herbert Marcuse 
from the position of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology. Specifically, this chapter will pull 
Marcuse out of the broader tradition of Critical Theory to introduce his specific critique of the 
technological society, and demonstrate how his anthropology obscures the ethical implications of 
that critique.  Ultimately, this will lead to the following chapter, will put forth the ethical 
component of this thesis, which is to construct from a synthesis of Niebuhr, Mumford, and 
Marcuse a new type of understanding ethical engagement with technology that can maintain an 
uneasy conscience, namely, technological ambiguity. 
In keeping with the goal of this chapter, this chapter will do two things.  First, (I) this 
chapter will lay out Marcuse’s critique of the technological society.  Second, (II) this chapter will 
critique the ethical implications of Marcuse’s easy conscience in the technological society.  
Essentially, while the first section of this chapter will provide helpful insights for the final 
synthesis of the three thinkers observed in this thesis, the second section of this chapter will 
continue the prophetic critique of the anthropology supporting Mumford’s observations. 
I: Marcuse’s Self in the Technological Society 
It should be noted that among the three major schools of technological philosophy 
(critical, substantive, and instrumental), Critical Theory describes perhaps the most formidable 
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and despairing picture of the technological society.  Indeed, for the critical theorist, “a quieter, 
more insidious bondage of consciousness has taken the place of older, more ‘immediate’ forms 
of oppression (which had allowed at least for opposition in thought).”804  Among those within the 
Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, the entire ability to reason—an extremely important 
feature within the Marcuse’s composition of self—is co-opted by the oppressive bourgeois 
system of labor.  In his conclusive remarks on the topic, Marcuse declares that “technological 
progress leads to the rule of dead matter over the human world.”805 
 However, unlike many of his contemporaries in the Frankfurt School, Marcuse has hope 
for a way forward, though at times he appears embroiled in a “frenzied search in the social 
periphery for potential revolutionary subjects….”806  Though despite this characteristic hope in 
the impending utopia, this chapter must now turn to describe the obstacle in Marcuse’s way—an 
obstacle which shall overwhelm his hope in a seemingly disproportionate fashion. 
 Within Marcuse’s assessment, the most dominating feature of technological society is 
found in its ability to infiltrate human consciousness.  While some technologists like Ellul807 
point to the media and propaganda as one of the chief epicenters for technological dominance 
over the individual and society, Critical Theory locates a precondition for the technological 
integration of the individual long before propaganda or instruments of social control arrive.  
Marcuse states, “The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of radio and 
television and with the centralization of their control.  The people enter this stage as 
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preconditioned receptacles of long standing;  the decisive difference is in the flattening out of the 
contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the 
unsatisfied needs.”808  Before media or propaganda arrives on the scene, society is already 
conditioned in a way to act mechanistically.  For Marcuse, there are three facets to this 
precondition: (A) Reification or technological reasoning, (B) Repressive Desublimation, and, 
finally, (C) the flattening out of society, or what Marcuse calls, “One-Dimensionality.” 
A. Reification and Technological Rationality 
 As discussed previously in Chapter 6, reification is the process by which “man and nature 
become fungible objects of organization.”809  However, to understand Marcuse’s particular brand 
of reification, it is perhaps best to understand it first in relation to who is presumed to be his 
greatest influence in the area, and his former professor, Martin Heidegger. 810  While it has been 
speculated that Marcuse owes much of his critique of the technological society to Martin 
Heidegger, and indeed the two appear similar in how they understand the rational components of 
“enframing” that were discussed in the prolegomena, the two differ in two significant ways. 
First, reification, as stated previously, is developed within the Marxist tradition and so carries 
with it certain economic and social implications, critiques, and conclusions.  To use Marxist 
language, reification is a product of the human’s alienation within the capitalist society.  
Essentially, it is the dehumanization of persons for the purposes of certain political or economic 
ends, especially those imposed upon the working class by bourgeois society.  The human is a 
worker who is alienated by the dominance of capital, and so the actual dehumanization of the 
                                               
808 ODM, P. 8. 
809 ODM, P. 168. 
810 For excellent resources on the Heidegger/Marcuse relationship, see: Richard Wolin, “Introduction to Herbert 
Marcuse and Martin Heidegger: An Exchange of Letters,” in New German Critique No. 53 (Spring – Summer, 
1991); Andrew Feenberg, “Heidegger and Marcuse: On Reification and Concrete Philosophy,” in The Bloomsbury 
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person is less a passive byproduct of what Heidegger calls, “enframing”—a cyclical way of 
thought imposed on the self and nature by the direction of self—and more a product of the 
systemic economic oppression of laborers. 
 The second way reification differs from Heidegger is that reification begins with the 
transmutation of human reason into economically-directed objectives.  For Heidegger, enframing 
begins in the will, positioned towards a desired end and a negation of the revealing properties of 
the technology being created.  However, for Marcuse, there is something that occurs prior to this 
free consideration of the world: a pre-existing, end-oriented rationality, or a kind of 
economically-oriented inner-language that is an extension of one’s economic and historically 
expressed alienation.  Essentially, Marcuse’s reification is an extension of one’s alienated 
condition that is expressed in the process of considering “every form of being as a form of 
reason.”811   
 While Marcuse holds reification squarely within the Marxist tradition of labor and 
proletarian struggle,812 he extends the concept of reification to apply its meaning to the 
technological society.  He states, “The universal effectiveness and productivity of the apparatus 
under which [the proletariats] are subsumed  veil the particular interests that organize the 
apparatus.  In other words, technology has become the great vehicle of reification….”813 To 
Marcuse, reification reaches its most devastating and dehumanizing form through the efficiency 
and productivity of the capitalistic technological society.  His merger of technology with 
reification—which formerly under Marx and Lukács only described a kind of “market 
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rationality”814—manifests within Marcuse’s concept of “technological rationality.”  
Technological rationality is an epistemic infiltration of the technological process; all of reality is 
filtered through a mode of reason that commodifies and reifies all external realities into 
mechanistic, technological properties.  The technological society is essentially a product of the 
bourgeois-controlled market, and technological rationality—reducing all of nature (humans 
included) down to functional elements within a machine—is a way of thinking that is adopted by 
the proletariat to ensure survival and market ends.  This style of thinking becomes present within 
all aspects of the technological society—from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat—and the end 
result is the continual dehumanization and commodification of all objects in reality, including the 
self. 
 Acting as a new kind of reification, technological rationality is derived from the 
confluence of scientific and technical ideals of progress and efficiency, and is then transformed 
into a unifying social and economic code of operation.  Marcuse states, “Theoretical and 
practical Reason, academic and social behaviorism meet on common ground: that of an advanced 
society which makes scientific and technical progress into an instrument of domination.”815  
Essentially, technological rationality is an all-consuming instrument or way of thinking that 
transmutes all of nature into standing reserve to the benefit of those powerful few within society 
that lord over the workers.  It is in this way that Marcuse’s critique of technology is really an 
extension of the Marxist critique of capitalism.   
 Technological rationality is still the reified relationship of a kind of reason’s domination 
over humans and nature, only now technology becomes the chief instrument of reification for 
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those in power. To Marcuse, technological rationality then becomes the most monstrous form of 
“irrationality” because, while deceptively “rational,” at least as it is internally consistent with its 
tasks and means, it is leveraged towards irrational ends at the hands of the bourgeoisie.  Marcuse 
states, “The industrial society which makes technology and science its own is organized for the 
ever-more-effective domination of man and nature, for the ever-more-effective utilization of its 
resources.  It becomes irrational….”816 
 The prospect of locating the self within this system becomes increasingly difficult the 
more Marcuse analyzes the depth of technological rationality. He states: 
 The social position of the individual and his relation to others appear not only to be determined by  
 objective qualities and laws, but these qualities and laws seem to lose their mysterious and uncontrollable  
 character; they appear as calculable manifestations of (scientific) rationality.  The world tends to become  
 the stuff of total administration, which absorbs even the administrators.  The web of domination has  
 become the web of Reason itself, and this society is fatally entangled in it.  And the transcending modes of  
 thought seem to transcend Reason itself.817 
For Marcuse, technological rationality intensifies reification to the point that the individual is 
completely consumed.  Even the way a human thinks is a part of the machine.  It is at this point 
that Marcuse appears almost indistinguishable from Ellul, save his use of soft qualifiers such as 
“appear,” seem,” and “tends.”  But these qualifiers disappear as Marcuse moves from reification 
to the next step in his critique of technological society: Repressive Desublimation. 
B. Repressive Desublimation 
An additional similarity between Heidegger and Marcuse is that both have a special 
affinity for art as a revolutionary undertaking within society.  The early, hopeful Heidegger 
proclaims, “essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen 
in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, 
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fundamentally different from it.  Such a realm is art.”818  To Heidegger, if there were to be a 
great savior of society in the midst of the technological threat, it would be found in artistic 
expression and articulation: poiēsis. Initially, Marcuse accepts this position emphatically, 
arguing that art is “…a rational, cognitive force, revealing a dimension of man and nature which 
was repressed and repelled in reality…[Its] truth [is] in the illusion evoked, in the insistence on 
creating a world in which the terror of life was called up and suspended….”819  For Marcuse, art 
sublimates reality by creating new dimensions—“higher” dimensions—that extend beyond mere 
economic necessities, and are therefore revolutionary as they harbor the social dimensions 
needed to employ self and institutional critique.820 
 However, despite his praises, Marcuse claims that technological rationality and 
organization has “invalidated”821 art by transforming “…their subversive force, their destructive 
content—their truth” into “familiar goods and services.”822 Effectively, the technological society 
transforms the revolutionary powers of art into simply another part of the social mechanism.  
This transformation occurs to the point that, in Marcuse’s words, “The music of the soul 
[becomes] the music of salesmanship.”823  To Marcuse, art is no longer that which subverts 
oppressive forces within society, but rather it is tamed to fit within, even reinforce, those 
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 246 
oppressive forces.824  It is this process through which art becomes a part of the oppressive system 
that Marcuse calls “Repressive Desublimation.”825 
 Through his analysis of Repressive Desublimation, Marcuse destroys the last thread that 
kept the early Heidegger hopeful and now seemingly enters into the fatalistic nightmare of the 
late Heidegger and Ellul.  Feenberg argues, “[Marcuse’s] theory subverts itself by canceling the 
idea of transcending action and appears to reinstate the fatalism of a Heidegger or an Ellul.”826  
That transcending action of artistic expression is now enveloped into the machine and no longer 
serves the proletariat, but rather the economic powers who control them. 
C. One-Dimensional World 
 Marcuse’s final indictment on the technological society is an examination of the kind of 
world that remains after technological rationality and Repressive Desublimation have consumed 
society and the individual.  For Marcuse, the once two-dimensional individual and society has 
now become “flattened-out” so as to become one, no longer maintaining a critical element 
derived from that which was once sublimated.  He calls it a “liquidation” of the two dimensions 
that “takes place not through the denial and rejection of the ‘cultural values,’ but through their 
wholesale incorporation into the established order, through their reproduction and display on a 
massive scale.”827  The one-dimensional society has no negations, no aliens, and no critical 
elements.  “The ‘other dimension’ is absorbed into the prevailing state of affairs…Thus [the 
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other dimensions] become commercials—they sell, comfort, or excite.”828  All avenues which 
would otherwise be the fertile grounds from which proletarian revolution would grow are co-
opted by the technological society, leaving the human with a false sense of happiness. 
 The individual within this society, lacking any critical dimension from which to pull, is 
left to establish in itself what Marcuse calls, “The Happy Consciousness.”  Marcuse states, “Just 
as this society tends to reduce, and even absorb opposition…in the realm of politics and higher 
culture, so it does in the instinctual sphere.  The result is the atrophy of the mental organs for 
grasping the contradictions and the alternatives and, in the one remaining dimension of 
technological rationality, the  Happy Consciousness comes to prevail.”829  For Marcuse, the 
human has lost one’s capacity to be uneasy about their own social, spiritual and psychological 
condition.  The human, acting as a reified thing, no longer experiences guilt, self-criticism, or 
ethical consideration.830  The outer, negative dimension is lost and, therefore, the “true 
conscience” is lost.  Without any alternative picture, the human embodies a “Happy 
Conscience,” void of self-criticism and aware of but one mode of reality, which is essentially 
naïve to any need for self or institutional evaluation.   
 For Marcuse, the one-dimensional society creates the one-dimensional individual.  From 
self-consciousness and ethical deliberation, even to sexuality,831 the individual has become 
primed for exploitation and integration within the technological society.  For Marcuse, there is 
no self in the machine.  The self has become reified, desublimated, and flattened-out to merge 
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with the machine through rationalizing elements that create, maintain, correct, and operate the 
machine.   
II: Ethical Implications of Marcuse’s Easy Conscience in the Technological Society 
 While Marcuse establishes a logically forceful argument regarding the “flattening out” 
and pacifying effects of an economically directed technological society, his anthropology as 
expressed as an easy conscience limits his ability to prescribe a realistic way forward.  As 
demonstrated at the end of Chapter 3, there are two consequences of the easy conscience: first, 
the easy conscience obscures one’s perception of the world, culminating in unrealistic attempts 
to save oneself from its various evils; second, while the easy conscience assuages the tensions 
necessary to discover evil at the center of human personality, it cannot assuage the existential 
tensions of human nature which create anxiety—the condition for sin.  This section will address 
how Marcuse’s anthropology leads to both unrealistic solutions, and an ignored and compounded 
form of anxiety in its final state, and will do so under the following headings: (A) Obscured 
World; Unrealistic Salvation and (B) Compounded Anxiety. 
A. Obscured World; Unrealistic Salvation 
As established in the previous chapter, for Marcuse, the proletariat is alienated and 
fractured, in need of an historical push forward to reconcile oneself with one’s work and the 
objective world that surrounds the alienated self.  While it was at one point presumed that history 
would eventually create the conflicts necessary to arrive at unification and liberation, Marcuse 
and the Frankfurt School perceive a lull in the materialistic dialectic.  Marcuse sees technological 
rationality as the primary force that is causing this lull, as one’s very reason is co-opted by the 
bourgeoise and held in place by a false sense of happiness that removes the negative thinking 
necessary to energize the proletariat towards revolutionary ends.  Thus, in order to understand 
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Marcuse’s coming ethical prescriptions, it is important to know that he articulates evil as a 
problem which is of historical and rational origin.  However, while the historical evils will 
eventually take care of themselves, new forms of salvation are necessary in the rational realm in 
order for the historical dialectic to proceed. 
This section will be divided into three parts.  First, (1) this section will describe 
Marcuse’s various rational forms of salvation, as expressed in his use of three key thinkers: early 
Marx, Heidegger, and Freud, and their culmination into his larger social project, “The Great 
Refusal.”  Second, (2) this section will effectively “zoom out” to show how Marcuse’s project of 
salvation should be understood on the basis of his Hegelian presumptions.  Finally, (3) this 
section will devise a Niebuhrian critique of Marcuse’s forms of salvation on the basis of his easy 
conscience.   
1. Revolutionary Voices and the Great Refusal 
 
While Marcuse utilizes three different thinkers to generate the basis for his negative 
thinking, he essentially uses them all for the same purposes: to prod the proletariat towards a new 
vision of self and rationality in order to propel revolutionary energies towards the ultimate goal 
of revolution and liberation.  Though different in language, Marcuse utilizes early Marx, 
Heidegger, and Freud in similar ways, and the result—he hopes—is an artistic take-over of 
culture in what he calls, “the Great Refusal,” which will provide the cultural conditions 
necessary to establish “True Consciousness” and, eventually, revolution and liberation. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the proletariat needs a new form of reason that can 
generate the proper dimension to jolt forward the dialectic.  Originally, Marcuse turns to early 
Marx, particularly his theses on Feuerbach, in order to “correct” the basis from which Marxists 
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traditionally understand Marx’s epistemology, and to do so on grounds of Marx’s use of the 
terms sensuousness and needs.  As described in Chapter 6, Marx’s early understanding of 
sensuousness was a synthesis of Hegel’s ideological dialectic and Feurbach’s position that “The 
Object, in its true meaning, is given only by the senses…the proper organon of philosophy;”832  
in other words, the purely passive form of reasoning as granted through sheer observation and 
experience of nature.  The two for early Marx, and by extension, Marcuse, is a form of 
sensuousness that integrates the subjective experience into the objective, materialistic world—
the subject is a participant in the formation of objective reality.  This synthesis is ultimately what 
early Marx calls “praxis,” and Marcuse will take liberties by such a formulation by extending 
this concept and applying it to the broader corpus of Marxist literature.  This effectively frees 
Marcuse’s subject to both be a product and shaper of history, and grants the proletariat rational 
space from which to influence the historical process. 
However, this rational space is co-opted by the bourgeoise in the form of technological 
rationality, and the very freedom which the subject has in the historical process has been 
flattened out to fit within the “one-dimensional,” technological society.  What is needed, 
according to Marcuse, is a rational liberation—a form of negative thinking—as understood in its 
most natural and dialectical (negation included) state; “The liberation of man,” Marcuse argues, 
“requires the liberation of nature, of man’s natural existence.” 833  It is a form of sensuousness as 
opposed to technological rationality.  It is for this reason that Marcuse turns to Heidegger and 
Freud for the dual purpose of discovering the true nature of human beings so as to establish what 
he calls “right thinking” and “True Consciousness” as a form of sensuousness.  
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First, Marcuse turns to Heidegger to establish the categories of “inauthenticity” and 
“authenticity.”  Heidegger’s view of the individual as “inauthentic” is one who is “…dominated 
by social forces, conforms to standard modes of behavior and…loses individuality and autonomy 
failing to develop one’s powers of creativity, will, responsibility, etc.”834  Already, this 
inauthentic self appears strikingly similar to Marcuse’s reified, technologically rational self; the 
human is “inauthentic” in that he or she has lost their individuality and autonomy.  Therefore, for 
Marcuse, it is appropriate to borrow its inverse term as a resolution: the “authentic self.”  
However, the “authentic” self is spurred to action only by the realization of the “inauthentic.”  
The “inauthentic” harbors the task within itself of returning to “authenticity,” of “taking a stand 
on itself”835 and essentially becoming the bearer of radical action.836  Therefore, the Great 
Revolution must be preceded by a revolution in the self, to become what is negative in the 
present; to change one’s very being.  For Marcuse, one’s understanding of one’s authentic self 
emerges at the very moment the inauthentic self is broken.  Marcuse states, “Knowledge of one’s 
own historicity and concrete (authentic) historical existence becomes possible at the moment 
when existence itself breaks through reification.”837  To discover authenticity within 
inauthenticity is to break the spell of technological rationality.   
However, Marcuse abandons this language of Heidegger relatively early in his career, 
perhaps because, as Feenberg suggests, his “early attempts at concretization [of the authentic 
self] appear as arbitrary as Heidegger’s.”838  He essentially remains too vague.  Whatever the 
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case may be, Marcuse moves to another form of expression—one that can embody the 
subjectivity of sensuousness without sliding into abstraction and betraying the objectivity and 
concreteness of his materialism.  For this reason, Marcuse turns to the psychoanalysis of Freud. 
Marcuse hopes to find in a Freud a “metapsychology” that can grant the necessary 
dimension of reason for revolutionary change, which is perhaps lying dormant deep within the 
human psyche, and below the iron cage of technological rationality.  This will provide what he 
calls “instinctual liberation,” which is a “pre-rational” form of reason that is exclusively built 
upon “true needs” as opposed to “false needs.”839  He essentially argues, similar to Mumford, 
that a psychological reorientation towards one’s basic needs—as opposed to false needs—is 
necessary to rejuvenate the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat.  It is about reinforcing what one 
actually needs to live, rather than that which corrupts one’s reason.  However, it should be noted 
that the “true needs” he conceptualizes is akin to a new form of piety, and presses against his 
otherwise materialistic conception of the self by forming a new metaphysic that articulates ethics 
from a spiritually extracted position.840   
Finally, whether it is envisioned through sensuousness and need, the authentic self, or the 
ethic of true need, Marcuse seeks to establish a new form of society alongside the development 
of these new forms of negative thinking.  To achieve this, and despite his own critique of 
Repressive Desublimation, Marcuse seeks a Hegelian mediation—a way of instilling and 
perpetuating his theory of the negation within the proletariat, or an “explication of 
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metaphysic that betrays his materialism.   
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revolution”841—through the channels of artistic expression and cultural application.  Mostly 
playing off his definition of art as a kind of four-dimensional “stylized reality,” in opposition to 
the technologically efficient reality, 842  Marcuse implores the artists of his day that the “luxury 
function of art must be destroyed” in order to negate the repressive desublimation now holding 
art hostage, and argues that “The protest of the artist becomes passionate, socially critical 
analysis.”843  Marcuse envisions that this mass artistic revolution—what he calls the “Great 
Refusal”—will become “a social force for the transformation of reality,” and the “possible 
artistic formation of the lifeworld.”844  The grounds for revolution will be a mutually reinforcing 
social structure of negative thinking (sensuousness, authenticity, or true need), artistic 
expression, and cultural refusal of the economic powers that reign in the technological realm.   
2. Marcuse’s Easy Hegelian Rationalism 
 
If Marcuse’s sources of salvation seem at all unrealistic or confused, it is perhaps to do 
with the fact that his underlying philosophical structure is deeply unrealistic and confused.  
Marcuse’s easy conscience, particularly his overly rationalistic presuppositions juxtaposed with 
his overly materialistic presuppositions, obscures his ability to generate realistic solutions to the 
technological society, presuming that all it should take is a rational or psychological reorientation 
towards negative thinking to set history back on its appropriate path towards liberation.  
However, this problem begins, not with his uses of early Marx, Heidegger, Freud, or the Great 
Refusal, but rather his misreading of Hegel, particularly his concept of “mediation.” 
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In order to fully appreciate the impact that his misreading of Hegel had on his concepts of 
salvation, one must understand the fundamental paradox at the center of his situation.  On the 
one hand, like others in the Frankfurt School, Marcuse must depart from the Marxist failures that 
would necessitate the development of Critical Theory, but still maintain certain grounding tenets 
that remain true to the Marxist project.  For reasons previously discussed, Marcuse still maintains 
three important doctrines of Marx: (1) The purely materialist composition of human nature, (2) 
the materialist dialectic of history, and (3) the ultimate goal of emancipation for the proletariat.  
However, on the other hand, Marcuse will seek salvation for the proletariat in philosophical 
observations and concepts that were established within radically different perceptions of self than 
those Marxist doctrines.  Nowhere except through a narrow reading of early Marx does Marcuse 
find room in the heavily materialistic and sociologically defined view of humanity and history to 
establish a position that generates enough dimension to discover revolutionary energies in what 
he now sees as a rationally-co-opted space of being; and even then, it is only through outside 
perspectives with radically different presuppositions about history and nature that he can he 
express a revolutionary figure.  He effectively seeks salvation from another paradigm’s savior.  
While this process of discovering a revolutionary agent within a failed/stalled materialistic 
dialectic caused others to eventually retreat into pessimism,845 Marcuse’s insistence upon the 
truth of the dialectic forged him deeper into utopian visions, propelled by ideations which would 
continually betray his Marxist anthropology.  He attempts to draw out the revolutionary 
dimensions of the self, in the words of John M. Swomley, “…like so many rabbits, out of the hat 
of materialism.”846   
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 Despite his varying attempts to “mediate” negative thinking to the proletariat (early 
Marx, Heidegger, Freud, Great Refusal), the problem with his forms of salvation lie in the 
Hegelian concept of mediation itself. From the beginning, his concept of mediation is essentially 
the attempt to impart [negative] ideology upon historically and materialistically-bound 
receptacles; to instill that which is by his own definition non-existent into a world where such 
categories or relationships do not exist.  To understand how this concept makes his forms of 
salvation unrealistic, it is important to understand Marcuse’s misreading of Marx and Hegel, and 
how such a misreading leads him to arrive at such a construction. 
When Marcuse retreats to the early writings of Marx, he makes the mistake of believing, 
as Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, that “Marx had a single and unchanging doctrine which is 
expounded in all these works.”847  In other words, he made a mistake very early on of assuming 
that somehow hidden within Marx’s fully developed thought were these Hegelian 
presuppositions of abstract mediation put forward exclusively within Marx’s early works in the 
form of, according to Marcuse, a type of negative thinking expressed in the concepts of 
sensuousness and need.   
To be clear, Marx rejected the idea that abstract mediation—the idea that one could take a 
concept that is not reflected in reality and impose it as an ideology—was possible in the 
materialist dialectic.  In his “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” Marx 
makes clear his position against such Hegelian, abstract mediation: “It is strange that Hegel, who 
reduces the absurdity of mediation to its abstract, logical, and therefore unadulterated, unique 
expression, describes it at the same time as the speculative mystery of logic, as the rational 
                                               
847 Alasdair MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1970), P. 34. 
Parenthetical term added for clarification. 
 256 
relationship, as the syllogism of reason.”848  He goes on to explain the necessary physicality of 
such an expression of negation, and seemingly calls out those who may come after, like Marcuse, 
who uphold an abstract form of mediation in his own dialectical materialism.  He states, “The 
one does not have in its own bosom the longing for, the need for, the anticipation of the 
other.”849  In other words, Marx would have roundly rejected Marcuse’s central claim that “The 
absent must be made present because the greater part of the truth is in that which is absent.”850  
The negative is not somewhere hidden abstractly in or outside the proletariat.  The abstract 
negative, according to Marx, has no place in the physical realm.  Therefore, according to Marx 
himself, Marcuse’s attempt to establish revolutionary energies from the idealized forms of 
sensuousness, authenticity, or “true need” are impossible.  Non-existence does not imply 
existence. 
Nevertheless, while taking this liberty of imbuing Marx’s early writings with a Hegelian, 
abstract mediation, Marcuse went far in assuring that he was still very much inbounds within the 
Marxist project.  However, it also led him to ignore the very real possibility that Marx left these 
Hegelian views behind for a reason.  This mistake will complicate Marcuse’s fidelity to 
materialism, as his newly acquired Hegelian dialectic will grow beyond what is permissible 
within the Marxist project. 
 Furthermore, Marcuse’s error of reading Hegel’s abstract mediation into early Marx—
and by extension, the entire Marxist project—was accompanied by a particularly unorthodox 
reading of Hegel himself.  The earliest Hegelian expositors, writing immediately after his death, 
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were divided on the issue of the relationship—or non-relationship—between categories of 
thought (affirmation/negation; thesis/antithesis) and the temporal and natural world.851  This 
divide was based primarily on a disagreement over whether it was the case that Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit should be treated as a fully matured work, and whether his later and 
more systematic publication, Science of Logic, was either the culmination or the unnecessary 
abstraction of Phenomenology.852  Those who treated Phenomenology as its own end and 
disregarded Logic stressed “…that the categories [of dialectic] are antecedent to nature and to 
history” and that “the Absolute Idea could never be reduced to its temporal and finite 
manifestations.”853  In other words, they treated Hegel as a rationalism, creating and maintaining 
categories of affirmation and negation to be applied, but never fully realized, within nature.   
On the other hand, those who read Phenomenology as an immature work and treated 
Logic as the full maturation of Hegelian thought stressed “…that this antecedence is only logical 
and not temporal, and that the categories have no existence apart from their embodiment in the 
world of experience.”854  To these Hegelian expositors, there is a full relationship between the 
world of experience and the Hegelian categories of dialectic.  
 However, Marcuse will create a strange combination of both views by reading Logic—
the later text—back into Phenomenology.  In other words, working backwards, Marcuse takes 
the more abstract, systematic, and logical themes of Hegel, and applies them to the more 
concrete and material observations held within Phenomenology.  Marcuse claims, “The 
foundations of the absolute knowledge that the Phenomenology of Mind presents as the truth of 
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the world are given in Hegel’s Science of Logic….”855  He is essentially saying that the 
foundations for material and concrete truth are discovered within Hegel’s abstract conception of 
the Absolute Idea.  Therefore, in a unique conflation of the previous Hegelian disagreements, 
Marcuse affirms the view that the categories of the dialectic (negations included) are antecedent 
to nature and history, but denies that the Absolute Idea cannot manifest concretely.  This begets 
to Marcuse what MacIntyre calls, “…the possibility of absolutizing and deifying tendencies in 
the present other than those which Hegel approved.”856  This misreading allows Marcuse to treat 
Hegel’s categories—particularly the concept of negation—as a divine mandate upon history; that 
negations are present, even as they are seemingly absent. 
 This new reading of Hegel will seem to provide for Marcuse the freedom and power 
necessary for the proletariat to consider possibilities outside the given realm of technological 
rationality.  The “deified” categories Marcuse now presents can be conjured from the full 
imagination of the subject, and can be accomplished without a necessary material referent.  This 
is how Marcuse can claim that a “negative” in the dialectic exists even as the proletariat is 
“happy.”  What will unfold is the basis for Marcuse’s critique: the negation is always present as a 
referent to truth (liberation), even when it is not empirically verifiable;857 which is diametrically 
opposed to Marx’s insistence that “The one does not have in its own bosom the longing for, the 
need for, the anticipation of the other.”858  Effectively, Marcuse’s unique construction of Hegel 
gives license to break with the material world in order to correct it. 
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 It must be stressed that, given traditional Marxism and Marx himself, Marcuse’s use of 
Hegel is committing the worst possible error by applying an imagined ideology—something 
which necessarily does not exist—to the concrete world. Marx states in his essay “The German 
Ideology” (1845), “The phantoms formed in the human brain too, are necessary sublimations of 
man’s material life-process which is empirically verifiable and connected with the material 
premises.”859  For this more fully matured Marx—as opposed to the vague, early Marx—there is 
no logical or rational antecedent to nature; logic and reason are birthed from nature.  While such 
a statement as this from Marx does not exist within those early works upon which Marcuse relies 
so heavily, it is apparent that Marx would fully refute Marcuse’s new take on Hegel.  Espen 
Hammer appropriately asks, “How can Marcuse’s concept…avoid the charge, which Marx made 
against so many of his contemporary socialists, of abstraction and empty idealism?”860 
3. Niebuhrian Critique 
 
 The Niebuhrian response to Marcuse’s salvation of negative thinking by way of Hegelian 
mediation is unified in the observation that Marcuse’s proletariat is far too pathetic to embody 
the revolutionary spirit he seeks to conjure, and far too pathetic to be ethically responsible for the 
evil discovered in the technological society.  Ironically, his pathetic conception of the human—
one who is a slave to both history and technological rationality—achieves for Marcuse an easy 
conscience that deadens any attempt to right what is wrong in the technological society by 
removing fault from those who most need to right its wrongs.  Marcuse’s proletariat is pathetic 
enough to be an historical and rational victim upon whom evil is imposed, but is somehow savvy 
enough to attain a full understanding of the rational nature of one’s bondage in order to 
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overcome that victimhood.  This irony is compounded on both sides of his dialectic: the more 
materialistic his view of history and the more rationally bound his proletariat seems, the more 
spiritual, idealistic, and unrealistic his sources of salvation must become.   
 The contrast of the easy conscience of the historically-bound proletariat with the 
grandiose, utopian vision of the Marxist project—while more spiritually devised in the work of 
Marcuse—is nothing new in the Marxist quest to unify the proletariat with one’s labor.  
However, it is important to note that such a construction has always led towards a destructive 
impulse that lies at the center of the Marxist project: a spiritualized proletariat in conflict with 
one’s own natural and historical restraints.  In Niebuhrian terms, the failure of the Marxist 
project is best described as the Christian conception of pride: “…when he seeks to raise his 
contingent existence to unconditioned significance.” 861   
For Niebuhr, the easy conscience expressed in the Marxist understanding of the 
proletariat—the myth of victimhood at the heart of their conception—is misguided and ignores 
the proletariat’s very real capacity for evil when the Marxist project is fully matured.  Niebuhr 
states, “The poor are not actually as disinterested and pure as the Marxist apocalypse 
assumes…their bitterness and their compensatory utopian visions may as frequently be sources 
of confusion as the social pride of the successful.”862  Though seemingly justified by their 
situation, their moral righteousness harbors within it the great capacity to recapitulate the very 
injustices they experience.  Niebuhr states, “…those who suffer from the arrogance or the power 
of others wrongfully assume that the evils from which they suffer are solely the consequences of 
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the peculiar malice of their oppressors; and fail to recognize the root of the same evil in 
themselves.”863   
While Marcuse expresses the Marxist project with an added dimension of a fallen, 
technological rationality, the easy conscience he is endorsing at the heart of the Marxist struggle 
establishes within his construction the same fundamental error: the pathetic are also righteous, 
and the pathetic have the capacity and moral justification to instill in the materialistic and 
historically-bound world a vision of ideological liberation.  This vision, however, is 
disproportional to the natural and historical constraints that he himself established 
(reification/repressive desublimation/one-dimensionality).  Marcuse effectively spiritualizes the 
cause of the proletariat by seeking its eventual revolution in the form of an abstracted ideology. 
The spiritualization of the proletariat’s cause, too, seems to be a recapitulation of past 
Marxist failures.  Niebuhr argues that the Communism of his time was nothing more than a 
modern secular religion.  He states, “Communism is a religion within the framework of a modern 
secular culture in which the ‘logic of history’ takes the place of Allah as the absolute source of 
meaning, and the writings of Marx and Lenin become the sacred texts, analogous to the 
Koran.”864  Similarly, Marcuse wields Hegel’s categories like a fundamentalist wields a holy 
book.  His Hegelian interpretation—and by extension, his use of early Marx, Heidegger, and 
Freud—is a spiritualized, deified logic which antecedes nature, and which he now seeks to 
impose upon the world in the most radical form.   
 Furthermore, Niebuhr had suspicions that despite Marx’s apparent “materialistically 
referential” logic, that there was still a movement of the subject that was unjustifiably imposed 
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upon the objective world.  For Niebuhr, Communism was the complete affirmation of this 
suspicion.  Niebuhr states: 
The Marxian imagines that he has a philosophy or even a science of history.  What he has is really an 
apocalyptic vision.  A confident prophecy of the future is never more than that.  In him political hopes 
achieve religious proportions by overleaping the bounds of rationally verifiable possibilities….There is 
something both sublime and ridiculous in…expecting the disinherited to conquer either by virtue of their 
moral qualities or by virtue of their very disinheritance.865 
According to Niebuhr, the categories of virtue, no matter how conceived—inheritance and 
disinheritance, affirmation and negation—create an undue spiritualization of theory, despite 
Marx and Engel’s insistence upon a philosophical fidelity to the material world.   
 Effectively, Niebuhr’s critique of what is implicit in Marx is now explicit in Marcuse: 
Marcuse’s deified Hegelianism, his abstract negative thinking, is nothing more than a modern 
secular religion.  For all his attempts to gain dimension for the “one-dimensional man,” the 
process for integrating each thinker—early Marx, Heidegger, and Freud—into his Marxist 
anthropology is nothing more than an attempt to find a materialist agent who can receive a 
spiritualized utopia.  Regarding his Great Refusal, his efforts to describe and impose this as a 
utopian ideal would remain unrealistic and “indeterminate,”866 as even Marcuse himself admits 
that “Nothing concrete can be said in anticipation of such a form except that it is contained as a 
possibility within the dynamic of the present society.” 867  In other words, Marcuse’s fidelity to 
both a materialistically and historically-bound proletariat on the one hand, and an abstract 
idealism on the other, disables him from imposing any realistic change from the perspective of 
the negation.  The subject is free enough to imagine, yet too bound to act and create.   
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The irony of Marcuse’s deification of categories is that he is essentially proposing a 
Rationalisation of his own; he is proposing an iron cage of Hegelian categories, elaborated 
within the infinite potentialities of the human mind, to be imposed upon society in its effort to 
defend it from an equally abstracted technological rationality.  While Marcuse toys with the 
more existential and psychoanalytic ideas of Heidegger and Freud, it is absolutely imperative to 
understand that what he is proposing is nothing more than Hegelian rationalism reconfigured to 
impose upon Marx’s materialistic world a utopian society—a cosmic invasion of his deified 
imagination.  Ironically, Marcuse’s attempt to decry reason results in his full embrace of its 
highest and most abstracted form.   
 From the Niebuhrian perspective, Marcuse’s dramatic embrace of a deified Hegelianism 
is prideful.  The permanently fractured self—fractured in terms of its subjectivity and objectivity, 
its transcendence and creatureliness—will always desire asylum in one completely when 
insecurity is detected in the other.868  Niebuhr claims that if “nature is regarded as a realm of 
chaos, the realm of reason is an easily accessible asylum from, and force of conquest over, the 
conflicts and disharmonies of nature.”869  Marcuse has little choice but to incorporate a 
spiritualized negation—a “true consciousness”—into the Marxist dialectic; to overwhelm the 
technological society with the cogency of his critique.  However, Marcuse’s insistence upon such 
a flattened out, historically materialistic view of self would necessitate a rational leap into a fully 
sublimated reality to call down from his ideology salvation for the proletariat.    
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 A curious truth about the Marxist dialectic, particularly as expressed in its stringent 
materialism, is that around every turn, from the failed bureaucracies of the Soviet Union,870 to 
the technological rationality that now, according to Marcuse, threatens humankind, the Marxist 
self is perpetually at risk of becoming swallowed up into an absolute, and consistently 
diminishes its freedom in the attempt to more fully affirm it.  Even Marcuse’s hope of salvation 
is placed in the proletariat becoming swallowed up and absorbed into a more liberating absolute 
form of reason.  Reasoning within his illusory dialectic of meaning, whether it considers a loss of 
self which is a product of its own idealism (Soviet Union), a description of the obstacle in its 
way (technological rationalism), or even unto his own form of salvation, Marxism—and Marcuse 
by extension—must always express a hollowed-out perception of a human who is dwarfed in the 
shadow of its ideal.  However, according to Niebuhr, the objective world will never perfectly 
conform to the subjective, and the human’s transcendent faculties will never perfectly instruct 
the creature.  The human must permanently remain unresolved, or perceived within a principle of 
faith which houses the tensions of that unresolved state. 
B. Anxiety in the Self 
 As this thesis previously established in Chapter 3 and continued to elaborate in the 
context of Mumford (Chapter 5), anxiety is an inevitable condition of the human situation.  The 
human is at once endowed with seemingly infinite capacities of imagination and spirit, yet can 
never fully establish that which he or she imagines in the finite realm of existence.  There always 
appears to be a subject/object divide.  While some thinkers—Mumford and Marcuse included—
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may attempt to assuage the human condition through a construction of self that inadvertently 
creates the easy conscience, anxiety is never assuaged.  The purpose of this section is to show 
how Marcuse’s anthropology—his expression of an easy conscience—compounds anxiety 
through his premature solutions regarding the problems of the self. 
As demonstrated in his failure to discover clear revolutionary subjects, there exists within 
Marcuse’s work an anxious note.  The twin traps of a deified Hegelianism and a Marxist 
materialism create within Marcuse’s proletariat the conflict of a transcendent mind in constant 
war with a pathetic creature.  Often, Marcuse speaks of the ideal like a prophet calling down 
from a mountain; other times, Marcuse is a caged animal groaning his lamentations from behind 
the iron bars of his critique.  On either occasion, Marcuse’s project is doomed to face a 
compounded form of anxiety from the outset. 
 In his work, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture, Larry Hickman makes an 
astute observation regarding Marcuse: “Marcuse’s own program,” Hickman argues, “despite its 
good intentions, ultimately remains utopian at best, debilitated by its vagueness.”871  This is an 
important observation for two reasons—that which it states explicitly, and that which it exposes 
implicitly regarding his anxious state.  First, this statement explicitly spells out the two 
weaknesses of Marcuse: his utopianism and his vagueness. Second, however, and despite 
Hickman’s apparent inability to express this irony, it is precisely Marcuse’s utopianism that 
necessitates his vagueness; the two are mutually reinforced.  The more utopian Marcuse 
becomes, the more vague and unrealistic his revolutionary subjects must also become.  His ideal 
revolutionary proletariat must become more and more vague in order to house the enormity of 
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Marcuse’s ambitions, despite the proletariat’s presumed weaknesses.  These two poles of his 
thought—the utopian vision and the vague revolutionary subject—complicate one another the 
more fully either is analyzed, manifesting in an anxious and “frenzied search in the social 
periphery for potential revolutionary subjects….”872 
 Perhaps in no other work does Marcuse reach such a fever pitch of anxiety as that of 
One-Dimensional Man.  In fact, a recent discovery of an early draft of the work demonstrated a 
dramatic shift in trajectories, oscillating between his more optimistic ideal and his more 
pessimistic resignation.873  Effectively, Marcuse could not decide between his utopian dreams 
and his dystopian nightmare.  Ultimately, the work settled in its final published version rather 
pessimistically, resting complete hope upon the vague notion of some “outsider” who may or 
may not propel the revolutionary vision forward.874  Indeed, this wavering is not only indicative 
of Marcuse’s apparent angst, but equally as important, his incoherence regarding the self. In his 
article, “Do Universals Have A Reference?” Matthew Sharpe rightly asks of Marcuse, “Where 
does the critical theorist speak from, when he denounces capitalism? To what do his categories 
refer, and from whence can they have come, if not their own social order?”875  Is the self within 
or outside the dominating structure?  Does the human transcend current realities or is he or she 
helplessly crushed underneath?  This is what ultimately remains vague, and thus allows his 
utopian vision to persist.  Marcuse cannot decide to what degree the human is an object or a 
subject; he cannot decide if it is history which shall correct the rational realm now sickened by 
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technological rationality, or if it is a new form of reason which shall correct history through 
sensuousness, the authentic self, or his Freudian conception of “true need.” 
 However, according to Niebuhr, it does not matter which side of the spectrum the self is 
situated for Marxist anthropology.  Speaking on this tendency to waver between transcendent 
and creaturely positions of the self, Niebuhr states: 
Whether they found the path from chaos to order to lead from nature to reason or from reason to nature, 
whether they regarded the harmony of nature or the coherence of mind as the final realm of redemption, 
they failed to understand the human spirit in its full dimension of freedom.  Both the majesty and the 
tragedy of human life exceed the dimension within which modern culture seeks to comprehend human 
existence.876 
No matter which direction leads to utopia—history to reason or reason to history—the self is 
ultimately flattened in its very process to find liberation precisely because it highly regards one 
aspect of its fissured nature while completely disregarding the other. 
 Notwithstanding, while Marcuse’s critique of technological rationality engages in a 
“dangerous flirtation with a substantive theory of technology,”877 it should be admitted that 
Marcuse does not fully resort to the complete pessimism of Heidegger, Ellul, or others in the 
Frankfurt School.  On the one hand, Adorno ultimately submits to the belief that “the human 
problem is insoluble in history,”878 despite his similar treatment of Hegel.879  On the other hand, 
Horkheimer “was consistently drawn to reflection on religion through his life in response to 
limitations he perceived within Marxist theory and practice.”880  The manner in which each 
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thinker responded to the anxiety of such a transcendent self over and against such a lowly 
materialistic being was not unlike the respective resignations of Heidegger and Ellul described in 
the first chapter: one submits to absolute pessimism, while the other flirts with a theory of 
mystical escapism. However, all four essentially end their projects with the final conclusion of 
Heidegger: “Only a God can save us now.”881 
 Ultimately, Marcuse is, at least in one way, admirable in that he keeps pressing on in this 
“frenzied” state to discover prospective emancipating subjects (early Marx, Heidegger, Freud, 
the “outsider”).  However, on the other hand, and in a Niebuhrian sense, he is pathetic if not 
tragic in that he is perennially existing within the anxious state of liberating that which cannot be 
liberated, unifying that which cannot be unified.882  This to Niebuhr is the definition of the sinful 
nature, or the anxious conditions antecedent to Christian sin.  He states, “Original sin is that 
thing about man which makes him capable of conceiving of his own perfection and incapable of 
achieving it.”883  Marcuse, throughout his career, is experiencing the perpetual interruption of his 
own fractured self.  He is consistently running towards ideals which continue to affirm the 
Niebuhrian critique that “our reach is beyond our grasp.”884 
 Niebuhr’s objection to Marcuse rests in his inability to ever find serenity within the 
tensions of human consciousness, which would establish a realistic way forward for Marcuse by 
generating an acceptance for what society could never change in history, yet a courage to make 
proximal changes within the scope of one’s modest and limited power.  Marcuse spends his 
career busied with failed grand illusion after failed grand illusion, but never finds in the failures 
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the resources for change.  Much like Mumford, Marcuse believes all must be changed or nothing 
at all.  His insistence upon both the ideal and the utterly failed state of human kind leaves no 
avenue for recourse; only pessimism, optimism, or the anxious frenzy in between. 
 Ultimately, the self is both less free and more free than Marcuse imagines.  The self is 
less free in that one’s higher faculties—one’s ability to transcend history—are never quite 
powerful and transcendent enough to ever fully create the conditions for its own unification—its 
own liberation.  However, the self is more free than Marcuse assumes, because it has more 
dimension than what can be conceivably controlled by history or society.  The self can imagine 
beyond its current place in history, even if it is influenced to a degree by technological 
rationality.  There is a transcendent dimension of self which is both established long before and 
still exists deep within the development and adoption of Rationalisation, reification, or 
technological rationality.   
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Chapter 8: Technological Ambiguity and the Uneasy Conscience 
Introduction 
While the previous four chapters undertook the prophetic and apologetic method to 
expose the easy conscience at the center of Mumford and Marcuse’s anthropologies, and 
subsequently showed how that easy conscience complicates each thinker’s ethical prescriptions 
for the technological society, this chapter will achieve the primary goal of this thesis: to construct 
a synthesis of the work of Niebuhr, Mumford, and Marcuse in order to create a new type of 
technological engagement from the basis of an uneasy conscience.   
In keeping with the goal of this chapter, this chapter will culminate to present its unique 
contribution to scholarship by presenting a new type of ethical engagement with technology: 
technological ambiguity.  To do this, this chapter will first (I) present a framework for 
understanding technological ambiguity.  Second, (II) this chapter will synthesize Niebuhr’s 
understanding of anxiety and sin with Mumford and Marcuse’s critiques of the technological 
society.  Finally, (III) this chapter will offer a Christian response to anxiety and sin within the 
technological society. 
I: A Framework for Understanding Technological Ambiguity 
 This section will begin to bring together Niebuhr, Mumford, and Marcuse to give a fuller 
picture of the technological society through a new way of understanding technology.  First, (A) 
this section will show why it is necessary to break from the neutrality/non-neutrality binary, and 
show why it is beneficial to examine a new approach: technological ambiguity.  Second, (B) this 
section will use Niebuhr’s treatment of history-as-ambiguous as a framework for understanding 
the ambiguity of technology, and provide a way in which both Mumford and Marcuse can be 
housed together. 
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A. Why Technological Ambiguity Matters 
It is not enough to say technology is neutral or non-neutral, as both presumptions obscure 
an anthropology high enough and low enough to maintain ethical responsibility—the uneasy 
conscience.  Presuming that technology is neutral obscures the depths of human nature, by 
assuming that the evils of the technological society can be eradicated by realizing and 
establishing society’s highest values.  Presuming technology is non-neutral obscures the heights 
of human nature, by assuming the effects of the technological society are so ubiquitous that the 
human is incapable of operating ethically within it.  Both ends of the binary presume and 
perpetuate an easy conscience that mitigates ethical responsibility by externalizing the sources of 
both good and evil.  What is needed is a fresh approach to technology that corresponds with an 
uneasy conscience; one that is not naïve to the myriad effects of technology, yet does not 
presume so weak a position so as to remain helpless.  What is needed is the confession of 
Technological Ambiguity. 
To call technology ambiguous is to affirm that technology is to some degree under human 
control, and to some degree not entirely under human control; that technology impacts humanity 
significantly, but not entirely, but that extent remains ambiguous.  Despite their helpful critiques 
regarding the technological society, Mumford and Marcuse ultimately failed because they 
assumed more about technology than what they could realistically know.  Both thinkers, 
emboldened by their overly simplified anthropologies, simplified too their presumptions about 
technology—and the two are related.  It is no coincidence that Mumford, who views technology 
as neutral, also views the human as maintaining an all-powerful consciousness that can be 
utilized in one’s control over that technology; likewise, it is no coincidence that Marcuse, who 
views technology as non-neutral, also views the human as a slave to history and rationality.  To 
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speak of technology is to speak of anthropology, and for both thinkers, the two subjects are 
simplified and synchronized to the point that the human is either too transcendent to be ethically 
burdened, or too contingent to be ethically complicit.  Neutrality and non-neutrality are simply 
two different avenues for arriving at the same easy conscience. 
However, to view technology as ambiguous is to grant proper dimension to anthropology, 
so that one may maintain a realism that can remain suspicious of its power without assuming it is 
beyond human control.  Confessing that the extent of technology’s impact on society is unknown 
properly places the human in a position of relative autonomy—an arena where ethical 
responsibility is possible, and the uneasy conscience can maintain the necessary intersection of 
power and limitation to remain responsible. 
B. Creator and Creature: Niebuhr’s View of History as a Way of Understanding 
Technological Ambiguity 
If it is the case that to speak of technology is to speak of anthropology—if neutrality 
presumes too high a view of anthropology, and non-neutrality presumes too low a view of 
anthropology—then it is necessary to argue that Technological Ambiguity must correspond to an 
equally ambiguous anthropology: the Christian doctrine of the Imago Dei.  To show how these 
correspond, this section will utilize Niebuhr’s treatment of history-as-ambiguous as an allegory 
for understanding Technological Ambiguity from the position of the Imago Dei. 
“It is obvious,” Niebuhr states, “that the self’s freedom over natural process enables it to 
be a creator of historical events.”885  Here Niebuhr asserts that, on the one hand, the human being 
transcends history in one’s freedom, and therefore has the ability, with that freedom, to some 
degree manage history towards society’s benefit or detriment.  However, on the other hand, 
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“…the self is not simply a creator of this new dimension, for it is also a creature of the web of 
events, in the creation of which it participates.”886  The human is simultaneously the subjective 
guide and the guided object of history.   
 This paradox Niebuhr detects at the center of the human’s perception of history is directly 
related to the ambiguity of the human situation, evidenced in the “vexation” that exists at the 
center of self-awareness: the human is both spirit and animal, both transcends nature and is very 
much a product of it; the human is “homeless.”887  However, the human devises “premature 
solutions” that articulate the human being either from the position of a spiritual, rational, and 
transcendent creator, or a bound creature, subject to nature’s impulses, vicissitudes, and drives.  
These same “premature solutions” are at work implicitly in how one perceives history.  The 
human situation as homeless is prematurely resolved and flattened out to resemble one aspect of 
one’s nature at the expense of the other—either as a subject which is an all free, all powerful 
guide to history—thus negating one’s affinity with nature—or a pathetic object which is guided 
by history—thus negating one’s capacity to direct it. 
 Niebuhr then carries this paradox into his formulation of a proximal solution by assuming 
the Christian language derived from his conception of the Imago Dei: the human is both creator 
and creature.  Niebuhr asserts that the human is “…a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in 
which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence and may 
reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life.”888  It is by 
this faith principle that Niebuhr makes sense of the reality of the human situation; the human is 
ambiguous, both creator and creature—the human is both rationally and spiritually transcendent, 
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and naturally and historically contingent.  It is the affirmation of the ambiguity of self—that the 
human is both powerful, yet limited; free, yet bound—that clarifies the human’s relationship 
with history.  The human does not completely transcend history to guide it, nor is the human 
entirely contingent upon history to be guided by it.  Thus, according to Niebuhr, “History is a 
realm of ambiguity.”889   
 Regarding technology, the binary of neutrality and non-neutrality is presented in a similar 
fashion as Niebuhr describes history.  To modify Niebuhr’s words on history towards those of 
technology, “It is obvious that the self’s freedom over natural process enables it to be a creator” 
of technology.890  The human being transcends nature in one’s freedom, and therefore has the 
ability, with that freedom, to some degree manage technology towards society’s benefit or 
detriment.  However, “…the self is not simply a creator of this new dimension [of technology], 
for it is also a creature…in the creation of which it participates.”891  The human is 
simultaneously the subjective guide and the guided object of technology.   
Similar to the paradox Niebuhr finds at the center of history, the paradox at the center of 
technology is also directly related to the ambiguity of the human situation.  The human is both 
spirit and animal, both transcends nature and is very much a product of it; the human is 
“homeless.”892  However, the human devises “premature solutions” that articulate the human 
being either from the position of a spiritual, rational, and transcendent creator over technology 
(neutrality/Mumford), or a bound creature, subject to nature’s impulses, vicissitudes, and history 
(non-neutrality/Marcuse).  These same “premature solutions” are at work implicitly in how one 
perceives technology.  The human situation as homeless is prematurely resolved and flattened 
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out to resemble one aspect of one’s nature at the expense of the other—either as Marcuse’s 
transcendent and heroic human who is tasked with overpowering technology via his organic 
rationalism, or as Marcuse’s pathetic human who is a slave to technology, absent the intervention 
of some spiritualized Hegelian mediation. 
It is, therefore, vital to carry the paradox of creature and creator into one’s estimation of 
technology by asserting Niebuhr’s language derived from the Christian concept of the Imago 
Dei: the human is both creator and creature.  It is this faith principle that clarifies the reality of 
the human situation in the technological society; the human is ambiguous, both rationally and 
spiritually transcendent, and naturally and technologically contingent.  Affirming the ambiguity 
of self—that the human is both powerful, yet limited; free, yet bound—clarifies the human’s 
relationship with technology.  The human is not completely transcendent above technology to 
guide it, nor is the human entirely contingent upon technology to be guided by it.  Much like 
history, technology is also a “realm of ambiguity,”893 as one cannot make any definitive or 
universal statements about it without obscuring also the immutably paradoxical predicament of 
the human situation.894 
II: Technological Anxiety and Sin 
A. Technological Anxiety 
To this point, such a case has been made from the basis of a Niebuhrian resolution 
between two opposing perceptions, and done so from the ground of Christian anthropology.  
However, there is a very clear impact—indeed the impact—that technology as an ambiguous 
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phenomenon has upon society: technology more fully reveals the human situation, and by 
extension, more fully complicates human anxiety. 
 In a brief, yet prescient essay regarding the new environment created by the proliferation 
of nuclear weaponry and the question of whether the United States should develop the hydrogen 
bomb, Niebuhr astutely argues that the newly created environment of the Cold War does less to 
create new problems, but it rather inflates and compounds the original vexations of the human 
condition.  “Each age of mankind,” Niebuhr argues, “brings forth new perils and new 
possibilities.  Yet they are always related to what we have known before…. Our present situation 
is a heightened and more vivid explication of the human situation.”895  Effectively, Niebuhr 
argues that the nuclear age—a new horizon of the human’s conquest over nature—has created an 
environment that exacerbates the fundamental vexation of the individual.  In fact, the more one 
attempts to bring such an environment “under moral control,” Niebuhr argues, “…the whole 
ambiguity of the human situation is more fully revealed.”896   
 Likewise, the technological society in its entirety more fully reveals and compounds the 
vexations at the center of the human situation by expanding human reach, further obscuring 
human limitation, and confusing the human’s ability to realistically assess either in relation to the 
other.  The technological society is a new environment much like the nuclear age was for 
Niebuhr: “…a heightened and more vivid explication of the human situation.”897  Ultimately, the 
greater the reach of technology, the more the human involves him or herself in the collision of 
one’s perceived capacities and limitations—one’s transcendence and contingence—and the more 
one’s anxiety is revealed and compounded. 
                                               
895 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Hydrogen Bomb,” in The Reinhold Niebuhr Reader, Charles Brown (ed.), (Philadelphia, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 1992), P. 75. 
896 Ibid., P. 76. 
897 Ibid., P. 75. 
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B. Technological Sin 
 As the ambiguity of technology reveals more clearly the vexations at the center of the 
human situation, it also points more directly towards the myth of the Garden of Eden as a 
clarifying resource for anthropology, as well as a guiding resource for human conduct; much 
more than Mumford’s story of mechanistic psychosis or Marcuse’s modified Hegelian dialectic.  
While the consequences of technological sin are much more ambiguous and perilous, the 
problem remains essentially the same: the human is “…tempted by the situation in which he 
stands.”898 
As described more fully in Chapter 3, Adam and Eve as Imago Dei are both creator and 
creature—both transcendent spirit and contingent animal—yet they are both sinners.  They sin 
not as necessity, but as an inevitable result of the “dizziness of freedom.,”899 or anxiety.  The 
collision of their transcendent faculties with the awareness of their contingency tempts them 
towards illusions about the self which obscure the full dimension of the Imago Dei.  Armed with 
these obscurities about self, they sin by acting upon their illusions in one of two ways: pride or 
sensuality. 
Regarding technological ambiguity, the anxiety at its center provides the same occasion 
for the sins of pride and sensuality.  While Niebuhr himself never articulates a full critique of the 
technological society, his Christian anthropology, in concert with the new approach of 
technological ambiguity proposed in this thesis, provides a platform upon which one can 
synthesize both Mumford and Marcuse’s critiques of the technological society to fit within the 
context of Christian sin.  This section will explore the ways Mumford and Marcuse’s critiques 
can be incorporated into Niebuhr’s conceptions of pride and sensuality, respectively. 
                                               
898 NDHN, P. 17. 
899 Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, P. 61. 
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1. Technological Sin as Pride: Mumford’s Myth of the Machine 
According to Niebuhr, “Man falls into pride when he seeks to raise his contingent 
existence to unconditioned significance….” 900  The human ignores one’s limitations, 
contingencies, and finitude and operates under the illusion that something of a divine status is 
achievable by the human’s transcendent faculties alone.  Adam and Eve were tempted by the 
recognition of their low stature, and attempted to raise that contingency to the heights of their 
divine aspirations.  They decided to ignore their unique and seemingly conflicted position in the 
cosmos as the Imago Dei, in order to achieve the higher position of God. 
While Mumford’s assessment of the technological society lacks in some areas because he 
obscures the human in a way that grants him or her infinite capacities of transcendence through 
consciousness, his construction of the technological society as a myth which finds its origin in 
ancient Egypt is particularly helpful when assessing technological pride.  Mumford exposes the 
ways in which humans move beyond their contingency, but lacks a proper countering myth to 
give the human enough dimension to be responsible in the technological society. 
Mumford is correct to argue that the technological society, or what he calls “the 
Megamachine,” is developed and propelled forward by a certain mythology that is created and 
reinforced by society.  To make this point, Mumford cogently draws similarities from the myth 
that is at work in ancient Egypt to today, where a religiously devout constituency of workers 
marry together in their minds the exploits of labor with spiritual servitude, and hold together that 
marriage by an unquestioning subservience to a divine king—Pharaoh—who represented for 
them a Prime Mover, a “…fusion of sacred and temporal power.” 901   
                                               
900 Ibid., P. 186. 
901 MOM, P. 170. 
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However, the way Mumford connects this myth to today’s technological society 
complicates the way in which the myth can be articulated and critiqued within an ethical 
framework.  He is right to affirm that humans today spiritualize their work and the fruits of their 
work, but it is not—as he asserts—for the lone benefit of the Megamachine, but rather for the 
benefit of the self.  In other words, it is not the Megamachine that takes the place of Pharaoh, it is 
every individual.  The individual in the technological society is now the Prime Mover. 
 While this shift does little to negate the cogency of Mumford’s broader critique, it does 
re-locate the problem of the technological society from a dubious form of abstract thinking to a 
problem of human pride.  While Mumford essentially argues that it is the abstraction of time, 
space, and value that leads towards the Megamachine becoming the new Pharaoh, his 
articulation of the Megatechnic Bribe—though far less pronounced in his work—is a much better 
conceptualization of the problem at the center of the technological society.  The human is drawn 
to the Megamachine, not because one grows accustomed to some psychopathic way of thinking, 
but rather to, in the words of Niebuhr, “…transcend their mortal and insecure existence and to 
establish a security to which man has no right.”902  The human is convinced of the myth’s power 
because he or she is convinced of their own power and transcendence.  The evils of the 
technological society are not due to some transcendent abstractions, but rather the illusion of 
human transcendence and self-sufficiency. 
 With that said, the abstractions of time, space, and value at work in creating and 
sustaining the technological society indeed amplify the illusion of self-transcendence.  The 
conceptual enslavement of nature creates a false estimation of self,903 by confusing the human’s 
                                               
902 NDHN, P. 138. 
903 In his essay, “God’s Design and the Present Disorder of Civilization” (in Faith and Politics, Ronald H. Stone, 
ed., New York, NY: George Braziller, Inc., 1968. P. 110), Niebuhr argues, “…the great achievement of modern 
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capacity to predict and control nature with the human’s stature in the cosmos.  Mumford’s 
critique of mechanistic thinking—of abstracting nature in order to better transcend it—informs to 
an even greater degree Niebuhr’s critique of the pride of modern society: “The mastery of nature 
is vainly believed to be an adequate substitute for self-mastery.”904 
 Furthermore, the myth of the machine at the center of the technological society tempts 
each adherent as it would the Prime Mover of Egypt.   Equipped with the power and reach of the 
technological society, each individual is endowed with illusions of their own transcendence, 
further leading to the myth of their own self-sufficiency.  On Egypt, Niebuhr states, “Thus Egypt 
exists by the beneficences of nature in terms of the Nile’s rhythmic seasons, but…she imagines 
herself the author of the source of her wealth.”905  Humans confuse their transcendence over 
nature for a divine, all-transcendence over nature.  Like ancient Egypt, today’s myth of the 
machine weds together the spiritualization of the human’s labor and the fruits of that labor, 
however, unlike ancient Egypt, today’s myth binds both of these in the illusion that the worker-
as-consumer is, by their own estimation, the origin and ultimate transcendent mover of that 
fusion. 
 It is important to observe that this pride is partly the result of the typical anxiety 
associated with the human’s relationship to nature, but it is expounded and further frustrated by 
the anxiety related to Technological Ambiguity.  Neither nature nor humanity’s instruments 
derived from nature are entirely controllable by the human, and neither are as easily assimilated 
and employed towards the achievement of their ambitions as what they seem.  This is partly 
because human ambition knows no limits, but partly because human contingency to nature is too 
                                               
culture, the understanding of nature, is also the cause of the great confusion of modern man: the misunderstanding of 
human nature.”   
904 Niebuhr, “Our Secularized Society.”  
905 NDHN, P. 138-139. 
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unavoidable.  Humans will always dream for results that are far beyond what they can 
realistically achieve; therein lies their sin.906   
Regarding the relationship between pride and anxiety, Niebuhr warns, “To the end of 
history social orders will probably destroy themselves in the effort to prove that they are 
indestructible.”907  There is a firm link between human pride and one’s anxiety regarding natural 
contingency and technological ambiguity; not unlike the consequences of the first sin of pride 
revealing the nakedness of Adam and Eve.  Every step towards transcendence reveals a new 
limitation or contingency, thus laying the foundation for the next sin of pride.  Niebuhr states, 
“Thus man seeks to make himself God because he is betrayed by both his greatness and his 
weakness; and there is no level of greatness and power in which the lash of fear is not at least 
one strand in the whip of ambition.”908  It is in this way that the technological society presents 
itself as an endless march towards domination, where the self is positioned in an endless quest to 
master that one stubborn part of nature that one fears is still not mastered. 
  2. Technological Sin as Sensuality: Marcuse’s Happy Consciousness 
While the highlight of the story of the Garden of Eden has overwhelmingly been, 
according to both Niebuhr and Augustine, Adam and Eve’s first sin of pride, the story as a whole 
is instructive regarding both forms of human sin—pride and sensuality.909  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, they are prideful because they ignore their contingent nature to achieve the 
transcendence of the Creator; they in effect raise their “contingent existence to unconditioned 
                                               
906 NDHN, P. 194. 
907 BTR, P. 224. 
908 NDHN, P. 194. 
909 Niebuhr argues, “Without question Biblical religion defines sin as primarily pride and self-love” (NDHN, P. 
228), and that it is “consistently maintained in the strain of theology generally known as Augustinian” (P. 186).  
Indeed, Augustine affirms this position in his City of God (Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan, 
Daniel J. Honan (trs.), New York, NY: Doubleday, 1958. Ch. 13): “Now could anything but pride have been the 
start of the evil will?” 
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significance.”910  However, they also sin by way of sensuality in that both seek “…to escape 
from [their] unlimited possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of self-
determination…by losing [themselves] in some natural vitality.”  Essentially, both externalize 
responsibility by blaming sin on another (Adam blames Eve, Eve blames the serpent), as if 
neither had control over their own actions.  It is as if in one moment, Adam and Eve thought 
themselves powerful enough to become gods, and in the next moment they considered 
themselves so weak that they could not be held responsible—as if they were mere animals.  This 
oscillation from pride to sensuality is also a feature of the technological society. 
While the externalization of responsibility—blaming others for the how they use their 
freedom—is a key outcome of sensuality, it arises by “losing [oneself] in some natural vitality.”  
Essentially, Adam and Eve confused the temptation itself for an unshakable coercion over their 
freedom; they “lost” themselves.  They believed that they effectively had no choice but to sin, 
and therefore, it was each sinner’s respective tempter who was to blame.  This movement of 
reasoning is partly due to their perceived weakness in retrospect, but it is partly due to the 
illusion that that which tempts them is also all-powerful, at least so far as their freedom is 
concerned.  They were fooled into interpreting their sin as a necessity.  This is in many ways the 
opposite of pride; Molhoek differentiates the two in this way: “Whereas pride is an attempt to 
control what is beyond control, sensuality is being caught up in the things that can be 
controlled.”911  Ultimately, sensuality is submitting one’s freedom at the feet of temptation, and 
giving up one’s power and transcendence for the sake of that which is not God. 
While Marcuse’s assessment of the technological society lacks in some areas because he 
obscures the human in a way that diminishes one’s capacities of transcendence under the weight 
                                               
910 Ibid. 
911 Molhoek, “Revitalizing the Originals,” P. 4. 
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of technological rationality, reification, and history, his construction of Happy Consciousness is 
particularly helpful when assessing the technological sin of sensuality.  Essentially, the economic 
and technological structures today perpetuate and expand the illusion that humans are helpless 
and incapable of critiquing and correcting both the self and society. 
Through his analysis of Repressive Desublimation and technological rationality, Marcuse 
rightly argues that the technological society has created for humans an environment that, by 
some measure, weakens critical insight by reducing human concerns and expression to economic 
exchange.  From art to sexual relationships, everything is commodified into a one-dimensional 
exchange of that which one wants for that which another has.  Technological rationality has 
tamed art and critical thinking by transforming “…their subversive force, their destructive 
content—their truth” into “familiar goods and services.”912  Ultimately, for Marcuse, Happy 
Consciousness is the condition where the human can no longer experience guilt or imagine any 
alternative to the society he or she inhabits because they are inundated with a false sense of 
contentment in the luxuries the technological society provides. 
While Marcuse is right that the technological society as a structure creates an 
environment that inhibits critical thought, it is not entirely for the reasons he gives.  The evils of 
the technological society—in this case, the diminishment of critical faculties—are not 
exclusively due to market forces, history, or the bourgeoise, but rather the sin of sensuality: the 
illusion that human beings are contingent and dependent upon the comforts and luxuries the 
technological society provides.  This is not to suggest that the technological society’s structure is 
not a part of this sin, as this would be akin to saying the serpent was not a part of Adam and 
Eve’s sin.  Rather, the technological society is unique in that it indeed creates such an abundance 
                                               
912 ODM, P. 61. 
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of goods in which the human’s most base impulses find desirable that all transcendent thought—
the basis for human criticism—is diminished for the sake of modern conveniences.913  It is in this 
way Marcuse is right: the human reifies the self by diminishing one’s transcendent features to the 
forces of supply and demand.914  The human is in a perpetual state of diminishing its higher—
both moral and rational—inclinations in favor of a flattened-out, naturalistic drive for survival 
and pleasure. 
Furthermore, what compounds the problem of sensuality in the technological society is 
an intersection where the Happy Consciousness it creates becomes reciprocated in the 
predominantly held naturalism of contemporary culture.915  The tendency to reduce happiness to 
the fulfilment of animal impulse and desire both perpetuates the technological society, and is 
rewarded by the technological society.  On the one hand, the technological society is perpetuated 
in that a growth in ubiquity is always in demand, as there is no end to human desire; on the other 
hand, the perception of naturalism is rewarded by the technological society in that it is always 
developing new comforts that feed the creature’s natural appetites.  It is in this way that 
naturalism and the technological society conform to one another, creating an illusion of one-
dimensionality.  Not coincidentally, the more the human understands him or herself as 
contingent to or enslaved by nature, the more the human accepts the illusion of their contingency 
and enslavement to the technological society. 
                                               
913 Molhoek argues that the temptation of sensuality is uniquely proliferated in the technological society: “Indulging 
every pleasure to its fullest is a sign of power and an expression of idolatry, something that one is freed to do 
because they have the resources and ability to do so.” (“Sensuality and Altering Anthropology in Artificial 
Intelligence and Transhumanism,” P. 103. Emphasis added.) 
914) Molhoek briefly argues the connection between sensuality and Critical Theory’s conception of reification: “An 
inherent aspect of sensuality is the reification of the self.” (Ibid.) 
915 For cogent arguments regarding modern society’s worldview defaulting to naturalism, see: Robbins, “It’s always 
right now;” Taylor, Sources of the Self. 
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Furthermore, and most crucial to the sin of sensuality, Happy Consciousness also 
expands and compounds naturalism’s ultimate anthropological and ethical expression: the easy 
conscience.  Like Adam and Eve blaming one another for their sin, the technological society’s 
illusion of human contingency diminishes ethical responsibility by diminishing human 
transcendence; this means not only that humans grow less critical of society, but also that he or 
she grows less self-critical, and further affirms the externalization of both good and evil.   
 Much like Adam and Eve conflating temptation with coercion, the tendency for those in 
the technological society—including its critic, Marcuse—is to escape one’s positioning as a 
transcendent, responsible being by interpreting its comforts as a necessary coercion of freedom, 
rather than a condition which provides the occasion for temptation.  The evil of the technological 
society is not necessary to the condition of human beings—it is not a sin to benefit from 
technology—it is a sin to use those comforts as a pretext to deny one’s transcendence, freedom, 
and responsibility.  This is the essence of the easy conscience, where one is moved to interpret 
evil and goodness—not as the product of one’s free will, as one is flattened to conform to 
“purely mechanical proportions” 916—but as external realities, if anything at all.  The self 
ultimately becomes mastered by nature and technology. 
II: Sources of Salvation 
A. Salvation from Technological Ambiguity as Anxiety 
 The Christian response to anxiety, according to Niebuhr, is two-fold.  First, humans are 
not the source of their own salvation, as “…every individual is a Moses who perishes outside the 
promised land,”917 and one must gain some measure of serenity in accepting that evil is not 
                                               
916 Ibid., P. 70. 
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 286 
something humans have the capacity to completely resolve.  This is particularly instructive in the 
technological society, as every new technological avenue opened provides the occasion for new 
expressions of sin.   
 Second, the recognition that one is incapable of resolving one’s sinful condition is bound 
up and housed in the belief of the promise of the coming Messiah.  This belief presents the 
resolution of evil in two important ways; one is obvious, the other is less obvious.  The obvious 
implication, according to Niebuhr, is that the Messiah “will fulfill and not annul the richness and 
variety which the temporal process has elaborated.”918  In other words, the coming Christ gives 
life meaning because His return is a continuation and fulfillment of the goodness already at 
work.  The less obvious implication is that “the condition of finiteness and freedom, which lies at 
the basis of historical existence, is a problem for which there is no solution by any human power.  
Only God can solve this problem.”919  Hope in the coming Messiah grants serenity for accepting 
the evils of the technological society, and restrains the urge to recapitulate its evils in the very 
attempt to correct them.  Finding serenity in the coming Messiah not only ensures humanity that 
goodness matters, but it is also a guard against the vain belief that humans can save themselves.  
It is in this way that humans are hopeful without falling into the naïve trap of idealism, self-
sufficiency, and unfettered optimism, and can yet achieve serenity and humility without falling 
into bitter cynicism, resignation, and pessimism. 
 As humanity progresses further into the technological age, and as humanity tethers itself 
ever closer to technology’s ambiguity, it is important to recognize the very real implications of 
an increasingly ambiguous future.  Just as those individuals who created the combustible engine 
had not the faintest idea of how what they made would contribute to climate change, humans 
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must proceed with technology with the understanding that its effects are never completely 
understood in any context of history.920  Equipped with the ever-increasing power of technology, 
humans may very well destroy themselves, as humans are constantly developing new ways to do 
it;921 and yet technology could also exponentially lengthen the human lifespan, or end world 
hunger.  The abuses that accompany the dissemination of information could very well lead to the 
dismantling of democratic institutions across the West, but it could also expose corruption and 
increase transparency.  Regardless of where technology takes humanity—or perhaps, too, where 
humanity takes technology—humanity must generate a sober view of its limitations and 
capacities, and the greatest source for that sobriety is having a serenity about the things that 
cannot be controlled.  Technology itself must be recognized as something humanity cannot 
entirely wield, and so humanity’s dependence upon a coming Messiah becomes that much more 
important, as it continually instructs its users and participants that both salvation from technology 
and salvation as a result of technology is not entirely in the hands of its creator, but rather in the 
hands of the human’s Creator. 
B. Salvation from Technological Pride 
 The Christian response to pride is faith.  Faith “…makes it possible for man to relate 
himself to God without pretending to be God; and to accept his distance from God as a created 
thing, without believing that the evil of his nature is caused by this finiteness.”922  Faith is similar 
                                               
920 Niebuhr argues that, if anything, technics have made the future more precarious.  See: Niebuhr, “Modern 
Civilization,” in NBC’s Town Meeting on the Air (1939).  Additionally, in his essay, “The Vulnerable World 
Hypothesis” (forthcoming in Global Policy), Nick Bostrom argues persuasively that such a great number of new 
innovations threaten humankind that a new approach, what he calls “the vulnerable world hypothesis,” is necessary 
in order to “evaluate the risk-benefit balance of developments toward ubiquitous surveillance or a unipolar world 
order.”  Bostrom argues that the primary objective for humankind currently is to appropriately conceptualize 
advancement under the perennial threat of global catastrophe. 
921 Niebuhr: “Yet civilizations do die; and it may be that, like the individual, they destroy themselves when they try 
too desperately to live or when the seek their own life too consistently.” (FAH, P. 216) 
922 NDHN, P. 15. 
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to the serenity found in the Messianic hope in that both provide the outcome of humility, but it is 
different in two important ways.  First, faith has an epistemic quality to it that guards against the 
temptation to prematurely resolve the paradoxes of human nature.  It effectively allows the 
human to house both human contingency and transcendence together without negating one to 
fully activate the other.  But second, faith is the human’s explicit guard against becoming God.923  
Faith is the confession that one can relate to God, but must not confuse him or herself with God.    
Faith in God is the realistic confession that no human is a master of nature or technology.  
It is a confession of both the ambiguity of technology, and the very real limitations of humanity, 
regardless of how the power and illusions of technology may tempt its user.  Faith is the ultimate 
confession that humans are never entirely in control of nature or the instruments they create, and 
the guard against confusing oneself with God, while still maintaining communion with God. 
C. Salvation from Technological Sensuality 
The Christian response to sensuality is two-fold.  First, Christianity affirms the 
transcendence of humans, yet the reality of their dependence upon God.  Moses and Christ’s 
statement that “one does not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth 
of the Lord” is a profound affirmation that the human being is not ruled even by that which he or 
she needs.924  Humans transcend nature, and are not bound to desire, greed, comfort, or luxury.  
However, the statement of human transcendence—“one does not live by bread alone”—is 
quickly qualified by a statement of dependence: “…but by every word that comes from the 
mouth of the Lord.”  While Moses and Christ are clear in their affirmation of human 
                                               
923 Concomitant to faith, for an excellent study on how Sabbath is in part a response to the pride of Pharaoh and 
idolatry of Egypt, see: Walter Brueggemann, Sabbath as Resistance: Saying No to the Culture of Now (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2014). 
924 Deuteronomy 8:3; Matthew 4:4 (Christ supplants “Lord” with “God”), NRSV. 
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transcendence over nature, they are also quick to affirm the rightful position of that 
transcendence: in submission to God’s word.  This construct of transcendent-yet-dependent is the 
ultimate guard, not only against sensuality, but also against the swing from sensuality to pride, as 
the human is never so controlled so as to be a slave to nature, yet never so transcendent to be its 
master. 
The second Christian response to sensuality is in some ways a furtherance of the first, yet 
is bound up in one single command:925 “[Y]ou shall have no other gods before me.  You shall not 
make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on 
the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.”926  This very clear dictate is not only an 
indictment on those who do not serve God, but conversely on those who serve another God.  
One is to devote oneself to the God that is beyond, who is unseen, whose purposes transcend the 
desires of this world.  The two parts of this command are bound up in one another, as faith in one 
necessarily means the diminishment of the other. 
Both of these Christian responses to sensuality—transcendence-yet-dependence and the 
worship God over idols—not only provide a guard against sensuality, but also reveal a clearer 
picture of the way humans sin in the technological society.  It is the illusion of human 
contingency and the idolatry of that which is created that leads to an easy conscience which 
diminishes human freedom when its fruit of responsibility is most in need.  In a statement on 
idolatry—though clearly finds resonance with technological idolatry—Augustine states, “For 
what could be more hapless than a man controlled by his own creations?  It is surely easier for 
                                               
925 While there is precedent to unify Exodus 20:3 and 20:4—not least Martin Luther in his Small Catechism (United 
States: Hymn Book Publishing Committee of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 1893, P. 5)—
it is understood that traditionally the two are separated into distinct commandments.  However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, it is most helpful to treat the two as one, as the both demonstrate the need to honor God before all others 
and abstain from idolatry.   
926 Exodus 20:3-4, NRSV. 
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man to cease to be a man by worshiping man-made gods than for idols to become divine by 
being adored.”927  Here Augustine laments on how pathetic it is for a human to worship that 
which is created, implying that the human transcends that which is earthly—the human does not 
simply live by bread alone.  But perhaps his further point is more instructive to the technological 
society: the worship of that which is created—including technology—diminishes human beings 
to the point they “cease” to be humans.  What humans risk in the sensuality made possible by the 
technological society is diminishment of what makes humans unique; it lowers the human to its 
most base impulses and rids the self of any determination of ethical responsibility.  The human 
escapes being human.928 
D. Conclusion: The Uneasy Conscience in the Technological Society 
The Christian conception of self—as expressed in creation as Imago Dei, and in the 
Garden as sinner—is the most optimal anthropology for assessing the technological society, as 
one is both mindful of one’s relationship to technology (creature and creator), and the way one 
becomes destructive when one facet of that relationship is diminished (pride and sensuality).  
“Christianity, therefore,” Niebuhr states, “issues inevitably in the religious expression of an 
uneasy conscience.  Only within terms of the Christian faith can man not only understand the 
reality of evil in himself but escape the error of attributing that evil to any one but himself.”929  
The oscillation of the technological society from humans, the master of technology, to humans, 
the slave of technology—from prideful exploiter of nature, to pathetic worshipper of nature—
                                               
927 Augustine, City of God, Ch. 23. 
928 In his essay, “The Niebuhrian Legacy and the Idea of Responsibility” (in Studies in Christian Ethics Vol. 22 No. 
4, October 2009. P. 413), Douglas Ottati notes the poignancy of Niebuhr’s analysis of sensuality in contemporary 
society, and especially its tendency towards escapism: “We attempt to insulate ourselves and perhaps grow numb.  
Now the problem is not inordinate self-assertion but rather deficient participation in our many relationships and 
responsibilities.” 
929 NDHN, P. 17. 
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must resolve itself in an uneasy anthropology that can house its necessary tensions of 
transcendence and contingence in a way that grants enough dimension to the self to ensure the 
expression of an uneasy conscience: the basis of ethical responsibility.  Without the faith 
principle of the Imago Dei and its corresponding confession of technological ambiguity, humans 
buy into the illusion that they are either too transcendent to be ethically burdened, or too 
contingent to be ethically complicit.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
I: Summary 
 There is a pressing need in contemporary scholarship to understand the anthropological 
dimensions of any presupposition regarding the relationship between human beings and 
technology.  The binary between technological neutrality and non-neutrality—whether it is the 
case that humans control their instruments absolutely or whether technology is shaping human 
conduct and society—is too often shaped by premature solutions regarding the paradox of human 
transcendence and natural contingence.  One is tempted either to presume that humans transcend 
technology to the point that further ethical consideration is unnecessary (Hard Instrumental 
Theory), or that humans are so contingent and dependent upon technology that the human is no 
longer free enough to think and act independently (Substantive Theory).  Either way, ethical 
responsibility is diminished, as technology is either non-threatening enough to disregard, or so 
threatening the human is enslaved. 
 However, two forms of critical analysis appear to be cognizant of the pitfalls of both 
extremes: Soft Instrumental Theory and Critical Theory.  The former, represented in this thesis 
by Lewis Mumford, is able to presume that technology is neutral and that humans transcend 
technology.  However, unlike others who view technology as neutral, he is still able to criticize 
the technological society.  The latter, represented by Herbert Marcuse, is able to presume that 
technology is non-neutral and that humans are effectively transformed and even enslaved by 
technology, yet he is still able to denounce the deterministic essence of technology that is shared 
by others who make the same non-neutral presumption. 
 Despite each thinker’s critical contribution, however, neither is able to generate realistic 
ways to respond to what they critiqued, as neither begin with a realistic anthropology that can 
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properly establish ethical responsibility.  It is for this reason that this thesis utilizes Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology as a basis for articulating and maintaining ethical 
responsibility, and to furthermore provide a framework for properly establishing the 
technological critiques of Mumford and Marcuse within a new type of technological 
engagement: technological ambiguity. 
 The second chapter articulates Niebuhr’s tripartite methodological construction of 
theological anthropology, prophetic apologetics, and ethical realism, and demonstrates the 
continuity of this project with such a methodology.  Additionally, in proposing such a unique 
methodology, it was necessary to establish and defend the theological validity of this method 
from its most ardent critics: namely, Karl Barth and Stanley Hauerwas.  This chapter concluded 
with the methodological vision of this thesis: (1) as part of the theological anthropology method, 
this thesis would establish Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology as a basis for understanding ethical 
responsibility in the form of two Niebuhrian categories: the easy conscience and the uneasy 
conscience; (2) as part of the prophetic apologetic method, this thesis would critique Mumford 
and Marcuse by showing that both thinker’s presumed anthropology is expressed as an easy 
conscience, and that expression leads to the diminishment of ethical responsibility and in turn 
provides unrealistic and faulty responses to the technological society; (3) as part of the ethical 
realism method, this thesis would synthesize key observations of Mumford and Marcuse with 
Niebuhr’s view of sin and the uneasy conscience in order to contribute a fresh and realistic way 
to approach ethics in the technological society. 
 The third chapter begins the methodological approach described in the second chapter by 
establishing Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology as the foundation upon which ethical 
responsibility is possible.  This chapter affirms Niebuhr’s preliminary observation that the 
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human being is a problem unto him or herself, and that any premature solution to such a problem 
eliminates ethical responsibility by embracing illusions of utter transcendence and freedom, or 
utter contingency and finitude.  Contrary to these premature solutions, this chapter offers 
Niebuhr’s paradoxical faith principle regarding anthropology, that the human being is both 
creator and creature (Imago Dei), and that the human sins by disregarding or diminishing either 
in favor of the other (Pride and Sensuality).  This chapter concludes that only the anthropological 
presumption of one as Imago Dei—and its corresponding doctrine of Original Sin—can offer the 
human the dimension necessary to express oneself in the form of an uneasy conscience—the 
ability to articulate both evil and good as a product of human freedom, and the anthropological 
foundation of ethical responsibility. 
 The fourth chapter begins the second part of the tripartite methodological approach 
introduced in Chapter 2, one that would extend through the seventh chapter: namely, prophetic 
apologetics.  In keeping with this method, the fourth chapter uses Niebuhr’s Christian 
anthropology to critique Mumford’s anthropology on the basis that it expresses itself as an easy 
conscience, incapable of attributing evil to the self.  Mumford’s articulation of organicism 
imagines that the human is by nature a certain internal and external balance, and that balance can 
be willed upon the self by a powerful, transcending consciousness.  Evil is nothing more than a 
rational defect that interrupts that balance in the form of psychosis. 
 The fifth chapter continues the prophetic apologetic approach regarding Mumford by 
examining his critique of the technological society and his prescribed ethical response to such a 
critique. While certain elements of that critique were found to be helpful, his responses to the 
problems he discovered were found too unrealistic, overwhelmingly due to the easy conscience 
resulting from his too simplistic anthropology.  Because Mumford understands evil as a rational 
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defect, one must either escape that place where mechanistic rationality is most disseminated or 
devise utopian myths that can correct the ills of society simply by believing in the more 
favorable view of organicism.  Both avenues are unrealistic, as human consciousness is 
presumed to be either too powerful to overcome (if the consciousness is creating the 
Megamachine), or powerful enough to correct its own ills.  Additionally, Mumford’s 
anthropology as expressed as an easy conscience also compounds the problem of anxiety as he is 
compelled to articulate an increasingly evil world while still maintaining a high estimation of 
self. 
 The sixth chapter continues the prophetic apologetic methodology, but instead now 
focuses on Marcuse.  Similar to Chapter 4, the sixth chapter uses Niebuhr’s Christian 
anthropology to critique Marcuse’s Marxist-Hegelian anthropology to show that it expresses 
itself as an easy conscience, incapable of attributing evil to the self.  Marcuse’s articulation of the 
self as a sociologically, materialistically, and historically-bound creature is too flat to be 
responsible for evil or goodness.  Even in his modified and spiritualized Hegelianism, at its best, 
Marcuse’s human is still a pathetic creature who is determined by the collectively held 
consciousness of one’s community.  Evil, to Marcuse, is nothing more than an historical, 
rational, or economic defect, imposed upon the creature from external sources. 
 The seventh chapter concluded the prophetic apologetic methodology by examining 
Marcuse’s critique of the technological society and his prescribed ethical response to such a 
critique.  While Marcuse offers an insightful critique of the technological society, his responses 
to that critique were too unrealistic due to the easy conscience expressed by his anthropology.  
Because Marcuse articulates evil as an external entity to which the human is enslaved, all forms 
of salvation are never fully about the correction of any single individual, but rather the collective, 
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in unison, discovering the negative thinking mediated to them from the work of Heidegger, 
Feuerbach, or Freud, that is necessary for economic and political revolution.  At best, his low 
anthropology forces Marcuse to develop an overly mystified Hegelianism, and at worst an 
unending search to discover revolutionary subjects to drag his pathetic conception of the human 
into action.  Additionally, Marcuse’s anthropology as expressed as an easy conscience also 
compounds the problem of anxiety, as the pathetic creature he assumes to be human is always 
absorbed into an evil reality that his deified Hegelian dialectic can never resolve. 
 The eighth chapter represents the final part of the tripartite methodological approach: 
ethical realism.  This chapter begins by showing that not only is a proper response to the 
technological society diminished by one’s prematurely resolved anthropology, but for both 
Mumford and Marcuse this is still reflected in their insistence upon presuming an answer to the 
binary of technological neutrality versus non-neutrality.  Instead, this chapter proposed a new 
type regarding ethical engagement with technology: technological ambiguity.  This chapter 
argues that technological ambiguity not only provides space for both Mumford and Marcuse’s 
critiques, but also that it rightly acknowledges the anxiety inherent to the binary itself: humans 
cannot fully understand to what extent they are in control of technology and to what extent they 
are being influenced and shaped by technology. 
 The eighth chapter then establishes Niebuhr’s anthropology alongside technological 
ambiguity, arguing that the technological society (1) is cradled by an ideological spirit and 
structure that obscures the self by articulating humanity as either the master of nature or one who 
is mastered by nature, (2) reveals a “a heightened and more vivid explication of the human 
situation”930 by intensifying anxiety through an increase in power and freedom, yet an increased 
                                               
930 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Reinhold Niebuhr Reader, P. 75. 
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sense of powerlessness, finitude, and ambiguity, and (3) creates new avenues and greater 
consequences for human sin.  Chapter 8 concludes by synthesizing Mumford and Marcuse’s 
critiques within Niebuhr’s Christian doctrine of sin, and formulating realistic Christian responses 
to both critiques. 
II: Implications 
 The goal of this thesis was to establish a way of talking about technology that takes 
seriously the challenges of the technological society without obscuring human freedom and 
ethical responsibility in so doing.  Accordingly, there are two sets of implications this research 
has upon future study and observation: those ways of discussing technology that this thesis 
refutes, and the novel approach this thesis contributes that most realistically situates the human 
in relation to technology. 
First, this research refuted the argument that technological neutrality is a viable means of 
assessing and correcting the problems of the technological society.  This thesis showed how the 
presumption of technological neutrality obscures human contingence to the point that the human 
is left only with an unsubstantiated faith in the human mind or progress; that the sheer 
transcendence of humanity will correct whatever problems emerge from the technological 
society.  Not only did this research show that such a presumption is unrealistic, but that such a 
position is governed by certain anthropological presumptions regarding the goodness and 
greatness of humankind.  This thesis showed that such an expression of an easy conscience 
diminishes ethical responsibility by reducing evil in the technological society to simply a rational 
defect that is too easily cured. 
 Second, this research refuted the argument that technological non-neutrality is a viable 
means of assessing and correcting the problems of the technological society.  Given the constant 
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expansion of technology into every aspect of life, this thesis showed how the presumption of its 
non-neutrality obscures human transcendence to the point that the human is left only with a naïve 
hope in history, mystical intervention, or spiritual mediation.  If technology—and the rationality 
that propels it—is in a constant state of growth and application, a non-neutral perspective of its 
influence invariably conflates technology’s ubiquity with its domination over the subject.  
Ironically, this thesis showed, the result of the non-neutral perspective is much like that of 
neutrality, where one’s estimation of self precludes one’s ability to detect evil as a product of 
human freedom, but rather as a defect of history or reason.    
 More positively, the most important implication of this thesis is the observation that to 
talk about technology is to talk about anthropology, and that one’s discourse regarding 
technology conceals implications about human nature that impact the way humans understand 
ethical responsibility in the technological society.  This observation, when understood from the 
position of Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology, made possible a more honest and realistic 
assessment of the human’s relationship to technology, especially as it pertains to more clearly 
understanding the limits of what can be known, what cannot be known, what can be controlled, 
and what cannot be controlled regarding technology. 
 Furthermore, the affirmation of technological ambiguity allows for the biblical notions of 
humanity to more concretely instruct humans towards a clearer understanding of the self within 
the technological society, as well as the human’s uses and abuses of technology.  The re-
application of the Imago Dei and Niebuhr’s analysis of Original Sin are once again informative 
to the technological society, as both affirm human transcendence and contingency while also 
providing a sober warning regarding both when one is obscured in pursuit of the other.  By 
presuming human-as-creator, in accordance with the doctrines of Imago Dei and sin, this thesis 
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offers a way of discussing human control over technology without assuming ultimate 
transcendence (pride).  By presuming human-as-creature, in accordance with the doctrines of 
Imago Dei and sin, this thesis provides a way of discussing the influence technology has upon 
humanity without assuming its bleak enslavement (sensuality).   
 Additionally, the implications of this thesis should also open new avenues through which 
the church and its members should understand themselves within the technological society.  If 
the technological society increases both the illusions of transcendence and contingence, there 
becomes even more reason to return to the central Christian teaching of sin, in both its prideful 
and sensual forms.  Much like in Niebuhr’s day, the doctrine of sin needs to be reinvigorated and 
reestablished as a foundational way the church interprets the self and society.  The observation of 
sin as a reality is the only view of evil that can properly orient the human towards God and away 
from the perils of pride and sensuality.  Acknowledging sin is the proper positioning of the 
human to God, as the doctrine presumes not only the evil capacities of humankind, but also 
humankind’s capacity for goodness.  “The church,” Niebuhr argues, “is that place in human 
society where men are disturbed by the word of the eternal God, which stands as a judgment 
upon human aspirations.”931  The very last thing a technological society needs, including those in 
the church, is another voice proclaiming its greatness.  Humanity needs no further praise and 
must be warned that the source of its own greatness is also the source of its peril.   
 Furthermore, the doctrine of sin needs to become more firmly established in church 
liturgy—not as some private vice or humorous indulgence—but as a more fully expressed 
anthropology.932  Liturgy is not to be, as James K.A. Smith positions it, a rivaling interpretation 
                                               
931 BTR, P. 62. 
932 While Niebuhr never devoted substantial energy to the topic of liturgy, he did make an argument for a greater 
liturgical focus on sin in his essay, “The English Church: An American View” (in The Spectator Vol. 157, 4 
September 1936, P. 373-374).  Additionally, two recent papers argue for a liturgical emphasis on sin from the 
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of reality, but rather a fuller revelation of reality, even in its darkest chambers.  Liturgy is not 
simply a litany of a church’s highest values, but rather a sober uneasiness about those highest 
values.  “No church,” Niebuhr exclaims, “can lift man out of the partial and finite history in 
which all human life stands.”933  A reinvigorated doctrine and liturgy of sin is necessary as 
humanity grows more powerful, more tempted by power, and more at home with interpretations 
of anthropology that do not think twice about the perils and ironies of that power. 
 Working in accordance with a reinvigorated doctrine and liturgy of sin, understanding 
technology as ambiguous, and regularly critiquing the ambiguities of technology, is a necessary 
position for both the church and society to undertake.  The two greatest mistakes society can 
make right now is either not take seriously enough the perils of technology, or interpret 
technology as a realm of determinative action.  Both illusions lead to false pretensions about the 
freedom and responsibility of human beings.  At the same time, however, society cannot be 
duped into the false assurance that it has the slightest foresight regarding what technology holds 
for tomorrow.  The seemingly innocuous instruments used today could very well be the greatest 
threat to humankind tomorrow; and the greatest technological threats to humankind today could 
provide the structures necessary relative peace tomorrow.  No technological instrument or 
enterprise is as harmless or as harmful, controllable or out of control, as what humans can 
imagine, and it is time to admit this ambiguity in humility.  It is for this reason that the 
anthropological limits that the biblical doctrine of sin sets out are just as instructive today as 
ever—if not more so—as there has never been a time where humanity is in such desperate need 
                                               
Nieburhian-anthropological tradition.  See:  Stephen Platton, “Niebuhr, Liturgy, and Public Theology” in Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Contemporary Politics: God and Power, Richard Harries and Stephen Platten, ed. (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); David Bains, “Conduits of Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr’s Liturgical Thought” in 
American Society of Church History Vol. 73 No. 1 (March 2004). 
933 BTR, P. 62. 
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of both the limiting force of humility and the transcending energies of moral conviction, as 
contradictory as that might seem. 
III: The Way to Move Forward 
 Much of the limitations of this project are directly related to three limitations: 
methodology, dialogical constraints, and time and space.  The first two limitations were foreseen, 
as a narrower approach was needed to establish Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology within the 
technological framework; it can be confidently stated, however, that now this perspective has 
been formulated, the groundwork for both Niebuhr and the concept of technological ambiguity 
can be explored in more methodological frameworks and engage with a wider assortment of 
philosophers and theologians.  The last limitation, namely time and space, however, was 
unforeseen, but provides a clear pathway from here to build. 
 Regarding the first limitation, the methodology of this thesis did not permit a more 
constructive, biblically deduced exposition of the human’s relationship to technology.  While 
such a construction seems possible, the opening steps of a Niebuhrian analysis had to be 
negative, as the prophetic and apologetic methodology more effectively corresponds to his 
argumentation, vocabulary, and dialectical and ethical approach.  However, now that this style is 
established, a more properly systematic, narrative, or virtue-centric approach could be 
constructed, beginning with anthropology and sin, and working towards contemporary culture at 
large. 
 Additionally, the methodology of this thesis did not permit a more historical approach or 
explanation of the technological society.  While some features were hinted in Chapter 8 
regarding the “spirit” and “structure” of the technological society, more work could be done with 
Niebuhr, perhaps as a critical cross-reference, with the history laid out by Mumford.  One 
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particularly clear area of exploration would involve Niebuhr’s critical assessment of the 
Renaissance as a movement that overemphasized the power and uniqueness of humankind 
overlaid with Mumford’s eotechnic phase.  Another could possibly be Niebuhr’s critique of 
Christian mysticism overlaid with Mumford’s assessment of the monastic origins of the clock. 
These are but two further areas that can be explored when analyzing the ideological structure of 
the technological society, all the while holding to a sober understanding of technological 
ambiguity.  
 The second limitation of this thesis that provides a window of further exploration is the 
way in which this thesis constrained itself to two interlocutors.  This was limiting in three ways.  
First, limiting this thesis to Mumford and Marcuse eliminated a potentially fruitful dialogue with 
Jürgen Habermas, in particular.  Habermas, like Mumford, can be viewed as a Soft Instrumental 
theorist who takes technology seriously, but he also hails from the Frankfurt School and attempts 
to construct a theory of technology that synthesizes the two through his theory of communicative 
action.934  The reason he was not chosen as an interlocutor is the same reason he is now a better 
suited interlocutor than when this project started: he in some ways already resolved tensions that 
this thesis sought to resolve, but in a much different way.  Before Habermas could be addressed 
through a Niebuhrian lens, Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology must have first established itself 
from a similar starting point as Habermas.  The same could be said additionally for the work of 
Andrew Feenberg, who played a relatively large part in framing some of the basic language and 
categories of this project.  Like Habermas, Feenberg, too, begins with a similar dialogical 
                                               
934 Feenberg states, “Habermas implies that in its proper sphere technology is neutral, but outside that sphere it 
causes the various social pathologies that are the chief problem of modern societies.  Although his position too is 
powerfully argued, the idea that technology is neutral, even with Habermas’s qualification, is reminiscence of the 
naïve instrumentalism so effectively laid to rest by constructivism.”  See: Feenberg, “Marcuse or Habermas: Two 
Critiques of Technology,” in Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Vol. 39 No. 1 (1996), P. 47. 
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framework regarding Instrumental, Substantive, and Critical Theory, but takes it more into the 
direction of Critical Theory but supplants its Marxism as a resource for political redesign with 
democracy.935 
 The second way this thesis was limited by its interlocutors is that it left much dialogue to 
be had with other Christian authors.  While the prolegomena made clear that scholarship 
regarding a Christian perspective on the neutrality/non-neutrality binary is limited, if not non-
existent, there are many Christian scholars who can occupy a similar space as Mumford and 
Marcuse in that many have excellent critiques of the technological society, but do not allow a 
realist perspective on Christian anthropology to guide that critique and their corresponding 
responses.  Instrumentalist, Derek Schuurman, and neo-Heideggerian Substantivist, Albert 
Borgmann are two thinkers in particular who have excellent critiques of the technological 
society, but lack the realist anthropology to generate realistic or relevant responses to it.  
Additionally, the same could be said for James K.A. Smith, but bending church liturgy towards a 
more in-the-world ethic—as mentioned previously, perhaps as more of a prophetic or revelatory 
liturgy of sin. 
 The third way the number of interlocutors limited this research is that it could not engage 
with more popular and publicly visible thinkers on the subject of technology and anthropology.  
Much could be critiqued regarding the anthropologies of Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, 
especially as they observe the moral landscape in an increasingly technological world.936  Much 
could also be critiqued in the technological presumptions regarding such technological pop 
                                               
935 See: Feenberg, Tranforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2002).  See secondary source: Tyler J. Veak, Democratizing Technology: Andrew Feenberg’s Critical Theory of 
Technology (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).  
936 Both Dawkins and Harris maintain a hyper-naturalistic worldview that provide a precarious foundation upon 
which ethical responsibility and freedom can be established.  See: Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1978) and Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 2011). 
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prophets as Ray Kurzweil and Elon Musk.  The concept of technological ambiguity could be a 
powerful foundation from which to argue against current sentiments regarding both the popular 
scientists and inventors of this age, and their respective influence on ethical responsibility.937 
 The final way this thesis was limited was by time and space.  The primary concern of this 
thesis involved great time and space to situate anthropology in a way that could properly position 
the human in the technological society in a way that allowed for ethical responsibility.  This 
priority made it difficult to include particularities to the subject that otherwise would deserve 
space.  The greatest deficiency of this thesis is clearly the lack of analysis regarding specific 
technologies of today.  Particularly, more research is clearly needed in the way specific 
technologies manifest in history as ambiguous, and the particular ways these technologies are 
abused in the form of human pride and sensuality.  For instance, much more needs researched on 
social media, warfare, how today’s society understands information from news organizations, 
and cutting-edge technology that is bound to expand the anxieties and predicament of the human 
condition: namely, “deep fakes,” “fake news,” artificial intelligence, and the current political 
implications of data mining. 
 All of these limitations provide new avenues through which the content of this thesis can 
be applied to further establish Niebuhr’s Christian anthropology in the current scholarship 
regarding technology and to further elaborate the position of technological ambiguity.  Above 
all, what is needed going forward is a more robust anthropology that can assess ethical 
responsibility in an increasingly technological world.  There is no moment in history that such a 
                                               
937 Both Kurzweil and Musk favor views of technology that lead to the absorption of human freedom into 
technology, leading to the diminishment of ethical responsibility.  See: Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New 
York, NY: Penguin Group, 2005) and Corey Powell, “Elon Musk says we may live in a simulation.  Here’s how we 
might tell if he’s right” in NBC News (3 October 2018). 
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sober understanding of human nature and technology is needed than now, and the hope is that 
current scholarship will accept this language and these concepts more fully. 
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Appendix A 
 Niebuhr brings to this study a well-established and still burgeoning tradition among both 
secular and Christian audiences alike.  His influence upon key thinkers, both in his own day and 
today, is prolific and culminates to create a large base from which to draw, and demonstrates the 
way in which Niebuhr is still relevant to contemporary audiences and concerns. 
 Niebuhr has been called the “greatest [American]-born Protestant theologian since 
Jonathan Edwards,”938 and while Niebuhr had—and continues to have—a pervasive impact 
within theological circles, his wider influence is seen across a broad spectrum of academic and 
public spheres.  On the theological end of the spectrum, thinkers like James Cone, Langdon 
Gilkey, Paul Tillich, and Abraham Heschel have all expressed their respective admiration and 
indebtedness to Niebuhr’s thought.939  On the political side of his influence, politicians Barack 
Obama, John McCain, and Jimmy Carter, historian Arthur Schesinger, Jr., and social 
revolutionary Martin Luther King, Jr., have all praised Niebuhr for his great impact upon society 
and their thought.940  The great political philosopher John Rawls has even been called “Niebuhr’s 
                                               
938 Bob E. Patterson, Reinhold Niebuhr (Peabody, MA, Hendrickson Publishers, 1977), P. 13. 
939In his lecture titled “Reinhold Niebuhr” (The Niebuhr Seminar.  Union Theological Seminary, New York.  18 
November, 2008), James Cone states, “There is no thinker in mainstream America who has influenced…my 
thinking about humanity more than Reinhold Niebuhr.  I feel about Niebuhr the way I feel about Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Malcolm X.”  Concerning Langdon Gilkey, in his book, On Niebuhr: A Theological Study (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001.  P. 15) he states, “[Niebuhr] opened up a new world to me, a new 
understanding of the larger reality around us, of the history in which we lived, and so of the communal life of human 
beings in which we participate.  It was an understanding of our being in the world coram deo, in the presence of God 
that he gave me.”  In his article, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s Doctrine of Knowledge,” Paul Tillich states, “I owe [Niebuhr] 
more for life and thought than I can express in this place” (Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, editors, 
Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, New York, NY: MacMillan Company, 1956. P. 
36). In his article, ”A Hebrew Evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr” (Kegley and Bretall, P. 392), Abraham Heschel 
states, “...the degree to which Niebuhr does influence American thinking is one of the most significant facts of 
contemporary American history….” 
940 In an interview with David Brooks, Barack Obama called Niebuhr one of his “favorite philosophers” (“Obama 
Chapter and Verse,” New York Times, 26 April, 2007. P. 25).  In chapter 5 of his book, Hard Call, John McCain 
writes a lengthy exemplification of Niebuhr claiming he is one who is “astute, eloquent, and persuasive” and a “man 
who understood the paradoxes of war” (New York, NY: Twelve/Hatchette Book Group, 2007.  P. 320-321In his 
“Law Day” address, Jimmy Carter claims Niebuhr as a source for his “understanding about the proper application of 
criminal justice and the system of equity” and paraphrases Niebuhr when he states, “the sad duty of the political 
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successor,” and has been closely linked with Niebuhr in both of their respective methods and 
conclusions, expositing a clear relationship in themes and analyses.941 
 Given Niebuhr’s influence upon contemporary thought, what is most notable so far as 
this study is concerned, is his lasting influence and legacy in the political realm.  It is evident, 
simply by noting those who consider Niebuhr a relevant resource, that he is more than simply a 
thinker to be admired historically, but rather his ideas are relied upon currently in matters of 
public policy, national security, and economic stability at the highest level of political 
discourse—topics that are central to the technological concerns of Marcuse and Mumford.942   
 Niebuhr’s remaining influence in the political realm is significant for this study because 
there is a Niebuhrian language already in use in contemporary discourse that can be deployed 
within varying contexts of public life.  Essentially, there is already a place for the Niebuhrian 
critique of the technological society within scholarship to land, as something of an extension of 
Niebuhr’s influence in the political realm.  Effectively, the goals of this thesis are in no way 
                                               
system is to establish justice in a sinful world” (“A Message on Justice.” Law Day.  Athens, Georgia. 4 May, 1974.  
Jimmy Carter Library. Web. 19 November, 2014: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/law.pdf). Historian 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called Niebuhr  “the most influential American theologian of the 20th century” (Schlesinger, 
“Forgetting Reinhold Niebuhr,” New York Times, 18 September, 2005. P. 1: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/18/books/review/18schlesinger.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).  Martin Luther 
King, Jr. has openly stated numerous times Niebuhr’s influence on his thought.  These references can be found in 
The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Vol 2, ed. Clayborne Carson, Ralph E. Luker, Penny A. Russel, Peter 
Holloran (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994). 
941 In his essay, “Before the Original Position: The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the Young John Rawls” (Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Volume 35, Issue 2, June, 2007. P. 179-206) Eric Gregory shows the influence Niebuhr had upon 
Rawls, especially in his undergraduate thesis: “Niebuhr and Rawls were realist defenders of a liberal tradition that is 
wary of perfectionism in politics, yet tries to sustain hope in the face of injustice. Both chastened metaphysical 
pretension and religious enthusiasm.  Both sought to avoid historicist and relativist conceptions of justice. Both 
criticized appeals to liberty that were not regulated by principles of equality.  Both defended the dignity of human 
persons.  Both expressed concern for the least well-off in a society vulnerable to natural contingencies and 
misfortune.” 
942 Concerning president Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize speech, Tom Heneghan states, “Then came the echoes 
of the man Obama has called one of his favourite thinkers, the 20th century American Protestant theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr.  The whole speech had a tone that American political commentators like to call Niebuhrian, either in its 
phrasing or its tough mix of political realism and moral thinking (“Thoughts on Obama’s Nobel Theology Prize 
speech” Reuters, 10 December, 2009. Web. 15 October 15 2014: 
http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2009/12/10/thoughts-on-obamas-nobel-theology-prize-speech/).” 
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foreign to the goals of the contemporary Niebuhrian scholar of politics or ethics, and indeed are 
an extension of those concerns.  Niebuhrian resources surround the challenges of the 
technological society currently, now one must use these resources to confront technological 
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